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 chapter one 
 
introduction 
 
 
 
Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to 
narrow the range of thought? (George Orwell)1 
 
 
This book has been written in a time of environmental neglect. A time in which the expansive needs 
of multinational corporations, western consumer interests and the politically celebrated ideals of 
economic growth and technological progress appear to override any consideration for preserving 
natural beauty as well as consideration for those unable to speak and negotiate on their own behalf: 
third world citizens, future generations, animals, plants and landscapes. This neglect is evident in 
the withdrawal of national governments from the requirements of international agreements on the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Kyoto treaty), it is manifest in the organised inability and 
unwillingness to establish more equal trade relations between rich and poor countries as well as in 
the lack of political commitment to protect extraordinary sites of natural beauty from economic ex-
ploitation (Alaska, the Amazon rainforests, the Dutch Wadden Sea). In times like these, environ-
mental education is a hazardous and primarily ambiguous enterprise, since it easily comes to 
function as a means to foist present responsibilities onto future generations. Some proponents, for 
instance, argue that environmental education should ‘create a new generation of citizens who are 
greener than their parents’ (Bell, 2004, p. 43). Thus, new born citizens are burdened with environ-
mental responsibilities that we failed to live up to ourselves.  
 This predicament prompts careful reflection on the nature and status of environmental 
education: if environmental education is designed to create ‘green citizens’ and advance a 
‘sustainable development’, how should we judge the prespecified aims of ‘citizenship’ and 
‘sustainable development’? And if environmental education is meant to raise aesthetic appreciation 
and care for the natural environment in our every day behaviour, how do we judge intrinsic value-
claims and ideals of environmental responsibility? These questions will be at the heart of this PhD-
thesis, which is dedicated to examining the ethical and politico-philosophical dimensions of envi-
ronmental responsibility and environmental education. To be more specific, the focus of this study 
will be on the framework of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), which dominates at 
present in all countries who participate in the educational and environmental organisations of the 
United Nations, (who recently declared the upcoming decade of 2005-2015 as the ‘United Nations 
Decade on Education for Sustainable Development’).  
 Some preliminary remarks should be made concerning the scope of this inquiry. To begin 
with, I would like to stress that my focus will be on discourses of environmental education in 
Western Europe and the English speaking world, because the practices of environmental education 
in these countries share a similar predicament, whereas consideration given to practices of environ-
mental education in Africa, Asia or Latin-America would require knowledge of their particular 
                                                      
1 Orwell, G. (1948), p. 46. 
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school systems, curricula and educational traditions. This is not to say that my analysis of the envi-
ronmental crisis and issues of sustainable development will be restricted to the western world. On 
the contrary, the global nature of environmental and developmental problems does not allow for 
such a limited view. Secondly, my primary focus will be on the practice of environmental education 
within formal schooling settings. This means that educational initiatives concerning sustainable 
community building and neighbourhood projects are not the main concern of the philosophical con-
sideration employed here. Again, the reasons for this limitation are to be found in the nature of that 
which is being considered: state-initiated policies of environmental education require politico-phi-
losophical reflection of a different kind than initiatives of social movements and practices of adult 
education. 
If there is anything characteristic of the field of environmental education as a whole, it is the 
rapid succession of ‘programs’ and ‘frameworks’ that all pretend to break with former practices in 
order to make room for a new educational practice. Thus, the succession of ideas on what environ-
mental education is for and about, clearly reflects the evolution of leading institutions and public 
opinion in society at large. Against this background, it is important to examine the history of envi-
ronmental education – including its predecessors and closely related practices – in order to gain in-
sight as to how environmental education became to be what it is at present. The brief history that 
follows is not complete, and comprises only a loose sketch of my view on the genealogy of envi-
ronmental education. As such, the overview is only meant to provide a general background for the 
formulation of my research questions. 
 
A brief history of environmental education 
Ever since human beings began to regard their relationship with the natural world as problematic in 
some way, they have presented this relationship as some kind of educational assignment. Consider, 
for instance, the idealistic educational program of the youth movement, emerging throughout 
Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. Inspired as they were by the spirit of 
naturalistic romanticism, the scouting groups and Wandervögeln organised hiking trips into the 
woods, mountains and countryside to experience the wholesomeness of natural life. Obviously, this 
spirit was articulated much earlier by naturalist educational thinkers, such as Rousseau and Froebel, 
who argued that youthful innocence ought to be shielded from the distorting influences of modern 
society, so that they would learn to recognise nature as their ‘hale arbiter’ and follow their subse-
quent natural destination. But as the industrial revolution and urbanisation gave rise to an 
increasingly rapid expansion of industrial towns, educators felt more and more uncomfortable with 
the ‘depravation’ and ‘alienation from nature’ they saw as inherent to modern city life. Moreover, 
the general state of the cities and their urban poor became a matter of social concern. In order to 
retrieve a ‘sound relationship with nature’, nature education was introduced in most elementary 
schools. This introduction was partly due to the powerful lobby of the educational reform move-
ment, that in similar fashion sought to overcome the alienation from the world inherent to the disci-
plined ‘listening school’. Instead, this movement was ready to welcome ‘full life’ into the class-
room. More specifically, nature education was aimed at teaching children about the ‘amazing se-
crets of natural life’. Natural educators were convinced that studying nature – birds, bees, plants and 
trees – both inside as well as outside of the classroom, would increase love and respect for the 
introduction 
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natural environment. For them, knowing about and caring for nature was considered fundamental to 
the same attitude that was to be cultivated in school2.  
 For a long period of time, nature education of this classical style continued to represent an 
important component of school curricula in Western Europe. However, under the influence of the 
emergent paradigm of scientific and technological progress, school curricula in general acquired a 
more utilitarian, positivist, techno-rationalistic character. Whereas nature education in elementary 
schools largely retained its traditional character – highlighting knowledge through acquaintance and 
life-world experience – this ideological shift implied that the secondary school curriculum gave 
privileged status to an ever more narrowly defined approach of natural phenomena in terms of 
scientific analysis. Within such a curriculum ‘nature’ appears mainly as an object of scientific de-
scription, explanation, prediction and effective utilisation for technological means, rather than as a 
source of admiration, contemplation, personal meaning, narrative and cultural significance – 
responsive dimensions of knowledge that were so directly evoked by the classical type of nature 
education. Thus, the intuitive unity of knowledge and care for nature was pushed to the rear, in fa-
vour of a more positivist approach to natural phenomena, positing quite an instrumental relationship 
to nature (cf. Bonnett 2003, p. 646; Lijmbach, 2004, p. 8).  
 Halfway through the twentieth century, problems of urbanisation and pollution began 
threatening the integrity of the countryside and natural resources – forests, moorlands, wetlands, 
riverbanks and watersheds – in large parts of Western Europe and North America. Public awareness 
of these problems of nature conservation elicited strong educational responses; in the late fifties, the 
conservation movement successfully lobbied for the introduction of Conservation Education as part 
of geography courses taught at secondary and higher educational level, particularly in the English 
speaking world. The aim of Conservation Education was to connect children to their land and natu-
ral environment, not merely by means of knowledge that would convince them of the need for pro-
tection, but also by means of excursions into nature, so that pupils and students were able to 
experience their involvement with the natural environment as a source of aesthetic enjoyment and 
an ‘ever-present power of recuperation’ (Marsden, 1997). In the wake of Conservation Education, 
new educational initiatives found their way into the classroom, under such names as ‘Nature Study’ 
and ‘Outdoor Education’.  
 Haunted by the alarming future scenarios of scientists and environmentalists in general, and 
the Club of Rome (1972) in particular, a growing awareness of the magnitude, seriousness and 
multidimensional nature of the environmental crisis emerged at the beginning of the nineteen 
seventies. Apart from the local problems of conservation, global problems of resource depletion in 
combination with population growth and world hunger, problems of climate change, the extinction 
of species, the unsafe storage of nuclear waste, acidification, ozone layer depletion, dehydration, the 
pollution of air, water and soil and natural degradation all started to attract public attention, albeit 
among a marginal group of progressive minds. Although scientists and environmentalists did not 
agree on all these problems in detail, their common message seemed to be clear: if we do not radi-
cally change our consumer behaviour, common practices and institutions within a short period of 
time, these problems will be aggravated and could ultimately lead to an irreversible situation. 
Newly founded groups of environmental activists, traditional conservation groups, student groups 
and associations of alarmed citizens all acted to mobilise social resistance against those industries, 
                                                      
2 Apart from (translations of) the term ‘nature education’, these school disciplines were sometimes labelled differently, 
like the German ‘Heimatskunde’ and the Dutch ‘heemkunde’. 
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companies and governments that were responsible for these newly identified environmental prob-
lems. At the same time, environmentalists translated public indignation into political claims thus 
striving to put environmental issues on the political agenda. Their analysis of the environmental 
crisis was radical in the sense that they criticised the capitalist organisation of our global market 
economy and questioned the allied ideals of economic growth and technological progress for their 
persistent disregard of its burdens on our natural habitat and depletion of natural resources. 
Moreover, the environmental movement also informed the public about their view on the environ-
mental crisis and started small-scale experiments with solar energy and biological farming in order 
to raise public awareness and support for possible alternatives (Waks, 1996). Thus, an international 
community emerged around the educational initiatives of this movement now predominantly la-
belled ‘environmental education’ and ‘ecological education’. 
 Of great influence during this period was the international field work of an early founder, 
Bill Stapp, who defined the aims of environmental education as ‘producing a citizenry that is 
knowledgeable concerning the biospherical environment and its associated problems, aware of how 
to help solve those problems, and motivated to work towards their solution’ (Stapp, 1969, p. 30). In 
the same spirit of high-flown idealism, the goal of environmental education was defined by the so-
called Belgrade Charter at the International Workshop on Environmental Education (1975): ‘The 
goal of environmental education is: To develop a world population that is aware of, and concerned 
about, the environment and its associated problems, and which has the knowledge, skills, attitudes, 
motivations and commitment to work individually and collectively toward solutions of current 
problems and the prevention of new ones’ (cited in: McKeown & Hopkins, 2003).  
 However, as the International Encyclopaedia of Education (1994) correctly mentions, envi-
ronmental education was of greater interest to individuals and collectives outside of the formal edu-
cation community – environmental activists, conservationists, natural resource managers, econo-
mists, sociologists, anthropologists and political leaders – than to the formal education establish-
ment itself (Husén & Postlethwaite, 1994, p. 1991). This is evident from the fact that it took a long 
time before issues of environmental education were formally included in national curricula. One of 
the characteristics that made environmental education a Fremdkörper among the traditional con-
tents of the formal curriculum, was its instrumental justification and subsequent purpose: as the 
previous quotes demonstrate, the practice of environmental education was not primarily intended to 
contribute to the actualisation of pupil’s developmental potentialities, but designed to change the 
pupil’s behaviour, attitude and mentality in a particular preconceived way, in order to create an en-
vironmentally sound world. In keeping with this advocacy, the aims of environmental education 
were almost exclusively defined in terms of individual dispositions, ranging from more general 
goals, such as ‘creating environmental awareness’, to rather specific objectives, such as the cultiva-
tion of environmental ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’, persuading (future) citizens and consumers to reduce their 
use of energy, to pay attention to the kinds of products they buy, to travel by bus or train instead of 
by car, and so on. 
 More precisely, environmental education was supposed to contribute to the development of 
responsible environmental behaviour, mainly for the larger purpose of enhancing of the quality of 
human life, either stated in survivalist or humanitarian terms. More radical and holistic versions of 
environmental education opted for the protection and maintenance of the global biosphere ‘for its 
own sake’. However, despite the survivalist, humanitarian or holistic language used to express these 
proposals, most initiatives in the field of environmental education insisted on a cognitivist pre-
sumption, namely, the presumption that cognitive understanding and awareness of the environ-
introduction 
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mental problems that threaten our world will result in personal concern for the natural environment 
and responsible action on its behalf. Simultaneously, many educators and researchers at that time 
bemoaned the fact that the relationship between cognitive knowledge and behavioural change was 
not as simple as they first assumed it would be (Husén & Postlethwaite, 1994, p. 1992). 
 Despite the new rhetoric of the nineteen seventies, Lucie Sauvé argues that many initiatives 
in the field of environmental education retained the spirit of naturalistic romanticism and the 
characteristics of nature education. Almost simultaneously, however, she observes the gradual 
emergence of a grass roots environmental education movement that was more problem-oriented, 
socially critical and politically engaged in local community action (Sauvé, 1998). In the Nether-
lands, the field of tension between both ‘spirits’ manifested itself in an ideological conflict between 
proponents of ‘green’ nature education – focussing on personal experience and care for the natural 
life-world – and those in favour of a ‘grey’ environmental education –focussing on raising under-
standing and awareness of the structures of society that have caused and preserved environmental 
degradation, in order to foster the creation of a critical citizenry, prepared to reflect on their own 
consumer behaviour, and motivated to engage in collective action. This tension is discernible in 
other countries as well, and was mainly a conflict between the old-style conservation movement and 
the more radical environmental movement. In the Netherlands, this ideological debate eventually 
diminished into a kind of consensus that ‘nature-and-environmental-education’ (natuur- en milieu-
educatie) – as it was called – should aim at both raising natural care and social awareness. How-
ever, in practice the schism between both orientations remained visible for a long time (Meijer, 
1996; Praamsma, 1993, 1997, p. 19-21, Verschoor, 1997).  
 In the early nineteen eighties, the institutionalisation of organisations and networks for envi-
ronmental education increased, and gradually, environmental education itself became a slightly 
more mainstream phenomenon, although it took until the second half of the nineteen eighties before 
some national governments – among whom the Dutch – took the initiative to first fund and then 
formalise some of the educational practices. Furthermore, contacts with the formal school systems 
were also being strengthened.  
 A major ideological turning point in the history of environmental policy and education was 
marked by the presentation of the United Nations-report Our Common Future (1987) by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) under the supervision of Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, at the UN Conference in Stockholm. In this influential report, an extensive analysis is 
given of the environmental problems that arise due to the tension between the finiteness of the 
earth’s natural resources and the infinite growth of human population and consumption. Thus, 
global environmental issues were analysed in connection with issues of (under)development and 
economic growth. Brundtland and her colleagues stressed that both poverty in the southern part of 
the world as well as excessive and indiscriminate economic growth in the northern part of the world 
have contributed to global environmental damage (Our Common Future, 1991, p. 28). This report 
was of immense importance, firstly because it intitiated a dialogue between environmental activists, 
conservationists, scientists and green politicians and representatives of international business and 
trade – two worlds that until then had failed to interact. It provided a common language that made 
this dialogue possible, namely, the language of sustainable development. The now familiar concept 
of sustainable development was introduced in this report and defined as ‘a development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’ (WCED, 1987, p. 12). As such, the concept was meant to stress the needs of those who are 
neglected by the present economic and political structures: the needs of people living in underde-
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veloped countries and the needs of future generations. Furthermore, the concept underlines that 
consideration for those needs, together with consideration for the earth’s carrying capacity, sets 
limits on our present consumption and exploitation of the earth’s natural resources. The harmful 
consequences of our actions for the well being of people in other places and in the future can no 
longer be ‘externalised’ from the calculations that inform local choice on the use of natural re-
sources. The report went on to insist that social and environmental costs should be weighed by all 
those ‘stakeholders’participating in the pursuit of a sustainable development.  
 Secondly, the Brundtland report was of major importance, because it included the first effort 
to globally unite institutional entities to lay the foundations for a common understanding and ap-
proach to the environmental crisis. Ever since 1987 and throughout the world, sustainable develop-
ment has been regarded as the overarching aim of developmental and environmental policies – in-
cluding environmental education. All UN countries that ratified this treaty are committed to de-
signing their national policies within the framework of sustainable development. It is not surprising 
then, that the term is defined in quite general and abstract terms. Moreover, the definition of sus-
tainable development was meant to have a ‘second-order character’, in order to leave open different 
local ‘interpretations’. The demands of sustainable development should be adapted to local needs 
and circumstances, as articulated in the slogan: ‘Think Global, Act Local’. However, due to its con-
sensual character, the language of sustainable development is notoriously ambiguous. As we will 
see, the ideal of sustainable development pays lip service to those who are committed to sustaining 
natural integrity and environmental quality as well as to those who are mainly concerned with sus-
taining economic growth.  
Michael Bonnett points to the seductive attractiveness of an appeal to sustainable develop-
ment: ‘it brings into harmony two highly attractive but potentially conflicting notions. First, is the 
idea of conserving or preserving those aspects of nature that are currently endangered through de-
pletion, pollution and so forth. Second, is the idea of accommodating ongoing human aspirations to 
develop, that is, in some sense, to have more or better, where this necessarily has implications for 
natural systems’ (cf. Bonnett, 2003, p. 676). Furthermore, the reports on sustainable development 
leave open so many conflicting interpretations on the possibility of reconciling the ideals of (envi-
ronmental) sustainability and (economic) development within a global capitalist free market 
economy that it is hard if not impossible to disagree with its general analysis and guiding principles. 
It therefore comprises a lucky bag of good intentions, everyone can find something in the rhetoric 
of sustainability that suits her taste or conviction – radical environmentalist as well as well as 
modern captains of industry (cf. Bonnett, 2003, p. 681).  
Unfortunately, this wide appeal has been reached at the expense of clarity and practicality. 
At face value, an appeal to the needs of future generations might appear helpful and concrete in 
practice, but as soon as ‘stakeholders’ refer to future needs, they either tend to veil present interests 
in terms of future needs or introduce a highly metaphysical, almost religious, authoritative argument 
that cannot be regarded a proper subject in public discourse. This is because it is not at all clear how 
the needs of future generations can be judged by us presentday contemporaries – as to how we 
should weigh their needs against ours, and how many future generations we should consider in our 
present deliberations. The idea of a sustainable development provides few indications as how to 
settle these questions. As soon as the guiding principles are applied in local practices, ideological 
tensions and oppositions between the different parties emerge when it comes to applying them, 
whereas the principle of sustainable development was supposed to bridge these ideological gaps.  
introduction 
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 It is important to dwell on the language of sustainable development, because ever since its 
major concepts and principles were introduced in 1987, the language has been of growing impor-
tance within the field of environmental education. The Brundtland report itself suggested only in 
general terms that ‘Environmental education should be included in and should run throughout the 
other disciplines of the formal education curriculum at all levels – to foster a sense of responsibility 
for the state of the environment and to teach students how to monitor, protect and improve it. These 
objectives cannot be achieved without the involvement of students in the movement for a better en-
vironment, through such things as nature clubs and special interest groups’ (Our Common Future, 
1987, p. 113). Illustrative of the practical ways in which the ideal of sustainable development in-
spired new educational initiatives, are the lessons in which pupils learned to determine their eco-
logical footprint. After listing their daily consumption of food and consumer goods, their means of 
transport, housing and use of services, pupils measure the total amount of productive land required 
to produce these resources and assimilate its waste products, expressed in amount of hectares (the 
ecological footprint of the average Canadian for instance adds up to 4.8 hectares). Thus, the eco-
logical footprint was presented – and is still used – as a measure of how sustainable our life-styles 
are3. Obviously, the purpose is to stimulate pupils’ reflection on the personal claims they lay on the 
earth’s natural resources, and change their ways in such a manner as to fit within the limits of a 
sound ecological footprint, determined by the limits of the world’s carrying capacity. This approach 
is a clear example of how environmental problems are presented not only as a matter of collective 
responsibility and global institutional reform but as a matter of individual consumer behaviour as 
well. Moreover, the idea emerged that the success of ‘implementation’ of sustainable development 
in education can be measured in terms of personal levels of consumption.  
 Whereas environmental education and sustainable development were only loosely connected 
in the Brundtland report, at the Earth Summit in Rio (1992) participating countries reached 
agreement over a global agenda for future action – the so called Agenda 21 – in which environ-
mental education is more narrowly defined as a ‘tool’ to advance sustainability. Chapter 36 of this 
agenda deals with issues of education and public awareness: ‘Education is critical for promoting 
sustainable development and improving the capacity of the people to address environmental and 
developmental education, the latter needs to be incorporated as an essential part of learning. Both 
formal and non-formal education are indispensable to changing people’s attitudes so that they have 
the capacity to assess and address their sustainable development concerns. It is also critical for 
achieving environmental and ethical awareness, values and attitudes, skills and behaviour, consis-
tent with sustainable development and for effective public participation in decision-making’ 
(Agenda 21, chapter 36.3). Again, the initiatives are regarded as successful or effective insofar as 
they bring about a change of ‘unsustainable’ patterns of production and consumption into more 
‘sustainable’ ones.  
In Agenda 21 there is a key focus on informing consumers about the social and environ-
mental impact of the products they buy, so that they are able to make ‘environmentally informed 
choices’. There are three types of policy instruments at the disposal of national governments to 
promote sustainable patterns of consumption and lifestyles. First, there are legal instruments, simply 
obliging concern for the environment and prohibiting unsustainable behaviour, such as pollution. 
Second, there are economic instruments – environmental charges and taxes, deposit/refund systems 
– to influence consumer behaviour. Third there are the social instruments, which include education 
                                                      
3 Check for instance the website: http://www.sustainabilityed.org/ef.htm 
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and public awareness programs that governments employ to impress on (future) citizens their envi-
ronmental responsibility. ‘Governments and private-sector organisations should promote more 
positive attitudes towards sustainable consumption through education, public awareness programs 
and other means, such as positive advertising of products and services that utilise environmentally 
sound technologies or encourage sustainable production and consumption patterns’ (Agenda 21, 
1992, chapter 4.26).  
 This strategy of a consumer-oriented education can be exemplified by the well-known pro-
ject of Eco-teams, initiated after the Rio Summit but still strongly operative in many countries and 
at present modified for implementation within schools as part of Education for Sustainable 
Development. Eco-teams is an educational programme, designed on the principles of behavioural 
change techniques to support households in their efforts to reduce their use of water, energy and 
waste on a grass-roots neighbourhood level. Eco-team participants – generally made up of six to 
eight households in a particular neighbourhood – gather every now and then to reflect on their co-
nsumption patterns, to develop and revise a plan of action as to how to reduce their use of natural 
resources and to present the measured results, and evaluate, exchange and advise one another4.  
 In the course of the late nineteen nineties, new ‘frameworks’ and programs for environ-
mental education were launched by local and national governments, environmental groups and in-
stitutions dedicated to the service of a general policy of sustainability. These programs were la-
belled Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), Education for Sustainability (ES), Education 
for the Development of Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility, Education for a 
Sustainable Future (ESF), Education for Our Common Future, or simply Sustainability Education 
(SE)5 (cf. McKeown & Hopkins, 2003; Sauvé, 1998, p. 44). As the titles themselves express, these 
educational programs were originally designed to promote ‘sustainable consumption patterns and 
lifestyles’ and strengthen public support for the agenda of sustainable development. As the ESD 
Toolkit mentions: ‘Education is an essential tool for achieving sustainability’ (McKeown, 2002). 
Thus, education is defined as ‘the management of acquisition of knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
values by individuals to enable and empower them for sustainable practices, initiatives and partici-
pation as citizens’ (Education for Sustainable Development in Europe: 1997-1999)6. This is under-
lined by the report of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in 2001:  
 
Agenda 21 recognizes education in all its forms (including public awareness and training) as an es-
sential means for achieving progress towards sustainable development and for the implementation of 
all chapters of the Agenda. Education is no longer seen as an end in itself but rather as a key-in-
strument for bringing about the changes in knowledge, values, behaviour and lifestyles required to 
achieve sustainability’ (Education and public awareness for sustainable development, 2001, p. 2). 
 
In response to this new approach of environmental education as an instrument of behavioural 
change, in the service of a policy of sustainable development, educational researchers criticised its 
presumed instrumental foundation, manipulative nature and normative content. This criticism was 
generally inspired by the liberal idea that education should not be employed in the service of some 
                                                      
4 http://www.ozgreen.org.au/lwlc/eco-team.htm 
5 Simultaneously, Duurzaamheidseducatie (Sustainability Education) was introduced in the Netherlands (followed by 
Leren voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling [Learning for Sustainable Development] en Leren voor Duurzaamheid [Learning 
for Sustainability]) and Bildung für Nachhaltige Entwicklung [Education for Sustainable Development] in Germany. 
6 http://www.hect.nl/hecteducationforsustainabledevelopmentineurope.html 
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particular ideology. According to Bob Jickling – well known for his paper Why I Don’t Want My 
Children To Be Educated for Sustainable Development (1994) – the real problem of these new 
frameworks for environmental education lies in the conceptual construction ‘education for...’. In his 
view, education should not aim for something external to itself. Educators should not be invited to 
prescribe a preferred social end or way of life, but they should support the development of ‘personal 
autonomy’, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘independent judgement’. These educational aims are assumed to 
be formal in character; they do not obtain a particular normative end, but provide the necessary 
competencies for children to choose their own ends. In this view, educators and pupils should al-
ways take a reflexive stance towards their subject. If environmental values of a particular ideologi-
cal kind are firmly imposed on pupils and students, this may preclude the development of rational 
and moral autonomy. In particular liberal philosophers of education disapprove of such a strong 
commitment to predetermined values in environmental education because they fear that risks of 
manipulation, moralism, or even indoctrination lie in wait. They suggest that education should be 
about sustainable development, but not for anything, except for the education of autonomous and 
critical citizens (Jickling, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001; Jickling & Spork, 1998; Lijmbach, 2000, 
p. 48-53; Meijer 1996, 1997; Praamsma, 1993, 1997; Jans & Wildemeersch, 1999). 
 Critics also responded to the external claims made on educational institutions and the heavy 
burden placed on the educational potential to change society. These critics stressed that, sometimes, 
educators should resist external claims to contribute to a predetermined approach of social prob-
lems. By virtue of its own task, purpose and position in society, the field of education should enjoy 
a certain amount of autonomy against the political and economic institutions in society. Educational 
institutions should not sacrifice their primary responsibility and expertise to thoughtless expecta-
tions from the outside. Some critics for instance argue that educators should not simply adopt the 
scientific and technological definitions of environmental problems, presented to them by environ-
mentalists, policy-makers and scientists, because these definitions fail to connect to the life-world 
experience and environmental awareness of their pupils (Bolscho, 1998; Margandant, 1998). 
Moreover, educators are called on to translate social problems in such a way, they connect to the 
purpose and meaning of educational practice. Besides, critics warn of too high expectations for so-
cial change by pointing out those educational practices take place within the same world in which 
the social problems occur. Since these practices share in the identified social problems as well, edu-
cation cannot just ‘exclude’ or ‘remove’ the inequality, injustice and environmental neglect from 
our world. By giving credence to the well-known slogan that ‘education cannot compensate for so-
ciety’, these critics do not shake off the educator’s social responsibility. Moreover, they underline 
their specific task in seeking answers to social problems (Meijer, 1996, 1997; Praamsma, 1997). 
 Furthermore, criticism was raised about the anthropocentrism inherent in the concept of sus-
tainable development. After all, only the needs of (present and future) humans are considered in its 
definition. But even more than the Brundtland report – leaving open the possibility of an intrinsic 
appreciation of nature – Agenda 21 (1992) is about protecting nature on earth for human’s sake: 
nature as a human resource and a condition for human survival (Jickling, 1994; Bolscho, 1998). In 
line with this criticism, some critics discovered an allegiance to the neo-liberal agenda of sustaining 
economic growth and extending the free market economy within the language of sustainable 
development. Shiva suggests that in the present global context, the central concept of ‘development’ 
can hardly escape connotations derived from the capitalist market economy. Thus situated, eco-
nomic development is immediately interpreted as economic growth, which in its turn is equivalent 
to the maximisation of profits and capital accumulation (cited from Bonnett, 2003, p. 680; cf. Bell, 
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2004, p. 46). This interpretation is supported by the ‘twelfth principle’ of sustainability as summa-
rised in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) and rehearsed in the ESD 
Toolkit (2002): ‘Nations should cooperate to promote an open international economic system that 
will lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries. Environmental policies 
should not be used as an unjustifiable means of restricting international trade’ (McKeown, 2002, p. 
9). A similar UNESCO document suggests that Education for Sustainable Development must pro-
mote ‘creative and effective use of human potential and all forms of capital to ensure rapid and 
more equitable economic growth, with minimal impact on the environment" (UNESCO, 1992, p. 3). 
Here, education is first and foremost perceived as a ‘central economic investment for the develop-
ment of creativity, productivity, and competitiveness’ (UNESCO, 1992, p. 14). It is not surprising 
then, that some critics see the concept of sustainable development as ‘nothing more (or less) than a 
neo-colonial concept riding the waves of globalisation’ (cited from: Hesselink, Kempen & Wals, 
2000, p.15). To be more precise, one could argue that the global striving for a sustainable develop-
ment encompasses a recent expression of the neo-colonial strategy to subject third world countries 
to the rules of our global ‘free’ market economy, thus creating new potential markets of consumers 
and cheap labourers, and neutralising political turmoil. Furthermore, the ideal of sustainable 
development is used to conserve nature as a pool of resources to be utilised for a sustained eco-
nomic growth. According to Sauvé, the main problem is that within the conceptual framework of 
sustainable development, the ‘economic sphere’ is viewed as a separate autonomous entity (next to 
the interlinked spheres of ‘society’ and ‘environment’: this triangle is sometimes expressed in terms 
of people, planet and profit). (Sauvé, 1998, 2002) 
 Previous criticism about the close connection between environmental education and 
sustainable development did inspire the proponents of these new frameworks and programs to re-
consider the nature of environmental education and the status of sustainable development. That is, 
many participants in the international debate on environmental education responded to this criticism 
(cf. Hesselink, Kempen & Wals, 2000; McKeown & Hopkins, 2003). However, judged from the 
outside, educational programs – especially those within formal school education – were framed 
even more strictly within the language of sustainable development. Gradually, Education for 
Sustainable Development (ESD) became the leading framework, in such a dominant way that other 
terms are simply ignored or neglected. Those who still choose to speak of ‘environmental educa-
tion’ or ‘nature education’ are either corrected – ESD is the right term – or they are associated with 
an old-fashioned educational practice. In many contexts the term ‘environment’ or ‘environmental’ 
is being replaced by ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’. A discussion about environ-
mental problems beyond the framework of ESD is scarcely possible. Apart from a handful of edu-
cational researchers who persist in their criticism of the framework of sustainable development, the 
mainstream discussion on issues of environmental education takes place within this framework. The 
dominance of the language of ‘sustainability’ has recently been underlined by the UN Commission 
in Education and Communication, declaring the next decade as ‘the United Nations Decade on 
Education for Sustainable Development 2005-2015’ (IUCN, 2004). Meanwhile, Education for Sus-
tainable Development has become an established part of the curriculum in most European and many 
Third World nations, not as a separate discipline, but as a cross-curricular theme or field of learning 
(Bonnett, 2003, p. 675).  
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Education for Sustainable Development: research questions and directions 
The fundamental questions guiding my research are informed by the present debate on the relation-
ship between ‘education’ and ‘sustainable development’. Within this debate, two views can be dis-
cerned. First, there is the positivist view7, dominant in circles of environmental management and 
policy-making, holding that education should be mobilised as a vehicle for the promotion of sus-
tainable knowledge, preferences, attitudes and patterns of behaviour that reflect the requirements of 
SD. According to Elliot, this view is related to the school effectiveness movement, because it pre-
specifies generalised tangible outcomes (referred to by Bonnett, 2003, p. 10). Informed by subject 
experts – mainly natural scientists – it is therefore assumed that environmental educators know 
what sustainability requires and that they impose the required knowledge, values, attitudes and be-
haviour patterns onto those who are assumed to be ignorant on this point, namely the pupils or stu-
dents. Thus, ESD is seen as a rather systematic, technical enterprise of transmission, the success of 
which can be measured in terms of desired consumption levels. Furthermore, as Bonnett outlines, it 
is tacitly assumed that ‘its underlying values are largely economic and unproblematic’, and that ‘the 
implications of SD for the moral/social/political structure of society are basically consistent with the 
status quo. Understood in this way ‘sustainable development’ rapidly converges with ‘common 
sense’ and an instrumental rationality determines the means for achieving a set of taken-for-granted 
ends’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 10). 
 Opposed to this positivist view of ESD is the constructivist view, dominant in educational 
circles, assuming that schools ought to further sustainable development by encouraging ongoing 
pupil exploration and engagement with environmental issues. Here the essence is to develop pupils 
own critical ability and interpretations of issues in the context of firsthand practical situations that 
they confront. This ‘action competence approach’ is more consistent with the ‘school development 
movement’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 10). Rather than adhering to a firm ideology or fixed end, proponents 
of this view see sustainable development as an ‘agenda’ or ‘conceptual vocabulary’ which makes 
discussion possible among the disparate stakeholders of sustainable development in local practices. 
The content and requirements of sustainable development are never fixed, but locally defined by the 
consumers, producers, politicians, environmentalists and other participants who deal with local 
problems in search of a common ground. Thus, the effort to achieve sustainable development can be 
characterised as a continuous dialogue and social learning process, in which social-cultural, eco-
logical and economic interests are weighed against the background of particular local practices and 
problems. There is no preconceived balance between the interests of ‘people, planet and profit’, but 
this balance is constructed through ‘learning by doing and doing by learning’. In such a process of 
social learning, pupils are now appealed to as consumers or holiday makers, then as family-mem-
bers, traffic participants, employees or neighbours, so that they learn to cope with various roles and 
interests (cf. Stuurgroep Leren voor Duurzaamheid, 2003; Hesselink, Kempen & Wals, 2000). 
 The questions guiding my research concern two fundamental controversies between the 
positivist and constructivist view on ESD. First of all, there is the issue of intergenerational citizen-
ship, secondly, the issue of natural value and care. To start with the first: inherent to the framework 
of ESD is the imperative idea that we should imagine ourselves as citizens of a world community 
stretching out over several generations with whom we are to share the natural resources that are 
                                                      
7 The terms ‘positivist’ and ‘constructivist’ view are drawn from Hesselink, Kempen and Wals (2000, p. 41). More or 
less similar distinctions are made by Bonnett, who chooses to label them respectively as the ‘environmentalist’ and 
‘democratic approach’ of environmental education, and those who distinguish between ‘weak’ and ‘strong 
sustainability’ (cf. Bell, 2004, p. 42).  
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conditional on our survival and well-being. This ideal of intergenerational citizenship requires us to 
reconsider our present use and exploitation of natural resources, measured against the standards 
provided by hypothetical claims of future people; those unknown people with whom we do not 
share and will not share a common life. Differences between the positivists and constructivist view 
on ESD are partly due to a disagreement on the question as to how citizens are to consider the hy-
pothetical needs and interests of future generations. According to the positivist view it is possible to 
prespecify the basic needs of future people and delineate the demands on our patterns of consump-
tion and production in terms of measurable outcomes. Thus, the exact limits of our ‘ecological foot-
prints’ can be settled in accordance with a distributive principle of justice. These requirements on 
our behaviour – which will be minimal in effect – should be transmitted onto new generations of 
citizens within educational settings, so that they learn to justify their behaviour against these settled 
standards and comply with the sustainable codes of conduct. Here, education is regarded as a mere 
instrument, employed to achieve behaviour change in accordance with settled, external ends. In this 
view, the determination of educational ends is the prerogative of natural scientists and experts (Bell, 
2004; Bonnett, 2003, p. 699). 
 Whereas the positivist view relies on a definition of sustainable development provided by a 
regime of scientists and experts, the constructivist view on ESD relies on local practices of 
deliberation, as previously outlined. In this view, the content and requirements of sustainable 
development are to be defined by local stakeholders, participating in a collective search for local 
answers to environmental problems. As such, sustainable development is part of a learning process, 
in a broad social as well as an educational sense. Rather than a complex of passive entitlements and 
some heavily circumscribed duties, citizenship implies an active responsibility for common affairs 
and requires us to participate in public life. However, what is unclear are the means the construc-
tivists use to judge the hypothetical claims of future generations. Are these claims only to be judged 
as general appeals to our future responsibility, or does the agenda of sustainable development still 
prespecify particular outcomes, albeit in more general terms?  
 Thus, a sharp opposition becomes evident between the positivist view – prescribing an ulti-
mately minimal, though substantive morality of sustainable development – and the constructivist 
view – offering a broad agenda, though without responsibilities. Within the liberal framework of 
ESD, debates on the nature of environmental education are generally trapped in an ideal-typical 
opposition between two extreme practices. One extreme leads to a wishy-washy domestication of 
environmentalism – treating ecological values and standards as mere lifestyle options – the other 
ends in practices of indoctrination – imposing sustainable development as a firm ideology upon 
(future) citizens. In my view, this unfruitful trap is due to the fact that both views take the well 
being, needs and rights of future generations as the primary object of our responsibility as citizens. 
In the next chapter, these intricacies of an intergenerational understanding of the political commu-
nity will be explored, and the outlines of an alternative, neo-republican understanding of future 
responsibility and environmental citizenship will be developed. 
 Positivists and constructivists within the field of ESD furthermore disagree on the issue of 
natural value and care. At face value, the framework of ESD appears to be of a rather anthropocen-
tric nature. The principle of sustainable development requires us to reflect on our involvement with 
the natural environment in economic terms. After all, the language of sustainable development is 
about ‘human resources’, ‘economic development’ and ‘satisfying needs’. Thus, our relationship 
with nature is narrowly understood as a relation between consumer and commodity. The funda-
mental awareness that nature might be valuable and good for its own sake, independent of our use, 
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consumption and exploitation – an awareness of intrinsic natural value – is excluded from the dis-
course on the environmental crisis as an economic problem of resource-management and -distribu-
tion. However, by taking sustainable development as the predetermined end of ESD, only the posi-
tivist view commits itself to the literal definition of SD, as outlined in the Brundtland report – Our 
Common Future (1987) – and Agenda 21 (1992). Many proponents of the constructivist view are 
not comfortable with this anthropocentric reading of the framework of ESD. And indeed, due to its 
consensual nature, there are indications in official (E)SD-documents that allow for a less narrow 
economic interpretation, leaving room for considerations of intrinsic natural value. According to 
some constructivists, the framework of ESD is compatible with an ecocentric approach of the en-
vironmental crisis. Others even argue that ESD is more ‘critical of the predominant market and con-
sumption driven society’ and ‘more open to new ways of thinking and doing’ than the old-style en-
vironmental education (Hesselink, Kempen & Wals, 2000, p. 15).  
 In order to distance themselves from the narrow anthropocentric interpretations, some con-
structivists deliberately avoid the term SD, and choose to speak of ‘education for a sustainable fu-
ture’, ‘education for a sustainable society’ or simply ‘education for sustainability’. Definitions of 
these frameworks of sustainability are similar but slightly different from the definition of ESD. 
However, it is doubtful whether these dissidents in the ESD camp will be able to maintain their al-
ternative understanding of sustainability against a vast majority of readers who will immediately 
associate sustainability with ‘sustainable development’ and its most influential expressions in 
Brundtland’s Our Common Future (1987) and Agenda 21 (1992).  
 Behind this word play hides the fundamental issue whether we humans are able to escape an 
instrumental valuation of nature. If one insists that the value of nature is intrinsic to nature, like 
constructivists assume, how can human evaluators experience this value without ‘using’ nature 
somehow as a resource for meaning or source of appropriation? And if one argues, like some posi-
tivists do, that natural value is no more than a label attributed by human evaluators, how can this 
value be seen as intrinsic to nature? ESD debates on the intrinsic value of nature are anything but 
clear on this point. In itself this vagueness would not be a major problem, if it were not of funda-
mental importance for our understanding of environmental responsibility. Intrinsic value claims can 
be understood as expressions of responsibility; by expressing the things in life we really care for, 
we commit ourselves to preservation of its meaning and pursuit of its goodness  
 What positivist and constructivist views on ESD have in common is their tendency to look 
for an answer to the issue of intrinsicallity and responsibility somewhere in the opposition of nature 
and its human evaluators, that is, between human subject and natural object. In chapter three, more 
detailed meta-ethical study will show that both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of natural value 
ignore the social nature of valuation. The judgements in which we assume responsibility for our 
natural environment are part of intersubjective practices of care for our natural environment. In line 
with this insight, I will argue that environmental education requires initiation into collective prac-
tices within which our caring involvement with the natural environment is preserved. Children 
gradually assume responsibility, not by practicing skills of personal choice, but through involve-
ment in collective deliberation and action. Furthermore, I will characterise the nature and scope of 
environmental responsibility in close connection to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological study of 
humans’ bodily involvement with the natural environment as displayed in our everyday perception 
and care for the things in our life-world. 
  These studies on the nature of future responsibility and responsibility for our natural life-
world are not only meant to result in profound criticism on the framework of Education for 
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Sustainable Development. The conclusions are also meant to inform an alternative perspective on 
environmental education. In the last chapter this perspective will be presented, implying an alterna-
tive understanding of environmental sensibilility, responsibility and knowledge of environmental 
issues. Furthermore, I will illustrate my perspective in a proposal for an alternative framework and 
program for environmnetal education, to be called Education for Environmental Responsibility.  
 The general aims underpinning this research are modest and mainly of a descriptive kind. 
My purpose is to describe the guiding concepts and conceptual relationships within ESD, to reveal 
the inherent tensions, contradictions and practical implications within its language and dwell on 
some of the underlying philosophical issues concerning future responsibility, intrinsic natural value 
and care. However, despite my commitment to ‘descriptivism’ in this broad sense, I do not think 
that any author can describe a social practice without simultaneously expressing a particular en-
gagement with the practice described. By presenting a particular picture of reality, philosophers do 
open up new spaces and possibilities for action. Thus, the practical purpose of this philosophical 
investigation should be understood in this light. As my descriptive analysis proceeds, I hope to re-
veal the strengths and weaknesses of the present understanding of environmental education within 
the framework of ESD, while simultaneously suggesting possibilities for an alternative under-
standing. Particularly, in the last section of this book (3.4) I will present an alternative framework 
for environmental education: an education for environmental responsibility. 
  This research is mainly dedicated to a philosophical enquiry into the language of environ-
mental responsibility and education, conducted in line with the ordinary language philosophy, as 
presented by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations (1953), and exemplified by Peter 
Winch in The Idea of a Social Science (1958). However, when I speak of ‘nature’, ‘future’ or ‘edu-
cation’ my concern is not limited to what people say and write about ‘nature’, ‘future’ or ‘educa-
tion’. Such a limitation would imply an unnecessary nominalist reduction of our experience of 
reality to linguistic experience. Indeed, my concern is with the nature that moves me, with the 
future that appeals to me or frightens me, and with the education that we practice and experience in 
everyday life. But these existential ‘objects’ of experience are only meaningful to us insofar as they 
are able to be articulated in a common language – not necessarily a language of spoken or written 
words, but more broadly understood as a common horizon of symbols and references, in which 
people express and share meanings with one another (such as in the various ways we also express 
ourselves using body language, facial expression and sign language). Therefore, an enquiry of the 
meaning of nature, future and education is necessarily an enquiry of the expression of nature, future 
and education in human behaviour and action. We cannot get behind these concepts, straight to ‘the 
phenomena themselves’, since our reference to these experiences is always mediated through lan-
guage.  
 The language we are analysing is not taken to represent an external reality. Our concepts of 
‘nature’, ‘future’ and ‘education’ do not correspond to the things itself ‘out there in the real world’. 
Rather, language and reality are co-emergent (gleichursprünglich), as Wittgenstein articulates in his 
proposition that an agreement in judgement is necessarily also a judgement in form of life (Wittgen-
stein, 1958, proposition 241). This does not mean that there is nothing outside our language, but it 
does mean that the ‘things out there’ – the sheer existence of things and our reactive responses to 
them – have to be expressed in a common language in order to be significant, in order to have a 
meaning and place in our world. Without expression, the sheer thereness of things remains unintel-
ligible and diffuse in such a way that it cannot be grasped in our mind. Subsequently, by expressing 
what ‘nature’, ‘future’ or ‘education’ means to us, we inescapably render ourselves susceptible to 
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responsive claims of others, who make sense of what we say and do according to the rules of 
meaningful behaviour that operate within the particular practice in which we find ourselves.  
 I would like to discuss my understanding and use of the concept of nature to be more precise 
about the implications this epistemological framework will have for the aims of my research. While 
I develop my own tentative definition of nature in chapter three, such an exercise will necessarily be 
disappointing, since no definition of nature is adequate enough to cover its full and deep meaning 
and presence in human life. Any definition highlights only one particular aspect, or perhaps a few 
aspects, but the full meaning of nature remains elusive. Nature in this metaphysical sense apparently 
transcends our language, and as further analysis will show, our language transcends individual 
preferences. It is not necessary to go deeper into this ‘double transcendence’ here, since this com-
plex issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter three. But by insisting on this transcendence I 
would like to stress that my rejection of the idea of representative language does not imply that any 
concept of nature is just a linguistic construction. On the contrary, there is always more to nature 
than we express in our words and display in our behaviour. There is, as it were, a transcendent sur-
plus of meaning. Consequently, there is always more to nature than philosophers are able to recon-
struct in terms of concepts and conceptual schemes. As any concept of nature, my concept of nature 
is an expression that is necessarily one-sided, but it is nevertheless capable of evoking a fuller 
meaning than allowed for in our present use of the concept. The transcendent surplus of meaning 
cannot be represented nor referred to in our concepts, but evocative language can remind us of this 
surplus. Not only the evocative language of the poet or philosopher, but ordinary language as well: 
when I speak of ‘the sky’, many connotations and personal meanings will resonate with the word 
that cannot be conceptually analysed such as meanings that have to do with the experience of 
infinity and human triviality, the aesthetic fulfilment we find in its beauty, personal memories of the 
nights when I have slept under a starry sky, and so on.  
 Just like our concept of time, our concept of nature might be labelled as a ‘reminder’ in the 
sense that Wittgenstein borrows from Augustine: ‘something that we know when no one asks us, 
but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it [cf. Augustine], is something we 
need to remind ourselves of’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, no. 89). This means that we can either embrace 
nature or speak about it. The words we use to express nature remind us of something, but this 
‘something’ exceeds our ability to express it. In its inexhaustible fullness and elusive complexity 
the essential reality of nature remains unspeakable to us, and therefore, incommunicable. However, 
if we assume that there is nature beyond our language in this particular sense, what is the awkward 
status of this ‘nature’? A tentative answer to this question can be found in Wittgenstein’s notion of 
the ‘form of life’ as the inescapable horizon of certainties against the background of which we act. 
These are foundational certainties like our experience of gravity and the experience of colours, 
comprising the very substratum of our human existence. In our action we anticipate natural things 
contrafacticly. We do not dispute the existence of the particular tree that we find on our path from A 
to B, but we simply walk around the tree. If we nevertheless choose to express in words ‘I walk 
around the tree’ then this assertion should be understood as an expression of a foundational belief in 
our coexistence with the natural things that our senses present to us. Ergo, whereas we cannot le-
gitimately deny nor confirm ‘the reality of the tree’ in a philosophical sense, at the level of everyday 
practical experience, we might insist that our behaviour in this particular situation would be com-
pletely insignificant unless we assume that there is a tree. In this sense, there might be a shared 
reference outside of language but we cannot articulate it. It is not the referent – nature itself – but 
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the shared practice of referring to nature that functions as the ultimate warrant for the coherence of 
meaning of the word ‘nature’.  
 So much for the social background, questions, epistemology and ambitions of my 
philosophical inquiry. Let us now turn to the heart of the inquiry itself: the issue of responsibility 
for our future world. 
 
 chapter two 
 
because we are citizens 
 
 
 
Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in 
every child, education must be conservative  
(Hannah Arendt)8 
 
 
Despite all the controversy about what environmental education ought to be for and about, the par-
ticipants in public discourse on environmental education would agree that it should prepare children 
for the practice of environmental citizenship. And despite what this practice implies, the partici-
pants would also agree that environmental citizenship involves responsibilities for presentday as 
well as future generations. They recognise the imperative of responding to future needs. We cannot 
remain indifferent to the demands that future people make on us, here and now, by virtue of the fact 
that they will inherit the world we leave behind for them. Our sense of justice tells us we ought to 
consider the implications and consequences of our present behaviour for the quality of future life on 
this globe. Just as our ancestors consciously contributed to the world we live in, we should 
contribute to a liveable world for posterity. This moral ideal corresponds closely to our common 
sense intuitions. In slogans and phrases used by political parties, for instance, future generations or 
‘our great-grand children’ are often appealed to as an incentive for change. Furthermore, there is the 
old saying that ‘we do not inherit the earth from our parents, we borrow it from our children’. And 
the biblical metaphor of ‘stewardship’ contains a clear notion of responsibility stretching out over 
several succeeding generations. But perhaps the most influential articulation of intergenerational 
responsibility is offered by the international key-concept of ‘sustainable development’, defining ‘a 
development that meets the needs of the present without comprising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs’ (Our Common Future, 1987). 
 When environmentalists, scientists and politicians speak on behalf of future generations they 
refer not only to our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, but all those unknown people 
who will live in the future, centuries from now. People about whose probable existence we can 
surmise, even though we cannot be sure. Obviously, the scope of our responsibility follows from 
the magnitude and widening radius of our actions. We can no longer stick to our initial 
responsibility for immediate descendants whom we care about, since, within the present context of 
rapid economic and scientific development, our personal consumption and use of technology will 
have an impact on the world and well-being of people who will live centuries from now. It is ques-
tionable, for instance, whether our present use of nuclear energy is consistent with an imperative of 
intergenerational responsibility, for, as long as scientists cannot guarantee safe and sustainable 
storage of nuclear waste, we consciously take huge risks for future generations who may suffer 
from leakage. The same can be argued with regard to the poisonous waste we produce and that will 
maintain its devastating effects on human health for thousands of years, or the uncertain effects of 
                                                      
8 Arendt, 1958b, p. 510. 
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genetic engineering on the ‘health’ of our ecosystem in the long run. Whereas the consequences of 
human behaviour used to be confined to a surveyable distance in time and space, right now the in-
tended and unintended effects of our behaviour stretch into the indefinite future with a magnitude 
that seems unprecedented. Therefore, we find ourselves in a position of increasing responsibility 
and uncertainty at the same time. We are called on to enter into a hypothetical dialogue with future 
strangers, since we have unintentionally entered their threshold and knocked on their door. Obvi-
ously, an adequate account of environmental citizenship has to respond to these changing conditions 
of human responsibility.  
 A shared commitment to an ethic of intergenerational responsibility seems to provide 
environmental educators with a strong incentive for environmental citizenship, but their common 
ground is weak and superficial, rather than firmly principled and circumscribed. As soon as we pose 
the question on what grounds and how we should consider future needs or include the ‘voice’ of 
future generations in our civil practices, we leave this common ground. There are many different 
views on the nature and ethical implications of our relationship with future generations. What kind 
of relationship with future people commits us to act in their behalf? What in this relationship in-
spires us to take up responsibility? What do these responsibilities consist of and how far do they 
reach? In this chapter I want to explore three possible views on this issue of intergenerational re-
sponsibility and citizenship.  
 In section 2.1 I will present the standard liberal view underlying the dominant understanding 
of the framework of sustainable development, that requires us to regard future generations as hy-
pothetical fellow citizens. According to this view, we should represent the needs of future genera-
tions in public discourse by acting as if they were present. Or more specifically, we are supposed to 
judge and act in line with an intergenerational contract of distributive justice that can count on the 
hypothetical consent of future generations. Thus, our community of justice is being extended into 
the indefinite future, and the rights of contemporaries are, in principle, equally important as the 
conditional rights of future citizens. In this way liberal contractualists have a strong case for inter-
generational justice. However, as I will argue, a principle of intergenerational justice cannot be jus-
tified within the liberal framework it presupposes because future generations are beyond the reach 
of our reciprocal relationships (in the narrow sense). Besides, it is unclear how such an abstract 
principle of intergenerational justice should motivate us to take up responsibility for the well-being 
of future generations.  
 My identification of fundamental flaws within the liberal view will lead us to explore the 
communitarian view on intergenerational responsibility in section 2.2. Communitarian ethicists 
suggest that we should treat future generations as heirs of our moral community. We are called on 
to contribute to their ‘good’ since future members of our community share our ideals and concep-
tions of the good life. After our death, they will continue the practices and projects we cared for and 
invested in during our life. Without trusting that future generations will carry on our traditions and 
pursue our ideals in the future, our life here and now would hardly be worth living. Thus, our rela-
tionship with future generations is understood and experienced in terms of extended community 
ties. Such an extension makes it possible to make obligations to posterity derived from the com-
mitment and solidarity expected within the present community. Although the communitarian view 
offers an adequate answer to the problem of motivation, the responsibilities that it gives rise to re-
main limited to members of the community. Though, I will argue this view rests on an inadequate 
and outmoded picture of society. 
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 In section 2.3 I will argue that the fundamental flaws of the liberal view, together with the 
shortcomings of the communitarian view force us to adopt an alternative understanding of future 
generations as imagined strangers. Although I draw on different sources, I will call this a neo-re-
publican view of intergenerational responsibility. Within this view the main focus shifts from the 
alleged needs, wants and rights of future generations to our present desires, expectations and imagi-
nation of the future world that bind us together here and now. We do not know about people in the 
future, nor their needs and wants. Therefore, every judgement on our part as to what kind of world 
people in the future will like, what ‘resources’ they will need to survive and what ‘goods’ will make 
their life worthwhile, reflects what we like and what we think ‘worthwhile’ and ‘good’ in our pre-
sent world. Every attempt to include the rights, needs or goods of future citizens throws us back 
upon our own devices as to what we value as ‘necessary’, ‘liveable’, ‘inalienable’ or ‘dignified’. 
This does not mean that we do not have to consider the existence of future generations. On the con-
trary, we should imagine what kind of world we wish them to live in, rather than calculating what 
the interests of its inhabitants could possibly be.  
 As I will argue, this kind of future responsibility does not arise from moral lessons but will 
emerge in the process of public debate and participation in the civil society itself. Therefore, envi-
ronmental education should consist of an introduction in the practices of this civil society, its de-
bates on the environmental crisis and its collective efforts to conserve what we care for. In section 
2.4 I will show that such an introduction and participation will ideally leave open our future to those 
who are new in this world. At the same time, guided participation will have to endow them with a 
basic trust in the indeterminate future. Such an open time horizon is of fundamental importance 
since it is requisite to the very possibility of education in general and of environmental education in 
particular.  
  
Some preliminary remarks should be made before we turn to the philosophical investigation of fu-
ture responsibility. First of all, one should be cognizant of the fact that the three perspectives on 
future responsibility and citizenship that will be distinguished in this chapter are expressions of 
ideas rather than practices. Liberalism, communitarianism and neo-republicanism represent more or 
less clearly distinguished schools of thought in contemporary political philosophy, but these 
positions are rarely if ever to be found in pure form within contemporary political practice. On the 
contrary, most practices of citizenship throughout the world bear traces of all three schools of 
thought. An acknowledgement of the fact that the basic system of rights and duties in most western 
countries reflects the liberal contract doctrine does not deny that the way in which communities ex-
press themselves alludes to the ideals of communitarianism, nor that the public culture of debate 
and protest is inspired by neo-republican thinking. These practices of citizenship coexist within 
post-modern society, nor are they mutually exclusive in all respects, even within political philo-
sophy. There may be some issues on which the positions of these three perspectives diverge, but on 
other issues they converge and overlap. Moreover, liberalism, communitarianism and neo-republi-
canism are distinguished in terms of the paradigmatical issues they address and the emphasis they 
place on particular practices, rather than on their formal principles or framework of reference. 
While liberals ask themselves what a state could possibly demand of its citizens, and vice versa, 
what its citizens can demand of the state, communitarian critics are mainly concerned with the pro-
blem of how to assure the continued existence of their moral community. Neo-republican theorists, 
on the contrary, are interested in the question of how citizens act collectively in response to collec-
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tive problems and thereby shape their lives, i.e how they appeal to one another’s responsibility in 
virtue of their being citizens.  
 When I use the terms ‘liberalism’ or ‘liberal morality’, I refer to the dominant framework of 
contractual liberalism, as articulated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971; and the revised 
edition of 1999) and Political Liberalism (1993). My discussion of the communitarian view on fu-
ture responsibility focuses largely on the theory developed by Avner de-Shalit in his book Why 
Posterity Matters (1995) and some papers of early precursors like Martin Golding. My selection of 
these representatives is arbitrary but not coincidental; Rawls and de-Shalit were simply the authors 
who I frequently encountered in the current discourse on future responsibility and recognised as 
interesting and influential spokesmen. My use of the term ‘neo-republicanism’ has a slightly diffe-
rent background, primarily because there is not a well-defined theory of future responsibility avai-
lable within this school of thought. In the second place, I chose to draw from the ideas and argu-
ments of neo-republican thinkers like Hannah Arendt and advocates of a radical democracy like 
Chantal Mouffe in order to formulate my own perspective on the issue of future responsibility that 
copes with the weaknesses of the other two perspectives and aims to transcend the opposition bet-
ween ‘formal’ liberalism and ‘substantive’ communitarianism.  
 My final remarks amount to the inadequacy of speaking in terms of the communitarian or 
the liberal position. Obviously, both schools of thought harbour many different classes and subclas-
ses that allow for divergent perspectives on the issue of future responsibility that all carry the predi-
cate ‘liberal’ or ‘communitarian’. As will become clear, there are even different positions within the 
Rawlsian liberal framework. Partly due to the fact that Rawls expressed his idea in rather formal 
terms, many interpreters have applied his principles and insights in a practical way that moves 
beyond the formal setting and scope of his initial theory. As such, Rawls’ theory of justice has en-
gendered an interpretative discourse that might be at odds with his initial purposes in some respects. 
However, it is not my prime ambition to do justice to the purposes that Rawls had in mind when he 
defined his theory, but it is the Rawlsian framework that is my main object of concern. In my dis-
cussion of all three strands of thought, I will give internal as well as external criticism. Within the 
context of the latter, I will criticise both Rawls and de-Shalit in terms of the social practices to 
which their theoretical concepts give rise. For instance, I will argue that the application of the libe-
ral distinction between private and public concerns is likely to privilege those consumerist lifestyles 
and conceptions of the good life that are consonant with the culture of free market exchange. Per-
haps this implication is not in line with Rawls’ purposes nor with the ideas of his interpreters, and 
obviously, it is not a logically necessary implication of the Rawlsian framework. However, argu-
ments of a more contingent-empirical nature allow me to argue that the application of liberal con-
cepts and principles in practice tend to work out in this or that particular way (that might indeed 
stand in sharp contrast to the purposes of their spokesmen). When it comes to this, my criticism is 
of a social rather than a logical kind. These preliminary remarks are largely reminiscent of the well-
known Wittgensteinian point that a rule or principle does not carry within itself the means of its ap-
plication. The application of a theory of responsibility in a particular intergenerational context 
brings along a particular cultural praxis, and together with this, all the contingencies that give 
meaning to who we think we are and what we should do in the face of an open and infinite future.  
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2.1 Future generations as fellow citizens 
 
In the vast majority of democratic states throughout the modern world the relationship between citi-
zen and state is governed by a so-called ‘liberal contract’, defining the basic rights and duties of 
both parties. These contracts start from the basic assumption that in modern pluralistic society there 
is no common view on what makes life worth living. Moreover, liberal thinkers argue that there is 
no rational way – no publicly specifiable principle or form of reasoning – that could determine the 
truth, goodness or beauty of one conception of the good life above the truth, goodness or beauty of 
the others. According to liberal theory, individual citizens should be able to make up their own 
mind in moral, ideological and religious matters. In line with the etymology of the word autonomy 
– comprised of autos (self) and nomos (law) – citizens should judge in accordance with a self-cho-
sen moral law. This conviction leads liberal thinkers to argue in favour of a contract that guarantees 
the inalienable right of all citizens to develop their own conception of the good and to live accor-
ding to their own life-plan, safeguarded from immediate state control or interference. Therefore, the 
liberal state in general, and the school as one of its institutions, should not promote a particular 
morality or conception of the good. Yet, the liberal state does not have to remain neutral to all moral 
dilemmas in society. In contrast to its neutrality regarding first-order conceptions of the good, the 
liberal state is morally bound to promote and protect liberal second-order values: those values, 
strictly necessary to guarantee democracy and personal freedom, such as tolerance, respect for di-
versity, non-violence and open-mindedness. Liberal morality, comprised of these second-order va-
lues, does not compete with the manifold (first order) conceptions of the good, but supports this 
moral and ideological diversity. In fact, liberal morality is conditional on this diversity; it encom-
passes the necessary conditions for freedom of consciousness, thought and speech (cf. De Jong, 
1998).  
 Of fundamental importance for the liberal understanding of personal autonomy, politics and 
public morality is the sharp distinction between the private and public sphere. As previously 
suggested, the private sphere is celebrated as the primary space where people are presumed to find 
ultimate life fulfilment by living according to their own device, taste, religion or view on life in ‘the 
pursuit of happiness’. This ‘conception of the good life’ that people enjoy and practice within the 
private sphere is generally taken to imply substantive values, tastes and opinions on what makes our 
life worth living, identifications to the communities and movements we feel ourselves bound to, 
opinions on environmental issues, ideas on what the ultimate meaning of nature consists of and 
what kind of involvement with the natural environment we would like to pass on to our children. As 
such, the private sphere is the space that gives room for ideological diversity (within ‘reasonable’ 
assumed limits). In fact, the private sphere is understood as a pre-political space; the arrangements, 
relationships and values of family, neighbourhood, profession and community are seen as given, 
that is, beyond the scope of political interest. The only limitation to this freedom in the private 
sphere is imposed by the freedom of others. Ergo, in order to coördinate the maximisation of every-
one’s private freedom, some public arrangements have to be agreed upon and settled in a contract. 
The central institution that regulates and supervises the compliance with theses regulations is the 
state. Now, the public space is negatively defined as the non-private space, or put in positive terms, 
the space that is marked by the relationship between citizens and state. Political action and debate 
within this space is supposed to take place within the boundaries of ‘public reason’. This means that 
citizens are required to express their interests and opinions in terms of arguments that do not origi-
nate from and are therefore independent of their particular conception of the good life. In principle 
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those reasons should be acceptable by all citizens on ‘reasonable grounds’, regardless of their pri-
vate background. This assumption of ideological independence of public and private sphere is of 
fundamental importance to safeguard state neutrality. Moreover, the belief in a non-ideological 
space is a constituent part of the standard-liberal understanding of state neutrality, that is, the state is 
required to justify its action and interventions without reference to an ideological or religious doc-
trine. 
 Environmental policy in general and environmental education in particular, do promote a 
particular morality. After all, with environmental education governments aim at a change of menta-
lity and behaviour, in public as well as in private life; they seek to persuade citizens to reduce their 
use of energy, to pay attention to the kinds of products they buy, to travel by bus or train instead of 
by car, and so on. Therewith, environmental education distinguishes between more and less ‘sustai-
nable’ lifestyles and conceptions of the good. Based on this normative distinction both state and 
school interfere with the choices people make within their private sphere. By doing this, govern-
ments inevitably value one conception of the good life above the other. These policies therefore 
seem to conflict with the normative requirements of liberal democracy unless the environmental 
values at hand can be justified within the framework of liberal morality itself; for then the promo-
tion of environmental morality should, on the contrary, be regarded as a core responsibility of the 
liberal state, and hence, of liberal education. If, on the other hand, environmental values cannot be 
justified in a liberal way, then environmental morality has to be regarded as a private conception of 
the good, and, consequently, environmental education would represent an illegitimate form of state 
paternalism. So, according to liberal morality, the legitimacy of environmental education depends 
on the question whether its morality should be identified as a particular conception of the good life 
or as a necessary part of every liberal contract (cf. Bell, 2004, p. 39)9.  
 Thus, the liberal state finds itself caught in a double bind. For, on the one hand, a normative 
form of environmental education seems necessary if the seriousness and urgency of environmental 
concerns are taken into account. On the other hand, however, normative interference seems 
undesirable, for reasons of autonomy. Among liberal philosophers there is a substantial debate on 
the range of environmental values that a liberal state should be permitted to promote actively and 
impose upon its citizens. To what extent can liberal morality be broadened in such a way, that it is 
able to include environmental values, necessary to justify a normative environmental policy and 
education? In order to achieve such a broadening of liberal morality, different authors on this sub-
ject start from different principles, and follow different routes from there. Within the context of this 
chapter it is not possible to give an extensive overview of all the approaches relevant to this ethical 
problem. Therefore, in the remaining part of this chapter the possibilities of three approaches, which 
are most promising, will be examined and scrutinised. These approaches depart from principles be-
longing to the canon of liberal ethics.  
 First, the basic intuition that ‘thou shall not harm’ can be applied to environmental concerns. 
After all, in the majority of cases, environmental pollution, degradation and unsustainable 
                                                      
9 A similar analysis is posed by Derek R. Bell, who states that political liberalism requires the curriculum of all schools 
to meet the so-called JBUC-standard: ‘It is important to notice that the requirements that political liberalism imposes on 
educational content apply to all schools whether they are state schools, voluntary-aided schools or private schools. 
‘Society’s copcern is with [children’s] education lies in their role as future citizens at all types of schools’ (and those 
educated at home) are future citizens (Rawls, 1993, p. 200). We might call these requirements ‘justice-based’ (to 
acknowledge their importance in the maintenance of just institutions over time through the social reproduction of the 
political virtues), universal (to acknowledge that they apply to all places of child education) and ‘compulsory’. For 
short, the JBUC curriculum (Bell, 2004, p. 39). 
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behaviour will eventually cause harm to human property, health or freedom. Second, the intuition 
represented by the primary goods principle implies that the liberal state ought to provide and protect 
those goods which are in everyone’s interest in general and in nobody’s interest in particular. Per-
haps, a sound and sustainable environment can be regarded as in everyone’s interest, without fa-
vouring one ‘way of life’ or ‘conception of the good’ over the other. A sound and sustainable envi-
ronment seems preconditional on whatever life individual citizens want to lead. Third, we will see 
that the limitations of both the harm and primary goods principle force liberals to explore the possi-
bility of a principle of intergenerational justice. If liberal morality is to cover our responsibility for 
the long term effects of environmentally harmful behaviour and the primary goods of future citi-
zens, then its scope should reach beyond the moral community of those living at present. At this 
point, our conviction that future generations are entitled to a certain quality of life will be severely 
tested; for is this moral intuition strong enough to motivate and justify sacrifices which weigh 
heavily on our present welfare and freedom?  
  
Environmental harm and risk 
Liberal theory does not promote personal freedom ad infinitum. While the contract is said to allow 
all people to develop, pursue and revise their own conception of the good, it will not allow anyone 
to violate the freedom rights of others. Logically speaking, everyone’s personal entitlement to free-
dom is necessarily limited by another’s entitlement to freedom. One of the most fundamental cur-
tailments of personal freedom is imposed by the harm principle, a classical liberal principle, the 
roots of which go back all the way to John Stuart Mill. The implications of this basic principle are 
rather strong; as Mill proclaimed: ‘whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk 
of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty 
and placed in that of morality or law’ (Mill, year, p. 149). Consequently, while the liberal state 
should normally refrain from normative intervention in the private lives of individual citizens, a 
liberal state is morally obliged to intervene, whenever there is a serious (risk of) harm (cf. Wenz, 
1988). 
 In itself the harm principle represents an uncontested component of liberal ethics. Therefore, 
the principle seems to provide environmental policy and education with a clear and solid ground for 
justification. An appeal to (the risk of) damage to our natural resources or our common health 
should be sufficient to justify radical environmental measures. At first glance, such a justification 
appears to be appropriate as well as easily applicable. Unfortunately, serious problems arise re-
garding the application of the harm principle. First, the anthropocentric foundation of this principle 
is problematic, for it precludes a direct state protection of nature. The harm principle protects na-
ture, only if, and insofar as the health or resources of human beings are threatened. Harm to nature 
itself carries no moral weight whatsoever; whereas our moral intuitions might tell us that it should 
be the valuing of nature that turns the scale (Vincent 1998). 
 A second, closely related problem concerns the certainty and provability of harm. The 
justification of a radical environmental policy and education, directly intervening in the private life 
choices of individuals, makes great demands on the evidence of (the risk of) harm. With this evi-
dence the state should be able to convince anyone whose private life is somehow influenced by such 
a policy of the necessity of state intervention. Unfortunately, such convincing evidence is rather 
exceptional within the context of environmental problems; direct causal links between environ-
mental degradation and, for instance, human health problems are seldom clear and convincing. 
Those links are predominantly speculative and ‘connected through the most tenuous of causal links’ 
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(Coglianese 1998). For instance, it is quite clear that the extinction of animal species will have a 
disturbing effect on the ecological balances within a particular ecosystem, but the effects on human 
health or resources are indirect and hard, if not impossible, to prove. Moreover, in the majority of 
cases, the harm will not be substantial enough to justify state intervention.  
 Thus, the difficulties of proving harm make it highly problematic to ground strong moral 
obligations on this principle; the harm is rarely incontrovertibly established and uni-linear, but 
mostly indirect, insecure, insignificant and probable (Coglianese 1998, p. 48-50). However, the se-
riousness and magnitude of this harm could be disastrous. Therefore, there are strong arguments for 
a precautionary approach that commits us to protecting any probable harm to the conditions of hu-
man survival. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, such an approach would not 
allow scientific uncertainty to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion. But even such a strong policy would require some proof of probability of harm. The key ques-
tion we have to face is how much uncertainty or how much risk of harm a liberal state should tole-
rate its citizens to suffer. Coglianese articulates the question in even more specific terms:  
 
Should government take the chance of not responding to what turns out be a real catastrophic risk? 
Or should it take the chance of interfering with individual life choices for what turns out to have 
been a false risk of catastrophe? The risk of mistake exists with both action and inaction, and liberal 
neutrality cannot offer a predetermined solution to such a dilemma (…) Yet liberalism’s basic con-
cern with the abuse of individuals by governments, rather than by environmental catastrophes, sug-
gests that it would be more consistent with liberal neutrality to err on the side of less governmental 
action when such action would impose substantial and unequal constraints on individuals 
(Coglianese 1998, p. 58) 
 
Coglianese rightly argues that government intervention brings along risks as well as non-interven-
tion does. However, in my view, her final estimation that liberals would probably prefer non-inter-
vention is less self-evident than it may seem. Apparently, Coglianese weighs the risk of individual 
harm attached to government intervention (abuse of individuals by governments) against the collec-
tive risk of environmental harm attached to non-intervention. However, this asymmetry between 
individual and collective harm is false, since both risks have potential consequences for our per-
sonal freedom and autonomy. An environmental disaster might severely limit our personal freedom 
or even cause a situation in which no individual is capable of leading a free life whatsoever. There-
fore, rather than an asymmetric estimation between individual and non-individual harm, the asym-
metry is between the immediate and certain harm of government intervention and the long-term and 
probable harm of non-intervention. This asymmetry does not justify a predetermined commitment 
to non-intervention, but does make the perceivable preference of liberal governments for the latter 
option intelligible. 
 Third, the scope of the harm principle is not only narrow with respect to the range of possi-
ble justifications in breadth; it also fails to reach far enough in time. The principle only covers those 
measures that prevent immediate harm to contemporaries. However, the major environmental con-
cerns of today, such as those concerning the greenhouse effect, the storage of nuclear waste and the 
preservation of biological diversity, deal with long-term processes of degradation and climate 
change. The harmful effects of those processes will not reveal themselves within a short period of 
time, or even within the life span of one or two generations. Moreover, the harm will be done to 
people living decades, perhaps centuries from now. Therefore, whether the harm principle is of any 
because we are citizens 
 25 
use within this context depends predominantly on its ability to prevent harm to the life conditions of 
future generations (Achterberg 1994b).  
 
Primary goods 
Given the inadequacy of the harm principle in this limited form for environmental purposes, liberal 
theorists have explored the possibilities of the ‘positive’ idea that underlies the ‘negative’ harm 
principle, that is, the idea that there are certain common goods in our society that need to be pro-
tected or prevented from harm on behalf of all of us. While liberal theory requires the state to re-
frain from promoting a particular conception of the good, it does not require the state to remain 
neutral with respect to all values. There are some values, liberal philosophers argue, which repre-
sent the interests of all citizens in general and of democracy in particular. Those values are defined 
as ‘primary goods’ (Rawls 1971, 1993), ‘primary values’ or ‘collective goods’ (Raz, 1986). Primary 
values are distinguished from secondary values, in that they are ‘based on benefits and harms that 
must count as such for all reasonable conceptions of a good life, while secondary values derive 
from benefits and harms that vary with conceptions of a good life' (Kekes, 1995, p. 19). John Rawls 
therefore clearly defines primary goods as ‘those things that any rational person will want regard-
less of whatever else he or she wants’ (Rawls 1971, p.). For example, democratic ‘goods’ such as 
freedom of consciousness, freedom of speech, as well as material ‘goods’ such as the right to suffi-
cient food, shelter, health service and education should be regarded as primary goods. Contrary to 
the manifold secondary values, attached to particular conceptions of the good, primary goods are 
considered to be part of a public morality, actively promoted, distributed and protected by the 
liberal state. However, in line with the liberal defense of individual freedom against the state, this 
shared body of primary goods should remain as narrow i.e. minimal as possible. The crucial ques-
tion here is to what extent environmental ‘goods’ can be regarded as primary goods, and, as such, 
be actively promoted and distributed by the liberal state. As suggested before, ‘health’ and ‘natural 
resources’ constitute appropriate candidates for the status of primary good, for both seem precondi-
tional on every life project, whatever its particular circumstances or ultimate goals (Bayles, 1980, p. 
33-34). 
 While a just distribution of primary goods must be regarded as the nuclear responsibility of 
the liberal state, the state cannot be held responsible for the distribution of all primary goods. For 
that reason, Rawls makes a distinction between social and natural primary goods. Social primary 
goods refer to liberties, opportunities, power, income and wealth, the distribution of which is highly 
correlated to the basic organisation of institutions in society. Natural primary goods, such as health, 
vigour, intelligence and imagination are not so directly under the control of society. Because natural 
primary goods cannot be appropriately distributed, Rawls asserts that its distribution is no object of 
state responsibility. (Rawls 1999, p. 54-55). This distinction has far-reaching consequences for the 
inclusion of environmental values in the public liberal morality. For, as summed up earlier, Rawls 
counts ‘health’ as one of the natural primary goods. With this rather rough distinction Rawls, inten-
tionally or non-intentionally, assumes that the liberal state has no responsibility whatsoever for the 
preservation or promotion of public health.  
 Manning critically responds to this categorisation of health by stressing that Rawls’ conclu-
sion seems counter-intuitive to our every day life experiences. It seems implausible to state that 
public health is entirely beyond the control of society. The national government, for instance, car-
ries immediate responsibility for the public health care and the institutional control over the quality 
of consumer goods. Furthermore, forms of pollution and environmental degradation strictly con-
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trolled and sometimes caused by governmental institutions, can be of direct influence on the health 
of citizens. Because our health can be positively influenced by public health care, and, conversely, 
negatively influenced by pollution and degradation, ‘health’ shouldbe understood, at least partly, as 
a social primary good. Manning convincingly argues that a liberal state is, therefore, morally com-
mitted to conduct an environmental policy, aimed at reducing (risks of) harm to human health 
(Manning 1981). 
 Mannings’ rescue of the health category from the gloomy status of ‘natural primary good’, 
together with the acknowledgement of sufficient natural resources as a social primary good, seems 
to provide a normative form of environmental education with a solid ground of justification. A 
liberal state would be allowed to intervene legitimately within the consumption and behaviour pat-
terns of their citizens, whenever those patterns contribute to the depletion of natural resources, the 
expulsion of greenhouse gasses, the extinction of animal species, the pollution of water, in short, all 
processes which carry harmful effects on to our health and food resources. When closely examined, 
the harm principle turns out to form part of the primary goods principle; everyone is entitled to state 
protection against harm to our health or natural resources. However, the conceptual status of 
primary goods differs from the status of the harm principle. Whereas the harm principle only leads 
to a negative obligation (to prevent harm), the primary goods principle determines strong positive 
obligations, derived from the basic obligation to provide all citizens with the goods ‘which any 
rational person will want’. Thus, the burden of proof is reversed; citizens no longer have to prove 
that their health or resources are threatened, on the contrary; the state has to guarantee that the basic 
needs of citizens are being met. 
 So, in a way, the harm principle has been incorporated by the primary goods principle. 
Consequently, most problems discussed within the context of the harm principle, cling to the 
primary goods principle as well. First, here too, the possibilities of justification are severely 
restricted by the anthropocentric character of liberal morality. For, presumably, many forms of 
environmental degradation will hardly have any influence on the means we think necessary for the 
realisation of our life plan. For instance, the destruction of a particular wildlife area or the extinction 
of particular animal species will leave our life plans unaffected. Therefore, it is highly questionable 
whether liberal morality is able to cover the preservation of those natural entities (Musschenga 
1991). Second, the problem of insecurity remains. The primary goods principle requires causal evi-
dence between environmental degradation and human health as well. These problems of provability 
and risk have been outlined in the previous section.  
 In fact, we are faced with conflicting primary goods, which have to be balanced against each 
other. Which primary good should the liberal state give priority? The ‘good’ of maximum personal 
freedom (in favour of non-intervention) or the ‘good’ of a sustainable environment (in favour of 
intervention)? Unfortunately, experience shows that, generally speaking, long term environmental 
interests are no match for short term economic interests. Most liberal philosophers therefore recog-
nise that, as long as the basic needs of future generations are not given any moral weight, the pri-
mary goods principle will be of little help within the context of the environmental crisis (Singer 
1988, p. 220; Musschenga 1991).  
 
Obligations to future generations 
Both the harm and primary goods principle leave room for an attitude of après nous le deluge. As 
long as we are able to lead meaningful lives and we can be sure the basic needs of contemporaries 
are being satisfied, then we have lived up to our responsibility. Such an ethic of responsibility 
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would be left empty-handed if people were to decide to foist the harmful effects of our action on to 
people who will live in the distant future. The analysis of both principles therefore concluded with a 
hopeful gaze into the future. Is it our responsibility to prevent harm to future generations? Are we 
obliged to save for posterity, so that their basic needs can be met? Perhaps, we should conceive of 
ourselves as citizens of an intergenerational community of justice. Consequently, future people 
should be regarded as no less than fellow citizens, whose ‘goods’ have to be considered in our pre-
sent behaviour and choices. 
 Although there is a widespread agreement about this moral intuition in general terms, its 
exact implications remain rather unclear. Underlying this persistent vagueness is the lack of any 
convincing justification of the concept of intergenerational justice, a justification which clearly pro-
vides the contents and limits of our obligations to future generations. As John Rawls pointed out in 
his Theory of Justice, the problem of intergenerational justice is extremely difficult to deal with: ‘It 
subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests’ (Rawls 1999, p. 251). The issue of in-
tergenerational justice is loaded with conceptual intricacies which logically follow from its complex 
time dimension; the very idea of obligations to future people presupposes the possibility of there 
being a moral relationship between those living and those not (yet) living. How is it possible to 
conceive of a relationship between persons who do not live simultaneously? This particular ques-
tion gives rise to major problems of justification within philosophical ethics. In particular four 
theoretical problems have to be dealt with: (1) the problem of reciprocity, (2) the problem of igno-
rance, (3) the problem of paternalism, and (4) the non-identity problem. So whether or not a princi-
ple of intergenerational justice can be regarded as a necessary clause in the liberal contract ultima-
tely depends on whether these three justificatory problems can be solved. 
 (1). The problem of reciprocity follows logically from the asymmetrical relationship bet-
ween contemporary and future generations; our behaviour, our choices will necessarily affect the 
lives of future generations. They are dependent on the world we leave behind for them. Surely then 
it is within our power to influence their opportunities, well-being, and conditions of life, both posi-
tively and negatively. Influences in the opposite direction, however, are logically impossible. We 
find ourselves in a sovereign position, beyond the reach of future generations. ‘Time’s arrow’ pre-
cludes every form of reciprocity. In itself this absence would not be a major problem if the very no-
tion of reciprocity were not considered a defining characteristic of any moral relationship, at least 
within this liberal framework. Underlying this characterisation is the idea that the existence of a 
moral relationship requires a situation in which nobody is invulnerable in such a way, such that he 
or she does not have to consider the needs and wants of others. Only if the moral parties are mutu-
ally dependent on each other, can there be a ground for a moral relationship in the strict sense. Ob-
viously, the intergenerational relationship lacks such a form of mutual dependency (Barry, 1977; 
Rawls, 1999; de-Shalit, 1995). 
  (2). That the future cannot be known constitutes another natural feature of time. This feature 
gives rise to the problem of ignorance. Future generations will always remain ‘strangers’ to us, as 
we are ignorant in large measure about their needs and desires. Unfortunately, within philosophical 
ethics, it tends to be tacitly presupposed that a moral relationship implies a relationship between 
identifiable individuals or groups. Some philosophers, including such communitarians as Avner de-
Shalit and Martin Golding, even argue that the moral parties should be part of a moral community, 
sharing particular values and ideals (Golding 1972, de-Shalit 1995). Without exaggerating this de-
mand of recognisability, as communitarians may seem to do, it should be granted that a lack of all 
relevant knowledge about the other moral party causes serious problems. For how are we to deter-
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mine our obligations towards future generations, towards people living centuries from now? How 
are we to meet their needs and wants when we do not know who they are, what their world will 
look like, and, consequently, what those basic needs and wants will require? Clearly it will be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine the content of our obligations to an unknown ‘generation X’.  
 (3). If the content of our obligations to future citizens cannot be based on well-founded 
knowledge about the needs, wants, values and ideals of future generations, then an intergenerational 
morality is in danger of becoming paternalistic or even repressive. If we contemporaries determine 
and pursue a particular future scenario, then we impose our ideals and values upon future genera-
tions, and, consequently, deprive them of the opportunity to shape their own world. In line with 
liberal morality, the basic outline and organisation of the future world should be left to future 
generations themselves. As is the case with our own contemporaries, they are entitled to pursue 
their own collective goals and ideals. For this reason, liberal and communitarian critics argue, we 
should refrain from projecting our values and ideals upon future people (Golding, 1972, de-Shalit, 
1995; cf. Rawls, 1999, p. 183). 
 (4). The so-called non-identity problem arises particularly because our present behaviour not 
merely affects the world and well-being of future generations but their identity as well. Their iden-
tity is dependent on our choices and behaviour, here and now. After all, we know that the smallest 
possible variations in circumstances of conception result in the birth of a completely different per-
son, that is, a person with a different genotype. A different energy-saving policy in the seventies for 
instance would have resulted in a completely different population in the present. This speculation 
might appear somewhat far-fetched or even absurd, but, as utilitarians like Parfit indicate, they 
might have a major impact on the limits of our intergenerational responsibilities. If we understand 
our responsibility in person-affecting terms – that is, we regard ourselves responsible for the conse-
quences of our behaviour on the people who are affected by those consequences – then future ge-
nerations could never hold us responsible for the world we leave behind for them. They are no 
worse off than they would have been if we were to have acted in their interest, since, if we had ac-
ted otherwise then they would not have existed in the first place. Thus Parfit argues that, for those 
future persons the choice is between existing-under-these-particular-circumstances and not existing 
at all. Although this objection is mainly directed towards consequentialist theories (the assumptions 
of which are extremely person-affecting by nature), it will become clear that some contract theories 
are affected by the non-identity problem as well (Parfit 1984, p. 351-379; cf. Grey, 1996; Kavka, 
1981). 
 The inevitable conclusion seems to be that if there is any moral obligation to future 
generations, then it must be one that urges us to stand totally aloof from all future concerns. ‘Hands 
off!’ seems to be the most appropriate maxim. Some philosophers do indeed argue that contempo-
rary generations should refrain from each and every potential interference with the lives of future 
people, and therefore can have no substantive obligations to them (Golding, 1972, Schwartz, 1978). 
Nevertheless, the crucial question is whether such an attitude of complete aloofness can logically be 
maintained. Is it possible to refrain from every influence on future life? The answer to this question 
must be negative since the world we leave behind will never be a tabula rasa. Our policies, choices 
and behaviour will necessarily affect their conditions of life. Future opportunities will be determi-
ned, to a great extent, by the effects of our contemporary actions (or inaction) and choosing (or non-
choosing). Therefore, whether we like it or not, whether we think it morally correct or abject, we 
simply cannot remain innocent. As many authors within this field have stressed, the hands off res-
ponse is not an adequate one and cannot be maintained. We have to respond to the potential claims 
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that future demands make on us, by virtue of the fact that our behaviour will shape the future world 
we leave behind after our death. Within a liberal-contractual framework, those demands can only be 
defended by the immediate stakeholders of future interests: future citizens themselves. Future inte-
rests can only be represented in the contract if future citizens are indeed included in the contract 
community. Consequently, liberal theory cannot simply side-step this issue but has to deal with the 
problem of including future generations as parties to the contract definition. Thus, what is needed is 
an adequate answer to the previously outlined problems of justification posed by the issue of inter-
generational responsibility. 
 
An extension of Rawls’ theory of justice 
In order to deal with the previously outlined problems of justification, different authors in the field 
of environmental ethics and political philosophy take different routes from here. Those who are 
confined to contractual liberalism, mostly choose to connect their ideas to the influential framework 
outlined by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971)10 and Political Liberalism (1993). From the 
late seventies, there has been an extensive debate on the implications of his theory for the possibi-
lity of extending the liberal contract community, in such a way, as to include future generations. 
Some liberal philosophers take their bearings from Rawls’ Just Savings Principle. Others address 
the issue of intergenerational justice by using formerly unseen possibilities in Rawls’ theoretical 
framework or reformulating its basic assumptions. Before we turn to an exploration of the various 
attempts in detail, it is necessary to sketch the basic outline of Rawls’ theory of justice.  
 Rawls’ main ambition is to define the possible conditions of social cooperation in a ‘society 
of strangers’, that is, a society in which citizens do not share a common view on the good life, and 
where ipso facto, any appeal of the government to common values runs the risk of excluding people 
who do not share this morality. What we need then, according to Rawls, is not a conception of the 
good, relying on a contested doctrine or morality, but a conception of justice that can count on the 
hypothetical consent of all citizens, regardless of their conception of the good life. Instead of com-
peting with the comprehensive moral doctrines in society, Rawls wants his principles of justice to 
precede moral diversity. Moreover, his principles are to make diversity possible. That is, they 
should define the necessary conditions of humans living together as ‘free and equal, rational 
beings’, by guaranteeing the greatest possible freedom of individual citizens to define and pursue 
their own life-plan, without thwarting the life-plans of others. Rawls articulated this normative pre-
mise as the priority of the right over the good. As a qualification of justice ‘the right’ refers to a si-
tuation of ‘equal fairness’. 
 Rawls chooses to establish the priority of the right over the good by deriving his principles 
of justice from a hypothetical contract, on the content of which all ‘rational’ beings in his view 
should be willing to agree. In this contract the basic structure of society and its institutions should 
be settled. But how can Rawls guarantee that the parties involved are not motivated by private in-
terests that follow from their particular religion, ideology, cultural background, their economic po-
sition and similar ‘contingencies’ that should not determine the content of the contract? In order to 
safeguard impartiality, Rawls presupposes that the agreement on the principles of justice is reached 
‘under ideal circumstances’. In order to envisage this presupposition, he presents his famous 
thought-experiment, in which he defines the initial situation under which the parties are to reach 
                                                      
10 I also made use of the revised edition of A Theory of Justice (1999) in which Rawls revised some of his original ideas 
on the issue of intergenerational justice. 
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agreement on the principles of justice: the original position. Among other things Rawls suggests 
that we should envisage the parties in the original position as situated behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. 
With this he assumes that the parties do not know what their characteristics are and under what par-
ticular circumstances they live. For instance, they do not know whether they will be man or woman, 
poor or rich, Catholic or communist, Dutch or Dominican and so on. In short, the parties are depri-
ved of all the knowledge that could possibly enable them to choose principles to their own advan-
tage instead of choosing on the basis of general considerations. Thus, the potential effects of speci-
fic contingencies on the definition of justice are nullified.  
 Furthermore, Rawls assumes that the parties in the original position are ‘rational beings’, 
who are motivated by ‘moderate selfishness’. This is because he wants his theory to be realistic and 
therefore derives his principles from weak anthropological assumptions. Since Rawls pretends that 
he does not presuppose any kind of human altruism, the greatest possible egoist should be willing 
tot subscribe to the principles defined in the contract. Under the prescribed circumstances, Rawls 
argues, the parties are likely to reach agreement over two basic principles of justice. The first prin-
ciple is generally labelled as the equality principle: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for 
all’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 266). The second principle is known as the difference principle: ‘Social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 266). 
 The issue of intergenerational justice has occupied Rawls from the outset, that is, from the 
very first draft of his Theory of Justice in 1971, when few philosophers had addressed these 
questions all together. Considerations of justice between generations have contributed to the con-
struction of the theory itself. This will become manifest when we see that core-elements of his 
theory, such as the design of the original position, his definition of the difference principle and the 
interpretation of the so-called circumstances of justice, show indications of these attempts to include 
future generations in his definition of justice. Rawls starts out with an exploration of the human in-
clination towards time-preference i.e. the inclination to have more regard for some interests rather 
than others, merely because of ones own location in time. Together with the few predecessors who 
did address issues of intergenerational justice before, such as the utilitarians Sidgwick and Bent-
ham, Rawls agrees that public judgements which reflect ‘pure time preference’ are not to be taken 
into legitimate consideration. In itself, time is not a morally relevant characteristic. However, 
whereas the utilitarians reject time preference on the basis of its irrationality, Rawls does not admit 
time preference because this would conflict with the demand of impartiality that is consistent with 
his understanding of justice as equal fairness (Rawls 1999, p. 259-260; cf. Bayles, 1980, p. 20).  
 Rawls looks at the generation problem from the standpoint of the original position. He 
requires the parties in the original position to reach agreement about the adoption of a just savings 
principle that insures ‘that each generation receives its due from its predecessors and does its fair 
share for those to come’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 254). More precisely, the aim of saving for the future is 
‘to make possible the conditions needed to establish and preserve a just basic structure over time’ 
(Rawls, 2001, p. 159). In order to reach such an agreement Rawls requires the parties to ask them-
selves how much ‘capital’ they would be willing to save at each stage of advance for each succee-
ding generation, on the assumption that all other generations have saved, or will save, in accordance 
with the same criterion. In Rawls’ view, the savings principle ought to be settled in accordance with 
the second principle of justice, the difference principle. Among other things, this implies that the 
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social minimum should be settled on a level that maximises the expectations of the least advantaged 
in each succeeding generation, and without causing hardship to the lowest level of the current 
society (Rawls, 1999, p. 252). Thus, Rawls argues, the just savings principle should be adopted as a 
constraint on the difference principle: ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 266). Positively stated, the just savings principle can be formulated as 
an obligation to ‘save for each succeeding generation without causing hardship to the lowest level 
of the current society’ (Manning 1981, p. 292).  
 Whereas the just savings principle is easily settled in sympathy with our intuitive sense of 
justice, Rawls encounters immense complexities in his justification of this principle within the deli-
cate theoretical web he has spun. At the very moment he has dealt with one contradiction in his 
theory, he comes into conflict with another basic assumption or intuition. However, Rawls and his 
critics go to great length, considering the implications of the particular design of the original posi-
tion and reconsidering its basic assumptions in the light of a just savings principle. In order to se-
cure an impartial standpoint that does not leave room for time preference, Rawls assumes that the 
parties in the original position are not informed about the particular generation they belong to. But 
since the application of the principle of justice is dependent on a condition of mutual reciprocity and 
dependency of the contractants, he chooses for a ‘present-time-of-entry-interpretation’ of the origi-
nal position. That means that, although knowledge about the generation one belongs to is located 
behind the veil of ignorance, the parties do know that they are contemporaries. Complete ignorance 
about one’s own generation and the contracting parties one negotiates with, would not only do in-
justice to the necessary condition of mutual dependency, but would, in Rawls’ view, ask too much 
of our imagination as well. What does this imply for the motivation of the contracting parties? Un-
fortunately, as Rawls is ready to admit, there is nothing to prevent the contemporaries behind the 
veil of ignorance from choosing their particular interest now. Nothing prevents them from using up 
the natural resources, and consuming all the available savings. Nothing prevents them from time 
preference because, as contemporaries-among-contemporaries, they remain immune to the claims of 
other generations. There is no mutual reciprocity that forces the contracting parties to consider one 
another’s interests. ‘(…) so unless we modify our initial assumptions, there is no reason for them to 
agree to any saving whatever. Earlier generations will have either saved or not; there is nothing the 
parties can do to affect that’ (Rawls 1999, p. 254-255).  
 Rawls seeks to overcome the deadlock in the negotiations between the contracting parties by 
adopting a motivational assumption. That is, he assumes that all the parties represent family lines, 
who care for the well-being of their descendants, at least for the more immediate ones, their chil-
dren and grandchildren. This sentiment could be thought of as parental concern: ‘We can adopt a 
motivation assumption and think of the parties as representing a continuing line of claims. For 
example, we can assume that they are heads of families and therefore have a desire to further the 
well-being of at least their more immediate descendants’ (Rawls 1999, p. 111). To this motivational 
assumption he adds another assumption ‘that the principle adopted must be such that they wish all 
earlier generations to have followed it’ (Rawls 1999, p. 254). These two assumptions, together with 
the operation of the veil of ignorance, Rawls argues, will guarantee that ‘any one generation looks 
out for all’ (Rawls 1999, p. 254). Conclusively, the savings principle not only covers an emotional 
span of two or three generations, but, this commitment is also universalised by the additional as-
sumption and the veil of ignorance into a ‘chain of commitment’ that secures the adoption of a 
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transgenerational savings principle in the original position. By deliberating about a just amount of 
savings, citizens are obliged to represent the interests of the future members of their family line, not 
only of themselves.  
 
The circumstance of justice  
Whereas Rawls himself is convinced that his justification of a principle of intergenerational justice 
is established his interpreters remain sceptical and divided. In the first place, there is thorough de-
bate on the question whether an empirical psychological postulate, like the motivational assump-
tion, can ever count as a legitimate argument in the justification of an ethical or political principle. 
On this particular point, Brian Barry compares Rawls with a magician ‘putting a rabbit in a hat, 
taking it out again and expecting a round of applause (...) if it is acceptable to introduce desires for 
the welfare of immediate descendants into the original position simply in order to get them out 
again as obligations, what grounds can there be for refusing to put into the original position a desire 
for the welfare of at least some contemporaries?’ (Barry, 1977, p. 279-280). Barry sharply points at 
the fact that the content of the motivational assumption seems at odds with the characterisation of 
the parties in the original position as ‘non-altruistic’, ‘mutual disinterested’. The strong and wide 
appeal of Rawls’ theory is mainly due to the fact that he derives strong obligations from weak as-
sumptions concerning human nature. In fact, ‘moderate selfishness’ is one of the so-called ‘circum-
stances of justice’ that Rawls borrows from David Hume in order to describe the ‘normal condi-
tions’ under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary, and thus, a conception of 
justice is needed. When these circumstances do not hold, or one of them does not hold, the principle 
of justice can find no application. Rawls is ready to admit that the motivational assumption com-
prises a contested element in his theory, but he nevertheless chooses to hold on to this assumption 
because, in his view, it requires no more benevolence of the parties than one can plausibly assume 
to be part of human nature. Among other critics, Manning strongly opposes this suggestion: ‘A 
good case can be made for the idea that parental care is not a part of natural human psychology but 
is a cultural phenomenon. Parents have been known to sacrifice their children to gods and sell them 
into slavery. Child abuse and neglect is only just short of being rampant in our own society. Paren-
tal love does not seem to be a strong enough motive on which to base the savings principle. Again it 
appears best to stay with mutual disinterest’ (Manning, 1981, p. 163; cf. Thero 1995, Barry, 1977).  
 In the second place, critics point at the lack of reciprocity in the relationship between 
generations. According to the ‘circumstances of justice’ mentioned earlier, a particular kind of re-
ciprocity between the contracting parties is required, if the principle of justice is to be applied. More 
precisely, it is the condition of ‘relative equality’ that requires the parties to be ‘roughly similar in 
physical and mental powers; or at any rate, their capacities are comparable in that no one among 
them can dominate the rest. They are vulnerable to attack, and all are subject to having their plans 
blocked by the united force of others’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 110). Similar to other contractual theorists, 
Rawls tries to explain the ‘willingness to cooperate’ by assuming a condition of mutual 
dependency. Underlying this postulation of a reciprocal relationship is the idea that the survival of a 
strong moral contract requires a situation in which nobody is invulnerable in such a way they do not 
have to consider the needs and wants of other(s). Only if the moral parties are mutually dependent 
on each other, can there be the grounds for a moral relationship in the strict sense. This particular 
requirement reflects the non-moral worldview expressed by Hobbes in his Leviathan. Justice is 
necessary because, and only where, there is a situation in which everyone is a threat to everyone 
else. Here, the motivation to sign the contract is based on mutual fear, and justice is understood as 
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penal machinery which serves as men’s security against one another (Rawls, 1999; Barry, 1978; 
Hobbes, 1960).  
 Although the case of Hobbes is extreme, even Rawls suggests that social cooperation and 
justice are impossible without a certain degree of reciprocity. His design of the moral contract is 
based on the psychological assumption that people are likely to act justly only regarding those who 
can give justice in return (Rawls, 1999, p. 447). Obviously, the intergenerational relationship lacks 
any form of such mutual dependency and reciprocity. Therefore, to put the conclusion as simply as 
possible: because future generations cannot consider our needs, we are not obliged to consider 
theirs. Rawls, however, maintains that there is a particular kind of reciprocity in our relationship 
with future and past generations that should be conceived of in terms of ‘equal compensation’; each 
generation finds itself located in a chain of giving and receiving. Ideally, a fair balance is achieved 
between the inheritance we receive from our predecessors, and the inheritance we leave behind for 
our grandchildren: ‘The only economic exchanges between generations are, so to speak, virtual 
ones, that is, compensating adjustments that can be made in the original position when a just sa-
vings principle is adopted’ (Rawls 1999). Most critics, however, are not convinced by this virtual 
solution since this particular kind of ‘reciprocity’ can only serve its justificatory purpose in a form 
that would stretch our imagination too far. 
 As we have seen, Rawls comes into conflict with the requirements of his ‘circumstances of 
justice’ twice. First, the motivational assumption conflicts with the circumstance of ‘moderate sel-
fishness’, and second, the very idea of a just relationship between generations conflicts with the cir-
cumstance of ‘relative equality of power’. Beyond these two circumstances, there is the third and 
last circumstance of ‘moderate scarcity’. Whether this circumstance will hold is not clear either, 
because it is not inconceivable that in the future, particular resources will be severely scarce. The 
provisional conclusion that can be drawn from this brief analysis is that, since these circumstances 
do not obtain within the intergenerational context, the principle of justice can find no application. 
For those liberal philosophers, who were not ready to accept this conclusion, this was an incentive 
to examine the status and implications of these ‘circumstances of justice’ more closely.  
 Rawls borrowed the ‘circumstances of justice’ from David Hume in order to describe the 
background conditions that give rise to the necessity of reaching an agreement over a principle of 
justice. More precisely, they are to describe the ‘normal conditions’ under which human coopera-
tion is both possible and necessary, and thus, a conception of justice is needed. The ‘circumstances’ 
are to ensure that the theory of justice rests on weak and realistic premises. It is his aim to incorpo-
rate widely shared and yet weak conditions by deriving all duties and obligations from minimal as-
sumptions concerning moral behaviour. A conception of justice should not presuppose extensive 
ties of moral sentiment or self-sacrifice. At the basis of his theory Rawls tries to assume as little as 
possible. Not a spark of altruism is expected from the contracting parties. Their choices and beha-
viour are supposed to be guided by ‘mutual disinterestedness’. The main idea is that the application 
of a principle of justice requires a society that is marked by a conflict as well as an identity of inte-
rests. Rawls for instance, embraces the condition of moderate scarcity because, in his view, a prin-
ciple of justice can find no grip in extreme situations: in a situation of superabundance, there is no 
conflict of interests, and therefore no need to agree on a principle of distribution since there is 
enough for everybody. Justice would be a redundant and idle ceremony. In the opposite situation of 
extreme scarcity, on the contrary, there is no identity of interests, since people will be motivated by 
a struggle for survival. For this reason, Rawls and Hume argue, justice only applies under ‘normal 
conditions of ‘moderate scarcity’. Together with the circumstances of relative equality and mode-
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rate selfishness, one can say, in brief, ‘that the circumstances of justice obtain whenever persons put 
forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scar-
city’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 110). 
 Barry argues that the circumstances of justice comprise a hybrid element in Rawls’ theory. 
He illustrates his argument by pointing at the absurd implications of the requirement of relative 
equality. In a society, where the political system denies its citizens equal rights and access to demo-
cratic institutions, like the former apartheid regime in South Africa, the theory of justice would not 
be able to offer human rights activists an independent argument in favour of justice. Rawls and 
Hume would have to leave them empty-handed, because in their society, the circumstance of rela-
tive equality does not obtain, and ipso facto, the principle of justice cannot be employed to criticise 
racial politics. This conclusion is absurd, thus Barry argues. The circumstances of justice lead to a 
‘hollow mockery of the idea of justice – adding insult to injury. Justice is normally thought of not 
ceasing to be relevant in conditions of extreme inequality in power but, rather, as being especially 
relevant in such conditions’ (Barry 1978, p.). Similarly, environmental problems usually emerge in 
situations where natural resources are scarce. If a principle of justice can find no application in 
situations of extreme scarcity, a theory of justice would be of little help. In line with this criticism, 
Van der Wal argues that Rawls employs an awkward theoretical construction by implying the con-
ditions of realisation within the definition of justice itself. Together with Barry, Van der Wal states 
that, whereas in practice particular societal factors have proven to be of decisive importance in the 
emancipation of socially deprived groups and the establishment of basic right, the legitimacy and 
content of a principle of justice should never be made dependent on its empirical presence in a 
given society (Van der Wal 1979, p. 21). 
 Previous considerations have lead Barry to redefine the status of the circumstances of jus-
tice. He agrees with Rawls that an ideal of justice can only arise in a society where people are more 
or less equal, and that it is likely to presume that justice will be established in situations of relative 
equality, moderate selfishness and moderate scarcity. But contra Rawls, Barry rightly argues that 
this does not imply that the legitimacy of this idea of justice is limited to these circumstances of 
justice, and that the idea of justice cannot be applied to a situation in which the circumstances do 
not yet hold. If this were so, then the theory would imply an apriori justification of the present sta-
tus quo. Therefore, Barry suggests that we should not understand the circumstances of justice as 
necessary conditions, as Rawls proposes, but as sufficient conditions for the application of a 
principle of justice. The bare fact that the conditions of moderate selfishness, relative equality of 
powers and moderate scarcity obtain, is in itself a sufficient reason to reach agreement over a com-
mon conception of justice (Barry, 1978, p. 225). Moreover, it is likely to assume that such an 
agreement is easier to establish in this situation than in a situation where these circumstances do not 
hold, but the principles of justice in terms of equal fairness do not lose their validity in ‘extreme 
situations’. On the contrary, in circumstances of extreme selfishness, inequality of powers between 
the parties and extreme scarcity, the principles of justice will have to prove what they are worth, 
even though justice will indeed be harder to establish. Thus, Barry defends the principles of justice 
for better and for worse. 
 In order to understand more deeply why this modification is necessary, Barry goes on by 
stating that Rawls’ misconception of the circumstances of justice is due to an untenable mixture of 
Humean and Kantian elements in his theory. On the one hand, Rawls chooses to hold on to the 
Kantian idea of hypothetical universalisability in his design of the original position, while, on the 
other hand, he introduces a conventional conception of justice by introducing the Humean circum-
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stances of justice in his theory. Hume defined these circumstances in his effort to demonstrate that 
the virtue of justice is a pure artefact. In his view, rules of justice are conventional. They are deter-
mined by the particular circumstances in which they arise, and in his view, there is no external stan-
dard of justice against which the conventional rules can be assessed. For this reason, a law cannot 
be unjust, since it is the law itself that defines justice. A conception of justice is no more than a 
function of a particular kind of human cooperation that should lead to mutual advantage, thus Hume 
argues. Needless to say that this conventional understanding of justice is at odds with the universal 
and transcendental Kantian understanding of justice. Thus, the Humean circumstances of justice are 
at odds with the universal pretensions underlying the idea of hypothetical consent in the experiment 
of the original position. Therefore, Barry argues, it is not only on behalf of future generations but 
for reasons of consistency as well, that the status of the circumstances of justice needs to be amen-
ded. With the proposed understanding of the circumstance of justice as sufficient conditions, Barry 
wants to do justice to the Humean intuition that rules of justice are conventions (in contrast to the 
principles of justice) that particularly arise in situations where there is a conflict as well as an iden-
tity of interests. On the hand, however, he claims not to undermine the universal claim of validity 
underlying Rawls’ principles of justice (Barry 1978; Achterberg 1994b). Whereas one might inter-
pret this solution as a fair balance between Humean and Kantian elements, in my view, the Humean 
intuition is being disarmed and put under guidance of the Kantian law. After all, the underlying 
Humean point that any principle of justice should be conceived of as a conventional artefact 
becomes insignificant or even self-refuting as soon as it is subsumed under the predicate of univer-
salisability.  
 
A negative principle of intergenerational justice 
Barry’s adjustment of Rawls’ theory of justice has been adopted by many liberal philosophers in the 
field of environmental ethics11. These philosophers argue that, as a result of this adjustment, the cir-
cumstances of justice do not obstruct the assignment of rights to future generations anymore. 
Among them there is, however, controversy concerning the question what the exact nature of their 
rights should be, and consequently, how we should include future generations in our hypothetical 
dialogue on environmental issues. The question is whether the savings principle – as a constraint on 
the difference principle – is the most adequate way of framing our obligations to future generations. 
The savings principle requires us to relate to future generations as hypothetical fellow citizens, who 
might belong to the least advantaged of our society. Therefore, they have a legitimate claim on our 
savings, and we have an obligation to make the deprived ones among them better off. In a way, the 
savings principle (as a constraint on the difference principle) postulates a particular kind of solida-
rity between generations, in which the protection of the weak and vulnerable is central (cf. Achter-
berg, 1994).  
 Barry as well as Hilhorst remark that Rawls deals with the issue of intergenerational justice 
from a somewhat one-sided angle of distributive justice. The environmental crisis cannot be fully 
understood as a problem of unequal resource distribution, but includes other problems of depletion, 
problems of degradation and pollution as well. The environmental problems that hang together with 
the greenhouse effect, for instance or the problems of acidification or the storage of nuclear waste 
can hardly be conceived of as problems of distribution. Whereas the label of ‘unequal resource dis-
                                                      
11 Barry’s adjustment of Rawls’ theory of justice has explicitely been adopted by Achterberg (1994b), Hilhorst (1987), 
Van der Wal (1979) and implicitly by many others. 
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tribution’ does not cover all environmental problems, they can altogether be regarded as problems 
that might be harmful to the basic rights of future citizens. Therefore, one might argue that envi-
ronmental problems require a negative duty to prevent harm to the fundamental life-conditions of 
future generations. Barry arrives at a similar conclusion: ‘(…) if we concentrate on the question 
how much we are obliged to make our successors better off, we miss the whole question whether 
there may not be an obligation to avoid harm that is stronger than any obligation to make better off’ 
(Barry 1977, p. 267).  
 In contrast to a positive obligation to make the least advantaged of our successors better off, 
which aims at establishing a particular favoured condition in the future, this negative morality aims 
at minimising our interference with the lives of future generations, or rather, put in positive terms, 
maximising their range of opportunities. Such a morality could be guided by the following maxim: 
do not bring about any state of affairs that is irreversible or irrevocable, that restricts the range of 
options and opportunities of future generations. In short, leave the future open to future generations. 
This maxim requires that present generations do not interfere with the content of future choices, but 
rather, that they bring about the necessary conditions of future freedom of opportunity12. Conse-
quently, it is our obligation to prevent the exclusion of prevailing options and opportunities in the 
future (cf. Achterberg, 1994; Bayles, 1980; Barry, 1977; Routley, 1982). In fact, this is exactly what 
the concept of sustainable development is about: meeting ‘the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987, p. 12).  
 Many liberal philosophers in the field of environmental education therefore drop the diffe-
rence principle as a ‘hang-up’ for our obligations to future generations in terms of intergenerational 
solidarity. Some of them choose to follow the first principle of justice instead: the equality 
principle, that requires each person ‘to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 266). A 
negative principle of intergenerational justice that takes its bearings from the equality principle 
might be defined as Achterberg does, that is, in terms of a fair equality of opportunities: ‘in their 
opportunities and possibilities of leading their lives in accordance with their own conception of the 
good, in their opportunities of using natural resources, and in their opportunities of enjoying nature, 
later generations should not be “worse off” than we are’ (freely translated from: Achterberg, 1994). 
In similar terms the utilitarian Bayles defines an equivalent principle, that requires us to compare 
and balance their quality of life against our quality of life: ‘The present generation has a duty not to 
render it substantially unlikely that future generations can have an indefinitely sustainable quality of 
life as high as it has, an equivalent quality of life’ (Bayles, 1980, p. 21). Besides, the application of 
the equality principle leaves more room for the prevention of harm, as Richard and Val Routley 
illustrate with their transfer limiting principle: ‘one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer the 
costs of a significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself onto other parties who are 
not involved in the activity and who are not beneficiaries’ (Routley, 1978, p. 123). From this prin-
ciple they derive the so-called transmission principle: ‘we should not hand the world we have so 
exploited on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we “received” it’. After all, that 
would imply a significant transfer of costs (Routley, 1978, p. 123; cf. Achterberg, 1989, p. 103). 
Despite, the different designs of a principle of intergenerational justice, the definitions just referred 
                                                      
12 In 2.3 it will become clear that it is inadequate to seperate the content from the conditions of freedom in this way. 
However, at this point I judge the credibility of the argument within the Rawlsian framework. 
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to all have in common that they aim to establish a continuing ‘chain of obligations’ between suc-
ceeding generations (cf. Howarth, 1992). 
 If intergenerational justice can be understood in this ‘negative’ way, at least some of the ma-
jor objections seem to be superseded. First, the objection of paternalism does not hold, because this 
morality is evidently negative. Contemporaries are not supposed to fill in the future for future ge-
nerations, but, nevertheless, they do provide the necessary conditions that will enable those genera-
tions to give shape to their own lives. By keeping the future open, we make future life possible, 
without imposing our own values and ideals onto people in the future. Second, by adopting a nega-
tive morality, the problem of ignorance seems to be superseded as well. For this, morality requires 
no particular knowledge about the values, needs and ideals of future generations, or it does so only 
in a minimal sense. Moreover, the only thing we assume, is that they will need personal freedom 
and such goods as drinking water, clean air and natural resources, sufficient to satisfy their basic 
needs. As outlined before, these goods are regarded as ‘those things that any rational person will 
want regardless of whatever else he or she wants’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 79). At this point Brian Barry 
somewhat cynically retorts to any protestations of ignorance the objection of ignorance: ‘Of course, 
we don’t know what the precise tastes of our remote descendants will be, but they are unlikely to 
include a desire for skin cancer, soil erosion, or the inundation of all low-lying areas as the result of 
the melting of the ice-caps. And, other things being equal, the interests of future generations cannot 
be harmed by our leaving them more choices rather than fewer’ (Barry, 1977, p. 274). 
 Whereas liberal philosophers have successfully dealt with the problems of ignorance and 
paternalism within their particular (Rawlsian) framework, the non-identity problem requires a se-
parate answer. Because those liberal philosophers in the field of environmental ethics who follow 
the approach of a negative principle of intergenerational justice hold on to Rawls’ construction of 
the original position and the connected idea of hypothetical consent, the non-identity problem takes 
a specific form. How can we choose policies at one and the same time that will affect the identity of 
the people who will live, and ask the not-yet-born to join us in taking these decisions?13 This is only 
possible by allowing potential persons to enter the negotiations behind the veil of ignorance, that is, 
people who might or might not exist, dependent on the policies the parties decide upon. So, the par-
ties have to decide whether the potential persons among them should be brought into existence or 
remain ‘potential’. Who are the people we are talking with, here, and who are we talking about? 
Due to the contingent status of future generations, the parties in the original position have to deal 
with more absurd problems such as these. Obviously, the thought experiment of the original posi-
tion, that seemed to be very clear and helpful in determining our responsibilities, requires too much 
of our abstraction and imagination as soon as those complexities are involved in the negotiations 
behind the veil of ignorance (de-Shalit, 1995).  
 But is it necessary to introduce the contingency of existence into the original position? In 
other words, do Rawls and his fellows assume a person affecting responsibility? Many liberal philo-
sophers have been puzzled about this question. Howarth, for instance, suggests that we should think 
of our obligations to future generations as mediated by a chain of obligations. The obligations to my 
great-grandchildren with whom I do not live together but whose identity is contingent upon my be-
haviour are, for instance, mediated by my obligations to my children, my children’s’ obligations to 
my grandchildren and my grandchildren’s’ obligations to my great-grandchildren. Thus, a chain of 
causal obligations is established, spanning an infinite number of generations, thereby expanding our 
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person-affecting responsibility into the indeterminate future (Howarth, 1992). Whereas Howarth 
succeeds in side-stepping the non-identity problem, another problem takes its place. Does a multi-
levelled approach such as this, offer sufficient ground for our obligations to those who will be a 
hundred generations away from us? A certain ‘discount’ of our obligations into the remote future 
seems inevitable; the more ‘chains’ in between us and future people, the less weighty our responsi-
bilities will be. In the end, our responsibilities will be nullified or outweighed other responsibilities.  
 The most promising attempt to deal with the non-identity problem is, in my view, offered by 
Hilhorst, who argues that our obligations to future generations need to not be grounded in person-
affecting relationships. That is to say, as long as we see our intergenerational responsibilities in 
terms of obligations to prevent harm, then we do have to prove how future people are affected by 
the consequences of our present behaviour, since the concept of harm is defined by one agent af-
fecting another agent. In principle we cannot hold someone responsible for our harm who did not 
personally harm us. Contrary to the concept of harm, the concept of ‘wrong’ does not imply a rela-
tionship that is mediated by personal consequences. On the contrary, were someone to leave behind 
a time-bomb in her car, her action should be regarded ‘wrong’, irrespective of who will suffer from 
the explosion. The same might be argued in case of the storage of nuclear waste. We do not need to 
listen to the complaint of identifiable future complainants in order to condemn our current policy on 
nuclear energy at this point as ‘wrong’. Hilhorst argues that we should judge in similar terms those 
unsustainable policies that will confront some future individuals – whoever they might be – with a 
fait accompli of the kind Parfit sketched before; either exist-under-these-horrible-circumstances or 
do not exist at all. To put someone in a situation like this is conceptually tantamount to blackmail. 
One forces someone into a position in which he has no other choice than to accept the current situa-
tion to which he strongly objects. In the construction of this argument Hilhorst employed 
MacLeans’ concept of the place-holder complainant. In our present choices we have to anticipate 
the potential compliant of the place-holder complainants, that is those people, whoever they may 
turn out to be, who are not being personally harmed, but who rightfully complain about their pre-
dicament, namely, the horrible position they were forced to take. By using this argument, Hilhorst 
opts for an alternative, non-personal way of dealing with our responsibility to future generations, in 
such a way, that the non-identity problem does not affect the justification anymore (Hilhorst 1987, 
p. 76-82).  
 
Reciprocity and motivation 
Whereas the problems of ignorance, paternalism and the non-identity problem seem to be met by 
this negative morality approach, the problem of reciprocity remains unsolved; there simply cannot 
be a reciprocal exchange of ‘goods’ and ‘bads’14 between contemporary and future generations. The 
intergenerational relationship allows for exchange in one way only. Whether we do good or bad to 
future generations, we will neither receive rewards nor suffer repercussions for our present beha-
viour. Our moral choices are left unsanctioned. The crucial question is whether the absence of reci-
procity precludes the acknowledgement of a moral relationship between generations within a liberal 
contractarian framework. To answer this question, it is necessary to take a close look at the liberal-
contractual understanding of moral relationships again, but now in the light of the suggested recon-
ceptualisation of the circumstances of justice. Barry and like-minded philosophers who adopted this 
negative morality approach claim that nothing obstructs the adoption of an intergenerational 
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principle of justice, now that the circumstantial requirements of moderate scarcity, relative equality 
and moderate selfishness are reconceptualised as sufficient, rather than necessary conditions. 
Theoretically speaking, this reconceptualisation comprises an ingenious exercise in order to side-
step the identified problems of justification. But if we examine what the practical implications are, 
it will become clear that this modification affects the very ambition of the theory of justice. 
 If we concentrate on the circumstance of ‘relative equality,’ for instance, what does it mean 
that the requirement of reciprocity is not considered a necessary but a sufficient condition? In my 
view, this modification implies the acknowledgement that we are likely to draw our moral motiva-
tion from reciprocal relationships, since reciprocal relationships provide us with a strong self-inte-
rest to do justice to the other, but we are nevertheless obliged to follow the principle of justice in 
non-reciprocal relationships as well. That is, we are expected to apply our principle of justice in 
situations where we are not motivated by self-interest. At this point, the implications of Barry’s 
modification conflict with the ‘weak assumptions’ which Rawls aims to secure through his design 
of the original position. Behind the veil of ignorance, the parties are not expected to act out of al-
truism or benevolence. In sharp contrast to this, such an altruistic motivation is precisely what is 
required of citizens after the veil is lifted. Citizens are expected to draw their motivation from the 
intergenerational solidarity they experience within their present community of interdependent citi-
zens, and apply this motivation to non-reciprocal relationships like those with future people. Ob-
viously, this is not what Rawls had in mind when he designed his theory. For him, this would be a 
clear-cut example of overcharging human benevolence. So, by modifying the circumstances of jus-
tice, Barry undermines the weak assumptions and ipso facto the wide appeal of Rawls’ theory of 
justice. In fact, one might argue that Barry obscures the very ground that enables Rawls to expect 
compliance of every citizen with his principles of justice. My criticism on this point reflects 
Sandel’s criticism on the discrepancy in Rawls’ theory between the weak assumptions concerning 
human nature in theory and the strong solidarity required by its application in practice (Sandel, 
1982).  
 Slightly different from what Barry suggests, Hume formulated ‘the circumstances’ to limit 
the sphere of justice in favour of the social sphere of solidarity and mutual benevolence. For Hume, 
justice is a relevant virtue, only in extreme situations, marked by scarcity and the absence of affec-
tive ties. In most situations however, where these circumstances do not obtain, we better trust on 
our moral sentiment and ‘natural’ motivation. Hume argues that too strong an emphasis on distribu-
tive justice will ruin ties of solidarity (Taylor, 1995, p. 20). Rawls, however, employs the circum-
stances of justice to assure his ‘weak assumptions’, but simultaneously aims at extending the sphere 
of justice, and ipso facto the sphere of mutual disinterestedness. As the foregoing indicates, Rawls’ 
theory of justice cannot do without the circumstances of justice, conceived of as necessary 
conditions for its application. Whereas the striving for inclusion of future generations urges us to 
drop the circumstances of justice, the application of the theory requires us to reintroduce them 
again. Thus, any liberal-contractual justification of obligations towards future generations as hypo-
thetical fellow citizens will break down on the problem of motivation. An intergenerational 
principle of justice, like that of sustainable development, cannot be justified on liberal grounds. The 
relationship of justice holds only among contemporaries. Respecting future generations is not a 
matter of justice between generations. If there is any place for a principle of justice here, it is a 
matter of justice with respect to the future.  
 Even if the lack of motivation would not preclude the justification of an intergenerational 
principle of justice, this would comprise a practical problem of its own. What inspires individual 
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citizens to take responsibility for the well-being of future generations? How can they be motivated 
to contribute to the establishment of a ‘sustainable world’? The underlying motivation would have 
to be quite strong, for our contribution to a sustainable future might require serious sacrifices. 
Liberal political theory has not yet given an adequate answer to this problem of personal commit-
ment. Why should people commit themselves to an abstract principle of intergenerational justice? 
Rather than by their commitment to procedural-democratic values and responsibilities, citizens will 
be motivated by their commitment to the traditions, ideals and projects of the community they are 
part of and to which they feel intrinsically bound. Such a personal commitment to a conception of 
the good life probably provides a stronger motivation to contribute to environmental ideals than a 
rather abstract idea of an intergenerational community of justice. These communal sources of mo-
rality have a central place in communitarian theory. Therefore, in the next part of this chapter the 
communitarian view of intergenerational responsibility will be examined (cf. de-Shalit 1995).  
 
The metaphor of the free market 
The previous problems of justification and motivation cannot easily be done away with; they are not 
incidental or merely contingent. The assumptions of reciprocity and mutual disinterestedness are 
constituent parts of the liberal way of thinking about public morality and politics. It is obvious then 
that the liberal framework itself constitutes the problem here. Its language and assumptions are not 
appropriate to deal with these kinds of problems, and this in turn raises more general questions 
about the liberal framework itself. Moreover, the assumptions of reciprocity and mutual disintere-
stedness clearly point towards the metaphor of the free market, inherent in every contract theory. 
Although they vary in purpose and outline, contract theories share at least one basic assumption as 
far as the nature of morality is concerned: morality is grounded in a rational consensus established 
in a bargaining process involving all moral parties. The manifold contract theories differ with res-
pect to the question of the object of consensus. Economic liberals such as David Gauthier argue that 
bargaining is concerned with the mutual protection of ‘rational egoists’ (cf. Gauthier, 1963). Here, 
the free market metaphor is clear. Though Rawls’ contract theory concentrates less narrowly on 
economic interests, and refers to a just distribution of social rights and obligations, his principles of 
justice are still the results of a contractual exchange of ‘goods’ and ‘bads’. Within these contractual 
terms, moral and political issues are regarded as problems of distributive justice. Even the environ-
mental crisis is conceived of as a problem of property distribution, or more precisely, as a problem 
of resource- and risk management. Furthermore, interactions between citizens and between citizen 
and state represent the structure of the trade relation. Interactions are determined by ‘calculation’, 
‘exchange’ and ‘bargain’. In fact, the very existence of the contract is the result of such a bargain: 
citizens pay the ‘price’ of their freedom for the ‘good’ of a well-ordered society. In exchange for the 
restriction on their freedom they receive the legal status of citizen.  
 The metaphor of the free market gives rise to a rather narrow understanding of rational 
choice and behaviour, as represented behind the ‘veil of ignorance’. Rawls thinks of the parties in 
the original position as ‘rational in the narrow sense’ and mutually disinterested: ‘(...) they are con-
ceived as not taking an interest in one another’s interests (...). Moreover, the concept of rationality 
must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking 
the most effective means to given ends’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 12). Rawls envisages the political com-
munity as a collection of discernible sovereign subjects, standing apart, merely involved in realising 
their own life plans. As such, the original position postulates a particular notion of the moral person, 
conceived as prior to society. By means of this thought experiment individual persons are detached 
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from the very sources – social and power relations, their natural environment, language community, 
culture and the whole set of practices – that constitute their ‘selves’ and are positioned towards 
these ‘contingencies’ in an instrumental way, as if we stand in relation to those things as ‘unencum-
bered choosers’ looking for the best option. Liberal theory in general aims to safeguard our personal 
autonomy by urging us to control all ‘external influences and claims’ that could possibly affect our 
ways of acting and thinking in a way we might not approve of. Paradoxically, by doing this, we run 
the risk of losing our receptivity to the appeal things make on us and cutting ourselves off from the 
authentic sources of meaning – that are located beyond the ‘self’. By postulating that ‘the self is 
prior to his ends’ Rawls creates a distance between me and the constituent parts of my identification 
in a way that ignores the existential nature of morality and judgement. This line of criticism will be 
examined more closely in the next section (cf. Oldfield, 1990, p. 19-20; Rawls, 1999, p. 492; Smith, 
1998; Taylor, 1992).  
 The Rawlsian picture of the moral person clearly reflects the solipsistic cogito of Descartes 
and the rational Kantian subject, whose glorification of the subject’s autonomy has been widely 
challenged. Hannah Arendt argued, for instance, that every personal act or judgement is enacted 
within an already existing ‘web of relationships’. This intersubjective level of meaning precedes 
every subjective rationality: ‘Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the hu-
man world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In 
other words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an 
author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely, 
its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author’ (Arendt, 1958b, p. 184). If our individual life stories 
and the web of human relationships are mutually interwoven, as Arendt suggests, then, obviously, 
there is more to society than a loose collection of individual choosers, and there is more to the 
common good than the mere addition of individual ends, tastes and preferences.  
 Another source of concern arises over the fact that every market economy is in need of a 
strict division between public and private matters. The basic economic activities, those of produc-
tion, bargain and trade, can only serve their public purposes if there is a private sphere where people 
are to consume, buy and reproduce (cf. Arendt, 1958b, pp. 79-135). Analogously, Rawls’ hypo-
thetical contract between ‘mutually disinterested’ persons draws a sharp distinction between the 
status of private and public concerns, that is, between contractual and non-contractual concerns. In 
general, the liberal contract is designed to keep the public requirements of citizenship as minimal as 
possible in order to maximise everyone’s personal freedom within the private sphere. Thus, a 
priority is established; private concerns are privileged over political concerns. Moreover, political 
concerns are regarded as a function of private concerns. Political debate and judgement are denied 
intrinsic value because they are to be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the private pursuit 
of happiness. By setting apart the public and private like this, individuals and groups in society are 
posited towards the common good and common concerns in an instrumental way. Political action 
and involvement are presented as instruments to achieve private goods. The entitlements we secure 
on a public level are to be ‘consumed’ within the private sphere. This is not to say that an intrinsic 
commitment to the public good is impossible. Of course, a public spirit and commitment might 
emerge in this process, but it is not required nor rewarded by the political system15. In this sense, the 
environmental crisis is only politically meaningful insofar as it threatens the freedom we experience 
                                                      
15 As we will discuss latersuch, the liberal contract aggregates private choices, but ignores the community-shaping 
function of deliberative judgments (cf. Whiteside, 1998). 
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in the private sphere. Public requirements appeal to our responsibility as consumers rather than citi-
zens.  
 The liberal state is said to aim at enabling individuals to develop, choose and pursue their 
own conception of the good or lifeplan, without interfering in these moral disputes themselves. 
Above all, this presumption raises questions concerning the possibility of such a non-ideological 
stance. Is it possible to ground a common allegiance to a contract on the preferences and needs of a 
pre-political subject (like Rawls’ parties in the original position) before they have entered public 
life? Is it possible to anticipate ones needs apart from one’s place in society, one’s ideology or re-
ligion, one’s family situation, lifestyle – in short – all things that could possibly render meaning to 
those needs? And consequently, does a liberal morality not falsely claim a second-order status? 
Though very interesting, I do not want to pursue this question here any further because they will be 
elaborated upon in section 2.3. Here, I would like to put forward more practical objections to this 
sharp distinction between the private and public spheres, between individual and citizen, and be-
tween first-order and second-order morality.  
 My first objections reflect the communitarian criticism that liberal philosophy cannot cope 
with the major societal problem we are confronted with in late- or post-modern society. As the pre-
vious analysis shows, a majority of environmental concerns can hardly be dealt with in the public 
arena because moral concerns for future generations are regarded to be of a private and first-order 
rather than public in nature. It is interesting to note that in almost every religion, world-view, ideo-
logy or lifestyle there are points of application for an intergenerational responsibility. Christians, for 
instance, find their environmental responsibility grounded in the biblical imperative of 
‘stewardship’ or the Franciscan respect for animal life, socialists draw from Marx’s ideas about the 
marginalisation of nature, and other people will start from a vegetarian or bio-dynamic lifestyle, and 
so on. However, moral commitments and arguments of these first-order kinds should not, according 
to liberal theory, play a part in the public debate. The same goes for arguments concerning the in-
trinsic value of nature in debates on biotechnology and genetic engineering, or arguments concer-
ning the ‘rights’ and welfare of animals; although a majority of people in modern society will 
acknowledge that animals are entitled to a certain moral consideration and think of the value of na-
ture in terms beyond those of human resources. These considerations are generally denied status 
within the contract and excluded from political debate because they are regarded as ‘metaphysi-
cal’16. In short, the moral concerns people find themselves intrinsically bound to are taken off the 
public agenda and left to private device. Thus, liberal politics give rise to a privatisation of moral 
dilemmas.  
                                                      
16 In Rawls’ view the issue of moral consideration for animals is beyond the limits of a theory of justice: ‘While I have 
not maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem 
that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it does not follow that there 
are no requirements at all in regard to them, nor in our relations with the natural order. Certainly it is wrong to be cruel 
to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and 
for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion and humanity in their case. I 
shall not try to explain these considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of a theory of justice, and it does not seem 
possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way. A correct conception of our relations to 
animals and to nature would seem to depend upon a theory of the natural order and our place in it. One of the tasks of 
metaphysics is to work out a view of the world which is suited for this purpose; it should identify and systematize the 
truths decisive for these questions. How far justice as fairness will have to be revised to fit into this larger theory it is 
impossible to say. But it seems reasonable to hope that if it is sound as an account of justice among persons, it cannot be 
too wrong when these broader relationships are taken into consideration’ (Rawls, 1999, pp. 448-449). 
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 This narrowing of the public agenda might seem to be at odds with the main ‘spirit’ of 
liberalism, which is said to glorify an open exchange of ideas and opinions in society. However, in 
practice, liberal theories do tend to restrict room for public debate by using contractual principles as 
‘principles of preclusion’. According to the analysis of Gutman and Thompson these principles are 
to ‘preclude fundamental moral conflict by denying certain reasons moral standing in the policy-
making process’ (Gutman & Thompson, 1990, p. 125). They serve their purpose by determining 
which issues deserve a place on the political agenda in the sense of being a legitimate subject for 
legislation. The aim of precluding conflict might narrow the agenda in such a way, that it leads to an 
impoverishment of public debate. Therefore Gutman and Thompson argue in favour of a ‘public 
philosophy of mutual respect’ which is to give room to substantive debate and conflict. They argue 
that our consensus on higher order principles should not serve to eliminate moral conflict from po-
litics, but on the contrary, should regulate moral disagreement. In stead of ‘principles of preclusion’, 
we need ‘principles of accommodation’, in which we agree how to disagree on controversial issues. 
Unfortunately, liberal philosophers have given less attention to this way of dealing with principles 
(Gutman & Thompson, 1990, p. 124). In sum, the fundamental problem seems to be that liberal 
theory conceives of this consensus on higher order principles as antecedently defined and hypothe-
tically agreed upon by the participating parties – thereby limiting the agenda – whereas Gutman and 
Thompson want this consensus to be strived for in the public debate, by the parties themselves. 
 Rawls’ way of dealing with the democratic majority rule clearly illustrates how the just sa-
vings principle serves as a principle of preclusion as well: 
 
I now wish to note the use of the procedure of majority rule as a way of achieving political settle-
ment. As we have seen, majority rule is adopted as the most feasible way to realize certain ends an-
tecedently defined by the principles of justice. Sometimes however these principles are not clear or 
define as to what they require. This is not always because the evidence is complicated and 
ambiguous, or difficult to survey and assess. The nature of the principles themselves may leave open 
a range of options rather than singling out any particular alternative. The rate of savings, for exam-
ple, is specified only within certain limits; the main idea of the just savings principle is to exclude 
certain extremes (Rawls, 1999, p. 318).  
 
Here, we see that the just savings principle itself is regarded non-negotiable. Rawls explicitly nar-
rows the scope of public debate on our responsibility for future generations to an almost trivial dis-
cussion on the exact interpretation of the just savings principle: the estimation of a just rate of sa-
vings. Thus, the antecedently defined principle itself and the definition of the problem are given a 
sovereign position, and kept beyond discussion. My criticism does not imply that liberal theory pre-
cludes or bans public debate on these principles, but rather, that it renders them redundant and 
meaningless. Liberal theory takes away the necessity to enter into debate about issues of environ-
mental responsibility. 
 By privatising environmental concerns, liberal theory tends to neglect the structural nature 
and causes of the environmental crisis, for obviously, those collective structures are beyond the ho-
rizon of interest of the environmentally spirited consumer. The mainstream liberal answer implies 
that environmental problems can be solved within the current economic, cultural and technological 
structures of liberal capitalism by cultivating environmental awareness and stimulating citizens to 
behave according to principles of sustainability. Thus, the requirements of sustainability are gene-
rally assumed to be compatible with those of the economic growth paradigm and technological pro-
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gress, underlying the structures within which people currently live and make their choices. Envi-
ronmental policy is primarily understood as an economic strategy of resource distribution and ma-
nagement that aims to regulate our means of production and consumption in such a way as to over-
come particular versions of the prisoners’ dilemma that arise within these paradigms17. Likewise, 
environmental policy and education are regarded as means to politically predetermined ends. More-
over, the basic structure of society – our common economic, social and cultural institutions – is left 
untouched by this type of analysis. In my opinion, this focus on individual change in behaviour and 
mentality falls short of an adequate analysis of the environmental crisis as a social problem. Conse-
quently the political dimensions of the environmental crisis are pushed into the background. Envi-
ronmentalists and environmental theorists have argued convincingly that ecological awareness is 
not a private concern. Considering environmental interests in our daily behaviour- and consumption 
patterns is not only a matter of individual choice. On the contrary, our daily choices and behaviour 
are continuously driven and regulated by the prevailing economic and social structures in society. 
The Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis gave the label ‘machine morality’ (moraal van de ma-
chine) to these powerful mechanisms. As long as the environmentally harmful structures and insti-
tutions remain intact, Achterhuis argues, every moral imperative, every appeal to individual mora-
lity is useless, or even hypocritical (Achterhuis, 1993).  
 For example, our ‘freedom of choice’ as consumers is severely limited by the structure of 
the global food market (its modes of production, use of energy and ‘raw material’, its social policy, 
modes of transportation and trade). If consumers have serious objections against genetic 
engineering, for instance, they will find it very hard to stick to a diet of genetically ‘sound’ soy 
bean. This controversial ingredient is blended into the most commonly used products, without con-
sumers being informed. Individual consumers hardly have any influence on the range of products 
that is offered to them, and their ecological quality. Therefore, the global food market leaves us lit-
tle choice and gives rise to particular consumption patterns. And apart from this, central govern-
ments are no longer in a position to guarantee the basic quality of the products offered to us by the 
food market. Eventually, the environmental risks and risks of safety and health are beyond the grip 
of centralised institutions because every general effort to reduce risks creates risks on another level 
that are sometimes even harder to control. For example, in order to minimise the risk that our har-
vest will be eaten by parasites, farmers started using pesticides. Unfortunately, as Rachel Carson 
warned in her famous book Silent Spring (1962), those pesticides poisoned our groundwater and 
entered into our food chain, thus becoming a threat to ourselves as well as to other animals. In re-
sponse to this risk, the agricultural industry started breeding parasite-resistant crops. However, the 
                                                      
17 In general terms the so-called ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ – formulated within early game-theory – can be formulated as 
such: in situations in which the realization of a common good requires sacrifices of all individuals of a particular group 
or society, the presumed calculative c.q. rational-economic bias of individual behaviour will discourage individuals to 
cooperate, since the benefits of each individual cooperation are uncertain and spread out over the collective, while the 
benefits of non-cooperation are certain and individually enjoyable. Ergo, the structure of this type of situation rewards 
the non-cooperative behaviour of the ‘free-rider’, who benefits from the sacrifices of fellows without sacrificing herself. 
Generally speaking, two types of solutions are proposed to overcome this dilemma. First, there is the informal ‘tit-for-
tat-startegy’ designed to realize self-regulation within small-scale groups; all individuals freely promise to act 
cooperatively. Second, in large-scale, impersonal situations there is the solution of ‘mutual coercion mutually agreed 
upon’, which comes down to the formalization of force: the enforcement of cooperative behaviour by means of sanction 
mutually agreed upon. This solution is often assumed to require a central institution – for example the state as ‘penal 
machinery’ (similar to the Leviathan of Hobbes) – that oversees compliance. Both strategies consist of providing 
assurance of fellow-cooperation, so that the barriers for cooperation are removed (the fear of free-riding fellows is then 
minimalized (cf. Van Asperen, 1993).  
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introduction of foreign and, eventually, genetically engineered crops together with the rise of mono-
cultures created risks of ecological disturbance. In order to reduce these harmful effects on the eco-
system, governments founded expert institutions, designed to measure and control the use of crops 
and pesticides. Right now, those institutions run the risk of being suffocated by the immense bu-
reaucracy and jurisdiction they engendered (Koelega, 2001). His insight in the dynamic processes 
by which centralist measures of risk control generate and disseminate even greater (social) risks 
lead Beck to describe late-modern society as a risk society. He argues that the standard responses to 
these risks – stronger state interventions – are no longer effective because they take away responsi-
bilities from the public parties on the local level where those problems have to be dealt with (Beck, 
1998). What follows from this brief analysis, is that environmental concerns are predominantly 
public concerns, which should be discussed and acted upon on a public-political level. Environ-
mental responsibility should therefore not be restricted merely to the private sphere of consumers, 
nor to the public sphere of state control. 
 The sharp distinction between private and public spheres precludes an adequate approach to 
the environmental crisis. As I argued earlier, within liberal theory the private sphere is valued as the 
primary space where people are truly free to live according to their own conception of the good or 
life-plan. The public domain is only of derivative value. Public morality and politics are necessary 
to guarantee maximum freedom within this sphere. Consequently, the liberal concept of citizenship 
is ultimately minimal and negative. Citizenship is understood as a legal status, a complex of passive 
entitlements and some heavily circumscribed duties. Furthermore, there is no obligation to partici-
pate in the public life. That means, there is no incentive to engage in the vital practices of the civil 
society; the free space occupied by media, political fora, churches, unions, environmental groups, 
organisations of farmers, neighbourhood associations and so on, independent of the state, which 
unite citizens around issues of common concern (cf. Oldfield, 1990; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 
353; Nauta, 2000; Taylor, 1995; Pettit, 1997; WRR, 1994). Within the public sphere no common 
ideals are to be pursued except for a shared conception of justice, which, as we saw, can neither 
represent the needs of future generations nor the intrinsic value of non-human nature. The liberal 
democratic state is committed only to protect the fundamental rights and interests of its present citi-
zens. The impotence of contemporary Rawlsian liberalism to cope with the challenges of the envi-
ronmental crisis is, in my opinion, rooted in this paralysing distinction between private and public 
spheres, and consequently in the minimal and negative conception of citizenship. Obviously, a more 
substantive and comprehensive understanding of politics and citizenship is needed. 
 
Conclusion 
In this section I have tried to reveal the inadequacies of the liberal framework that subtends the 
narrow understanding of sustainable development for environmental education. First and foremost, 
I have argued that Rawlsian liberal ethics cannot include obligations towards future generations 
because such generations are beyond the reach of our reciprocal relationships. However, in his re-
cent paper Creating Green Citizens? Political Liberalism and Environmental Education (2004) 
Derek R. Bell argues that my understanding of both the nature and the place of Rawls’s theory are 
‘flawed’. For Rawls, reciprocity is not the same as mutual dependency, so he argues. Instead, re-
ciprocity is itself a political ideal: “A society regulated by the principle of reciprocity is one in 
which all citizens who do their part benefit fairly from their mutual cooperation. Citizens from non-
overlapping generations cannot be mutually dependent but they can be engaged in a single coopera-
tive venture, which for Rawls is ‘realizing an preserving a just society’ (...). For Rawls, there is no 
because we are human 
 46 
‘problem of reciprocity’ because his notion of ‘reciprocity’ – as the fair allocation of benefits and 
burdens between those engaged in a cooperative scheme – is perfectly compatible with the idea of 
justice between generations” (Bell, 2004, p. 46).  
 In response, I would like to emphasise that Bell is right in stressing that Rawls – in some 
places – opts for a more broad interpretation of reciprocity between citizens in terms of ‘equal fair-
ness’. However, as I have previously argued, he cannot maintain this broad interpretation, because 
at another point in his magnificent theoretical construction Rawls makes the application of the prin-
ciples of justice dependent on certain empirical conditions – the ‘circumstances of justice’. As we 
have seen, the strong and wide appeal of Rawls’ theory is mainly due to the fact that he derives 
strong obligations from weak assumptions concerning human nature. He does not assume a spark of 
altruism from the contracting parties. The ‘circumstances of justice’ are adopted in order to secure 
these weak assumptions. They outline the ‘normal conditions’ under which human cooperation is 
both possible and necessary, and thus, a conception of justice is needed. If these circumstances do 
not hold, or one of them does not hold, the principle of justice can find no application. Therefore, 
the ‘circumstances’ function as a constraint on the applicability of ‘justice as fairness’. The ‘cir-
cumstance of relative equality’ requires that the parties ‘are roughly similar in physical and mental 
powers; or at any rate, their capacities are comparable in that no one among them can dominate the 
rest. They are vulnerable to attack, and all are subject to having their plans blocked by the united 
force of others’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 110). Obviously, our hypothetical relationship with future genera-
tions does not fit into this picture. Owing to our privileged position in time, we – contemporaries – 
can block the presumed plans or range of options of future generations. Furthermore, they cannot 
harm us in return. We are invulnerable towards future generations. Conversely, future generations 
are dependent on our capricious feelings of benevolence, or the coincidental convergence of their 
interests with our self-interest. Therefore, in my view, the principle of justice can find no applica-
tion in an intergenerational context.  
 Of course, this negative conclusion concerns the Rawlsian liberal framework. As such, the 
scope of my criticism is limited to the Rawlsian discourse on intergenerational responsibility. 
Strictly speaking, I have not yet provided sufficient arguments that allow me to rule out the possibi-
lity of an alternative liberal framework that is fruitful with respect to the issue at hand, though I 
would not know any author in the field of liberal political theory who has provided a theory as well-
defined and influential as Rawls’. While one should indeed be cautious when it comes to making 
generalisations on based on my conclusions concerning liberal theory in general, in the last part of 
this section I have put forward some arguments in support of my view that it will be very unlikely 
for any liberal political theory to deal with the issue of future responsibility in a satisfactory way. 
First, I have shown that a contractual understanding of justice is less neutral than its advocates want 
us to believe. In fact, the contractual notion of intergenerational responsibility – captured by the 
narrow understanding of sustainable development – posits an economic-distributive and anthropo-
centric perspective on the issue of environmental responsibility. This perspective leaves intact the 
problematic underlying structures of society within which citizens make their choices and their be-
haviour is being regulated.  
 Secondly, liberal theory privileges autonomous citizenship in a way that places the self at a 
distance from his sources of meaning and identification. As such, it is likely to assume that the in-
centives inherent to the contract will elicit an instrumental rather than an intrinsic involvement in 
public affairs. The sharp distinction between private and public concerns easily leads to an impove-
rished practice of environmental morality and politics. Furthermore, in contrast to liberal minima-
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lism, the creation of a shared environmental morality requires intense political debate and struggle. 
It requires debate and struggle about such moral questions as: what does the future mean to us? 
What kind of world do we want for our children and grandchildren? Which sacrifices are we pre-
pared to make now in order to realise this? I have argued that these questions can no longer be re-
stricted to the private sphere but have to be confronted in the public arena of environmental politics 
and education. My criticism of the liberal framework of intergenerational responsibility will be ela-
borated in section 2.3. 
 The meaningfulness of these questions itself reveals that there must be some other kind of 
reciprocity between us and those unknown descendants, who will live centuries from now, albeit 
that this is not a reciprocity in any strict, procedural sense. We need a sense of the future in order to 
make our life here and now worthwhile. We need a sense of continuity – a sense that our worries, 
hopes and dreams have not been in vain because life on earth will continue, and our worldly activi-
ties and projects will be carried on. Maybe we – reflexive creatures that we are – need the idea that 
there will be future generations to remember us, just as we remember – and sometimes praise – past 
generations for who they were and what they did (for us). In short, the idea of a virtual bond with 
past and future generations seems to be an anthropological sine qua non for humans to make sense 
of their life. From this perspective, our moral obligations towards future generations might turn out 
to be less free-floating than the assumptions of procedural contractualism suggest. For one thing is 
clear, the liberal notion of intergenerational justice seems to present us with a false dichotomy. 
Either it leads to a wishy-washy domestication of environmentalism – treating ecological values and 
standards as mere lifestyle options – or it ends in practices of indoctrination – imposing sustainable 
development as a firm ideology upon (future) citizens.  
 In my view, a proper justification of intergenerational responsibility should not only be logi-
cally consistent, but should simultaneously articulate our personal commitment to a common future. 
Obviously, liberal theory not only fails to meet the first condition but the latter as well, because in 
my eyes it abstracts too much from the things we care for, here and now. The communitarian analy-
sis of intergenerational responsibility – which will be central in the next section – starts with these 
communal sources of meaning and value. 
 
 
2.2 Future generations as heirs of our community 
 
That which binds us together as a society is not merely a common understanding of justice, but a 
common history, a common culture, morality and identity as well, thus communitarian critics stress 
in response to the liberal focus on rights and justice between individuals. Consequently, they argue, 
our obligations to future generations should not be regarded as exclusively determined by our indi-
vidual allegiance to a contract of justice. Primarily, intergenerational duties arise from our commit-
ment to the communal practices in which we are involved, and our commitment to the continuity of 
those practices. We take responsibility for future generations because they will be the heirs of our 
community, and as such, they represent our hope and trust in a prosperous future for our commu-
nity. They will have to carry on our communal traditions, projects and ideals after our own death. 
To sum up, it is not our allegiance to the community of justice but the solidarity we experience wit-
hin our moral community, which obliges us to take care for future generations.  
 Therefore, communitarians do not locate the source of our responsibilities beyond our ‘sel-
ves’ – within the claims of future generations – but within our present identity as community mem-
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bers. The objects of our present strivings do not cease to exist with our lives. On the contrary, our 
commitments reach beyond our own demise into the indeterminate future. John Passmore, for in-
stance, notes on his commitment to philosophy ‘To love philosophy – to philosophise with joy – is 
to care about its future as a form of activity: to maintain that what happens to it after our death is of 
no consequence would be a clear indication that our “love of philosophy” is nothing more than a 
form of self-love’ (Passmore, 1974, p. 88). Inherent to our membership of a moral community is a 
sense of continuity. We participate, so that those activities we care about continue to exist. Without 
basic trust in the continuity of our projects and activities after our death, most if not all present ef-
forts would lose their meaning. Communitarians therefore start with the things we care about here 
and now. Furthermore, they examine what kind of responsibilities human beings take up by caring 
for something near and dear.  
 The most detailed communitarian theory of intergenerational responsibility is presented by 
the Israeli philosopher Avner de-Shalit in his influential book Why Posterity Matters (1995). In line 
with the intuitions previously expressed, De-Shalit derives strong obligations to future generations 
from our sense of belonging to a community that stretches out over several generations, i.e. from 
the membership of a transgenerational community. The life span of a community covers a longer 
period than the life span of one of its members. Unlike Rawls’ contractual understanding of the 
community of justice, membership of this community is not contingent upon personal consent or 
choice. We cannot swap communities – leave communities and enter others – like we change 
clothes. My ties to the community are not external to my self, but on the contrary, they define me. 
These ties and commitments are in a sense constitutive for personal identity. As such, de-Shalits 
understanding of the relationship between individual and community corresponds with the well-
known communitarian thesis of the ‘embedded self’, as expressed by Sandel, Taylor, MacIntyre and 
many others. De-Shalit expresses this thesis by recalling the Aristotelian insight that ‘he who lives 
outside the community is either too good or too bad, either subhuman or superhuman, or in other 
words, non-human’ (de-Shalit, 1995, p. 15). Specific to his theory, however, is the thesis that we are 
embedded in a community that covers more than those generations with whom we live together; a 
sense of connectedness with those members who gave shape to our community as we inherited it, 
and those members who will carry on our heritage into the future. Against this background, de-
Shalit criticises liberal theory for abstracting the individual from the community he is bound to, and 
thereby, cutting him off from the personal sources of meaning and inspiration. Second order values, 
like impartiality and tolerance, will not be strong enough to motivate the kind of sacrifice and effort 
that an adequate approach to the environmental crisis will require of us. 
 
The transgenerational community and moral similarity 
Whereas de-Shalit appeals to strong and convincing examples of transgenerational communities – 
ranging from the Tibetan Buddhists to the British Labour Party – he experiences huge difficulties in 
his effort to define what precisely constitutes an intergenerational community. As his argument pro-
ceeds, de-Shalit comes up with three necessary characteristics of a transgenerational community. If 
these characteristics do not hold in the intergenerational relationship, then there is insufficient 
ground for obligations to past and future generations. First, there is the characteristic of cultural in-
teraction, second the characteristic of moral similarity and, third, the characteristic of reflection. 
These conditions are closely interrelated, and I will address them as such, since one follows from 
the other. For instance, de-Shalit argues that cultural interaction between people presupposes a cer-
tain degree of moral similarity; we need a common stock of values that functions as a moral back-
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ground for conversation: ‘In every genuine community some values and some attitudes towards 
moral and political questions are common to most people and serve as a background or as a frame-
work when the members engage in discourse on their political and social life’ (de-Shalit, 1995, p. 
27-28). A genuine community, de-Shalit argues, is one whose members are in search of moral 
similarity. However, the conditions of interaction and moral similarity appear to be extremely 
problematic in our relationship to future generations, as Martin Golding argued in one of the first 
philosophical papers on this issue, titled Justice between generations (1972).  
 In Goldings’ view – which we would now label communitarian – the existence of a social 
community is of decisive importance for the establishment of obligations. We measure our 
obligations by reference to our relationship to those who make a demand on us. Whether the claim 
of the other will be recognised by me, and whether I ought to feel obliged to respond to his or her 
claim, depends on the existence of a moral relationship. Knowing the values and ideals of the other 
is necessary, though not enough, Golding argues, for I could still simply ignore or reject his con-
ception of the good. For the establishment of a moral relationship it is necessary that I recognise 
that ‘his good is good to me’. That is, I should count his ‘good’ to be mine as well. Both parties 
have to share a common good. Only if I acknowledge his good as mine, can I feel obliged to contri-
bute to the conditions of his good life. For this reason, our obligations to strangers are never imme-
diately clear from the start. Suppose, for instance, that we were visited by creatures from a far-away 
planet, say Mars. In order to lay claim to our achievements and share in our wealth, Golding expects 
those strangers to emphasise their moral similarity to us: ‘your good is our good’. Initially, we 
would probably reject their claims because ‘they are not like us’. However, as the interactions bet-
ween them and us increase, we will gradually be more inclined to recognise them as ‘one of us’. 
And consequently, we will be inclined to recognise their claims and will take our obligations to 
them more seriously. In a similar way, our history reveals a gradual extension of civil rights to la-
bourers, women and children (Golding 1972).  
 What are the consequences of Goldings’ analysis for the establishment of obligations to fu-
ture generations? Whether we should feel obliged to contribute to the well-being of future 
generations depends on the possibility of sharing a common good. Obviously, we do not share a 
common life with future people. Therefore, we lack the opportunity of interaction with future 
people, and ipso facto, we lack the opportunity of developing a common ideal or conception of the 
good. Their good is not necessarily good to us, and our good is not necessarily good to them. For 
this reason, Golding draws a rather pessimistic conclusion: ‘It appears to me that the more remote 
the members of this community are, the more problematic our obligations to them become. That 
they are members of our moral community is highly doubtful, for we probably do not know what to 
desire for them’ (Golding 1972, p. 97). Therefore Golding argues that since there is no common 
moral framework we can rely on, we should keep our hands off their good life. 
 In general, face-to-face interaction is assumed to be a necessary characteristic of a moral 
community. Though de-Shalit agrees with Golding that intergenerational obligations should be 
grounded in a common conception of the good, and though he agrees that a certain kind of interac-
tion between the moral parties is a preresquite for the establishment of such a common good, de-
Shalit does not believe that this interaction should necessarily be a face-to-face interaction. The ob-
vious impossibility of direct communication between people, who do not exist simultaneously, does 
not preclude other kinds of cultural interaction between and across generations. In our human co-
existence as cultural and historical beings there are many indications to be found for intergenera-
tional interaction. De-Shalit, for instance,points to the interaction embodied in a common canon of 
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artworks, evolving traditions, stories and rituals. By engaging in a common culture, by revaluating 
our great works of art, by retelling our stories and carrying on our traditions and rituals in our own 
way, we are in conversation with our ancestors, and we are inviting future generations to respond 
and carry on. Every cultural act inserts itself into a historically evolved tradition and alludes to 
some future apprehension. In my view, this profound insight is most eloquently expressed in the 
hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer reveals that if we are to make sense of ancient 
works of art, if we want those works to ‘speak’ to us, a fusion of horizons ought to be established 
between the ancient world of the artwork and ours. Such a fusion of horizons into a common hori-
zon of significance cannot be established directly, because we are connected to those ancient works 
of art by means of an ‘effective history’ (eine Wirkungsgeschichte), that is, a trace of interpretations 
that its reception left behind in the course of history. Only by following this conversation of the 
intergenerational community of reception throughout the years that divide us, we will be able to 
bridge the time-gap in between us and the ancient work of art (Gadamer, 1960). 
 So, apart from the face-to-face interaction that we enjoy as contemporaries, there is a kind of 
genuine interaction between generations and continuity across generations that allows us to speak of 
a transgenerational community. This is most obvious, when looking at the history of moral commu-
nities from the outside: ‘From the perspective of the outsider, the community remains constant over 
generations although its members change; people die and others are born, but we continue to speak 
of the same community: the British Labour party, the Tibetan Buddhists, etc.’ (de-Shalit 1995, p. 
21). More problematic and controversial however is de-Shalits thesis that underlying this interaction 
and continuity is a search for moral similarity: ‘Cultural interaction, then, exists when, in addition to 
the common language, codes, and tradition of symbols, there is a cultural, moral and political de-
bate. That is when people accept that they are governed by common values and principles’ (de-
Shalit 1995, p. 25). What is unclear is what de-Shalit precisely means by postulating ‘a search for 
moral similarity’. Obviously, de-Shalit believes communities organise themselves around shared 
moral and political values, and these shared values form an interpretative framework. He uses the 
metaphor of ‘moral spectacles’ to indicate the function of these shared values as a backdrop for po-
litical debate.  
 However, it still remains unclear as to what the status and ‘thickness’ of this moral simila-
rity are. In his careful search for a profound position, de-Shalit finds himself in between two 
positions to which he is not ready to subscribe. First, the moral similarity he has in mind is not fixed 
or given beforehand by some religious authority or metaphysical doctrine, as some conservative 
communitarians seem to suggest. De-Shalit is reluctant towards thick notions of community which 
are thought to determine our moral values. Moreover, de-Shalit argues that the notion of a moral 
community should be compatible with the notion of the ‘free and rational agent’. That means that, 
in his view, membership should be self-chosen, members should reflect on their membership and 
the values embodied in their community practices. Furthermore, the community should remain open 
to debate and change. If these conditions do not hold, de-Shalit argues, there can be no transgenera-
tional community in a genuine communitarian sense (de-Shalit 1995, p. 16-17). So, the moral simi-
larity he proposes is less thick, and its status is less solid than the moral similarity of many fellow 
communitarians. On the other hand the moral similarity de-Shalit has in mind is thicker than that 
which the liberal contract allows since it includes a shared self-understanding. And the common 
good encompasses comprehensive cultural and moral values that would obviously conflict with the 
liberal demand of impartiality and neutrality. However, the moral similarity de-Shalit postulates, is 
of an empirical rather than a Rawlsian transcendental nature. The change of values is more like a 
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cultural evolution or the expression of an ongoing conversation, than a result of procedural delibe-
ration.  
 
Obligations to immediate and remote posterity 
The concept of a transgenerational community enables de-Shalit to establish strong obligations for 
future generations that go beyond the minimal obligations of distributive justice. After all, we 
should regard future descendants as the heirs of our community with whom we share a common 
conception of the good life. And because of this commonality we are able to judge what is good for 
them and enjoy a moral relationship. In de-Shalits own words: ‘In this theory, one’s self-awareness 
is related to one’s community, both in the present and in the future, i.e. in relation to the aims, de-
sires, ideas, dreams and values of the transgenerational community. By extending the community to 
include future generations, I have argued that obligations are owed directly to them, and that since 
these obligations are owed directly to them, and since these obligations derive from the community 
that constitutes our “selves”, contemporaries should take these obligations very seriously, as they 
indeed have good reasons to do’ (de-Shalit, 1995, p. 124). Thus, communitarian theory appears to 
liberate us from the problems of neutrality, paternalism and ignorance. Unlike Rawls’ contract 
community, the transgenerational community provides us with a base for strong, positive and nega-
tive obligations to future generations: ‘That is, we should consider them when deciding on envi-
ronmental policies; we should not overburden them; furthermore we should supply them with 
goods, especially those goods that we believe are and will be necessary to cope with the challenges 
of life, as well as other, more non-essential goods’ (de-Shalit, 1995, p.13). 
 However, since the transgenerational community is not immune to change, its life-span is 
not unlimited. De-Shalit is ready to admit that the transgenerational community does not reach into 
the indefinite future because our moral similarity with future generations will diminish with the 
passage of time. Inevitably, there will be a particular moment in the future, when we nolonger re-
cognise their good as ours. In the evolution of practices and traditions, the embedded goods will 
gradually transform into goods that are too far removed from the goods that once made our lives 
worthwhile. Consequently, we will no longer feel obliged and motivated to contribute to the condi-
tions of their good life. At that particular moment in the future, our membership of the transgenera-
tional community comes to an end, and our obligations fade away. De-Shalit stresses that we should 
not want to have it otherwise, if we take the normative requirement of a genuine transgenerational 
community seriously: ‘We can reasonably predict that changes in technology, together with other 
factors, will lead to changes in the values held by future people. What is more, we would like this to 
happen, or at least to know that reflection will take place and that if future generations agree with 
our norms, values and policies, it is because they find them good and not because they have not re-
flected upon them. Ultimately, we would rather be sure that our transgenerational community is a 
genuine constitutive community than see our values forever accepted without a reasoning process 
taking place’ (de-Shalit 1995, p. 50).  
 When future generations are no longer part of our community, our strong obligations to-
wards them vanish because there is no moral similarity between them and us anymore. For this rea-
son, de-Shalit introduces a sharp distinction between our obligations to immediate posterity and 
those to remote posterity. We have strong, positive and negative obligations towards those future 
generations closer to us. That means that we are in a sense, co-responsible for their realisation of the 
good life. We should consider their good as ours and contribute to the conditions of their good life: 
‘(…) we should supply them with goods, especially those goods that we believe are and will be 
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necessary to cope with the challenges of life, as well as other, more non-essential goods’ (de-Shalit 
1995, p. 13). As time goes by, these strong obligations fade away until they have completely 
vanished. But this does not imply that we do not owe them anything, that we do not have to con-
sider their needs in any way. According to de-Shalit we still have a negative duty to prevent ‘severe 
predictable harm’ to the life conditions of remote posterity: ‘To people of the very remote future we 
have a strong ‘negative’ obligation – namely, to avoid causing them enormous harm or bringing 
them death, and try to relieve any potential and foreseeable distress’ (de-Shalit, 1995, p. 13). Our 
obligations to those future generations are similar to our obligations to strangers. These negative 
obligations cannot be derived from a common good but are grounded on universal principles of 
humanity. With a reference to Rawls’ theory, de-Shalit notes that: ‘This is a matter of humanity 
rather than of justice. The difference between the two is that justice is concerned with principles of 
ownership or the control of resources, while humanity is concerned with people’s well-being. It re-
quires us to avoid the infliction of suffering and to relieve it where it occurs’ (de-Shalit, 1995, p. 
63). The split between strong communitarian and weak humanitarian obligations corresponds 
closely to our common sense intuitions, de-Shalit argues. We are more prepared to contribute to the 
good life of those future people near and dear to us than for those far-away people we can hardly 
picture, although we would not want to harm either one (de-Shalit, 1995, p. 13). 
   
Evaluation 
Where does this communitarian approach lead us to? By taking the powerful concept of a transge-
nerational community as a ground for justification of the establishment of duties to future 
generations, de-Shalit ingeniously dissolves the four problems of justification that liberal 
contractualists see themselves confronted with (see 2.1). First, the problem of reciprocity does not 
arise, because our obligation to consider the good of future generations is not dependent on a situa-
tion of mutual dependency in which the parties are assumed to be motivated to cooperate out of 
mutual self-interest. Moreover, it is because of the good life we share that we are intrinsically moti-
vated to respect one another. Second, de-Shalit has overcome the problem of ignorance by under-
standing future generations as fellow-members of our community who are very much like us. We 
know what to wish for them, because their good is ours as well. Choices about what to sustain for 
them are made on grounds of a shared conception of the good. Third, the problem of paternalism 
does not hold, for, according to communitarian theory, intergenerational relationships are in a sense 
paternalistic by nature. In a sense, paternalism can be seen as a function of the intergenerational 
transmission of community practices and traditions. That means, we act out of their interest by ac-
ting out of the interest of our community. Fourth, communitarian theory liberates us from the diffi-
culties of the non-identity problem, since its thesis does not depend on the claims of those who will 
be personally affected by our present action, but on our striving for continuation of our communal 
practices. For this reason, de-Shalit does not have to employ a gloomy distinction between potential 
and actual persons (cf. de-Shalit, 1995, p. 125; Feinberg, 1974b). 
 It is indeed fascinating to see how these four problems of justification lose their significance 
in a communitarian framework, but more important is de-Shalit’s answer to the problem of motiva-
tion, as I stipulated earlier. How are we assumed to be motivated to do justice to posterity? Ac-
cording to communitarians, our desire to secure a liveable world for future generations follows 
naturally from the fulfilment we find in our lives, here and now. In fact, de-Shalit locates the source 
of intergenerational obligations in our present commitments to those values and ideals embedded in 
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our community practices that constitute our identity. That is, a genuine self-awareness obliges us to 
consider the good life of future members of our community. 
 Another advantage of the communitarian view of intergenerational responsibility is the 
acknowledgement that the environmental crisis comprises a complex of collective problems that 
requires collective responsibilities rather than individual choices. We have to act, not because our 
individual rights, needs or properties are in danger. Moreover, it is because our ‘common goods’ are 
being affected or even threatened with extinction as a result of collective behaviour. This collective 
threat requires us to determine which goods constitute our community life and should be preserved 
for the heirs of our community. Understood in this way, the common good is more than a mere sum 
of individual preferences or a convergence of private interests, as some liberal theorists suggest. 
The whole is more than the sum of its parts, since the common good is constituted in public dis-
course or to be more precise, it is mediated by common practices in which we come to recognise 
our good in the eyes of others. More than a passive consent of individual parties, the common good 
requires an active identification and commitment of the community that sustains it (cf. Taylor, 
1995, p. 31-34). Therefore, communitarian theory allows for a more comprehensive practice of citi-
zenship. The sustaining of our common good calls for an active participation in communal practices 
and a personal responsibility for community life.  
 Unfortunately, there are fundamental problems, apart from these strengths, that are also con-
nected to this communitarian model of intergenerational justice. The most obvious weakness is its 
limited scope of justification, in temporal as well as ‘social distance’. To start with the latter: since 
de-Shalit derives obligations from the goods that bind us together as community members, neither 
do our obligations reach beyond the limits of our moral community. Therefore it is unclear how 
communitarian obligations are to contribute to an effective approach of environmental problems of 
a global scale. De-Shalit might respond that everyone should care for its own community-members, 
and as such, every single person on this globe is being cared for. However, on this particular point, 
the idea of a strong transgenerational community rests on a more or less outdated view of society. 
De-Shalit appeals to the picture of a stable society neatly compartmentalised into coherent commu-
nities, along religious and ideological lines. Its members are assumed to live and die within the 
same community and are assumed to devote their lives to the ideals and projects of this particular 
community. However, this picture is in sharp contrast with the reality of late- or post-modern 
society, profoundly marked by plurality and a general shift from a standard biography to a choice 
biography. Sociologists argue that individual lifestyles take precedence, that internally coherent 
communities are being threatened with extinction and our common values as a society are becoming 
subject to erosion. With this loss of unity, an appeal to community spirit loses its grip.  
 The problem of limited inclusiveness repeats itself in the time dimension: it remains unclear 
as well how far communitarian obligations reach into the future. Does our collective responsibility 
cover a time span of three generations, or perhaps ten or twenty? De-Shalit is ready to admit that the 
transgenerational community is limited in time, but he veils himself in rather vague terms when it 
comes down to concrete questions with an empirical bearing, such as: how are we to determine – 
with only present knowledge available to us – at which particular moment in the future our commu-
nity stops being our community? Here the problem of ignorance rears its ugly head again, albeit in a 
different way. 
 Finally, and in connection with the latter, there are fundamental objections that should be 
made against the expression of community commitments and solidarity in terms of abstract values, 
in particular, in situations where communities claim exclusive ownership of those values, as if it 
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were possible to patent something like ‘genuine respect for posterity’. This objection is most clearly 
articulated by Blake, Smeyers, Smith and Standish: ‘(...) it is arguably a failing of communitaria-
nism to characterise this interconnectivity in abstract terms of values and principles, rather than in 
terms of interlocking and sometimes mutually interfering narratives. In emphasising supposedly 
shared abstractions rather than the concrete projects of making sense, in and amongst each others’ 
lives, communitarianism risks becoming yet one more variety of negative nihilism, positing some 
kind of transcendent sense of the good, over against meaning and value immanently constructed by 
ourselves’ (Blake et al., 2001, p. 45). Thus, communitarian theory cannot come to grips with the 
reality of late- or post-modern citizens. They no longer enjoy an all-embracing membership of one 
community, but participate in varying associations and practices. And from their disparate commit-
ments they extract disparate roles, identities and loyalties, which sometimes conflict with one 
another (cf. Mouffe, 2000, p. 59; Van Gunsteren, 1992, p. V-VI). As such, de-Shalit seems to adopt 
a rather static concept of personal identity. In other words, de-Shalit glorifies the idea of a pre-poli-
tical community (in contrast to the liberal glorification of a pre-political individual) but fails to re-
cognise the reality and power of political community or the civil society. In the next section I will 
argue that an intergenerational ethic should take its bearings from this powerful public sphere, inde-
pendent of the private world of the family and moral community on the one hand, but independent 
of direct state intervention and public institutions on the other.  
 
 
2.3 Future generations as imagined strangers  
 
Until now both liberals and communitarians have failed to give an adequate account of our respon-
sibility for future generations. Whereas Rawls’ attempt to include future citizens in the contract 
community fails because of the absence of reciprocity – understood as mutual dependence – be-
tween people of different generations, de-Shalit assumes a substantive communal reciprocity that is 
too limited of scope and, even in its limited form, no longer present in late-modern society. The 
shortcomings of both perspectives are in my view due to the fact that they abstract too much from 
the actual political community that binds us together as citizens, namely the civil society. The civil 
society defines the intermediate, public sphere of voluntary associations between citizens, beyond 
the private sphere of the family and moral community, but also independent of immediate state in-
tervention. This is the sphere where public opinion on environmental issues is raised, where debate 
about the institutionalisation of ecological responsibility takes place, where parties hold one another 
responsible for their involvement with the natural environment, and where the public agenda is set-
tled. Moreover, this is the sphere where people identify themselves as political actors and where 
they engage in collective action and take responsibility for the public good. In this section I will 
draw on the ideas of traditional civil republicans, such as Hannah Arendt and Adrian Oldfield, as 
well as on the ideas of new representatives within this progressive school of thought, some of whom 
call themselves neo-republicans, others as civil society theorists, and still others as advocates of a 
radical democracy (as distinguished from the ideal of a deliberative democracy in the Habermasian 
or Rawlsian tradition), such as Chantal Mouffe. Altogether, those authors have inspired me to de-
velop an alternative account of citizenship and future responsibility; an account that I will refer to as 
a neo-republican account. I will present my alternative account of citizenship, by contrasting my 
ideas and arguments with those of liberal and communitarian theory.  
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The civil society and its citizens 
Within liberal theory the private sphere is valued as the primary space where people are truly free to 
live according to their own conception of the good life. The public domain is only of a derivative 
value: public morality and politics are necessary to guarantee maximum freedom within this sphere. 
Consequently, the liberal concept of citizenship is ultimately minimal and negative. Citizenship is 
understood as a legal status, a complex of passive entitlements and some heavily circumscribed du-
ties. Furthermore, there is no active responsibility or obligation to participate in public life. Within 
the public sphere no common ideals are to be pursued except for a shared conception of justice, 
which, as we saw, can neither include future generations nor non-human nature. The impotence of 
contemporary liberalism to cope with the challenges of the environmental crisis is, in my opinion, 
rooted in this paralysing distinction between private and public spheres, and consequently in the 
minimal and negative conception of citizenship. Obviously, a more substantive and comprehensive 
understanding of environmental politics is needed. In their response to liberal minimalism, commu-
nitarians have succeeded in locating the communal sources that give meaning to our life and future 
life. Moreover, they promote an active participation in community practices. However, in my view, 
communitarians altogether fail to formulate an adequate alternative for the liberal contract doctrine, 
because the participation and common commitment they require is limited to the private sphere as 
well, albeit not the private sphere of the individual, but that of the moral community. Therefore, in 
my opinion, communitarian theory is not so much about citizenship as it is about about community 
membership (and as such perfectly compatible with the liberal ideal of citizenship). Insofar as 
communitarians do address issues of citizenship, they tend to speak to citizens as spokespersons of 
their community. In this sense, communitarians reconfirm the liberal hierarchy between private and 
public spheres. Whereas liberalism resorts to a pre-political private subject, communitarianism em-
braces the idea of a pre-political community. 
 Following the neo-republican analysis along general lines, I would like to argue that a viable 
democracy, one which is strong enough to deal with the societal problems arising from the envi-
ronmental crisis, is in need of a more comprehensive and substantive theory and practice of politics. 
Obviously, a revaluation is needed of the traditional liberal hierarchy between private and public 
spheres. A reversal of this hierarchy is commonly proposed within the neo-republican tradition of 
political thought, expressed by manifold philosophers throughout western history, moving from an-
cient Greece (Aristotle) and Rome (Cicero) to Machiavelli and modern philosophers like Hegel, 
Rousseau and Arendt. In contrast to the liberal glorification of private life, the main emphasis of 
neo-republicanism is on the intrinsic value of political life. According to some, political life is even 
superior to ‘the merely private pleasures’ of family, community and neighbourhood, dictated as 
they are by the biological necessities of human consumption and reproduction. In this view, politi-
cal action comprises ‘the highest form of human living together’ (Arendt, 1958a; Honohan, 2002; 
Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, p. 362; Oldfield, 1990, p. 6). 
 According to Hannah Arendt, for instance, human destiny lies on the public stage; the 
highest human capacities, those of public speech and action, are realised in political debate and 
struggle and find their home in the public arena. Only here, are human beings able to live together 
as free and equal, though radically different beings. It is within our ‘intersubjective web of human 
relationships’ that individual words and acts acquire a public meaning. Simultaneously, in public 
speech and action a glimpse of our personal ‘self’ is being expressed. In public action we expose 
ourselves, we display who we are and what we stand for. However, our words and actions do not 
express a pre-given essence or identity. On the contrary, our self is constituted by the public expres-
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sion itself; we create ourselves anew in words and actions by enacting our life stories in a public 
web of narratives, meanings and relationships. In this view, the activities of the citizen are premised 
on the demands of freedom, whereas the labour of the animal laborans – the labourer – is dictated 
by the biological necessities of life, and the work of the homo faber – the working man – is con-
trolled by a compulsive instrumentality (Arendt, 1958b). 
 There is, however, a difference between this neo-Athenian tradition of thinking about 
citizenship, that elevates political activity to the rank of a supreme end in human life, and the neo-
Roman tradition in which our civil activities are regarded intrinsically valuable among other activi-
ties we engage in as family members, professionals, community members, lovers and so on. In this 
latter view, our civil responsibilities do not necessarily transcend other responsibilities and loyalties. 
However, in contrast to the liberal conception of citizenship-as-legal-status, both neo-republican 
sources value citizenship as a desirable activity, an active responsibility shared with fellow-citizens. 
In this view, citizens should engage in common practices and debates on the problems they find 
themselves confronted with. Insofar as one can speak of a common morality, purpose, good or 
ideal, these are not given beforehand. Rather, these goods and ideals are continuously defined, re-
defined and evoked in the political debate and struggle itself (cf. Oldfield, 1990; Kymlicka & Nor-
man, 1994, p. 353; Nauta, 2000; Taylor, 1995; Pettit, 1997; WRR, 1994).  
 Iseult Honohan offers a definition of neo-republicanism that clearly distinguishes this school 
of political thought from that of liberalism and communitarianism (while acknowledging that there 
are also similarities among these schools of thought):  
 
Civic republicanism addresses the problem of freedom among human beings who are necessarily 
interdependent. As a response it proposes that freedom, political and personal, may be realized 
through membership of a political community in which those who are mutually vulnerable and share 
a common fate may jointly be able to exercise some collective direction over their life (...) In this ap-
proach, freedom is related to participation in self-government and concern for the common good 
(...). Emphasising responsibility for common goods sets republicanism apart from libertarian theo-
ries centred on individual rights. Emphasising that these common goods are politically realised sets 
republicanism apart from neutralist liberal theories which exclude substantive questions of values 
and the good life from politics. Finally, emphasising the political construction of the political com-
munity distinguishes republicans from those communitarians who see politics as expressing the pre-
political shared values of a community (Honohan, 2002, p. 1). 
 
As opposed to the mainstream liberal conception of a common good as an addition of convergent 
goods that can be defined prior to public discourse, Honohan states that the common good is con-
stituted by public discourse itself: ‘The model of common good central to republican politics is that 
of intersubjective recognition in the joint practices of self-government by citizens who share certain 
concerns deriving from their common vulnerability’ (Honohan, 2002, p. 156). And elsewhere:  
 
The common good is realised in the activities of participants for whom membership in the commu-
nity of the practice is part of living a worthwhile life (...). The common good towards which members 
are oriented is the flourishing of those practices, and this depends on the quality of participation of 
members. Thus there are common goods which are not decomposable into individually distributed 
goods, and cannot be understood wholly instrumentally. These goods are neither a property of the 
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whole, nor determined by the goal of an organic entity. Thus, in this context, it is more appropriate 
to speak of common goods than “the” unitary common good (Honohan, 2002, p. 153-154).  
 
Common goods, as distinct from convergent ones, depend on common meanings and practices that 
are socially defined and closely interconnected. You cannot, for example, be a vegetarian in a 
society of meat-eaters that is unfamiliar with vegetarianism. Others will simply fail to recognise the 
reasons the vegetarian expresses for not eating meat: he will either be declared insane or he will be 
looked at as someone who does not enjoy meat or who is apprehensive about eating dead animals. 
Moreover, another constituent part of republican thought is the idea that sometimes common goods 
have a certain priority over individual goods, precisely ‘because they consist of practices and possi-
bilities through which individuals realise themselves in many dimensions essential to human fulfil-
ment. But common goods should not be thought of as inherently in conflict with the good of indi-
viduals, but as part of the good of individuals. Nor are they essentially in tension with freedom, if it 
is understood in terms of autonomy. Autonomy is a matter of acting according to one’s most sig-
nificant purposes, and needs some social framework to support’ (Honohan, p. 153-154). 
 Neo-republicans argue that the requirements of autonomy are not mainly of an individual 
kind, as liberal theory suggests. Moreover, the possibility of political autonomy implies collective 
action. Since we read off our sense of who we are from the social world we live in, much of our 
autonomy can only be won by changing the social world collectively (Smith, 1998b). Couched in 
terms of Isiah Berlin, the neo-republican notion of autonomy rests on a more positive concept of 
freedom in terms of self-government, self-expression and participation, rather than on a negative 
concept of freedom in terms of non-interference and the absence of obstacles to the fulfilment of the 
individuals’ desires. Furthermore, the requirements of political autonomy are by no means only of a 
rational kind, and they are only loosely related to neo-liberal notions of choice, needs and wants. It 
is not so much by means of rational choice but by means of collective action and meaningful practi-
ces that we deal with the problems arising from our distorted interaction with the natural environ-
ment. Thus, we strive to free ourselves from the structural constraints that restrict our freedom 
(Berlin, 1958; Pettit, 1997; Dewey, 1916; Oldfield, 1990; Smith, 1998b).  
 For neo-republicans autonomy is the prerogative of those who act in a public space. As 
such, the status of autonomy and citizenship is contingent upon this activity. Only of those who en-
gage in political action and make judgements about common concerns in dialogue with fellow citi-
zens can be said that they enjoy political autonomy. Consequently, individuals can lose political 
autonomy, if they fail to take up their responsibility as a citizen. This is one of the reasons why 
Oldfield describes neo-republicanism as a ‘hard school of thought’.  
 
One can cease to be a citizen if one no longer performs the duties, but this does not mean that one 
loses the ‘rights’ – for the rights, contra the liberal-individualist position, belong not to citizens but 
to individuals (...). Not to perform the duties of citizenship, therefore, is not to lose one’s rights, but 
to lose the esteem of one’s fellows. It is to declare that you prefer them to take on the responsibility 
of politics; it is to abdicate from self-government; it is to cease to be a citizen. But it is not to lose the 
possibility of becoming a citizen again (Oldfield, 1990, p. 160-161). 
 
Civil republicans, neo-republicans, civil society theorists and representatives of a radical democracy 
have in common that they strive towards a re-politicisation of society. They reclaim a free, public 
space for active citizens against the expanding powers of the market economy, and against the per-
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vasive interference of the state. Such an intermediate space, in between the private and public 
sphere, is marked by the civil society. According to Charles Taylor, a civil society should be con-
ceived of as ‘a network of institutions that are independent from the state, which unite citizens 
around issues of common concern and which by their very existence, or by their activities, can bring 
influence to bear on policy’ (Taylor, 1995, p. x; cf. Kymlicka & Norman, p. 363)18. Churches, 
unions, ethnic associations, co-operatives, environmental groups, neighbourhood associations, wo-
men’s support groups and charities are among those institutions or voluntary associations at the core 
of the civil society. Within the neo-republican school of thought – civil society theory in particular 
– heavy weight is placed on everyone’s active participation in these voluntary associations. Through 
their voluntary participation and association citizens are expected to develop a public spirit and a 
common commitment to issues of a public interest. Perhaps one of the strongest expressions of a 
civil society is the proliferation of public opinions through the widespread debates, disseminated by 
all kind of media, forums and public institutions. What was particularly unique about the emergence 
of a public opinion in the nineteenth century was that it arose from sources that, for the most part, 
were wholly independent of church and state authority. Historically, this indicates the rise of a criti-
cal public or critical mass (Taylor, 1995). 
 Rather than being some kind of abstract ideal, a global civil society is actually emerging 
within current environmental politics. The state is no longer in the supreme position of a top-down 
director or arbiter as in the heydays of the welfare state. There are indeed more players in the field, 
as the rise of a global movement of grassroot resistance – initially labelled the anti-globalisation 
movement – indicates. Thus, environmental policies are continuously being shaped and reshaped in 
the political struggle between environmental activists, NIMBY groups19, governments, trade unions, 
networks of biological farmers, consumers' organisations, international institutions like the World 
Trade Organisation, industry and car lobbies. Considered from a historical perspective, environ-
mental politics is initiated neither by politicians nor by policy-makers. Environmental issues are 
placed on the political agenda by environmental activists and lobby groups of alarmed citizens 
(Hertz, 2001; Klein, 2000; Waks, 1996; Beck, 1992). 
 The emergence of a powerful global protest movement reveals a development that Beck 
describes as the ‘sub-politicisation’ of society: a shift of political power from the traditional politi-
cal centre, marked by official state institutions of representative democracy towards the civil 
society, or what Beck labels the domain of ‘sub-politics’ (Beck, 1992). This shifting focus of the 
critical mass is not without reason. After all, national representative democracies lose power in fa-
vour of international institutions like the European Union, the United Nations, the World Trade Or-
ganisation, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The most important global 
issues, ranging from regulations on biotechnology and genetic engineering to agreements on energy 
reduction, the conditions of livestock transport, water management and corporate investments, are 
decided upon by these global institutions. Simultaneously, democratic institutions lent their ears to 
multinational corporations that enforce free trade zones – free from social and environmental regu-
lations. Moreover, former government responsibilities and public services concerning public trans-
port and water supply, for instance, are taken over by private corporations. The international protest 
                                                      
18 As such, my strong conception of the civil society is distinguished from the liberal conception that regards the civil 
society as synonym with the free market or communitarian conceptions that conflate the civil society with the moral 
community (cf. Barber, 1997 and 1998). 
19 NIMBY groups, as they are called by their critics, are those for whom change is tolerable so long as it is Not-In-My-
Back-Yard – that is, so long as it does not affect members of the groups themselves. 
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movement emerged as a means of resistance to these new centres of political power, that are either 
democratically weak or have no democratic legitimacy at all. Paradoxically, at the world conferen-
ces where these parties gather, the main focus is not merely on what happens inside the conference 
buildings but on the protests on the streets outside. This shift of focus indicates the dialectical 
power of the global civil society movements. In her popular book The Silent Takeover (2001) Nor-
eena Hertz expresses the general cynicism and indignation that motivates people to join the protest:  
 
As we have seen, while the power and independence of governments withers and corporations take 
over ever more control, a new political movement is beginning to emerge. Rooted in protest, its ad-
vocates are not bounded by national geography, a shared culture or history, and its members com-
prise a veritable ragtag of by now millions, made up by NGO’s, grassroot movements, campaigning 
corporations, and individuals. Their concerns, while disparate, share a common assumption: that 
the people’s interests have been taken over by other interests viewed as more fundamental than their 
own – that the public interest has lost out to a corporate one (...). The apparent inability or 
unwillingness of our elected representatives to defend our interests against those of business has 
created a cycle of cynicism (...).While some may welcome the recent attempts of various corpora-
tions to address some of the failings of the system and contribute to the social sphere, they tend to 
see these attempts as window-dressing or corporate PR, and remain sceptical about companies’ 
motives. At the same time, they reject representative government as an ineffective, coopted and 
flawed mechanism for dealing with the failings of the market or representing their interests on the 
global stage, and reject the politics of today as the ‘politics of Narcissus’, concerned only with 
presentation and ‘spin’. They choose to voice their concerns on the street, on the Internet, and in the 
shopping malls, because they feel that these are the only places that they can be heard. They will not 
trust either government or business except in terms of responsiveness and result (Hertz, 2001, p. 
251-253). 
 
To sum up, whereas traditional politicians lose credits and take resort to forms of symbolic politics 
– making promises as if they still were in power – or create a situation of organised irresponsibility 
– shaking off their liability – the civil society responds by organising collective responsibility, 
thereby filling the gap that these politicians leave behind. Thus, the civil society is expanding and 
gaining power. Unlike some critics suggest, Beck as well as Hertz are not promoting the end of re-
presentative democracy, but they do believe that other forms of collective action and commitment 
are necessary to defend our public goods and keep politicians, corporations and international insti-
tutions on their toes (Beck, 1992; Hertz, 2001).  
 
Plurality and conflict among adversaries 
The neo-republican ideal of a civil society presupposes a particular way of life: an open, active and 
inspiring culture of debate and struggle for the common good and a common future. As such, politi-
cal life does not imply a self-securing way of living together with like-minded people. On the con-
trary, that which constitutes the public domain is the ongoing confrontation with people of different 
beliefs, opinions and ideological backgrounds. Here one’s conception of the good should not be 
shaped solely within the terms of the established norms of one’s own community but in confronta-
tion with those who dissent. Thus, the civil society is profoundly marked by pluralism. Our com-
mon commitment to public concerns does not follow from a common core of values or principles 
but emerges from political practice itself. More specifically, a common practice requires an ongoing 
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‘understanding in agreement’. This agreement is ultimately fluid and can never be made explicit, or 
exhaustive, because political practice itself is marked by pluralism. Therefore, paradoxically, one 
could say that it is plurality and conflict rather than moral similarity or agreement that unites us as 
citizens. Thus civil society theory holds that in public discourse we implicitly agree to disagree, in 
contrast to liberal theory that renders this agreement explicit in a more or less fixed contract.  
Liberalism and communitarianism are largely insensitive to considerations that follow from 
the social condition of plurality and conflict, dominant in the civil society and at the heart of politi-
cal practice. In fact, both Rawls and de-Shalit postulate a moral agreement that is assumed to pre-
cede political debate, defined respectively as the contractual consensus of pre-political subjects or 
the moral similarity between members of a pre-political community respectively. From this postu-
lated agreement they derive prima facie rules that restrict political action in advance. In her book 
The Democratic Paradox (2000) Chantal Mouffe sharply reveals how Rawls’ theory, by postulating 
an overlapping consensus on which all ‘reasonable persons’ are assumed to agree, in fact aims at 
clearing the public space from conflict, struggle and antagonism: 
 
Rawls seems to believe that whereas rational agreement among comprehensive moral religious and 
philosophical doctrines is impossible, in the political domain such an agreement can be reached. 
Once the controversial doctrines have been relegated to the sphere of the private, it is possible, in 
his view, to establish in the public sphere a type of consensus grounded on Reason. This is a consen-
sus that it would be illegitimate to put into question once it has been reached, and the only possibil-
ity of destabilization would be an attack from the outside by the ‘unreasonable’ forces. This implies 
that when a well-ordered society has been achieved, those who take part in the overlapping consen-
sus should have no right to question the existing arrangements, since they embody the principles of 
justice. If somebody does not comply, it must be due to ‘irrationality’ or ‘unreasonableness’. At this 
point, the picture of the Rawlsian well-ordered society begins to emerge more clearly and it looks 
very much like a dangerous utopia of reconciliation. To be sure, Rawls recognizes that a full over-
lapping consensus might never be achieved but at best approximated. It is more likely, he says, that 
the focus of an overlapping consensus will be a class of liberal conceptions acting as political rivals. 
Nevertheless, he urges us to strive for a well-ordered society where, given that there is no more con-
flict between political and economic interests, this rivalry has been overcome (...) The way he envis-
ages the nature of the overlapping consensus clearly indicates that, for Rawls, a well-ordered 
society is a society from which politics has been eliminated (Mouffe, 2000, p. 28-29). 
 
Rawls’ conflation of consensus and reason precludes the possibility of legitimate dissent in the pu-
blic sphere, since to disagree with the consensus is to be ‘unreasonable’. This argument suffers from 
extreme circularity: political liberalism provides a consensus among reasonable persons, who, by 
definition, are persons who accept the principles of political liberalism. Herewith, Rawls takes the 
sting out of public debate, and therefore Mouffe accuses him of ‘politicide’20: eliminating politics of 
our lives. At this point an interesting parallel can be drawn with the ideal of sustainable develop-
ment, which is conceived of, in similar terms, as an antecedently defined consensus on which all 
‘reasonable’ parties should be willing agree. Paul Treanor, a critic of the paradigm of sustainable 
development, complains that it is hard to have a decent discussion on sustainable development with 
advocates of this paradigm because those who support sustainable development hardly recognise 
                                                      
20 This is my term, borrowed from Middelaar, L. van (1999). Politicide. Amsterdam: Van Gennip 
because we are citizens 
 61 
the possibility of objection. As soon as critics argue that they oppose the ideal of a sustainable de-
velopment, the advocate will respond that no one is against sustainable development, but that ‘we 
just disagree on its definition’21. This anecdote provides a clear-cut illustration of how the liberal 
focus on consensus tends to de-politicise public debate. To present the institutions and principles of 
liberal democracy as the necessary outcome of a pure deliberative rationality ‘is to reify them and 
make them impossible to transform’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 32). 
 Unlike liberals with their focus on consensus, and unlike communitarians who assume a 
moral similarity between community members, neo-republicans and civil society theorists argue 
that the conditions of plurality and conflict constitute political discourse. Plurality is not a sign of 
democratic weakness or lack of community coherence nor a situation to overcome. On the contrary, 
plurality is the condition that necessitates and inspires us to act and judge politically. Likewise, 
conflict is not a threat to political discourse that has to be eliminated. Conflict is an element without 
which no political discussion among adversaries is possible or meaningful. According to Mouffe a 
democratic struggle among adversaries is of essential importance, if we do not want our conflicts to 
end in ‘a war between enemies’. To illuminate her position on this particular point, she contrasts her 
idea of plurality with that of Rawls who speaks of ‘the fact of pluralism’. By stating this ‘fact’ as an 
empirical background for his theory of justice, Rawls refers to a society in which there is no agree-
ment on the ultimate truths, but a diversity of conceptions of the good, a diversity that has to sub-
tended by a contract. However, Mouffe argues, plurality is more than an empirical observation of 
diversity. Above all, plurality has a symbolic and metaphysical meaning. Plurality marks the irre-
ducible otherness of ‘the other’: the elusive other who is necessarily excluded by any social ar-
rangement, and therefore forms its constitution. To put it in more practical terms: Mouffe does not 
believe in the possibility of a power-free dialogue or consensus, because consensus without exclu-
sion is impossible. That is, any consensus, agreement or other social objectivity exists merely by the 
grace of perspectives that are excluded beforehand. Any social objectivity is constituted through 
acts of power and exclusion. What is more, as Mouffe suggests: ‘Any social objectivity shows the 
traces of the acts of exclusion which govern its constitution: what, following Derrida, can be 
referred to as its “constitutive outside”’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 21; cf. Lyotard, 1984; Smeyers & 
Masschelein, 2000).  
 The borderlines between ‘we’ and ‘the other’, between ‘the inside’ and ‘the outside’ 
permeate all contracts, commitments, personal opinions and social practices. In this sense, power is 
omnipresent and inescapable. Mouffe wants us to think of power not as an ‘external relation taking 
place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather as constituting the identities themselves’ 
(Mouffe, 2000, p. 99). Because power is a constituent part of our identity as political actors, we 
should not strive to ban power from the public sphere, but we should strive to canalise power in 
such a way, that the dichotomies it produces – we/them, inside/outside, powerful/powerless – are 
made compatible with our democratic ideals. In other words, we must aim to transform antagonism 
                                                      
21 Borrowed from the Treanor website : ‘Why sustainability is wrong’ (http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/#lib). 
On his site Treanor notes a conversation with an advocate of sustainability: ‘What is your position on those who oppose 
sustainability?”/ “No- one is against sustainability”/ “I am”/ “No, I think we just disagree on the definition”/ “I am 
against all definitions”/ “No-one can be against sustainability”. Then Treanor somewhat cynically remarks: “This is 
probably inherent: if objections of conscience are recognised, no sustainability policies are possible. It is like belief in a 
universal God: if you believe God is only for believers, then you do not believe in a universal God. By nature, 
sustainability must claim a monopoly of belief: as a "belief" it cannot admit an opposite belief is equally valid. It is a 
consistent and Universalist world-view, Weltanschauung. Its adherents act in accordance with one general principle: 
that it should be accepted by all persons’. 
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– war between enemies – in agonism – struggle between adversaries. This transformation cannot be 
realised merely by designing and monitoring procedural arrangements, since the legitimacy of these 
arrangements are themselves constituted by exclusion22. Therefore Mouffe argues, we have to leave 
behind the ideal of transparency of power and harmony. Instead, we should acknowledge and 
actualise within our acts and judgements the productive coalition between power and legitimacy. 
Thus, justice is not understood in contractual terms, but as a public virtue. Or more specifically, 
justice comprises a sensitivity towards otherness. Underlying any political judgement and action 
there should be a personal striving to give voice to those who are excluded by our present judge-
ments and actions. The impossibility of attaining full justice constitutes a continuous incentive to 
meet the ‘other’. This means that a social agreement can never be justified a priori, but that its le-
gitimacy has to be gained in every new situation again and again. In a sense, political judgement 
and action are without precedence. Every political act and judgement should be self-reflexive, i.e. 
every political act and judgement should produce its own legitimacy. For this reason, we should 
never adopt a consensus that precedes political debate, because any consensus fixes particular di-
chotomies, and thereby, limits its legitimacy. Rather, pluralism and conflict should be given a clear 
field in the public arena to meet the condition of justice.  
 Although Mouffe does not mention civil society as such, civil society comprises the public 
space par excellence that gives room to conflict and plurality. Civil society theorists eschew all an-
tecedently defined principles that could possibly legitimate an a priori limitation of the public 
space. Most of them will agree that transcendental grounds of justification have lost their credibility 
in politics. Political arguments can no longer be justified on grounds, principles or authorities that 
precede or go beyond the common practices of the civil society we live in today. In this sense, the 
notion of a civil society is an expression of radical secularisation: ‘(...) the public sphere is an asso-
ciation constituted by nothing outside the common action we carry out in it: coming to a common 
mind where possible through the exchange of ideas. Its existence as an association is just our acting 
together in this way. This common action is not made possible by a framework that needs to be es-
tablished in some action-transcendent dimension: either by an act of God or in a Great Chain, or by 
a law coming down to us since time out of mind. This is what makes it radically secular’ (Taylor, 
1995, p. 267). Although political practice is conceived of in secular terms, this secularism does not 
imply nihilism, since, as we will see in that which follows, it is precisely collective action that sha-
pes meaningful communities. 
  Since political action is without precedent we cannot rely on it for our justification. Political 
action has to bring along and express its own justification. Justification has to be realised in the ac-
tion itself. That means that issues are never ‘political’ from the outset, because there is no pre-esta-
blished political agenda of legitimate issues. Citizens and associations of citizens have to make 
things political. Political action places issues on the political agenda. In the eighteenth century, civil 
society emerged as an independent though secondary counterpart of the nation state: a public, but 
                                                      
22 This is not to say that procedures are seen as redundant and should be pushed aside. On the contrary, formal 
procedures do indeed contribute to justified judgements in complex situations. However, Mouffe’s point is that these 
formal procedures as such do not warrant justice because they have to be applied in social practices that are profoundly 
marked by conflict and plurality, which means that there is not necessarily agreement among the parties on the status 
and nature of the conflict at hand and the kind of procedures that the conflict asks for. So, in the end, justice depends on 
a particular sensitivity, trust and prudence that allow the parties or arbiters to apply the procedures in a just spirit. 
Conclusively, the disagreement between Mouffe and Rawls is not on the necessity of procedures but about the status of 
procedures: for Mouffe they are part of political practice as such, whereas Rawls renders them a meta-status: the 
procedures are seen as preceding political practice and securing justice within this practice.  
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not politically structured space, where debate took place and public opinions were formed, and 
wherein the authority of the state was given a mandate. That is, the expanding power of nation sta-
tes was balanced by the emergence of a critical public to which it should give an account of its 
actions. Without the mandate of this society the state could not possibly exercise its authority (cf. 
Taylor, 1995, p. x). What we witness at present, at the outset of the twentyfirst century, is that civil 
society emerges from the shadow of the nation state and changes the very nature of political action. 
Where this long term development will lead is uncertain. Whether civil society can ever rely on 
complete self-regulation without the ‘supporting’ political framework of a nation state remains to be 
seen. But neo-republicans and civil society theorists share a common ambition to strengthen this 
public sphere, and they are looking for ways to change political structures in order to realise this. 
 But if neo-republicans are not ready to define democratic meta-principles, one might ask, 
how are they to guarantee democracy? To answer this question, it is important to consider the para-
digmatic problem they address. While liberals ask themselves what a state could possibly demand 
of its citizens, and vice versa, what its citizens can demand of the state, communitarian critics are 
mainly concerned with the problem of how to assure the continued existence of their moral com-
munity. Neo-republican theorists, on the contrary, are interested in the question how citizens act 
collectively in response to collective problems and thereby shape their lives: how they appeal to one 
another’s responsibility by virtue of their being citizens. In this view, a strong sense of collective 
responsibility arises from horizontal relationships between citizens, rather than from the vertical 
relationships of citizens to state- or community authorities. Thus, neo-republicans arrive at demo-
cratic ‘principles’ as well, but those will never be given a meta- or a priori status, because they can-
not serve as a ground of justification. They serve as normative anthropology: what does it mean to 
be a citizen? As such, the difference between liberal theory and neo-republican theory can be under-
stood as a difference of perspective on the nature of political philosophy. Philosophy should not 
justify existing political frameworks, but create openings for new ones. Philosophy is not about 
fixing frameworks but about putting them in motion. 
 
Political judgement 
In light of the analysis of civil society and political action in terms of public opinion, pluralism, 
otherness, conflict, debate, commitment and horizontality just given a neo-republican account of 
citizenship can be hazarded. As the outline proceeds, the question of future responsibility will be 
dealt with in particular. In line with neo-republican writings on citizenship, civil responsibility is 
marked by a particular kind of judgement and commitment (cf. Honohan, 2002; Oldfield, 1990; 
Nauta, 2000; Pettit, 1997; WRR, 1994). As a form of practical wisdom, political judgement allows 
people to distance themselves from their roles in society, reflect on the structural factors that con-
stitute these roles, and determine their course of action from there. In case of environmental con-
cerns, for instance, there is a need to reflect on our role as consumers and the ways in which con-
sumer markets direct our ‘free choices’ and behaviour in directions of which we might not approve. 
So, in public discourse, we need to make judgements about these issues, at a certain distance from 
our roles as consumers. This emphasis on the public nature of judging is in line with Arendt’s sta-
tement that moral judgements are always expressed in front of a – real or imagined – audience of 
others whose recognition one seeks. Our judgements would be meaningless unless there were others 
present to recognise them. Consequently, to withdraw from moral judgement is tantamount to cea-
sing to interact, to talk and act in the human community (Arendt, 1982).  
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 However, this audience does not speak with one voice, but shows a concert of voices. Wit-
hin a civil society, Arendt argues, citizens judge in light of plurality: ‘Action, the only activity that 
goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the hu-
man condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world 
(...). Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is human, in such a 
way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live’ (Arendt, 1958b, 
7-8). In public discourse the differences between human beings flourish and become productive. 
That is, our expressions of difference – our words and actions – acquire meaning and influence by 
means of their immersion in an intersubjective web of meanings and relationships; a common world 
or language. Unfortunately, as a consequence of this ‘immersion’ in a complex interplay of forces 
the agent loses control over the meaning of his words and actions. The consequences of our actions 
proceed in directions we can not possibly predict. As such, unintended (side) effects have an open 
field. This recognition of the boundlessness of human action and power leads Arendt to define un-
predictability as a fundamental frustration of political action. Our actions engender a chain of reac-
tions in a direction that is beyond our grip. The effects of this particular uncertainty are reinforced 
by another frustration of political action, the frustration of irreversibility: that which is done within 
the public arena cannot be undone. That means that we are not able to nullify the unintended effects 
of our actions. These two fundamental frustrations of unpredictability and irreversibility are in 
Arendt’s view inherent to the narrative character of action. Only in the told story that is reconstruc-
ted by hindsight, do the acts of the protagonist acquire full meaning. As long as the story proceeds, 
the plot is by definition unknown. (Arendt, 1958b, p. 236-247).  
 These two frustrations turn political judgment making into a risky game, somewhat like 
gambling. How are we to judge responsibly, if we do not know what the consequences of our 
actions will be and are unable to correct our actions if these consequences turn out to be horrible? 
Throughout western political history many remedies have been tried to eliminate these weaknesses 
but most of them consisted of eliminating plurality. This was what Plato did when he proposed to 
render all political power to a king philosopher. And according to Arendt, this is what those philo-
sophers do who turn the praxis of politics into a poeisis – an activity of ‘making’ or ‘managing’ 
social affairs. Arendt argues that the only acceptable remedies are to be found in the political virtues 
of promise and forgiveness. To overcome the weakness of unpredictability, people make promises 
and lay them down in laws, treaties and agreements. By articulating promises in public documents, 
we hold one another responsible for the continuity of our intentions over time. And the human po-
wer to forgive should balance the irreversibility of political action. Without this power to forgive we 
would probably feel paralysed beforehand by the prospect of forever being chained to the uninten-
ded effects of our past actions and judgements. In my view Arendt marks the contours of an inter-
generational ethic by posing a specific relationship between the faculties of promise and forgive-
ness: ‘The two faculties belong together insofar as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds 
of the past, whose “sins” hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation; and the other, bin-
ding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by 
definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let along durability of any kind, 
would be possible in the relationships between men’. (Arendt, 1958b, p. 237). 
 Arendt would be the first to admit that these remedies are hardly airtight and perhaps even 
somewhat naïve. However, if we adhere to plurality and political autonomy as democratic values, 
we have to make do with the powers we have. But if the basic pretensions to predictability and 
controllability are to be given up, the prospects of judgement in general and those of future respon-
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sibility in particular look worse than ever. How can we hold one another responsible for the conse-
quences of our actions if they are not in our hands? Obviously, the conditions of political action 
force us to understand civil responsibility beyond the instrumental terms of accountability: being 
held responsible for the intended consequences of one’s actions in light of pre-given aims and stan-
dards. In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (1982) Arendt shows that political judgement 
comes into play when the standards or aims which constitute the grounds on which one ought to 
judge, are not self-evident or fixed beforehand; when conflicting claims and stories about reality 
have to be weighed against each other. This weighing cannot be resolved on the grounds of any pre-
given standard, exactly because such a standard is not available to us. Political judgement, like aes-
thetic judgement, is without precedent. Each particular case is unique in the sense that it calls for its 
own standards, just as a work of art thrusts its own standards on us. In this sense political judgement 
floats by ‘thinking without banister’, as Arendt argues. 
 To acknowledge the plural nature of political judgement is to say that we cannot rely on a 
pre-given framework of shared values underlying our current debates. In our attempt to convince 
others of our point of view, we cannot appeal to a common good or common conception of justice, 
preceding or transcending the arguments we express here and now. To judge prudently then, is to 
deal with a plurality of opinions, and to deal with the subsequent conflicts of loyalty. In order to 
fathom the precise nature of political judgement, Arendt reverts to Kant’s political philosophy. 
However, she does not elaborate on Kant’s ethics of The Critique of Practical Reason (1788), 
which would be the most evident point of departure, but on his ideas on aesthetic judgement as de-
veloped in The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (1790). Arendt was one of the first thinkers to 
recognise that political judgement can be understood analogous to esthetical judgement. Rather than 
an activity that consists of applying principles or following rules, making judgements in esthetical 
and political matters is an art of ‘enlarged thinking’ (eine erweiterte Denkungsart):  
 
The power of judgement rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which 
is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between 
me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, 
in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agree-
ment. And this enlarged way of thinking, which as judgement knows how to transcend its individual 
limitations, cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others “in whose 
place” it must think, whose perspective it must take into consideration, and without whom it never 
has the opportunity to operate at all (Arendt, 1961, p. 220-221). 
 
Judgement is thus conceived of as the ability ‘to think in the place of everybody else’. This capacity 
and willingness to take on multiple perspectives, she insists, is a way of situating and regarding 
oneself as a political being operating in the public realm. My subjective judgements are only 
fleeting, subjective impressions until they are thrown into discourse with others. Political judgement 
for Arendt, like aesthetic judgement for Kant, necessarily implies an attempt to ‘woo the consent of 
everyone else’. Judgements are formed first by reviewing my conceptions through others’ perspec-
tives in the hope of arriving at a mutual agreement about what will appear in our world. As such, 
judgmental thinking comprises a form of representative thinking; our imagination and reflection 
helps us to present the absent, or in other words, to represent the perspectives of those who are not 
present. Judging then consists of viewing a particular case from different perspectives, by taking the 
perspectives of as many as others as possible (Arendt, 1982).  
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 For Kant a particular judgement cannot be subsumed under a general rule or predicate, but 
the judgement itself reveals a general predicate that we will never be able to articulate exhaustively. 
In line with this insight, Arendt points at the exemplary validity and power of judgements in politi-
cal discourse. Judgements that appeal to particular events sometimes reveal a strong general idea 
that cannot be expressed otherwise. Particular events in recent history have fuelled public debate on 
environmental issues and shaped our awareness of environmental problems in an unprecedented 
way (Arendt, 1982, thirteenth lecture). If, for instance, we take into account the warnings of the 
Club of Rome, the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, the nuclear disaster in Tsjernobyl, the conflict 
about the Brent Spar, the shipwreck of the Exxon Valdez, the outbreak of foot and mouth disease, 
the revolt of the Zapatista’s against the NAFTA treaty, or the recent protests in Seattle and Genoa, 
then we must acknowledge that historical events like these have contributed to our environmental 
awareness and ability to act in a way that a principle or universal ideal would never achieve. As 
such, these events are manifestations of a non-universalisable freedom. 
 Within our faculty of judgement social imagination plays a vital role: as we anticipate the 
possible judgements of imagined others we tune in to the sensus communis. Literally speaking, the 
sensus communis refers to the common sense we share as members of a political community, or 
more precisely, the sense that creates a community. This is not a matter of formal agreement or a 
shared stock of substantive values but a common way of responding to things that appear to us. A 
sensus communis does not necessarily imply that we act in the same way – although this will often 
be the case – but that we experience reality in a way that serves “to direct us in the common affairs 
of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark” (Shaftesbury, cited in: Gadamer, 
1960, p. 31). As such it is not a common way of doing things but a common way of experiencing 
the things we do (Arendt, 1981, p. 50-53; Arendt, 1982, p. 105-106; Gadamer, 1960, p. 24-35). In 
the particular meaning Arendt attributes to the sensus communis, it functions as a warrant for im-
partiality in cases of political judgements. By taking the perspectives of others, that is, by ‘enlar-
ging’ our point of view in such a way as to include the possible standpoints of fellow citizens, we 
transcend the subjectivity of our personal judgement and open up the possibility of a general stand-
point. In this specific sense esthetical judgement is characterised by disinterestedness. Thus under-
stood, impartiality is not typified by the perspective of the arbiter standing above the parties, but 
rather by the perspective of the dedicated parent who strives to adopt a general standpoint in cases 
of conflict. The more perspectives they take into account, the broader their scope of judgement and 
the more general or ‘impartial’ their standpoint23. Again, taking responsibility for one’s judgements 
is conceived of in terms of openness to a plurality of voices. Rather than a matter of justifying our 
judgements and actions in terms of the standards on which they rely or the aims to which they are 
supposed to contribute, taking responsibility is like the kind of responsiveness we exhibit in pro-
found story-telling. In order to make our judgements and actions sensible to ourselves and others, 
we tell stories in which our articulation of the actions and motives of the ‘I’ solicit the recognition 
of a largest possible audience (Arendt 1982; cf. Altieri, 1994; Van Nieuwkerk & Van der Hoek, 
1996; Whiteside, 1998, p. 36). 
 
                                                      
23 Arendt substitutes Kant’s imperative of universalizability for an imperative of generalizability (Nieuwkerk & Van der 
Hoek, 1996).  
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Judging the status of future generations 
If the sensus communis constitutes a common sense we share as members of a civil society, who are 
the ‘we’ on behalf of which we judge and speak? Are future generations included in this commu-
nity? Obviously, there is no pre-existent community on the rules or standards of which the legiti-
macy of our judgements rely – like liberals and communitarians assume – but it is the other way 
around: deliberative judgements shape communities around issues of a common concern (cf. White-
side, 1998, p. 35-38). This means that there are no fixed or fundamental limits to our political com-
munity beforehand, for every ‘other’ who is not yet included in the ‘we’ might be a potential partner 
in conversation and ipso facto, a potential other whose perspective I should take into account in my 
search for a general standpoint. Unfortunately, there is at least one practical limit to the scope of our 
political community and that is a temporal limit. ‘We’ comprise a community with a common sense 
by virtue of the fact that we are potential partners in conversation. This implies that ‘we’ should at 
least be contemporaries. The others whose potential perspectives I ought to take into account in my 
search for a general standpoint are real others, with whom I should be able to experience a certain 
reciprocity. To be more precise, what is lacking in my relationship to future people is not a recipro-
cal relationship in terms of strict mutuality like Rawls assumes or a common good as de-Shalit ar-
gues. Moreover, the particular kind of reciprocity Arendt implies is operative in our engagement in 
a common discourse or practice.  
 In my view, this reciprocity consists of a reciprocal quest for recognition as discourse mem-
bers. For, if we understand judgement in terms of anticipated communication, like Arendt does, 
then we have to recognise one another as potential communication partners in order to woo each 
others’ consent. Unfortunately, future generations are beyond the scope of such a potential dialogue. 
Right here and right now, a dialogue with people who will live in the distant future is inconceivable 
and beyond imagination in the practical sense Arendt has in mind. We cannot anticipate the poten-
tial judgements of future descendants in a way that constitutes our present judgement, because, as 
we have seen in the foregoing analysis, one’s contemporary political community is the ultimate be-
drock on which all our political judgements and actions are based. Arendt’s practically empirical 
understanding of the sensus communis – intimately tied to our sensual experience of participating in 
public discourse – does not allow for an abstraction from this community towards a potential future 
community. For this reason future generations are excluded from our political community by neo-
republicans as well.  
 This conclusion might appear to be a drastic disillusionment for those who expected neo-
republican theory to provide a clear-cut alternative for the fruitless attempts of both liberal and 
communitarian theory to include future generations. One might wonder why we have taken this 
route if it does not seem to lead us anywhere. Well, as I will argue, our study of neo-republican 
ideas until now has indicated why every attempt to include future generations as fellow citizens is 
doomed to fail. A closer study of the necessary limit of political judgement and responsibility will 
disclose an alternative understanding of future responsibility. 
 What has become clear in the foregoing analysis is that every attempt to include the rights, 
needs, goods or potential judgements of future citizens throws us back upon our own devices. In our 
present judgement on what will count as a liveable world for future generations and our estimation 
of what their needs will be, we necessarily rely on what we sense as ‘liveable’, ‘inalienable’ or 
‘dignified’ within our current political community and horizon of sensibilities. We reflect on the 
possible implications of our present behaviour for people in the future on the grounds of the delib-
erative judgements we share with contemporaries with whom we act together. Our future imagina-
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tion and expectations take their cue from our sensus communis, a common sense that is tied to a 
particular time and place. Thus, our diagnosis corresponds closely to that of communitarians like 
de-Shalit. However, unlike de-Shalit, we do not assume that posterity will be like us, and that they 
will share our conception of the good life. We are not connected with future citizens by means of a 
common good. Moreover, we are connected only loosely by means of evolving practices that con-
stitute the evolution of our political community. As historically situated beings, we are connected 
with citizens of the nineteenth century in the sense that the public practices in which we participate 
bear the traces, for instance, of their efforts to realise universal suffrage. Just as they helped to shape 
the current practices in which we participate, so our participation will help to shape the practices in 
which the citizens of the twenty-third century will participate. But to say that we are connected with 
future citizens by means of historically evolving practices is not the same as recognising them as 
participants in the same practices.  
 This insight allows us to indicate even more precisely why the activity of ‘enlarged 
thinking’ (inherent in political judgement) can only be ‘enlarged’ towards persons existing at pre-
sent. Arendt writes: ‘this enlarged way of thinking needs the presence of others “in whose place” it 
must think, whose perspective it must take into consideration’ (Arendt, 1961, p. 220; italic mine). In 
my view, the others’ presence is required, because my search for an impartial standpoint is moti-
vated by my desire for their recognition. We anticipate communication and take multiple perspec-
tives because we desire recognition as participants in public discourse. And this desire for recipro-
cal recognition emerges in common practice. It is the realistic possibility of gaining recognition 
from discourse members that motivates our striving for generality and impartiality. Thus, the con-
temporary political community casu quo sensus communis forms the warrant for impartiality. Of 
course, we might desire recognition from those who are not yet included in public discourse. After 
all, the boundaries of our political community and sensus communis are not fixed. But we can be 
sure that those who do not yet exist cannot answer or mirror our desire for recognition. And in the 
absence of any answer, a lasting desire for their recognition as discourse members is not likely to 
emerge. Therefore, anticipated communication with future generations will remain illusive and can-
not be a source for political judgements. 
 Within public discourse, appeals to the needs, rights or goods of future generations ought to 
be answered with suspicion. Those who pretend to speak on a behalf of future generations often 
hide behind future generations in order to pursue their own projects. As a particular rhetorical way 
of phrasing arguments ‘the interest of future generations’ lends itself too easily for conflation with 
our own personal preferences and ambitions. On the internet, for instance, we find strong propo-
nents as well as opponents of an eugenic policy designed to decrease the world population and in-
crease our evolutionary fitness. Both of them refer to ‘the interests of future generations’ as though 
these arguments would sweep away any counter-argument. Proponents of an eugenic policy argue 
that future generations are entitled to a certain ‘genetic health’, whereas opponents argue that they 
have the right to live in a ‘natural world’, free of manipulation and genetic doctoring. What we wit-
ness here, is that future generations have come to function as a projection screen for our collective 
fears and hopes. However, those fears and hopes themselves remain unarticulated in public dis-
course because the appeal to future generations is regarded as self-evident.  
 Thus, instead of judging properly by taking multiple perspectives of fellow citizens and bor-
rowing arguments from the intersubjective sensus communis underlying our political community, 
these participants take refuge behind an external authority: the chain of future generations. And 
since no contemporary citizen is in the position to trace the origins and authority of these argu-
because we are citizens 
 69 
ments, the strong appeal to future generations is similar to an appeal to God: these arguments have a 
metaphysical bias, in the sense that their legitimacy depends on the invocation of a transcendent 
authority external to human discourse. In fact, the idea of sustainable development seems to imply a 
secularised form of the biblical stewardship: instead of God calling on our responsibility as 
stewards of our world, it is the infinite chain of human generations that gives the world on loan un-
der our trust. The difference between the two is a difference of degree rather than a difference of 
kind. We do not have to go as far as deliberative democracy theorists, who state that these argu-
ments are not at home within political discourse and should therefore be denied status (cf. Korthals, 
1994, p. 51; cf. WRR, 1994). However, we should acknowledge that these arguments either have no 
chance to solicit agreement among discourse members, or tend to mystify the issues at hand and de-
politicise public debate. So, as a source of political judgement future generations are suspect.  
 
In pursuit of continuity of our civil practices 
The previous analysis indicates that our relationship with future generations cannot serve as an 
authentic source for judgement, but leaves open the possibility that their claims are an object of 
judgement. That is, we cannot include future people in the ‘anticipated communication’ inherent in 
political judgement as anticipated communication partners, but their claims could be among our 
subjects for discussion. For instance, in our current debates on what energy policy to choose we 
would presumably consider the interests of future generations without meeting them as fellow citi-
zens whose actual consent or participation in deliberation is required. Rather than fellow citizens, 
future generations should be regarded as those who will be affected by our present judgements: the 
beneficiaries or the parties injured. However, as I have argued before, most public appeals to the 
needs, rights or goods of future generations are of an exclusive rhetorical nature. Nevertheless, 
these appeals are highly attractive in public discourse. They make a strong demand us. Therefore, 
we cannot do away with all these claims as merely rhetorical window dressing, but we ought in-
stead to pay closer examination to what is implied in our recognition of any claims made on behalf 
of posterity.  
 While we recognise claims on behalf of future generations as making a demand on us, we do 
not anticipate communication with them. We may perhaps wonder how our potential grandchildren 
or great grandchildren might react to our present judgement. But as soon as we leave this inner cir-
cle of family and friends, there will be no particular others who make an immediate demand on us 
like contemporaries do. Moreover, the ‘call’ we experience emerges from our practical involvement 
in those public practices, projects, movements and traditions to which we are committed at present. 
Our personal investment in these practices and our dedication to its purposes imply an open time 
horizon. For instance: citizens participate in environmental pressure groups because they believe 
that their influence on decision-making processes can make a difference. Their involvement is 
meaningful in light of the belief that the particular future of these processes is not fixed but open-
ended, and at least partly dependent on our present judgement and action. What is more, the partici-
pants will experience their collective action as meaningful, even apart form the effects in the future. 
As a worthwhile practice they will care for the continuation of this practice in the future; as such, 
their commitment implies a desire that this commitment be sustained or carried over to future 
people. To examine this claim, Visser ‘t Hooft wonders what would happen to our practical com-
mitment if we were to realise that we were living in the final days of mankind. He suspects that an 
immediate feeling of absurdity would take possession of us and our activities. Our participation in 
these practices would become meaningless, he concludes, because our commitment is partly 
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premised on trust in the continuation of these practices in the indeterminate future. Inherent in our 
present commitment is a claim that takes possession of a particular future of indeterminate length. 
As such, basic trust in a common future is among the very conditions of our existence as citizens 
(Visser ‘t Hooft quoted in Van Putten, 1999; cf. Achterberg, 1989/1990, 1994). 
 I deliberately speak of continuity of practices rather than ‘sustainability’, ‘durability’ or 
‘consistency’ because the first term leaves more room for unprecedented change and difference. 
Furthermore, the term ‘continuity’ seems more adequate to express experiences of the inside practi-
tioners, rather than the qualification of those who observe or study their commitment in the more 
objective terms of the outsider. Take for instance, the identity change that the environmental 
movement has undergone over the last thirty years. Environmentalists themselves might experience 
their present commitment in well-established funding organisations as following on in a process of 
continuity from their radical involvement in the late seventies, whereas the media and public criti-
cise their action over a period of time as being ‘inconsistent’ or ‘untrustworthy’. The same 
discrepancy applies to reverse situations in which the public perceives the actions of a particular 
environmental group as consistent with their image of this group over all these years, while I myself 
have lost my commitment: their actions are no longer a continuation of my authentic desires any-
more. These considerations touch upon considerations of identity-formation, i.e. in order to be our-
selves and keep our commitments and ‘selves’ alive, we have to change (cf. Bransen, 2003). Civil 
practices are worthy our concern, because they contain within themselves the means to carry over 
what we regard as important in our modes of behaviour into new situations we face. The insider’s 
perspective is of greater importance for environmental ethics and politics, because it is our personal 
experience of continuity inherent in our fulfilment that directs our attention to the future and obliges 
us to care for the future (Winch, 1958). 
 This basic assumption of a dynamic continuity underlying our involvement in civil practices 
marks an importance difference with de-Shalit’s communitarian approach. Neo-republicans and 
communitarians both locate the sources of future oriented responsibilities in our present desire for 
recognition of significant others. However, whereas de-Shalit argues that those ‘others’ include fu-
ture people, for us, the others are necessarily contemporaries. But even more important are the im-
plications of the underlying contrast between the communitarian insistence on moral similarity and 
the neo-republican stress on plurality as hallmarks of a political community. An extrapolation of the 
neo-republican assumptions teaches that what we share with contemporaries as well as future ge-
nerations is not a common good or morality. Instead, we are connected by means of an evolving 
sensus communis or form of life that consists of multiple practices, which differ as well as overlap. 
These practices change analogously to Wittgenstein’s tables of family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 
2002, p. 111). Acknowledging the intrinsic quality of difference and change in our judgements 
leads us to recognise that we do not necessarily solicit agreement with others, but we consider their 
possible standpoints and judgements as we go along. Seeking judgement, I try out my views and 
thereby test their strengths and limits. This means that we might sometimes head for conflict rather 
than for consensus. Not (only) because we want to compete with others or because we have con-
flicting interests, but just like communitarians would argue, because we strive for a genuine conti-
nuation of our ‘selves’ and ipso facto, the continuation of the civil practices that constitute our sel-
ves. 
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Future imagination and immortality 
A remarkable similarity between the liberal and neo-republican view on future responsibility is that 
both views regard future generations as possible beings with hypothetical needs rather than kindred 
heirs with familiar preferences. To us, contemporaries, future generations remain faceless and 
nameless. The only familiarity between future and contemporary generations, and the only relation-
ship between us, is created by our ability to hypothesise. However, liberals and neo-republicans 
would not agree on the particular nature of our hypothethical thinking. According to Rawls, we 
should calculate what future generations are entitled to by means of a rational reconstruction of 
those necessary needs whose fulfilment would be conditional on leading a meaningful life – inde-
pendent of time and place. Neo-republicans, on the contrary, do not believe in the possibility of 
such an a-historical concept of personhood, and would probably give more weight to the act of 
imagination. As Arendt argues, in line with Kant’s aesthetics, our faculty of judgement consists of a 
twofold mental operation. To begin with, it is through imagination that that we can present to our 
inner sense that which is absent: the object of judgement. Our imaginative powers enable us to pic-
ture possible future worlds, in such a way that we are immediately seized by its beauty or ugliness, 
its goodness or badness, its truth or illusive nature. Those sensations are highly subjective and can 
hardly be represented in language. Therefore, subsequently, we perform an operation of reflection 
on that which has previously been presented by our imagination. As indicated earlier, this reflection 
comprises an act of taking multiple perspectives and making our reflection communicable to others 
by anticipating on a common sense we share as a community: a sensus communis. Thus, imagina-
tion as well as reflection plays a vital role in the transformation from subjective taste to judgement 
by moving back and forth from the inner sense to the common sense (Arendt, 1982). 
 Our visions of the future will always be rather vague and rarely well-defined. They cannot 
be designed out of a detached position of contemplative isolation, as Arendt makes clear, because 
our imagination requires a common sense in order to be stable and communicable. Thus, our imagi-
nation of the future will emerge from our involvement in every day activities. We make them up as 
we act and go along. Sometimes they are alluded to or articulated in poems, paintings or novels, but 
generally, they remain unsaid. As such, these visions remain elusive. Perhaps it is their elusiveness 
that lends these visions their attractiveness. We keep on chasing them but as soon as we try to pin 
them down, slip through our fingers. Within the political realm, our imagination is generally trig-
gered by desires and fears that adhere to our personal involvement in public practices. Imagine, for 
instance, a technically skilled citizen who participates in a campaign for hydrogen energy applica-
tions in public transport. This involvement presumably brings with it a strong desire to change our 
way of travelling and our systems of public transport in an unprecedented way. But as that person’s 
desire grows stronger, so too will the fear that the mission will fail. The activity of imagining that 
takes its cue from this experience consists – at least partly – of an extrapolation of particular rules 
underlying our current practices leading into an intuitive, though unknown direction. Suppose, for 
example that the advocate of hydrogen energy enjoys strong support for his articles on this subject 
in local newspapers and he gets invited by local energy companies, then the imagination concerning 
his future efforts will probably move from the local newspapers to the national newspapers to inter-
national publications. This is a loose extrapolation of the rule underlying his past experience – 
gaining public support and pressure by publishing articles – into the indefinite future. Of course it 
might work in the other direction as well. Suppose, for instance that his articles are repeatedly re-
fused for publication, then he will probably extrapolate the rule underlying this disillusionment into 
the future: he might anticipate resistance and lack of interest in public discourse. Obviously, the 
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extrapolation that is part of our imagination takes place within human practice and discourse, be-
cause only if qualities are validated through public deliberation, does it become possible to apply 
them in new ways. Thus, the focus of our imagination will be on future practices rather than future 
people. Future people remain imagined strangers to us. They inhabit a world we dream of, and we 
sometimes allude to this possible world but we cannot derive any obligations or responsibilities 
from these worlds without losing touch with present reality. What they can do, is make a demand on 
us to consider what in our life is worth sustaining. 
 There is significant degree of imagination inherent to political action, thus neo-republicans 
argue. In The Human Condition (1958) Hannah Arendt argues that in the ancient polis, political 
action was thought to be motivated by a profound striving for immortality. For the ancient Greeks 
and Romans the only way to overcome our mortality would be to act gloriously on the public stage 
and to gain honour in the eyes of one’s fellows and heirs. Arendt recalls the idea that, in the ancient 
meaning of the word, ‘dying’ was regarded equivalent to ‘ceasing to be among men’ (Arendt, 
1958b, p. 20). To be immortal in this sense would be to stay alive in the memory of others after 
one’s death. The idea that the public sphere can provide a kind of ‘earthly immortality’ in the face 
of human mortality dissolves, however, with the discovery of the fragility of the public sphere itself 
(Arendt, 1958b, p. 28—32, 64). What might be left of this ancient idea in post-modern times is our 
desire to be remembered by future generations in a particular way. We need a sense of continuity – 
a sense that our worries, hopes and dreams have not been in vain because earthly life goes on, and 
our worldly activities and projects will be carried on. In short, the idea of a virtual bond with the 
past and future world seems to be an anthropological sine qua non for humans to make sense of 
their lives. We want to leave behind a world, which we perceive as worthy our remembrance 
 The meaningfulness of these considerations reveals that there must be some other kind of 
reciprocity between us and those unknown people in the future, who will live centuries from now, 
even though this reciprocity in is not in any strict sense, procedural. Within the public sphere, citi-
zens want to leave something behind that corresponds to their own understanding of self. Though 
even this desire might sound somewhat megalomaniac, namely the idea that we, contemporaries 
desire recognition from future generations is not completely beyond the pales of imagination. To 
give this intuition a less narcissistic slant, it might be helpful to explore the distinction between 
‘grand’ and ‘small immortality’, as pictured by Milan Kundera in his novel Immortality (1990). 
Both aspirations imply a refusal to die in the present and with its presentday cares and a wish to 
transcend oneself. However, the aspiration to grand immortality consists of a desire to exhibit one-
self on the stage of human history and rank oneself among the ‘big men’ in some Hall of Fame, 
while the aspiration to small immortality consists of the modest desire to be remembered by those 
who have known us during our lives (Kundera, 1990). We strive for continuity of our relationships 
and practices because we want to maintain our ‘self’, perhaps even beyond our death. Conceived of 
in these terms, our inherent striving for immortality might imply a particular caring attitude: care for 
the continuity of our practices and the sustainability of our world. In chapter four we will examine 
the status, possibilities and limits of this idea more closely in connection with environmental re-
sponsibility. 
 In the neo-republican view on future responsibility sketched in this chapter, the main focus 
shifts from the rights and needs of future people to our present worries, cares and desires on the 
grounds that we imagine a common future. As we consider the implications of our current practices 
for future generations, we will imagine a particular future world, but rather than calculating what 
would be in the interest of its inhabitants – future people – we have to judge for ourselves: what 
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kind of world would we want them to live in? Which practices are worth carrying over? Which 
world would be worthy our remembrance? By taking responsibility for the world we want to leave 
behind, and by safeguarding the continuity of our worthwhile practices, we do not need to hide be-
hind hypothetical rights of future people. Judged from a neo-republican view, that would be a 
means to run away from our responsibilities. In this approach toward future responsibility, future 
generations are only of indirect signficance. When we say that we anticipate their possible stand-
point, our judgement is in fact a function of our present commitments. Underlying this judgement is 
our striving for continuity of what we care for. The strong conviction that future people are entitled 
to a dignified existence similar to ours is derivative of this primary judgement.  
 
Why survive? 
Our hypothetical relationship to future people in itself cannot be an ethical source to act on their 
behalf. However, imagining their future existence calls on our present feeling of responsibility. To 
be more precise, their image forces us to make up our minds about what we want to leave behind. 
Simultaneously, their imagined existence prevents us from doing things that might reduce their life 
chances or ruin their world. Now, the core question is: what is the status of our conviction that we 
ought to strive for continuity of human practices? What is the metaphysical status of the ideal of 
sustainability (broadly conceived of in terms of continuity of practices)? In the end, our answer to 
this question is dependent on our answer to the question of human survival: why should there be a 
future world, why should there be future generations, why should there be future life at all? Is there 
a duty to survive? This question is, at least partly, of a metaphysical nature, and as such, philoso-
phers have touched upon this question.  
 But first of all it is important to stress the logical point that, in a particular sense, the future 
is always given in our present horizon of action, as Winch makes clear in his analysis of meaningful 
behaviour. To say that behaviour is meaningful is to say that this behaviour is intelligible in terms 
of the modes of behaviour which are familiar in our world, and that it was governed by considera-
tions appropriate to the rules of its context or ‘language game’. Inherent to Winch’s conception of 
meaningful behaviour as rule-governed behaviour is the notion of ‘being committed by what I do 
now to doing something else in the future’. Take for instance his example of bookmarking: ‘(...) if 
N places a slip of paper between the leaves of a book he can be said to be ‘using a bookmark’ only 
if he acts with the idea of using the slip to determine where he shall start re-reading. This does not 
mean that he must necessarily actually so use it in the future (though that is the paradigm case); the 
point is that if he does not, some special explanation will be called for, such as that he forgot, 
changed his mind, or got tired of the book’ (Winch, 1958, p. 50). In other words, it is because I in-
tend to do something tomorrow that my action today is intelligible and meaningful. But while I am 
committed to doing something in the future by doing something now, my future action is not deter-
mined by my present action. Winch’s point is that all human action borrows meaning from this 
commitment to an inescapable horizon of past and future action. However, this leaves the meta-
physical background question –should there be a future? – untouched. 
 Now we can turn to the metaphysical question of what commits us to strive for survival of 
human life on this planet. To start with a brief analysis of the implications of Kant’s philosophy on 
this particular point: the maxim underlying our intention to spoil the life conditions of future 
generations would obviously fail the test of universalisation, implicit in the categorical imperative. 
We cannot want to contribute to the extinction of mankind and at the same time want others to do 
and have done the same, because this striving would pre-empt any contribution to existence or non-
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existence whatsoever. Therefore, universalisation of this particular maxim leads to contradictions 
on a volitional level we should not tolerate. As such, Kant implicitly defends a duty to contribute to 
human survival. However, for Kant, future obligations do not amount to future people or their well-
being. Moreover, these obligations follow from the realisation of talents inherent to humanity as a 
species, guided by the law of progress. As Kant articulated in his Idea for a Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Purpose: ‘human nature is such that it cannot be indifferent even to the most re-
mote epoch which may eventually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be expected with 
certainty’ (cited from: Li, 1994; cf. Arendt, 1982, p. 118; Van der Wal, 1989, p. 160)24.  
 Apel underlines the imperative ‘that there be humanity’, although he does not share Kant’s 
metaphysical idea of progress but departs from the assumption of human beings as rational beings. 
For him, our collective duty to survive follows from the transcendental conditions of the communi-
cation community of which we are always already a part. Were we to collectively agree to commit 
suicide, then this agreement would conflict with the duty, presupposed in our argumentation, to an-
ticipate the realisation of an ideal communication community. The arguments leading to this radical 
decision would go against the very conditions that render these arguments valid. Consequently, in 
every attempt to deny a duty to survive, our commitment to survival is already implied. So, for Apel 
as well as Kant, survival is a matter of consistency with a transcendental argument (Apel, 1996). 
Though an ingenious and interesting point of view, neo-republicans would not go along with Apel, 
since this transcendental line of thought subsumes the plurality of possible voices in public dis-
course under a universal principle or rule of consistency and thus limits the range of legitimate 
thought. In line with Wittgenstein’s view on the nature of language games, neo-republicans would 
stress that the application of a principle or language rule is not implied by the rule or principle itself. 
The relationship between a rule and its application in language is contingent in the sense that the 
rule could have been applied otherwise. Rules can only be reconstructed retrospectively. Now, Apel 
might insist that this arbitrary relationship indeed holds for most rules as part of a language game, 
but that there is a special class of rules that transcends the diversity of language games by virtue of 
the fact that these rules make possible this diversity without being part of it – for instance- the ideal 
or principle of diversity itself. They are rules-about-language games rather than rules-of-language 
games. These transcendental rules, so Apel claims, can be held universally valid and should be 
exercised as such. However, it does not make sense to distinguish between rules-of-language games 
and rules-about-language games in the way proposed here, because even these more abstract rules-
about-language games – the rules of consistency and survival that will indeed have a wide appeal – 
are meaningless unless they are expressed in a particular practice according to the rules-of-language 
games that are operative within this practice. As soon as rules are applied, the practice of applica-
tion requires guidance by rules-of-language games. Thus, transcendental rules can only maintain 
their transcendental status as long as they remain unapplied casu quo unspoken, and as such they 
can only function as an empty category or a fictive entity. This is why language rules can never be 
conceived of as necessary conditions for a particular practice or language game in advance. Conse-
quently, there would be nothing irrational or inconsistent to our collective decision to ‘finish’ hu-
manity for, by communicating, we do not commit ourselves to antecedently defined rules of sur-
vival underlying our language games (cf. Mouffe, 2000; Smeyers, 2002; Wittgenstein, 2001). 
                                                      
24 Arendt points out that Kant’s idea of progress conflicts with his notion of human dignity, that requires us to respect 
human beings in their particularity, without treating them as representatives of (the idea of) humanity (Arendt, 1982, p. 
118). 
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 Instead of begging the possibilities of human language and reason, Jonas locates the duty to 
survive in our very being, that is, in our human being as part of humanity. Inspired by the Aristote-
lian idea that all living things strive towards the realisation of their own potential in accordance with 
an inherent purposiveness or telos, Jonas argues that we are summoned to respect the telos imma-
nent to all life. He elevates the existence of humanity to the level of the highest realisation of nature. 
This status brings along a special responsibility for mankind; the responsibility of guarding over the 
flourishing of all life that surrounds us and sustains our own flourishing. The imperative of respon-
sibility does not originate from human or divine will, but from the immanent claim of the intrinsic 
good to its own realisation. Every being ought to be, because of the realisation of its potential good. 
Jonas perceives the actual striving of an organism for survival as an articulation of the fact that this 
being wants itself. Thus, he derives an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ by pointing at the underlying teleologi-
cal self-affirmation of being. There is an ought-to-be, beyond the is (Jonas, 1984; cf. O’Neill, 
1992).  
 Recognition of the realisation of such an intrinsic good immanent to earthly life would be 
very helpful to understand and ground our duty to survive. But, even apart from the apparent 
anthropocentrism present in this line of thought, there are profound reasons why we should refrain 
from adopting Aristotelian metaphysics as a ground for the imperative for survival. My main objec-
tion could be stated in terms of plurality. In order to accept that all that is, ought to be, one has to 
embrace the ‘metaphysics of presence’. Derrida employs this label to indicate the western intellec-
tual tradition, going back to Parmenides and Plato, that tells us that beyond humanity, and immune 
to historical and cultural change, there is something to which humanity owes respect. We assume 
that there is some present world, which we then represent. This is something which we have a duty 
to make clearly and distinctly present to our minds. Derrida attacks this privileging of presence by 
arguing that we can only have something that is through difference. Any identity requires some 
system of differences in order to be an identity, in order to have a certain character, which would 
remain the same through time. To perceive something as present, or as having being, means that we 
give it some form above and beyond the flux and the plurality of its appearances. It is, as Derrida 
has put it, ‘a fixed presence beyond the reach of play’. Sometimes this thing is called God, some-
times the intrinsic nature of reality, sometimes moral law, and sometimes the structure of human 
thought. Throughout history, the metaphysics of presence have proven to be dangerous and ex-
tremely violent, because all are subsumed under the regime of one ‘transcendental signified’. Such a 
signified cannot be sensitive to a plurality of perspectives. Rather than owing respect to that which 
is present, we should do justice to that which is presently absent, by means of exclusion: ‘the con-
stitutive outside’ as Mouffe borrowed from Derrida (Derrida, 1995; Mouffe, 2000). 
 The previous shows that there is no duty to survive inherent to our practices as a language 
community or to our being human as such. Perhaps it is meaningful to think of this duty and the 
ideal of sustainability – urging us to strive for continuation of our worthwhile practices – as an ines-
capable human response to the perspective of an infinite and open future. For us, this unthinkable 
future embodies the ‘constitutive outside’: it enables us to make judgements and it (partly) consti-
tutes these judgements, but, at the same time, it is elusive. Not only the future itself is elusive, but 
our imagination of the future eludes all human judgement and action. In our judgement and action, 
we anticipate possible futures, but we will never be able to articulate our future imagination fully. 
Obviously, our future imagination transcends the reasons we express for having them. In my view, 
that is because we respond to the ‘constitutive outside’ in a way that is not transparent to ourselves. 
It would be an illusion to think that our future expectations, commitments and desires can be sur-
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veyed by oneself altogether. To a certain extent, they remain opaque. That is why we sometimes 
catch ourselves longing for something or caring for something about which we were not previously 
aware. Many philosophers have wondered why we tend to be most convinced of the value of 
something when the existence of the object of our care is being threatened: ‘We become aware of 
the importance of the ozone layer only when the pursuit of individual goods begins to destroy it, 
and of languages when they are dead or dying. We regret the loss of countryside or wilderness only 
when these have been dramatically reduced by urban and industrial expansion’ (Honohan, 2002, p. 
159). Hans Jonas generalises this insight by stressing that ‘we know the thing at stake only when we 
know that it is at stake’ (Jonas, 1984, p. 27). This insight leads Jonas to acknowledge the ‘heuristics 
of fear’; more precise than positive mental states like joy or desire, fear of specific dangers in the 
future points our attention precisely to those vulnerable goods we really care for. Perhaps, John 
Cale was right after all, when he wrote the song Fear is a Man’s Best Friend (1974)25. 
 Whereas fear can be an indicator of what we care for, it appears to be a bad counsellor when 
it comes to motivating environmental education (this question will be addressed in chapter four). 
But apart from these educational considerations, the heuristics of fear point our attention to a 
different way of conceiving our relationship with future generations as future members of our po-
litical community. As suggested earlier, political communities ought to be understood as a commu-
nities of fate; the existence of a community is premised by a shared condition, thrown as it were 
into a particular location in time and place. Thus, it may be a common predicament – or the threat 
of a common danger – that binds people together as a community. When we take a look at the scope 
and nature of environmental problems like those of global warming and biological diversity against 
this background then we have to conclude that both contemporary fellow citizens as well as past 
and future citizens are partly vulnerable to the same dangers emerging from these problems. In this 
respect we may be seen as living in a common world, and thus share at least an overlapping frame 
of reference. However, as Honohan argues, at this level it may be more appropriate to speak of 
common concerns than of shared goods because the ‘good’ in question is necessarily defined in 
negative terms (Honohan, 2002, p. 152). Our responsibilities to future generations will therefore be 
of a different kind. After all, they do not answer our desire for recognition in a direct way as con-
temporaries do. Nevertheless, as we judge, we appear to respond to the potential judgement of fu-
ture citizens as the judgement of those who are partly subjected to the same conditions.  
On this particular point, an analogy can be drawn with Strawson’s notion of the ‘reactive at-
titude’. Strawson endorses this notion to indicate the intertwining of our moral practices with reac-
tions towards ‘others’ that are not transparent to us and cannot be articulated in publicly specifiable 
terms. With this notion Strawson challenges the idea that the limits of our responsibility are deter-
mined by conscious personal choice, conviction and principle. He argues, on the contrary, that to 
hold an agent responsible for his actions is an expression of a reactive attitude. In our attribution of 
responsibility to ourselves and others we are lead by intersubjective rules, according to which some 
‘reactive attitudes’ are more appropriate than others. In the examples Strawson espouses, those 
‘others’ are living persons with which the agent interacts. If we consider the ideal of sustainability 
                                                      
25 In the introduction to the so-called ESD-toolkit a similar insight is articulated through an argument against those who 
are waiting for a perfect definition before they consent to collective action: ‘It is curious to note that while we have 
difficulty envisioning a sustainable world, we have no difficulty identifying what is unsustainable in our societies. We 
can rapidly create a laundry list of problems – inefficient use of energy, lack of water conservation, increased pollution, 
abuses of human rights, overuse of personal transportation, consumerism, etc. But we should not chide ourselves 
because we lack a clear definition of sustainability’ (http://www.esdtoolkit.org/discussion/default.htm). 
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in this light, there are still others with whom we participate in common practices and hold 
responsible for the continuity of our practices. However, the beneficiaries of our behaviour – future 
generations – are located beyond the scope of our current practices. In itself this difference should 
not prevent us from applying the Strawsonian insight to the question of sustainability, because, as 
Burms reveals, our reactive attitudes play a vital role in our treatment of animals and the deceased 
as well. The theory of Strawson leads us to acknowledge, that in the end, the limits of our responsi-
bility and the scope of our judgements remain opaque, because they depend on the reactive attitudes 
we hold towards each other as members of communal practices. Those attitudes are interwoven 
with our practices and our form of life in ways that are simply not open to us. This means that reac-
tive attitudes and their related practices are not open to general justification. In contrast to beliefs 
and judgements attitudes are neither true nor false, and are not warranted by anything over and 
above their standard conditions of applicability. The fact that we cannot give publicly specifiable 
reasons for doing one thing as opposed to another does not mean that anything goes. We are still 
left with choices about whether to respond to those who spoil the life conditions of future 
generations in a reactive way – with blame or indignation – or to understand their behaviour in ob-
jective terms thereby discharging the agent from future responsibility (Strawson, 1974; cf. Magill, 
2000; Burms, 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, I would like to give an overview of my neo-republican view on future responsibility. 
The neo-republican ideal of sustainability requires us to take responsibility for the continuation into 
the future of the civil practices in which we are currently involved. As we have seen, an integral 
part of our participation in civil practices is paying particular care to its future. Our present com-
mitment brings with it a personal claim that takes possession of a particular future of indeterminate 
length. However, our political judgements in public discourse are warranted by contemporaries 
only. Those who do not yet exist can neither answer nor mirror our desire for recognition. And in 
the absence of any answer, a lasting desire for their recognition as discourse members will simply 
not emerge. Therefore, anticipated communication with future generations will remain illusive and 
cannot be a source for political judgements. This conclusion is underlined by the widespread expe-
rience that advocates of future generations either veil their own interests behind this rhetoric, or in-
troduce a highly metaphysical, almost religious authoritative argument that cannot be a proper sub-
ject in public discourse. This is not to say that future generations have no role at all in political 
judgement and discourse on environmental concerns; we cannot include future people in the ‘an-
ticipated communication’ inherent in political judgement as anticipated communication partners, 
but their claims could be among our topics of discussion. When we recognise that claims on behalf 
of future generations will make demands on us, we do not anticipate communication with them. 
Moreover, the ‘call’ we experience emerges from our practical involvement in those public prac-
tices, projects, movements and traditions that we are committed to at present. Our personal invest-
ment in these practices and our dedication to its purposes imply trust in an open time horizon. 
 Imagination plays a vital role in political action. As we consider the implications of our cur-
rent practices for future generations, we will imagine a particular future world, but rather than cal-
culating what would be in the interest of its inhabitants – future people – we have to judge for our-
selves: what kind of world would we want them to live in? Which practices are worth carrying into 
the future? Which world would be worth remembering? By taking responsibility for the world we 
want to leave behind, and by safeguarding the continuity of our worthwhile practices, we do not 
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need to hide behind hypothetical rights of future people. Judged from a neo-republican perspective, 
that would be a means to run away from our responsibilities. Future generations are only of indirect 
importance when it comes to this approach of future responsibility. Even if we claim that we antici-
pate their possible standpoint, our judgement is in fact a function of our present commitments. Un-
derlying this judgement is our striving for continuity of what we care for. The strong conviction that 
future generations are entitled to a dignified existence similar to ours is derivative of this primary 
judgement. In order to distinguish this existential perspective from the perspective of sustainable 
development, I choose not to speak of an ideal of sustainability, but instead, of an ideal of 
continuity. 
 In searching for a common ground or foundation that renders the ideal of continuity an 
obligatory force, I found that we cannot rely on transcendental conditions underlying our practices 
as a language community nor can we rely on the idea of a telos inherent to the realisation of man-
kind throughout history. Rather, our commitment to survival and striving for continuation of com-
mon practices should be perceived as our response to a call that originates from the perspective of 
an infinite and open future; a future that stretches out in front of us, and invites us to engage in fu-
ture considerations. This perspective functions as a ‘constitutive outside’: an elusive other to which 
we answer in a way to which we will never be able to fully do justice. There is always something 
that escapes our present judgement and action. We are seized by this ‘surplus’, and we act in 
response to this, but will never be able to give a full account of our action in terms of reasons, pre-
cisely because our action assumes a particular responsiveness that is not transparent to the agent. 
However, before we take refuge in speculative metaphysics, I would like to stress that our particular 
response to this call is warranted by what we think and do within the intersubjective practices of the 
language community of which we are a part. Rather than being a matter of introspection or future 
speculation, we appeal to one another in our response to the infinite future that thrusts itself upon 
us. In this response we express how we experience ourselves as human beings and what we really 
care about. In short, we answer this call, not as an individual but as a discourse community. And 
again, the importance of a public space and discourse is highlighted. Within the public arena, we 
hold each other responsible for striving after the continuity upon which we implicitly agree. The 
continuity claim of the others we live among is not something we can easily shake off, for who 
wants to appear as a blunt egoist or moron in front of those others who also constitute who we are?  
 As such, the ideal of continuity (that requires us to take responsibility for the continuation of 
the civil practices we are involved in) can appear as an intersubjective ground for environmental 
action and judgement, without being elevated to the ultimate status of a metaphysical foundation. 
Given the fact we are intersubjectively situated in civil practices, we can make no judgements other 
than by including future considerations. This is an anthropological necessity, inherent to human ac-
tion, rather than a logical one. We do not have the sufficient and necessary arguments for obliging 
others to consider the future implications of their judgements and actions. Conceived in this way,, 
we can hold on to the expression that we judge or act in favour of future generations, while main-
taining that we make our judgements in dialogue with contemporary others and derive motivation 
from our interaction with contemporaries. Even if we sense that we anticipate recognition of future 
generations, this desire is buttressed by present judgements of contemporary others. In my view, 
future generations are neither the source, nor object of environmental responsibility. The source of 
environmental responsibility resides within our current practices, while the focus or object of 
responsibility is the continuation of those practices, rather than its imagined participants. 
 
because we are citizens 
 79 
2.4  Education for an open future 
 
If environmental citizenship implies an existential and active responsibility as neo-republicans and 
civil society theorists argue, then the question arises as to how people become responsible citizens 
in the first place. How are we prepared for participation in political life? Human beings are gene-
rally endowed with the gifts of speech and action, as Aristotle claimed when he characterised hu-
man beings as zoon politikon – political animals – though obviously we are not born as fully-fled-
ged citizens. Therefore, new-born generations will always be in need of some form of civil educa-
tion or initiation into political life. There are, however, various views on the general purpose and 
outline of such a civil initiation. In general, liberal theorists tend to prefer a more or less isolated 
curriculum of competencies required by the status of citizenship. In this view, civil education is 
mainly designed to communicate and inculcate a common core of knowledge, values, skills and 
attitudes that is regarded preresquite for participation in the political system of a particular country. 
Communitarians, on the other hand, stress the acquisition of virtues within the moral community in 
which children grow up and learn to participate before they become citizens. In their view, civil 
responsibilities naturally emerge from the responsibilities of community membership. A neo-repu-
blican approach to environmental education as we have just outlined would stand in opposition to 
both approaches. Contra mainstream liberalism neo-republicans would reject the possibility of defi-
ning necessary conditions antecedently required by democratic citizenship in terms of competences. 
Therefore, they would probably object to the idea of an isolated education of civil competence as 
liberals propose. But this rejection would not lead them to adopt the communitarian approach, be-
cause participation in a moral community can never serve as a learning experience for participation 
in civil society. After all, the political community is profoundly marked by plurality instead of mo-
ral homogeneity, and requires a different attitude and way of judging.  
 Neo-republican thinkers and civil society theorists do argue that a particular form of moral 
bond exists between members of a political community. According to Hohohan the republic is ‘a 
specific community of citizens related by substantial ties and a sense of loyalty more like fraternity 
or friendship than agreement on institutions or procedures’ (Honohan, 2002, p. 6). This loyalty is 
not due to a common way of life or a common morality, but, as indicated earlier, the political com-
munity can be understood as the expression of a common fate. Oldfield for instance borrows the 
ideal of ‘concord’ from Aristotle in order to describe this particular kind of solidarity:  
 
Concord is, thus, that friendship which exists between citizens as members of a political community. 
It is a relationship between people who know each other; they are not strangers, between whom 
goodwill is possible, but not friendship. It is a relationship between people who differ in their talents 
and capacities. It is a relationship based on respect for such differences, and on concern for others’ 
interests; each, thus, acknowledges the other’s autonomy. It is above all a relationship based on 
recognition that living is a shared venture, that can only be successfully engaged in if there is com-
mitment. The commitment, however, is to the fellow-citizens, who – in choosing amongst themselves 
how to conduct their shared lives in the spirit of justice – create and sustain a community (Oldfield, 
1990, p. 122-23). 
 
Because of their trust in the strength of the political community some neo-republican thinkers and 
civil society theorists place their faith in the educative power of the process of political participation 
itself. Inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and J.S. Mill they assume that political participation itself 
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will elicit civil virtue and teach people responsibility and toleration. In this view, the more one par-
ticipates in public discourse the more one develops the attitudes and public spiritedness appropriate 
to a citizen. As Oldfield notes, they foster hope in the activity of participation ‘as the means 
whereby individuals may become accustomed to perform the duties of citizenship. Political partici-
pation enlarges the minds of individuals, familiarises them with interests which lie beyond the im-
mediacy of personal circumstance and environment, and encourages them to acknowledge that 
public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention’ (Oldfield; cited in Kym-
licka & Norman, 1990, p. 361)26. Furthermore, those neo-republican thinkers expect that political 
participation of some will inspire others to join them: ‘the example set by the initial participators 
will draw ever widening groups of individuals into the political arena’ (Oldfield, p. 155; cf. Van 
Gunsteren, 1992).  
 Oldfield criticises this faith in the educative power of participation for being overly optimis-
tic. He perceives their advocacy for collective participation and decision-making as a means of 
resolution to all kinds of social problems as a way to bypass the issue of responsible citizenship. In 
his view, the ‘moral character which is appropriate for genuine citizenship does not generate itself; 
it has to be authoritatively inculcated. This means that the minds have to be manipulated. People, 
starting with children, have to be taught what citizenship means for them, in a political community, 
in terms of the duties it imposes upon them, and they have to be motivated to perform these duties’ 
(Oldfield, 1990, p. 164). Oldfield goes on by discussing educative proposals for national service – 
civilian as well as military – which are expected to install a public spirit within the new generation 
entering our political community. Obviously, these particular remedies to fulfil the need for civil 
education will not be shared by those who approach this question from a progressive-educational 
point of view or those left-wing participatory democrats and civil society theorists who equate 
learning with participating.  
 When it comes to the educational issue, there are huge differences of opinion among neo-
republicans and civil society theorists. But what appears to unite them is the fundamental conviction 
that civil education should take place within the public sphere itself. The (re-)creation of citizenship 
is itself regarded as a core responsibility of the political community. Citizens are expected to or-
ganise their political life and structure their institutions in a way that sustains and preserves the 
public spirit and engagement in collective affairs of each and every (future) citizen. Therefore, neo-
republicans argue that this collective responsibility cannot be left to the moral community or to in-
dividual choice (Van Gunsteren, 1992, p. 119; Kymlicka & Norman, p. 361). In line with this neo-
republican perspective, environmental education should be understood as a particular kind of initia-
tion into our civil practices; an initiation in which newcomers are gradually involved as fellow-citi-
zens, who help to shape these practices and are, ipso facto, gradually assuming co-responsibility for 
the continuity of our practices in the future.  
 But what exactly is it, that educators do when they involve children in our practices and 
simultaneously strive for continuity of those civil practices? Are environmental educators merely 
offering an appealing perspective on a possible future world, or do they treat their pupils as human 
                                                      
26 It should be noted, however, that Arendt herself was not in favour of a civic education within the public sphere itself. 
However, her placement of educational practice within the social sphere gave rise to an extensive debate about the 
precise delineation between the social sphere and the private as well as the public sphere (that we will not discuss right 
here, since a more close study of Arendts thoughts on this point would draw the attention from the core issue in this 
section). Nevertheless, we can conclude that Arendt did regard school education as a responsibility of the community 
rather than a private matter of parents (Arendt, 1958a, 1961).  
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material for the establishment of this future world to come? Derek R. Bell testifies to the latter by 
stating that the aim of environmental education ought to be to “create a new generation of citizens 
who are greener than their parents” (Bell, 2004, p. 43). In others words, does the claim of continuity 
do justice to the right of children to an open future horizon, or does it lead to a colonisation of our 
future in such a way that we deny new generations the opportunity to shape their own future world? 
This latter danger is precisely what the German philosopher of education Theodor Litt described as 
the ‘Vorwegnahme der Zukunft’. Apart from Litt, philosophers of education generally warn against 
the utilisation of education as a means for creating some preconceived ‘ideal society’. On the other 
hand, every educational act and judgement casts its shadows ahead. Every educational intention or 
response lays claim to a particular future of indeterminate length. By acting in a particular way now, 
the educator commits himself and the child to doing something in the future. Moreover, both our 
action or inaction has consequences for the world we leave behind for the next generation. There-
fore, we cannot remain innocent and complete refrainment from continuity claims in education can-
not be logically maintained. Thus, on the one had tension exists between the inevitability and con-
stituting force of the promise of continuity and the risk of treating the present as a technology of the 
future on the other (Meijer, 1996).  
 In my view, this particular dilemma originates from the paradoxical nature of educational 
responsibility, as characterised by Arendt in her notorious paper The Crisis of Education (1958). 
Educators bear a double responsibility, so she argues, one of which aims to preserve the child’s 
openness and newness against the powers of the established world, whereas the other aims to pro-
tect the durable world against the potential recklessness of the new generation:  
 
In education they (adults – DWP) assume responsibility for both, for the life and development of the 
child and for the continuance of the world. These two responsibilities do not by any means coincide, 
they may indeed come into conflict with each other. The responsibility for the development of the 
child is in a certain sense a responsibility against the world: the child requires special protection 
and care so that nothing destructive will happen to him from the world. But the world, too, needs 
protection to keep it from being overrun and destroyed by the onslaught of the new that bursts upon 
it with each new generation (Arendt, 1958b, p. 504). 
 
This tension is prevalent in the practice of environmental education because here, in particular, both 
child and world are vulnerable to each other’s powers. On the one hand, every new generation car-
ries with it the promise of a new future and the ability to think about worldly problems anew and to 
go in a direction previously unthought of. This is an expression of what Arendt calls ‘the condition 
of natality’27. In her eyes, it is the task of educators to preserve this newness over and against the 
established powers that may force them to act and think about the world and the environmental cri-
sis in a particular preconceived way, for instance, as a problem of resource management. On the 
other hand, every new generation constitutes a potential threat to the durability of our world, and it 
is the task of educators to take responsibility for this world in front of them. They are to protect the 
environmental goods of our world against destruction and decay, for example, against the 
                                                      
27 Arendt writes about natality as the condition of human action and, ipso facto, of human freedom: ‘action has the 
closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the 
world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting’ (Arendt, 
1958, p. 176). Thus understood, Arendt’s idea of natality is very similar to Lyotards notion of childhood – l’enfance in 
terms of a radical indeterminacy that cannot be represented (Smeyers & Masschelein, 2000, p. 149-152). 
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consumerist threats inherent in contemporary youth culture. In this sense, Arendt argues, education 
is and should be a conservative enterprise:  
 
Basically we are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for this is the basic 
human situation, in which the world is created by mortal hands to serve mortals for a limited time as 
home. Because the world is made by mortals it wears out; and because it continuously changes its 
inhabitants it runs the risk of becoming as mortal as they are. To preserve the world against the 
mortality of its creators and inhabitants it must be constantly set right anew. The problem is simply 
to educate in such a way that a setting-right remains actually possible, even though it can, of course, 
never be assured. Our hope always hangs on the new which every generations brings; but precisely 
because we can base our hope only on this, we destroy everything if we so try to control the new that 
we, the old, can dictate how it will look. Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in 
every child, education must be conservative; it must preserve this newness and introduce it as a new 
thing into an old world, which, however revolutionary its reactions may be, is always from the 
standpoint of the next generation, superannuated and close to destruction (Arendt, 1958b, p. 510).  
 
In Arendt’s view adults are able to fulfil their twofold task of protecting the young against the world 
and the world against the young only by introducing the young into our world as it presently is, in 
all its potential and with all its flaws. Educators stand in relation to the young as representatives of 
the present world for which they must assume responsibility even though they themselves did not 
make it, and even though they may, secretly or openly, wish it were other than it is. As such, edu-
cators must present an authentic picture of the world that is open to critique and change. Arendt 
therefore argues against those progressive educators who introduce the young into a desired world 
instead of the world we actually live in. It would be a big mistake to transform our picture of the 
world on behalf of the young as though our desired future were already a reality: ‘These educators 
unwittingly send the message to students that the world is no longer in need of transformation; it 
has already been transformed’ (Levinson, 1997, p. 443). For this reason, educators should not incul-
cate us with the ideal of a bright green future Ecotopia. Instead they are called upon to show what 
commits us to the present world. Rather than being utopian prophets, environmental educators 
ought to be guardians of our common world. Moreover, they ought to familiarise children with the 
problems that threaten our common world as part of their introduction into that world, so Arendt 
argues. Only when educators refuse to take responsibility for these worldly problems, and take 
refuge in utopias, do risks of indoctrination and manipulation lie in wait (Arendt, 1958a, p. 307; 
Levinson, 1997; Gordon, 1999; Achterhuis, 1996; Vansieleghem, 2004). 
 Arendt refines her statement that education should be conservative by stressing that educa-
tion should take place in ‘the gap between past and future’. The present offers us a possible space in 
which to recollect and understand the past in a way that does not determine the future, but does 
throw an illuminating light on it, and fosters responsibility for the future. As representatives of the 
present world, educators mediate between the old and the young by balancing between that which is 
‘no longer’ and that which is ‘not yet’, or, as Levinson notes: ‘To teach in this gap is to take on the 
twofold task of introducing students into a world that precedes them, while preserving the possibi-
lity that students might undertake something new in relation to this world’. And: ‘to teach in this 
gap is to commit ourselves to teaching about the past – for understanding and guidance, and for the 
preservation of memory that underlies both – and to motivate students to try to set things right. At 
the same time we have to resist the temptation of attempting to determine and control our students’ 
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futures’ (Levinson 1997: 450). According to Levinson this gap is not mainly to conserve and pre-
serve the past, but occupies a provocative space as well, one which opens the possibility of inter-
rupting social processes that appear fixed and inevitable (Arendt, 1958a; Gordon, 1999; Levinson, 
1997; Vansieleghem, 2004) 
 At a recent conference on environmental education the Dutch state official Herman Wijffels 
posed the rhetorical question: ‘Do we educate pupils to cope with the problems of today or do we 
educate them for answering the challenge of tomorrow?’28. If I were to answer this question – 
despite its rhetorical nature – I would agree with Arendt and prefer to educate children for dealing 
with ‘the problems of today’, because those who pretend to know ‘the challenge of tomorrow’ are 
either reformulating present problems in terms of future challenges by invoking the speculative aut-
hority of future generations or they are taking possession of an indeterminate future that should re-
main open for posterity.  
 Perhaps it is due to the metaphysical nature of Arendt’s ideas on educational responsibility, 
that her advocacy of conservatism can so easily be misunderstood. What does Arendt precisely 
mean when she states that educators must assume responsibility for the present world in which they 
introduce the young? Does her statement imply that environmental educators are to justify the pre-
sent status quo? Does she mean that they have to render the existing institutions, practices and pro-
cedures legitimacy by providing the arguments that sustain their raison d’être? Obviously not. Edu-
cational responsibility is not primarily concerned with justification or legitimisation, but with res-
ponsiveness. In their words and actions educators have to respond to a common world, rather than 
turn their backs on this world and creating an educational ‘micro-world’ in which they hold the 
young captive. By responding, educators introduce the young into a common world, as if they want 
to say: ‘This is our world’. Only by introducing new generations to our common world and its 
practices, will they be able to see its strengths and weaknesses, its beauty and ugliness, its goods 
and bads. Only then will they be sufficiently prepared to participate in public discourse, to speak 
and act in order to change or protect these practices29. This conclusion is in line with the analysis of 
the preceding in which our future responsibilities are derived from those practices we care for here 
and now. 
 Once this is clear, the question remains as to how educators raise awareness of and instil 
commitment to what we experience as good and meaningful in our world. In order to understand the 
nature of our allegiance to common practices and rules, we should dwell for a moment on the ideas 
of Mouffe, who argues that ‘allegiance to democracy and belief in the value of its institutions do not 
depend on giving them an intellectual foundation’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 97). In the end, fostering alle-
giance is not a matter of giving reasons but of persuasion against a background of shared beliefs. On 
this particular point, Mouffe elaborates on the later work of Wittgenstein in which he stresses that to 
agree on opinions, there must first be agreement on the language used, and agreement in the use of 
language depends on agreements in forms of life: the inescapable horizons of certainties on which 
we rely in our daily actions by sharing a common life. These ‘certainties’ are not grounded in 
reason but rest on trust or belief. For Mouffe, allegiance to democratic practices is similar to what 
                                                      
28 This is my translation of Wijffels’ question, that was originally posed in Dutch as follows: ‘Leiden we leerlingen op 
voor de problemen van vandaag of voor de uitdaging van morgen?’. 
29 Arendts’ expression of educators’ double responsibility and her advocacy of conservatism can be understood as a 
response to the famous pedagogical paradox, as expressed by Kant: ‘How do I cultivate freedom through coercion?’ 
(Wie kultiviere ich die Freiheit bei dem Zwang). In other words: ‘How can a free, human being, who, at birth, is not 
what he should be, be prompted by external means (i.e. by an educator) to become what he should be?’ (Vanderstraeten 
& Biesta, 2001, p. 10).  
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Wittgenstein calls ‘a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it is belief, it 
is really a way of living, or of assessing one’s life’ (cited in Mouffe, 2000, p. 97). This commitment 
is not warranted by rational consent, but established by means of identification with the beliefs we 
experience as ‘true’ or ‘good’ in our daily practices, and through recognition of the demands these 
beliefs make on us. Following the later Wittgenstein as well, Rorty underlines that to call somebody 
irrational in this context ‘is not to say that she is not making proper use of her mental faculties. It is 
only to say that she does not seem to share enough beliefs and desires with one to make conversa-
tion with her on the disputed point fruitful’ (cited in Mouffe, 2000, p. 65).  
 In line with these Wittgensteinian insights, Ramaekers and Smeyers (2004) argue that 
education should be seen as a particular kind of initiation into a ‘form of life’ understood as a hori-
zon of beliefs: 
 
What Wittgenstein envisages here is, from the perspective of the parent, initiating the child into a 
picture of the world, into a shared practice of doing things this way and not the other. For the child, 
it is about acquiring a pattern of beliefs—belief not in the sense of “lacking the proper grounds and 
therefore merely belief instead of knowledge”, but belief understood as a foundational expression 
(Cf. Stroll, 1994). The child is acquiring the very grounds or “substratum” (Wittgenstein, 1969, # 
162) of what is understood to be a human existence. This is shown primarily in the way she acts. She 
does not learn these beliefs propositionally—they may never have been expressed, thus Wittgen-
stein—but learns to act accordingly (Cf. Wittgenstein, 1969, # 144), “learns to react in such-and-
such a way” (Wittgenstein, 1969, # 538). To be precise, this is not a matter of acquiring single be-
liefs or propositions, but of coming to believe “a whole system of propositions” (Wittgenstein, 1969, 
#141), of which Wittgenstein says in the very same section, that “Light dawns gradually over the 
whole”. Importantly, the giving of reasons to bring in some kind of epistemological justification is 
not what is involved here. Rather, trust, in its most basic form, is what takes centrestage here. 
(Ramaekers & Smeyers, 2004).  
 
Wittgenstein’s point is precisely that the exchange of reasons comes after the ‘belief’ or ‘conver-
sion’. Accordingly, the authors suggest that education might be thought to consist of the persuasion 
of children to ‘see things differently’. Not by arguing for or against a particular perspective, but by 
gaining trust in the practices in which we introduce children, we invite them to see things from this 
or that particular angle. Sometimes, it is by seeing a particular aspect of reality in a different way 
that the entire picture of reality changes (in this context Wittgenstein discusses what happens to us 
when we see the well-known picture of a duck that suddenly transforms into a picture of a rabbit as 
soon as we identify that which we took to be the duck’s beak as the ears of a rabbit. Here, Wittgen-
stein speaks of ‘the dawning of an aspect’). This insight in what might be labelled a gestalt switch 
can be extrapolated to an ethical and esthetical context as well. Thus, the shift of an anthropocentric 
view of nature to a more poetic world-view that leaves room for recognising beauty, integrity or 
value in nature, might indeed be ‘triggered’ by seeing this particular tree from a different angle; as a 
powerful symbol of strength and vitality, for instance, rather than an irritating obstacle on the side-
walk. To give a more practical example: if city children are taken on a field trip to an organic farm 
in the countryside to study and work in the field, then this involvement i.e. experience summons 
them to see their daily food in a different way; not as consumer commodities you buy in a super-
market or eat in a fast food restaurant, but as the fruit of our land that sustains our very being. Rai-
sing an awareness like this – an awareness of the symbiosis we enjoy with our land – cannot (me-
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rely) be passed on to others in terms of rational arguments and propositions. Moreover, such an 
awareness is part of a belief system or a picture of the world, that cannot be argued for or against. 
An awareness like this can only be evoked by practical experience with which educators familiarise 
children by introducing them into such a caring practice (Ramaekers & Smeyers, 2004; Wittgen-
stein, 2001, p. 295).  
 To sum up, educators foster allegiance to their common practices and the underlying rules 
governing our behaviour within those practices by persuading children to participate; by inviting 
them to act in agreement with those rules and to live with the underlying truths and certainties as we 
do. An initiation of this kind will enable children as newcomers in our civil practices to apply rules 
in a different way than we commonly perform, and as such, change the rules and meanings of our 
practices. Furthermore, an initiation like this will render new participants receptive to the evolution 
of the background beliefs and shifting truths in time. Consider for example our growing sensitivity 
to animal welfare, our intuitive recognition of particular future claims or the sense of beauty we ex-
perience in our involvement with the natural environment. Against this background four features 
emerge as constitutive for the form of environmental education we have in mind: the focus on prac-
tice, plurality, conflict and double responsibility. 
 
Practice 
Since it is impossible to detach environmental knowledge, values, skills and attitude from the prac-
tices in which they are expressed and acquire meaning, education must consist of an introduction 
into meaningful practices as a whole, rather than an isolated education of action competences. 
Therefore, environmental education is not primarily concerned with the transmission of environ-
mental knowledge, ecological values, skills and attitudes, so that the child can function in particular 
practices. Moreover, the educator is focussed on the selection and design of an ensemble of prac-
tices for an educational purpose: environmentally caring practices that foster particular kinds of 
identification and make possible particular kinds of individuality. The environmental educator looks 
for caring practices in which a particular involvement with the natural environment and care for the 
future is preserved and a particular model of ecological responsibility is practised. In such caring 
practices, children are familiarised with a style of interacting with nature and anticipating future 
concerns that is ultimately different from those interactions we usually employ as consumers. Thus, 
environmental education comprises an initiation into counter-practices that offer an alternative pic-
ture of the world, an alternative ethos and an alternative model for experiencing our contact with the 
natural milieu. The common ground for an environmental morality should not be located in a com-
mon rationality, but in a common practice plus its subsequent ethos and belief. 
 
Plurality 
Since it is impossible to define what is ‘reasonable’ without referring to certain pivotal judgements 
within paradigmatic practices – my devotion to the Sunday afternoon walk in a nearby forest, my 
dedication to American cars or my attachment to traditional farming practices – it would be unjust 
to resort to one conception of justice in our definition of the conditions of citizenship. Rather, there 
are many ways in which we can practice environmental citizenship within a civil society and we 
have no practice-transcendent reason to judge one above the other. Environmental educators and 
citizens are not concerned with applying general rules or values in particular cases, rather, it is the 
other way around. Particular cases will lead them to identify an ‘ensemble of practices’ each of 
which subsumes some aspects of our environmental responsibility. There is no ‘correct under-
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standing’ of environmental responsibility that every rational being should be willing to accept but a 
plurality of ways to approach the environmental issues we are confronted with. In this light, Mouffe 
argues for a plurality of practices employed for the formation of citizenship: ‘Democratic 
individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, the forms of 
life that foster identifications with democratic values’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 96). In a similar way, en-
vironmental education should be understood as an introduction into an ensemble of environmentally 
caring practices, thereby persuading children to broaden the range of their commitments to others, 
to build a more inclusive community that comes to terms with the imperatives of future continuity 
and responsibility for nature. These practices are collectively labelled ‘educational’ and ‘environ-
mental’ because they are related by means of family resemblances rather than subsumed under a 
uniform conception of ‘sustainability’ or environmental education. 
 
Conflict 
Since there is no master-practice that renders all practices their relative place within a larger frame-
work of environmental responsibility, ambiguity and conflict will always be at the heart of envi-
ronmental education. Every practice and potential articulation of our care for nature necessarily ex-
cludes other possible ways of acting and caring. There is no unifying framework beyond the sheer 
plurality of practices. This plurality does not only engender interpersonal conflict between citizens, 
communities and associations within civil society, as we have seen above, it also implies intraper-
sonal conflicts of loyalty and identification as well. The divergent loyalties and identifications chil-
dren develop by participating in disparate practices sometimes harmonise within a coherent idea 
they have of environmental responsibility, but they may conflict as well. A familiar example is the 
conflict between our role as consumers and our role as world citizens when it comes down to the 
purchase of fair trade products. Whereas my vigilance when it comes to shopping and constraints 
not to exceed the household budget urges me to keep away from the expensive products of fair 
trade, my responsibility as a world citizen requires me to consider the social and ecological condi-
tions under which the products are produced and will probably motivate me to buy the fair trade 
product instead of the cheaper alternative. But how should we weigh both claims against one 
another, and what kind of reflection or determination should settle a personal conflict like this? The 
exact nature of these conflicts and possible ways of dealing with them will be explored in the fol-
lowing chapter. According to Honohan, it is the split between private and public concerns that 
highlights ‘a tension within each person between the immediately perceived particular advantage of 
each and the general interest of the citizen as an interdependent member of the polity, and requires 
each to be active in pursuit of the common good, to have public spirit, and to participate in public 
service’ (Honohan, 2002, p. 158). Mouffe stresses that ‘these conflicts are inevitable since our 
identities are shaped by a plurality of changing audiences’ (Mouffe, 2000, p. 59). As such, dealing 
with conflicts of loyalty on the borderline between disparate practices is not only part of the process 
of becoming a citizen, but this is a necessary part of the process of increasing self-understanding as 
well. For this reason, I want to argue that, apart from the caring practices to which children are in-
troduced, environmental education also requires a separate space within which pupils and student 
are enabled to deliberate on these conflicts and exchange experiences. A discursive practice of this 
kind should aim at making collective reflection on environmental responsibility possible rather than 
subsuming all practices under a common practice or framework of environmental education.  
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Double responsibility 
Unlike the educational ideas of some neo-republicans, the analysis given above leads us to assume 
that the practice of citizenship does not reproduce itself without some educational guidance. Partici-
pation alone does not breed citizenship, since new-born generations need to be introduced into the 
civil practices in which they are thrown. Without education, the young would probably be lost in a 
civil society that is far too complex and diversified for them to find their way around by themselves. 
But even more important, the public sphere is profoundly marked by display and exercise of power 
against which newcomers are defenseless. Without adult guidance the existing powers would un-
dermine the promise of young generations to bring along something new. They would lose their 
ability to speak and act anew in an old world. This need for a guided introduction calls on the 
double responsibility of environmental educators; by virtue of their position as mediators between 
an old world and new generations, educators need to be responsive to the implicit claims of young 
generations to an open future, as well as to the implicit claim of our old world in need of protection. 
In fact, educators maintain a relation based on trust with the young as well as the old; they require 
the young to trust the old and require the old to trust the young by protecting the newness of the 
young against the established powers of the old and protecting the established world against the 
destructive newness of the young.  
In Arendt’s view adults are only able to fulfil their twofold task by introducing the young 
into our world as it is at present, in all its potential and with all its flaws. Only when educators act 
as representatives of our present world, for which they assume responsibility, can the fundamental 
conflict between both claims be dissolved. This is because in order to preserve our common world it 
has to be continuously reformed, and reform is only possible when newcomers take their bearings 
from the present world in which they are properly introduced. According to the Geistenwissen-
schaftliche philosopher of education Klaus Mollenhauer, we educate the young so that the good in 
our life may continue to exist (Mollenhauer, 1986). In a similar spirit Hargrove claims that humans 
have ‘a duty to promote and preserve the existence of good in the world’ (Hargrove, 1992). So, 
rather than being utopian prophets environmental educators should be guardians of our common 
world. Moreover, Arendt also argues they are to familiarise children with the problems that threaten 
our common world as part of their introduction into that world. Only when educators refuse to take 
responsibility for these worldly problems, and take refuge in utopias, do risks of indoctrination and 
manipulation lie in wait (Arendt, 1958a, p. 307; Levinson, 1997; Gordon, 1999; Achterhuis, 1996). 
 Of course, the introduction of the young into our common world and its problems should 
proceed gradually. Arendt sharply delineates the line between the political practice of adults, acting 
among equals, and the educational practice in which adults cannot assume equal responsibility for 
the world among children (according to Arendt the Greek word schole literally means ‘abstain from 
political action’). This insight in the discrepancy between adults and children leads me to argue that 
adults should not confront children with environmental responsibilities they cannot live up to them-
selves. Rather than as an educational issue, these responsibilities ought to be a subject of political 
action. As such, contemporary citizens cannot shirk their responsibility to future citizens (cf. Ach-
terhuis, 1996). Furthermore, adults should not confront children with responsibilities for problems 
they cannot possibly oversee. Educators must introduce children into environmental problems only 
if and insofar as these practices offer them concrete possiblites for taking action. In the absence of 
possibilities for taking action, environmental educators risk bringing about destructive feelings of 
fear, impotence and defeatism. So, obviously, there is no use in teaching six year old children about 
acid rain, for they will not be able to grasp the problem and judge its implications in proper propor-
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tions. Experience has shown that a premature introduction into problems of acidification might in-
deed make children afraid of rain (When it once started raining a six year old boy remarked to his 
mother: ‘The trees are all going to die, right now’). It might perhaps be more valuable to involve six 
year old children in our collective efforts to keep the playgrounds around school free of litter. Intro-
duction into environmental practices is meaningful, only when children are able to apply the rules 
of these practices and when they are in a position to co-shape those rules and apply them in pursuit 
of a different future for those practices. As such, a gradual introduction into environmental 
problems and practices – following the extension of the children’s’ life-world – may inspire them to 
take care of their environment without losing trust in the continuation of our worldly practices. 
 
The first section of this chapter ended with the conclusion that liberal theory, underlying present 
proposals for environmental education, presents us with a false dichotomy. Dependent on its suc-
cess, the liberal attempt to justify sustainable development on second-order grounds either results in 
a wishy-washy domestication of environmentalism – treating ecological values and standards as 
mere lifestyle options – or it ends in practices of indoctrination – imposing sustainable development 
as a firm ideology upon (future) citizens. A viable way between the two extremes of complete per-
missiveness and indoctrination cannot be offered by communitarianism since its understanding of 
intergenerational responsibility is too limited in scope and the underlying assumptions concerning 
community life and personal identity are unrealistic and flawed. However, such a viable way may 
be found by adopting a neo-republican perspective, as outlined in this section. By focussing on 
practice, plurality, conflict and double responsibility as being the constituent parts of environmental 
education, children will then be inspired to take responsibility for the continuation of the practices 
they are involved in, without being pinned down to a particular ideology or future condition of this 
practice.  
 To be more precise about the contribution of our neo-republican perspective on environmen-
tal education: the focus on practice prevents us from rationalising our contact with nature in a way 
that turns this relationship into a mere option for choice or, on the other hand, into an ideological 
relationship. Moreover, the focus on practice requires us to participate in those practices within 
which our care for the natural environment will be preserved in a way that dovetails with our self-
understanding. The focus on plurality prevents us from adopting one single practice as a model for 
environmental responsibility, but forces us to be receptive to those perspectives that are excluded by 
the current practice in which we participate. The focus on conflict prevents us from striving for an 
agreement that settles for only one particular image of the future as being worthy of our attention 
and simultaneously prevents us striving for a free-floating agreement that leaves everything to vo-
luntary choice. Moreover, the focus on conflict opens up the possibility of substantive debate in 
which we call on one another’s responsibility. And, finally, the focus on double responsibility pre-
vents us from sacrificing the freedom of the young to the powers of the established world, or sacri-
ficing the powers of the established world to the freedom of the young. Moreover, their double res-
ponsibility requires environmental educators to be receptive to both the young and the old whose 
claims appear to join in the present necessity to act and respond to the dangers that threaten our per-
spective of an open future. 
 
 
 chapter three 
 
because we care for nature 
 
 
 
       BWA-PL 
 
After a bike ride through a dripping wood 
we reached 
the Border Lake. 
It was as if a sleeper opened her eyes 
and knew us 
You sat in front. 
I laid my hand 
On the warm coconut of your skull 
The light looked far into your eyes 
I said: now this is water. 
Wa-ter 
Wa-ter 
Wa-ter, I said again 
And you said: bwa-pl 
You said it again 
It was certain, son of mine, that it was the same 
we did not understand 
 
(Willem Jan Otten)30 
 
 
If future responsibility emerges from our commitment to what we care for here and now, rather than 
our hypothetical relationship with future citizens, how do we stand towards the things we value? Do 
we ‘make’ our natural environment valuable by ascribing value, or do we ‘find’ value in nature? 
Perhaps both acts of ascribing and finding value are operative at the same time, but if this were so, 
how do the acts of ascribing and finding value relate to one another? These questions will be at the 
heart of this chapter. Within the field of environmental ethics there is a long history of debate 
between those who defend that natural value resides within the subject – the evaluator – and those 
who argue that the value is intrinsic to the object – nature itself. Most environmental philosophers, 
however, place their position somewhere in between the extreme ends of value-subjectivism and 
value-objectivism. In the first section of this chapter, section 3.1, we will explore where the advo-
                                                      
30 This is my translation of the poem BWA-PL of Willem Jan Otten, from his collection Eindaugustuswind (End-of-
august-wind): Wij bereikten/ na een tocht door een druipend bos/ het Randmeer./ Het was alsof een slapende haar ogen 
opende/ en ons kende/ Jij zat voorop./ Ik legde mijn hand/ Op de warme kokosnoot van je schedel/ Het licht keek ver in 
je ogen/ Ik zei: dit is nu water./ Wa-ter/ Wa-ter/ Wa-ter, zei ik nog een keer/ En jij zei: bwa-pl/ Je zei het nog een keer/ 
Het was zeker, zoontje van mij, dat wij hetzelfde niet begrepen (Otten, 1998). 
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cates of Education for Sustainable Development stand with respect to these questions of natural 
value. There is much debate within these circles on ‘the intrinsic value of nature’, but it is seldom 
clear what the proponents imply by claiming intrinsic value. Therefore, an index will be given of 
possible positions on the question of what constitutes the intrinsic quality of natural value. In 
general, all positions seem to imply that we value nature not merely for instrumental reasons, but 
the value of nature, in a sense, transcends our private interests and preferences. As such, a cow is 
more than a milk machine and a tree is more than a bearer of fruit or producer of oxygen.  
 Still, one might wonder why we are so deeply concerned with the question of intrinsic value. 
After all, ill-defined claims of intrinsic value are often a source of mystification, disguising inherent 
contradictions and controversies as to its meaning. Then why do we bother to enter into this debate? 
To begin with, we are not so much concerned with the question of intrinsic value itself, but we are 
interested in the core question of responsibility. Intrinsic value claims can be understood as expres-
sions of responsibility. By expressing the things in life we really care for, we commit ourselves to 
preserve their meaning and pursue their good. For example, if someone declares her love for cats in 
public, she takes responsibility to care for them, otherwise the public will hold her responsible for 
the promise inherent in her testimony. Thus, examining the nature and meaning of intrinsic value 
claims allows us to examine the way we stand towards the things we value and the way we in which 
we take responsibility for their preservation and prosperity.  
 In the second place, our relationship to nature might be of an exclusive kind, in the sense 
that it requires us to value and act on its behalf in a particular way, different from our responses to 
human beings, communities, ideas or cultural products. As such, the status of environmental ethics 
as an independent field of study is often thought to be based on the claim of the intrinsic value of 
nature. If nature were conceived as a mere stock of human resources, as some kind of standing re-
serve for human consumption and exploitation, there would be no need to think about our relation-
ship to nature in an ethical way. Or to quote Rolston: ‘Environmental ethics in the primary (...) 
sense is reached only when humans ask questions not merely of prudential use but of appropriate 
respect and duty (towards the natural environment)’ (Rolston III, 1988, p.1; cf. Regan, 1992, p. 
161). In a similar way the status of environmental education as an independent educational practice 
rests on our recognition of the natural environment as intrinsically valuable. Without this recogni-
tion we would have no reason whatsoever to pass on our concern for nature to the next generation.  
 In light of this I will argue in section 3.1 that there is a sensible way of speaking about ‘the 
intrinsic value of nature’ in terms of aesthetic judgement. In this view, the value is neither intrinsic 
to the subject, nor to the object of valuation, but resides in the common language that enables us to 
speak about nature. As such, the value of nature is embedded in the intersubjective level of our lan-
guage community. However, as I will argue, the intrinsic value of nature transcends our articulation 
of value. Its ultimate value and meaning eludes us. In section 3.2 I will examine in more detail the 
status of transcendent nature as valued object and the human agent as valuing subject within an in-
tersubjective-aesthetic account of natural value. As we will see, the issue of intrinsic value is im-
portant to our understanding of what it is that inspires us to care for nature. How to understand the 
caring responsibility we assume in our practical involvement with the natural environment will be 
explored in section 3.3. Nel Noddings’ phenomenology of care as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception will be given precedence in my investigation of our corporeal expe-
rience of caring for nature that is immediately at hand. These phenomenological characterisations 
allow me to derive an ethical ideal of caring responsibility for the natural environment in section 
3.4. 
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3.1 In defense of an aesthetic account of intrinsic natural value 
 
For a long period of time, environmental discourse was marked by controversies between anthropo-
centric and ecocentric views on the nature and scope of the environmental crisis. As the word itself 
says, anthropo-centrism places humans at the centre of reality, and views humanity as standing 
apart from and above nature. Or to be more precise, anthropocentrism “involves the foundational 
assumption that human beings, and the way in which they value nature, are the modus operandi of 
any attempt to think about the green environment” (Smith 1998, p. 4). Rather than a particular 
school of thought, anthropocentrism refers to a tendency inherent in western culture and 
philosophy, running from ancient Protagoras – who argued that man was the measure of all things –
to the modern positivists who postulate nature as an object of human experiment and manipulation. 
In line with this tendency, anthropocentrists weigh environmental issues merely in terms of what is 
in the long-term interest of human beings, or in terms of what satisfies human needs and serves hu-
man purposes. Gifford Pinchot, for instance, a major figure in the American Conservation Move-
ment of the nineteen forties and fifties, insisted that “there are just two things on this material earth 
– people and natural resources”. As a provider of resources, necessary for human survival and pros-
perity, he regarded nature only of instrumental value. Environmental concerns are thus considered 
to emerge only in situations in which natural resources are scarce, or otherwise, in situations in 
which our resources are being threatened by forces of nature or by the unintended effects of human 
behaviour (Matthews, 2001, p. 227).  
 Anthropocentric analyses of environmental problems are pursued within the prevalent 
framework of the economic, political and socio-cultural structures in society. Generally, environ-
mental problems are considered to be problems of control, manageable by employing the 
appropriate, economical and technological means with which these structures provide us. With 
respect to the issue of car use and exhaust fumes this means, for example, that the efforts of anthro-
pocentrists concentrate on the installation of catalytic converters, the introduction of hydrogen cars, 
and perhaps, the inclusion of environmental costs in the fuel prices. However, the threats to nature 
that do not directly affect our life conditions are not on their agenda, neither are the structural ques-
tions concerning our modern ways of transportation, the economic interdependencies that regulate 
our transport behaviour nor, for instance the questions that have to do with the political power of the 
global oil industry. 
 Ecocentrism emerged out of dissatisfaction with this ‘shallow’ analysis of environmental 
problems. As a response, ecocentrist critics challenged the exclusive anthropocentric concern with 
issues of pollution control and resource conservation for the protection of people in the developed 
countries. By moving beyond the pursuit of human interest and assuming equal respect for all forms 
of life, ecocentrists aimed to extend the environmental agenda to issues of natural integrity, biologi-
cal diversity and the preservation of biotic communities. Contrary to the adherence of 
anthropocentrism to the modern ideals of technological progress, economic growth and the autono-
mous subject as providing us with the means to solve ecological problems, ecocentrism conceives 
of those ideals as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. That is because these ideals 
signify a world-view in which the human and natural world are strictly divided, and only humans 
warrant moral consideration. Furthermore, there seems to be no regard for unequal relationships 
among species and the ways in which some forms of life are vulnerable to the consequences of hu-
man action. Therefore, ecocentrists argue that the environmental crisis is not so much a ‘shallow’ 
problem of technical mastery but, first and foremost, a ‘deeper’ problem of mentality, world-view 
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or even spirituality. Environmental problems reveal the unsound relationship to nature we employ 
within the dominant practices and institutions of modern society. Rather than simple ‘problem-
solving’ the ecocentrist plea is for a reinterpretation of our relationship to nature, our world-view 
and incentive to change our basic attitudes towards the natural environment (Matthews, 2001; Li, 
1996; Snik, 1991).  
 In his famous book Deep Ecology (1973) Arne Naess, one of the most powerful representa-
tives of ecocentrism, set out an alternative, metaphysical world-view. In contrast to what he labelled 
‘shallow ecology’, his ‘deep ecology’ perceives reality as fundamentally relational; the identity of 
each individual form of life is a function of its relationships with others, and as such, one form of 
life flourishing is dependent on the flourishing of other forms of life. This metaphysical insight led 
Naess to adopt an ethic of interrelatedness, according to which all forms of life are equally entitled 
to live and blossom. Thus, Naess calls on our desire to live in harmony with the ecosystem of we 
inextricably are a part and to live in symbiosis with the other inhabitants of this system. 
Accordingly, Naess pleas for recognition of the values of complexity and diversity of nature. Those 
values have to be protected, not only because they enhance the opportunities of other forms of life, 
but because they constitute the integrity of the ecosystem as a whole. Apart from this ‘biospherical 
egalitarianism’, Naess presents an alternative notion of selfhood for the self-understanding of the 
autonomous subject. Rather than a self that employs the environment as a resource for his own pur-
poses, Naess postulates a self that matures by means of identification with ever wider circles of 
being. These widening circles do not merely imply human sources of identification – our family, 
community or humanity as a whole – but include elements of our natural environment as well. We 
identify ourselves in terms of where we were born, the place where we live, the land where we feel 
we ‘belong’, our land, our earth. On this view, not only does self-recognition mark the transition 
from ego to a social self, but from a social self to an ecological self’ (Matthews, 2001, p. 221). For 
Naess, nature comes to have intrinsic value by virtue of the fact that self-realising persons enlarge 
their ‘selves’ in such a way as to encompass nature and become one with it (Hargrove, 1992; Mat-
thews, 2001; Naess, 1973; Li, 1996). 
 
Versions of intrinsic value claims 
Against the background of this fundamental controversy, the debate focussed on the underlying 
claims concerning the intrinsic value of nature. Naess and other ecocentrists accused 
anthropocentrism of a narrow instrumental valuation of nature and a profound disregard of its in-
trinsic value. However, many anthropocentrists refused to accept the charges of instrumentalism. In 
response, they criticised their ecocentric opponents of a lack of analytic rigour. In their view, it is 
senseless and incoherent to speak of the intrinsic value of nature – at least outside the spheres of 
religion and metaphysics – since any value is contingent upon an act of valuation, and this act can 
only be pursued by human beings. Without the presence of human beings, nature would be without 
meaning and value, so they argue. Because we cannot escape ourselves as evaluators, any value we 
know of must be (at least partly) extrinsic to nature (cf. Les Brown, 1987; Li, 1996). How should 
we judge these arguments and claims within environmental discourse?  
 Obviously, there are different notions of ‘intrinsic value’ at work, depending on the particu-
lar discourse in which the term is used and the purpose for which it is used. A lack of agreement 
among participants on the central concepts they use precludes a clear discussion and analysis on the 
value of nature. Therefore, I would like to follow O’Neills typology (1992; 2001), who cleared up a 
lot of misunderstanding and conceptual confusion by distinguishing four notions of intrinsic value 
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that are current within environmental discourse: (1) intrinsic value as non-instrumental value, (2) 
intrinsic value as objective value, (3) intrinsic value as non-relational value and (4) intrinsic value 
as ethical standing. Discussions about these four notions of ‘intrinsic value’ are partly about 
arbitrary matters of definition, but as the following survey will reveal, choices of definition do have 
an epistemological and (meta-) ethical bearing as well. Though I follow O’Neill’s typology, I will 
elaborate on the different notions in my own terms. Simultaneously, I will judge these notions on 
their adequacy, distinctness and coherence, so that a first selection can be made as to which no-
tion(s) to employ within the context of this inquiry.  
 
(1). Intrinsic value as non-instrumental value 
Within the discourse of environmental ethics the phrase ‘intrinsic value of nature’ is generally em-
ployed in order to mark the contrast with the instrumental value we often attach to our natural en-
vironment by virtue of the human resources and economic commodities with which it provides.us. 
Nature is regarded to have intrinsic value if and insofar as the value of nature is not limited to the 
instrumental use we make of it. Nature is valued, not (merely) as a means to some further end, but 
as an end in itself: ‘Good for its own sake, as an end, as distinct from good as a means to something 
else’ (O’Neill, 2001, p. 164). As such, the predicate ‘intrinsic value’ can be used to refer to a natural 
object, an activity or a particular state, that an agent pursues or aims at. In some practical situations 
these three addressees of intrinsic value are tied together in such an intimate way, that it is hard, if 
not impossible, to discriminate between them. Suppose, for instance, that we recognise within our-
selves an intrinsic desire to protect the wetlands of the Dutch Wadden Sea against pollution and 
degradation, what precisely then is the nature and object of our care? Perhaps we do want to pre-
serve the wetlands because this piece of nature represents a meaning and value that cannot be ex-
pressed in instrumental terms of personal benefit, profit or usefulness. But equally plausible is that 
we care for the wetlands because we enjoy aspects of this extraordinary landscape during our vaca-
tion activities: we like to look for seals and feed the sea-gulls from the ferry or we enjoy the 
reflecting colours of the water streaming along the sandbanks on our walks across the shallows.The 
activities through which we enjoy practical intercourse with nature are then the object of intrinsic 
value. Still another possibility is that we want to protect the wetlands against aggressive forms of 
mass tourism, exploitation of oil companies, overfishing and mechanical cockle fishing, arising 
from public indignation or because of a particular vision on the future state of the Wadden Sea. 
However, most plausible is that our sense of the intrinsic value of the wetlands is based on a combi-
nation of these conditions.  
 Unfortunately, the general notion of intrinsic value as non-instrumental value is of little help 
for our purpose. Though this notion connects closely to our every day use of (intrinsic) value claims 
in ordinary language, its meaning is insufficiently specific to guide us to the particular addressee. 
Furthermore, this notion has little discriminating power within environmental discourse, because 
few philosophers will deny the possibility of an intrinsic valuation of nature in this weak sense. 
Nearly all are convinced that animal species, plants, landscapes and so on should be protected and 
appreciated not only because of their usefulness for human purposes, but because of their non-in-
strumental qualities as well. Besides, the recognition that something is of intrinsic value in this 
general sense does not at all exclude the possibility that it is of instrumental value as well. These 
difficulties and flaws do not lead us to abandon this notion of intrinsic value from our vocabulary. 
However, the meaning and status of intrinsic value claims have to be specified in order to be fruitful 
in our analysis. References to intrinsic value only have power insofar as they call upon concepts 
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that give more specific reasons and claims about the ways in which we express nature as a sources 
of value. 
 
(2). Intrinsic value as objective value 
Within the discourses of epistemology and meta-ethics intrinsic value is generally defined in oppo-
sition to extrinsic value, in the sense that one can only speak of the intrinsic value of nature, if and 
insofar as the value of nature is established independent of human valuation. To argue that our 
natural world is of intrinsic worth in this strong sense is to make a meta-ethical or epistemological 
claim: the claim that the value of nature should not be located in the subject or its valuing activity 
but in the natural object itself. This is to assert a form of realism or objectivism about values. An 
objectivist stance like this would imply that value is ‘’found’ or ‘discovered’ in nature rather than 
‘attached’ by human beings. The most influential, contemporary proponents of such a strong view 
on the intrinsic value of nature place themselves within the Aristotelian tradition of teleological 
thinking, in which nature is seen as inherently purposeful. All living things are seen as being 
inhabited by a ‘good’ striving towards their own realisation. Plants, animals and organisms carry 
within themselves their own means of flourishing in accordance with an inherent purposiveness or 
telos. Respecting the intrinsic value of nature is to respect the immanent claim of the natural good 
towards its own realisation. Jonas, for instance, perceives the actual striving of an organism for sur-
vival as an articulation of the fact that this being wants itself. Thus, he derives an ‘ought’ from an 
‘is’ by pointing at the underlying teleological self-affirmation of being. There is an ought-to-be, 
beyond the is (Jonas, 1984; cf. O’Neill, 1992, 2001).  
 In a way, this meta-ethical notion of intrinsic value encompasses the former notion of intrin-
sic value as non-instrumental value. After all, the instrumental categories of means and ends neces-
sarily lose their significance within a teleological framework: it is senseless to ask whether the seed 
is a means to produce a tree or the tree a means to produce the seed. As Arendt points out: ‘Unlike 
the products of human hands, which must be realised step by step and for which the fabrication 
process is entirely distinct from the existence of the fabricated thing itself, the natural thing’s exis-
tence is not separate but is somehow identical with the process through which it comes into being: 
the seed contains and, in a certain sense, already is the tree, and the tree stops being if the process of 
growth through which it came into existence stops’ (Arendt, 1958b, p. 152).  
 Strong claims of objective value, like Jonas’ teleological claim, insist that it is nature itself – 
as an objective entity outside of us – that determines its value. Whether or not human beings are 
willing or able to recognise this value makes no difference at all. Neither whether or not humans 
relate to nature in a particular way. These extreme forms of value objectivism appear to be at odds 
with the main ambition of environmental ethics, because it invokes a strict dualism between subject 
and object. Accordingly, it reifies a dualism between man and nature that environmental 
philosophers have tried to overcome. As such, radical objectivism fails to appreciate our sensual 
and sense-making experience of being connected with all surrounding forms of life in a way that 
constitutes who we are. Argued from a more general epistemological perspective, one could add 
that extreme forms of value objectivism in a specific sense tend to ignore human freedom and plu-
rality. If the correctness of a judgement about nature is assumed to be judged in terms of its 
correspondence to ‘real nature’ as the external object of judgement (acknowledging that full 
correspondence is unattainable and, thus, a perfect check is unattainable for humans), then there 
seem to be no grounds for respecting plurality of judgement about natural beauty, value and truth 
among human beings, apart from the fallibilistic reservation that ‘we could be mistaken’. As such, 
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the ‘monistic bias’ of radical objectivism precludes intrinsic respect for plurality (cf. Lijmbach et 
al., 2002). 
 Apart from these strong claims of objective value, there are moderate claims maintaining 
that the intrinsic value of nature originates from nature while at the same time recognising that our 
evaluative response to nature co-constitutes the intrinsic value we experience and express. Some 
authors in the field of environmental ethics take their cue from Heidegger’s understanding of human 
language as a creative response to a call. In this view, we ‘draw the word out of silence’, the silence 
that emerges in our encounter with something that is beyond our grasp: the mysterious gaze of a 
cow, the rhythmic sound of a woodpecker or the breathtaking panorama from the top of a hill. 
Others depart from a slightly more empirical understanding of our evaluative vocabulary as expres-
sion of a sensus communis, a common sense: the normative concepts we use to express the ‘beauty’, 
‘ugliness’, ‘truth’ or ‘cruelty’ of nature are understood as the inescapable responses of humans un-
der certain objective conditions. It is through this common language or vocabulary that we share a 
common world (O’Neill, 2001). In the next sections I will elaborate on these particular insights, 
since they make it possible to hold on to the intuition that it is not completely up to us how we 
would like to value nature, as well as to the intuition that it is us who express this value by virtue of 
the fact that nature is valuable to us.  
 
(3). Intrinsic value as non-relational value 
Sometimes, intrinsic value is taken to refer to the value an object has solely by virtue of its intrinsic 
properties, that is, its non-relational properties. If we appreciate a field of grass, for instance, be-
cause of its bright green colours or its fresh smell after a spring shower, then the appreciated value 
is intrinsic to the field of grass itself. In this particular sense, intrinsic value is contrasted with ex-
trinsic value as well, albeit in a slightly different sense: here, extrinsic value indicates the value that 
something has by virtue of a particular relationship with another thing. Suppose, for instance that 
we value a field of grass because it reminds us of our happy childhood days, because it will feed our 
cattle for a few days, or because it will serve as a pleasant spot for a picnic, then the value is extrin-
sic to the object of valuation. This particular use of intrinsic value was first proposed by the phi-
losopher G.E. Moore: ‘To say a kind of value is “intrinsic” means merely that the question whether 
a thing possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (Moore, 1922, p. 
260; cited from: O’Neill, 2001, p. 165). 
 If we would choose to follow Moore’s definition of intrinsic value as non-relational value, 
then strictly speaking, many predicates we might use to underline that particular species or natural 
spots are worthy our preservation, like ‘exceptionality’, ‘scarcity’, ‘biodiversity’, ‘energy-richness’, 
‘usefulness’, ‘nutritional value’ or ‘level of cuddliness’ cannot count as expressions of intrinsic 
properties, because the question whether a particular animal is exceptional, scarce, energy-rich or 
cuddly cannot be answered without referring to properties of other animals, species or the larger 
ecosystem. Accordingly, adherents of this notion would deny the status of intrinsic value to endan-
gered species on grounds of their ‘endangeredness’ alone. The property of endangeredness can only 
be acknowledged if an external reality – that is the larger ecosystem and food chain – are taken into 
account. But how are we then to argue for or against the conservation of natural species or spots if 
their intrinsic value is the premium criterion? If we want to protect the habitat of the godwit (grutto) 
in order to save them from extinction, should we dwell on something like the intrinsic essence of 
this bird rather than its place in our landscape, in our farming traditions and our life? Apparently, 
this use of the intrinsic value claim forces us to separate the natural entity we want to protect from 
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its environment that renders it meaning, beauty or value. Such an act of separation is incompatible 
with an ecological ethic of interrelatedness and holism.  
 Furthermore, this notion of intrinsic value fails to appreciate the human stories, rituals and 
practices in which animals, plants and landscapes emerge as valuable. It is against this background 
that Weston is opposed to intrinsic value claims and argues for an alternative understanding of 
values-as-part-of-patterns: things are only valuable to us in their appearance within our daily pat-
terns of behaviour, rituals and customs. In his eyes, the acknowledgement of value as constituted by 
an interconnected ‘ecology of values’ is obstructed by this rhetoric of intrinisicallity (Weston, 
1992). In short, the notion of intrinsic value as non-relational value seems to ignore the fact that 
value is – by its very nature – the expression of a relationship rather than a quality of a single object 
or entity: ‘Value is the quality a thing can never possess in privacy but acquires automatically the 
moment it appears in public’ (Arendt, 1958b, p. 164). But I am get ahead of myself as I will come 
to my analysis later. 
 Apart from this ethical problem, there are conceptual problems tied to this notion of intrinsic 
value within the fourfold typology presented here. One might wonder whether this notion of intrin-
sic value is conceptually clear enough, and if so, whether it is sufficiently distinct from the other 
notions. In my view, intrinsic value as non-relational value either coincides with intrinsic value as 
non-instrumental value, or with intrinsic value as objective value, depending on the position one 
chooses on a meta-ethical level. Those who take an objectivist or realist stance (and pursue a notion 
of intrinsic value as non-relational value) will regard the valuable properties they find in animals, 
plants, things and landscapes as intrinsic to these natural ‘entities’ themselves. Rolston, for instance 
argues that there is ‘intrinsic objective value, valued by me, but for what it is in itself. Value at-
taches to a non-subjective form of life, but is nevertheless owned by a biological individual, a thing 
in itself’ (Rolston III, 1982, p. 146). Consequently, the value of a particular animal, plant, thing or 
landscape is conceived as a value it has independent of the value of other things and, more impor-
tant, independent of human valuation. Thus we arrive at an objectivist claim of intrinsic value: in-
trinsic value as objective value.  
 Those who take a subjectivist stance (and pursue a notion of intrinsic value as non-relational 
value) will argue the other way around: they will talk of ‘the valueing agent assigning value to ob-
jects solely by virtue of their intrinsic natures’ (O’Neill 2001, p. 965). According to subjectivists, it 
is possible to speak of ‘the intrinsic value of nature’ if I attribute value to an object on grounds of 
properties that I perceive or experience as intrinsic to this object. Properties that borrow their value 
from my valuation of another object, need or purpose are to be regarded as ‘relational’ properties 
and therefore ‘extrinsic’. At face value, this notion of intrinsic value might appear plausible, but 
when it comes down to application in practice, profound problems will come to the fore. Suppose, 
for instance, that a cattle farmer wants to examine the grounds of his appreciation of Frisian black-
white dairy cows, then his search for valuable properties that are evidently relational will probably 
result in a list like the following: a cow fed on concentrates gives about twenty litres milk a day; a 
mature cow will yield about x euro on the cattle market; healthy cows provide us with juicy meat 
and so on.  
 While this list contains doubtful cases, it is even harder, if not impossible, to give an account 
of non-relational properties that are beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, a dedicated farmer 
might come up with the following properties that underly his sincere care for his cows: the marvel-
lous pattern of black splotches on a white hide that lends every single cow a sense of being unique; 
the loyal gaze in the cow’s glassy eyes; the immaculately pink udders, the penetratingsound of her 
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mooing, the undisturbed grazing to fill her four stomachs and so on. Regardless of whether this an-
swer convinces us, the problem is that we cannot judge the relational or non-relational quality of 
these properties. Is her gaze an independent property of a cow, or is the gaze, at least partly an an-
swer or mirror to our gaze? Is it possible to judge the farmer’s appreciation of his cow’s grazing 
independent of his economic interests in their milk production? And is his appreciation of the 
mooing not a function of this sound being a sign that they need to be milked? In sum, this notion of 
intrinsic value is everything but clear and hard to maintain. Insofar as the distinction between rela-
tional and non-relational values is clear, it coincides largely with the distinction between instru-
mental and non-instrumental values.  
 
(4). Intrinsic value as ethical standing  
Finally, intrinsic value claims are used in a classical Kantian sense. In his second formulation of the 
categorical imperative, Kant claims that one should respect every human being as a person of intrin-
sic worth. That is, one should never treat other persons merely as means to an end, but always as 
ends in themselves as well. Within the field of environmental ethics this Kantian notion of intrinsic 
value is used to indicate that particular natural entities have ‘ethical standing’, that they are moral 
subjects and, qualitate qua, belong to our moral community, in which we treat one another as ends 
in themselves. To say that an animal or plant is intrinsically valuable in this sense is to say that their 
good must be considered. To claim that a pig is of intrinsic worth, is to claim their right to be a pig 
and their entitlement to be treated like a pig: for example the right to retain their tails – which are 
cut off in standard factory farming – or the right to have room to move around and wallow in the 
mud, like pigs do when they are not in human hands. Among those who pursue these claims, there 
is, however, disagreement on what kind of characteristic someone or something should have in or-
der to be recognised as a moral subject with ethical standing. What property should count as crite-
rion for the assignment of intrinsic value? Peter Singer’s ethical theory is well known in this 
respect, who assigns intrinsic value to higher animals by virtue of their capacity to suffer pain 
(Singer, 1993). For liberal contractualists, on the other hand, it is the ownership of interests or the 
ability to pursue a ‘conception of the good’ that constitutes moral subjectivity (Feinberg, 1974a). 
 But we do not need to enter into this discussion, because the relevance of this notion of 
intrinsic value as ethical standing is primarily limited to the discourse of animal rights and animal 
welfare. Though very interesting in itself, for the purpose of my discussion this discourse is of 
secondary importance. The alternative understanding of environmental responsibility that we are 
looking for embraces the special responsibility for our involvement with animal life, but its scope is 
much broader. Admittedly, our general attitude towards the natural environment is partly deter-
mined by our recognition of animals as moral subjects. But even if we agree with Peter Singer, and 
acknowledge that ‘higher animal species’ should be able to count on our care and respectful treat-
ment, this leaves our involvement with the rest of nature – unconscious nature – untouched. So, in-
stead of elevating our acquaintance with this exclusive class of higher animals to the status of being 
exemplary for environmental responsibility, I would like to take a more broad ecological concern as 
my framework of reference. Apart from this, in the next chapter, our reactive attitudes towards ani-
mals will be examined more closely in order to shed new light on our general concern toward the 
environment. 
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Towards an intersubjective claim of intrinsic value  
After this preliminary survey we are left with two claims of intrinsic value that seem to be rather 
coherent and at home within our discourse on environmental responsibility and education. At the 
same time, these claims represent two contradictory uses: an extremely weak claim and an ex-
tremely strong claim. First, there is the weak claim that the value of nature transcends the instru-
mental use we make of its resources. Within our ordinary use of language the intrinsic value of na-
ture is understood in this weak and general sense as non-instrumental value. Nature is regarded as 
‘good for its own sake’. Second, there is the more specific, meta-ethical claim that the value of na-
ture is intrinsic insofar as it is established independent of human valuation: intrinsic value as objec-
tive value. Henceforth, I will refer to this claim as the strong claim of intrinsic value. 
 Few philosophers will deny the possibility of an intrinsic valuation of nature in the weak 
sense. Nearly all are convinced that animal species, plants, landscapes and so on should be pro-
tected and appreciated not only because of their usefulness for human purposes, but because of their 
non-instrumental qualities as well. However, since modern subjectivism is strong within analytic 
ethics, there has been a tendency to deny the possibility of an intrinsic valuation of nature in the 
strong sense. The subjectivists start their objection by stressing that every value is contingent upon 
a human activity of valuation. Callicot for instance argues that: ‘There can be no value apart from 
an evaluator (…) all value is as it were in the eye of the beholder. The value that is attributed to the 
ecosystem, therefore, is humanly dependent or at least dependent upon some variety of morally and 
aesthetically sensitive consciousness’ (Callicot, 1989, p. 27). In a similar spirit Vincent states: ‘The 
environment becomes worthy through human valuing (…) There are certain necessary conditions 
for any society to exist and flourish. In short, these necessary conditions derive value only in so far 
as they provide the conditions for the well-being of human agency. If a healthy and clean environ-
ment is a condition (necessary or sufficient) for society and thus human agency, it acquires a de-
rivative value from human agency’ (Vincent, 1998, p. 447-448). 
 So, in this view we cannot escape extrinsic value. Therefore, beyond the domains of meta-
physics and ontology, expressions of intrinsic natural value should be regarded as a contradictio in 
terminis (Brown, 1987, p. 49; Li, 1996). In my view, however, we can – or even should—speak of 
the intrinsic value of nature in both senses. The weak and strong concepts of intrinsic value are in 
fact two sides of the same picture of human valuation (though they point to different levels). As I 
will illustrate in the remaining part of this chapter, a close study of the use of the weak concept of 
intrinsic value in ordinary language leads to recognition of the intrinsic value of nature in the 
strong sense. 
 If we take the weak sense of intrinsic value (as non-instrumental value) as a starting point 
for our analysis, then the question arises: what exactly constitutes the difference between instru-
mental value and intrinsic value? One might argue that, in the end, all human valuation is of an in-
strumental kind. Take for instance the beautiful landscape that inspires an artist to paint a 
watercolour. Though, we would not hesitate to ascribe an intrinsic value to this landscape on the 
basis of its aesthetic qualities, one might argue that the artist ‘uses’ the landscape as a ‘means’ or 
‘instrument’ for pursuing her own artistic end. The same goes for my Sunday afternoon walk in a 
nearby forest. One might argue that the value I attach to this forest is nothing more than an instru-
mental value: walking in the forest satisfies my aesthetic or contemplative ‘needs’. When an aes-
thetic value judgement is converted into instrumental terms, the person having the aesthetic 
experience is depicted as using natural scenery as a trigger for feelings of pleasure (Hargrove, 1992, 
p. 197). Obviously, these examples point to the limits of instrumental valuation; speaking about 
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aesthetic, existential or spiritual values in terms of needs, ends or interests is highly counterintui-
tive. In our experience, there is a major difference between consumer needs or economic needs on 
the one hand, and ‘needs’ of imagination, contemplation, inspiration, consolation and spirituality on 
the other. Apparently, a radically different attitude is implied in these ways of relating to our natural 
environment.  
 Some philosophers refer to instrumentality in such a broad way that any relation between a 
person and something or someone outside that person is given an instrumental bearing. Thus, hu-
man action and judgement cannot escape the category of instrumentality and the possibility of an 
intrinsic appreciation of the natural environment is ruled out from the outset (cf. Li, 1996; Brown, 
1987). In my view, this tendency to reduce all human values to instrumental values is not only re-
ductionist but ultimately unfruitful, since it would render meaningless many clarifying distinctions 
within the field of ethics. Not only would the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value lose 
its meaning, but along with it, the distinctions between means and ends, constitutive and regulative 
ideals, categorical and hypothetical imperatives and so on. My fundamental objection against this 
reductionist form of instrumentalism is that an untenable picture of the moral person is presupposed 
like the picture of the ‘rational egoist’, presented by rational choice theory. A moral person is pre-
sented as someone who continuously looks for the most efficient means in order to satisfy their pre-
determined needs and preferences. As such, one is expected to act in the line of least resistance that 
provides one with the maximum yield. Obviously, this picture abstracts the moral person from their 
environment, community, past and future. As we will see in the next section, the understanding of 
human valuation to which this picture gives rise is ultimately flawed. Rather than satisfying a priori 
needs and preferences, we express and find what we ‘prefer’ and ‘need’ in dialogue with significant 
others and the world around us. So, to say that any valuation of nature we know of is necessarily 
human valuation is one thing. But stating that all human valuation of nature is in the interest of hu-
mans is quite another. In line with my criticism, Musschenga is ready to acknowledge that in a 
sense all human valuation of nature serves human purposes or personal preferences, but he adds that 
those preferences or purposes are not necessarily of an instrumental kind. Instead of speaking of 
intrinsic value, Musschenga therefore chooses to speak of the inherent value of nature. However, 
introducing such a new term does not solve our fundamental problem, concerning the epistemologi-
cal difference between instrumental and non-instrumental value. If one chooses to hold on to the 
intuition that all value of nature is a function of its service to human purposes, as Musschenga does, 
it is not clear how one can simultaneously perceive human evaluators as those who appreciate na-
ture on grounds beyond our instrumental relationship (Musschenga, 1991; cf. Koelega, 1995). 
 In contrast with instrumental valuation, Burms and De Dijn (1995) argue that the recogni-
tion of intrinsic value rests on an experience of transcendence. Intrinsic value emanates from our 
involvement in meaningful ‘wholes’, larger realities that exceed the limits of our contingent exis-
tence and valuation. This existential feeling of interconnectedness, of being part of a significant 
reality we did not choose gives meaning to our world and ourselves31. Experiences like these 
                                                      
31 In pre-modern times, this existential awareness was signified as a profound feeling of piety, about which Roger 
Scruton writes: ‘Put in simple terms, piety means the deep down recognition of our frailty and dependence, the 
acknowledgement that the burden we inherit cannot be sustained unaided, the disposition to give thanks for our 
existence and reverence to the world on which we depend and the sense of the unfathomable mystery which surrounds 
our coming to be and our passing away. All these feelings come together in our humility before the works of nature and 
this humility is the fertile soil in which the seeds of morality are planted (...). Piety is rational in the sense that we all 
have reason to feel it. Nevertheless, piety is not, in any clear sense, amenable to reason. Indeed, it marks out another 
place where reasoning comes to an end. The same is true, it seems to me, of many moral attitudes and feelings: while it 
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necessarily imply an awareness of negation; inevitably, something eludes our picture of nature, its 
value is always beyond our grasp, as if nature resists each human appropriation in order to value, to 
categorise, or utilise. In other words, that which brings about an experience of meaning, beauty, 
wonder, imagination, or inspiration transcends the experience itself. The awareness of an elusive 
‘surplus’ is often articulated as the experience of a call; we experience ‘a call’ from those things 
that go beyond our limited existence: a beautiful layer of clouds, a frightening storm, or the amazing 
flight of an eagle apparently appeal to our feeling for meaning and beauty (Burms & De Dijn, 1995, 
p. 8).  
 That the value of nature transcends the valuation of the subject or collectivity follows logi-
cally from the fact that not all valuation of nature can be experienced nor represented as the result of 
an instrumental act – in such a way that the value of nature is determined by our preferences or 
standards. Ergo, valuable nature transcends valued nature. In fact, our recognition of intrinsic natu-
ral value originates from the experience of this ‘surplus’. A call emanates from that which eludes 
our standards and preferences. A more precise description of the nature of this experience will be 
given as we discuss Kant’s category of the sublime and Heidegger’s understanding of language as a 
response to a call.  
 By recognising that intrinsic valuation in the weak sense (i.e. non-instrumental valuation) 
rests upon a transcendent experience of a call, we have unintentionally moved from a weak to a 
rather strong concept of intrinsic value. This being acknowledged, the subjectivist might insist that 
‘natural value’ in this sense still results from our subjective responses; individuals will respond to 
this call by applying their own personal value to nature. However, contra the subjectivist, I would 
like to stress that it is not my response or your response, but our response that is intrinsically 
meaningful. As we can delineate from the insights of Wittgenstein, nature can only be significant or 
meaningful to us within a shared language: ‘The limits of my language are the limits of my world’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1923, 5.62). (This does not mean that there is nothing outside of our language, but it 
does mean that the ‘things out there’ – the sheer existence of things and our reactive responses that 
are there like our life – have to be expressed in order to be significant, in order to have a meaning 
and place in our world). There is no such thing as a private language, in which we express our most 
inner and individual impressions of nature, without appealing to a sensus communis, a common 
sense appreciation of nature. Every expression of value solicits an understanding in agreement. In 
other words, we find ourselves constantly negotiating for a personal appreciation of nature with an 
audience imagined as a tribunal whose understanding, if not whose approval, is necessary for our 
experience of intrinsic value (Blake et al., 2000, p. 136; Altieri, 1994). So, from the outset, the 
value of nature is part of the intersubjective practices of our language community. Intrinsic value is 
neither intrinsic to the subject – the evaluator – nor to the object of valuation – nature itself – but 
rooted in ordinary language. 
Summarising, we may say that our common use of weak intrinsic value claims only makes 
sense if we accept (some version of) the strong intrinsic value claim. After all, if we recognise that 
it is possible to reciprocate with our natural environment in a way that cannot be expressed in 
purely instrumental terms, then we acknowledge the realisation of a transcendent experience. This 
experience should be characterised as ‘transcendent’ in a double sense: first, the experience of na-
ture transcends any expression of natural value. Second, any expression of natural value transcends 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
is supremely rational to possess them, they are not themselves amenable to reason, and the attempt to make them so 
produces the kind of ludicrous caricature of morality that we witness in utilitarianism’ (Scruton, 1998, p. 50). 
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the preferences of the beholder/evaluator. That is, the expression of value is not under voluntary 
control of the ‘beholder’, since this expression only acquires meaning within an intersubjective 
practice, governed by rules of meaningful behaviour that are beyond subjective control. Thus un-
derstood, this double transcendence is continuously being mediated by evocative language: not a 
language representing an object in front of subjects, but a language creating meaning among at the 
interface of intersubjective experiences of nature. Thus, the value of nature is caught in the open-
ness and movement of language. By virtue of this flexibility and openness, evocative language is 
able to capture natural value in a way that does not fix nature as an object nor fasten the evaluator to 
one expressive response. It is in these terms of double transcendence that nature is experienced as 
an inexhaustible source of value. In other words, the value of nature is not determined by the 
preferences of the beholder, nor dictated by our intersubjective language rules and standards. To 
claim that natural value is independent of our valuing in this double sense is to assert a (version of 
the) strong claim of intrinsic value. 
 Whereas human beings as individuals are not necessarily at the centre of this valuation, their 
presence is required and – even more important – their possession of language is fundamental to the 
very possibility of valuation. Nature should not be defined in opposition to ‘culture’ – in terms of 
what is left untouched by human beings. On the contrary, natural entities such as plants, animals, 
rocks and landscapes are meaningful only if they are somehow fostered in our human practices and, 
as such, inserted in our horizons of sensibility and significance. In this sense, nature is a dimension 
of reality, intrinsically part of our human world, rather than a separable entity. Even if we speak of 
‘wilderness’ or ‘pristine nature’, we refer to those images of ‘untouched’ nature as we have seen on 
Discovery Channel, on our safari-tour in a zoo, or we appeal to fantasies evoked by reading Robin-
son Crusoe or The Jungle Book. However, the value of nature can never be attributed completely to 
the intentions of the valuing subject. In my view, that is precisely what Michael Bonnett means by 
stating that ‘we are not the author of things but the occasioner of things’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 687; cf. 
Rolston, 1982). 
 
In the spirit of Kant’s aesthetic judgement of nature 
The intersubjective account of intrinsic value as previously sketched requires specification on 
several points. First, a more detailed understanding should be given of the so-called transcendent 
experience: what does this experience imply, where does it come from, what or who does it tran-
scend, and how does this experience manifest itself in every day life? These questions will be dealt 
with in the next section (on the nature of transcendence), since we should first deal with a second 
issue, concerning the precise nature of the accepted intersubjectivity. To say that the intrinsic value 
of nature has an intersubjective bearing within ordinary language and everyday practices is not to 
say that the meaning and value of nature are determined by language in the sense that subjects have 
no say in what they holds meaningful, true or beautiful whatsoever. Neither does the primacy of the 
intersubjective imply that the object of valuation – nature – is a mere construction. Therefore, ques-
tions will need to be raised about the epistemological status of subjective and objective claims 
within an intersubjective understanding of natural value.  
 In line with my study of civil responsibility in the previous chapter, we will start from the 
philosophical framework provided by the Kantian tradition of thought on aesthetic judgement. Just 
as political judgement can be understood analogous to aesthetic judgement, the valuation of nature 
should be understood in these fundamental terms. Essentially, our appreciation of nature should be 
conceived of as a matter of taste, as Kant argued in his Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790). 
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Taste, not in any trivial sense, but again, in terms of that which constitutes our common sense or 
sensus communis: the power to judge the beauty of something. It is, however, curious to note that 
the power of taste is commonly considered to be a highly individual sense, too subjective to do the 
required foundational work (Bonnett, 2003, p. 671). To say that something is ‘a matter of taste’ is to 
say that we are not in the position to question the judgement of others since there can be no dispute 
about one’s taste. However, if Kant and his interpreters are right about the nature of aesthetic 
judgement, then there is more to say about beauty than that it is ‘in the eye of the beholder’. 
Moreover, there is something like a ‘beholder’s share’: a general standpoint, intimately tied to the 
sensus communis that makes communicable judgements of taste possible. By inserting our judge-
ments in a common world of action and speech we anticipate recognition of others, and as such, we 
appeal to intersubjectively experienced qualities of taste and beauty. Ergo, in our expression of 
aesthetic judgement we transcend our subjective situatedness as space- and time-specific beings 
(Kant, 1790; cf. Fischer, 2001).  
 For Kant, nature as such counts as an object of aesthetic judgement par excellence. In fact, 
Kant argued for the priority of natural beauty over and above artistic beauty, first and foremost, be-
cause of the disinterested pleasure we find in nature, consequent upon the ‘free play’ of imaginative 
faculties and feelings that the experience of natural beauty arouses (das freie Spiel der 
Gemütskräfte). This is in contrast to human works of art that are more or less designed and intended 
to elicit feelings of beauty and imagination. Thus, the aesthetic delight we find in nature reveals the 
aesthetic judgement in its most authentic, i.e. non-intellectual and disinterested form. For Kant, 
beautiful is that which brings along a disinterested feeling of pleasure (Gadamer, 1960, p. 56-58).  
 As a reflecting judgement the faculty of taste is opposed to the determining judgement – 
normative within Kant’s practical reason – not only in that it trades on our imaginative powers 
rather than our rational faculties, but foremost by virtue of its excessive particularity. The deter-
mining judgement subsumes the particular under a given universal rule, principle or law, whereas 
the reflecting judgement starts from the given particular object for which the universal is yet to be 
found. In this way, we perceive the object in the unrepresentable fullness of its properties; we attend 
to the object in its individual particularity. For instance, in the intuition of a beautiful flower, it is a 
matter of ‘sustaining the operation of the powers of cognition without ulterior intention. We linger 
in the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself’ 
(Kant, 1790, p. 68). Rather than an activity that consists of applying principles, concepts or rules, 
judging in aesthetic matters implies a sensual art of attentiveness to the object as given in our 
experience, unmediated by categories or concepts. As such ‘aesthetic pleasure is a pleasure in the 
perception of the unreduced presence of an object and its surroundings, in the instant of whose per-
ception the life of the subject enacts itself’ (Seel, 2000)32. Thus understood, an experience of beauty 
is unprecedented. Our desire for the particular object cannot result from a previous desire for the 
object nor a somehow ‘filled’ expectation. Such a desire for the existence of the object would bias 
the judgement and move it from the realm of aesthetics, within which experiences are to be judged 
disinterestedly, as experiences in their own right (cf. Fischer, 2001, p. 269). Perhaps, that is why 
every time we are astonished by a beautiful sunset – in itself almost a pastiche or cliché of natural 
beauty – it is as though we are enjoying the sunset for the very first time. It is because we are re-
ceptive in such a way that we experience the sunset as though it takes us by surprise, time and time 
                                                      
32 Translation of a phrase in: Seel, M. (2000). Ästhetik des Erscheinens. Munchen. This translation is borrowed from the 
website of the German Goethe Institute: http://www.goethe.de/kug/prj/kan/en81442.htm. 
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again, that we are able to see its beauty. And perhaps, it is because we expect a similar expression 
of beauty when we glance through our photo album, that our pictures of such a sunset are nearly 
always disappointing. 
 Within the domain of aesthetic experience, then, to reflect is not to move from the univer-
sally given to the particular, but in reverse direction, to go from and beyond the immediately given 
to the universal. However, as I have outlined in the section on political judgement, this movement 
towards the ‘universal’ is not realised by means of rational induction – because then we would have 
to assume the operation of a pre-given law – but by means of an enlarged way of thinking – eine 
erweiterte Denkungsart – conceived of as the ability to ‘to think in the place of everybody else’. To 
be more specific, our faculty of judgement consists of a twofold mental operation. First, it is by 
means of imagination that that we can present to our inner sense that which is absent: a familiar 
landscape, a terrifying snake or a beautiful sky. Our imaginative powers enable us to picture natural 
things or natural scenes in such a way that we are immediately seized by its beauty or ugliness, its 
goodness or badness, its truth or illusive nature. Those sensations are highly subjective and cannot 
be exhaustively represented in language. Therefore, subsequently, we perform an operation of 
reflection on that which has previously been presented by our imagination. As indicated in the pre-
vious chapter, this reflection comprises an act of taking a multiple perspective and making our 
reflection communicable to others by foreseeing the common sense we share as a community: a 
sensus communis. In other words, we express the things that bring about an experience of beauty 
within the evaluative language we share with significant others. Thus, we take the evaluative atti-
tudes of other people concerning our expressions of beauty to our own identifications of beauty. 
Imagination as well as reflection plays a vital role in this transformation from the particular object 
to the general judgement. Modern interpreters of Kant, like Hannah Arendt, deliberately speak of a 
‘general judgement’ and ‘generalisation’ rather than a ‘universal judgement’ and ‘universalisation’, 
presumably, because the latter terms invites unwelcome connotations of a transcendental a priori. 
In my further elaboration on Kant’s aesthetics I will follow this translation of universality into 
generality (Arendt, 1982; cf. Cuypers, 1992). 
 Martin Seel explains how Kant understands the aesthetic experience inherent in the power of 
judgement as a liberating experience:  
 
(...) in the enactment of aesthetic perception we are in a special way free – free from the compulsions 
of conceptual recognition, free from the calculation of instrumental action, and free from the conflict 
between duty and inclination. In the aesthetic state, we are free from the coercion to determine our-
selves and the world. This negative freedom, according to Kant, also has its positive side. For in the 
play of aesthetic perception we are free to experience the determinability of our selves and of the 
world. Where the real stands before us in a fullness and mutability that cannot be grasped and yet 
can be affirmed, we experience a space containing possibilities of cognition and action which is al-
ways presupposed by all theoretical and practical orientation. Therefore Kant sees in the experience 
of the beautiful (and even more in that of the sublime) a bringing to bear of man’s highest capacities. 
The richness of reality admitted in aesthetic contemplation is experienced as the joyous affirmation 
of its vast determinability through us (Seel, 2000)33.  
 
                                                      
33 Translation of a phrase in: Seel, M. (2000). Ästhetik des Erscheinens. Munchen. This translation is borrowed from the 
website of the German Goethe Institute: http://www.goethe.de/kug/prj/kan/en81442.htm. 
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Whereas contemporary philosophers might hesitate when it comes to whether it is still sensible to 
state that the reality we find by immediate apperception ‘is presupposed by all theoretical and prac-
tical orientation’, Kant is commonly praised for revealing the particular moral significance of aes-
thetic experience. In fact, he describes the experience of natural beauty as a moral experience; an 
experience that reminds us of our place in this world and the necessities that sustain our being: ‘the 
starry sky above me and the moral law within me’. Kant goes even further by stating that the 
inherent purposiveness of all natural life – striving towards its own flourishing – reminds us of our 
own purpose as final destiny of God’s creation (cf. Gadamer, p. 56). We do not have to go as far as 
this, to acknowledge that there is an exclusive subclass of natural experiences in which we feel that 
something larger than ourselves appeals to us, or mirrors our desires. Take for instance the 
experience of a magnificent landscape that suddenly thrusts itself upon us. Well known are the ro-
mantic nature poets of the nineteenth century, like Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry Thoreau, for 
their exalted celebrations of the healing impact of such magnificent peak experiences on the human 
soul. In his essay Nature (1836), Emerson dwells on our most authentic involvement with nature as 
an experience that brings us back into a child-like state of innocence and receptivity: 
  
The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward senses are still truly adjusted to each other; 
who has retained the spirit of infancy even into the era of manhood. His intercourse with heaven and 
earth, becomes part of his daily food. In the presence of nature, a wild delight runs through the man, 
in spite of real sorrows. Nature says, — he is my creature, and maugre all his impertinent griefs, he 
shall be glad with me. Not the sun or the summer alone, but every hour and season yields its tribute 
of delight; for every hour and change corresponds to and authorizes a different state of the mind, 
from breathless noon to grimmest midnight. Nature is a setting that fits equally well a comic or a 
mourning piece. In good health, the air is a cordial of incredible virtue. Crossing a bare common, in 
snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of 
special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear. In the 
woods too, a man casts off his years, as the snake his slough, and at what period soever of life, is al-
ways a child. In the woods, is perpetual youth. Within these plantations of God, a decorum and 
sanctity reign, a perennial festival is dressed, and the guest sees not how he should tire of them in a 
thousand years. In the woods, we return to reason and faith (Emerson, 1883). 
 
To say that we experience ‘a call from beyond’ is to say that within such an experience of nature 
something happens that requires our further explanation. In its inescapable presence, nature ques-
tions our being. Nature appears to us in an appealing form: it requires a response, not primarily in 
the sense of an articulate answer, but a response in our attitude and action. For instance, the 
experience of being immersed in an overwhelming fjordland might release within us a strong 
feeling of futility or piety, as if our being here did not make the slightest difference whatsoever. In 
harmony with our immediate emotional responses – feelings of comfort, consolation or anxiety – 
the experience of such a natural setting that entirely surrounds us, urges a particular mode of appre-
ciation that is not under our voluntarily control: its presence makes us speak more softly, it makes 
us move slower, act more caringly or change our conduct in a different way. Thus, every moment 
‘corresponds to and authorises a different state of mind’, as Emerson writes. Or to paraphrase 
Michael Bonnett, we are ‘commissioned’ by the experience of natural things to do this rather than 
that. Not only natural experiences of great magnitude, but common-or-garden experiences might 
elicit similar moral responses as well. Consider for instance how we react to the entreating look of a 
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redbreast in our window frame on a freezing winter day, or imagine our response to the sound of a 
screeching cat. Natural experiences of this kind have a moral significance in the sense that they 
structure our world in a way that makes particular responses – expressed in words, actions and atti-
tudes – more appropriate than others (Bonnett, 2003; Drenthen, 2002, p. 76-80; Fischer, 2001, p. 
268; cf. Scruton, 1996). 
 In his Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790) Kant refers to the former, exclusive cate-
gory of overwhelming natural experiences as the experience of the sublime. Whereas ‘ordinary’ 
aesthetic judgement deals with matters of taste and pleasure, the experience of the sublime opens up 
a sense of the absolute. This experience is marked by ambivalence: a strong sense of unease, tied to 
a sense of intense pleasure. For instance, if we are forced to take shelter from a powerful thunder-
storm or bear witness to a volcanic eruption, we are likely to realise our human vulnerability and 
futility in a kind of uncomfortable, perhaps even painful way, while we are simultaneously over-
whelmed by a profound experience of beauty. Therefore, some speak of the sublime as a sense of 
‘delightful terror’ or ‘negative lust’. However, this experience cannot (yet) be represented or ex-
pressed in ordinary language. Initially, we are faced with a notorious speechlessness. The sublime 
constitutes a transitional category, indicating the transcendent experience of that which is on or just 
beyond the boundaries of our language and ipso facto our world. Here, nature shows itself as the 
dimension of reality that challenges each every instrumental appropriation on our part. In this meta-
physical sense nature can be understood as the inexhaustible source of meaning that simply escapes 
our concepts and categories because these are necessarily tied to one-sided human perspectives. As 
such, the experience of the sublime is intimately connected with our ordinary sense of beauty or 
taste; nature is beautiful in the ordinary sense, precisely because something always escapes our 
judgement of taste. It is this dimension of elusiveness and infinity that co-constitutes natural beauty. 
Obviously, there is more beauty to nature than meets our senses (Hargrove, 1989, p. 88; Drenthen, 
2002; Bonnett, 2003; De Mul, 2002). Nevertheless, as Martin Drenthen points out, there are legiti-
mate reasons to doubt the practical significance of sublime nature: 
 
Sublime nature withdraws itself from us, it is inconceivable, and it provokes wonder and a feeling of 
awe. However, it does not allow us to identify its exact meaning or to construct a system of ethics 
that could justify our actions. Sublime nature reminds us of the fact that there is something ‘out 
there’ that is valuable in a way we cannot control, identify, or possess. This sublime nature, how-
ever, is not just convenient. Wild nature can be beautiful and sublime, but can also be discomforting, 
perhaps distressing sometimes. We cannot have one without the other. We can only experience 
something of value, when we dare to risk losing it (Drenthen, 1999, p. 8). 
 
Among those contemporary authors within the field of environmental ethics who follow an aes-
thetic approach to the issue of natural value there are still major controversies between those who 
hold a rather subjectivist account of value and those who defend a more objectivist or realist under-
standing of value. The fundamental disagreement between them is primarily about the nature of 
aesthetic experience. On the one hand, there has been a tendency within modern aesthetics to iden-
tify aesthetic experience as a merit of the subject. The competences and attitudes of the perceiver 
are regarded as prior to the experience: aesthetic experience is thought to result from the exercise of 
these dispositions (characterisation of Bonnett, 2003, p. 669). These authors account of aesthetic 
value as a function of our aesthetic response. They tend to define the aesthetic value of an object as 
‘the value it possesses by virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic gratification’ or please our aes-
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thetic desires (Fisher, 2001, p. 266). Illustrative is William James’ understanding of value and 
beauty as ‘pure gifts of the spectator’s mind’ (cited in: Rolston, 1982).  
 Objectivist critics retort, however, that to regard natural value or beauty as completely 
dependent on the perceiver – determined by the eye of the beholder – is to turn nature into a chi-
mera or private projection. Michael Bonnett for instance chooses to hold on to the idea of nature as 
a primordial reality that precedes us, and whose essence or ultimate meaning is always beyond our 
grasp. In line with the ancient Greek understanding of nature as physis – or the self-arising – he ar-
gues that its origins are independent of us. As such, we cannot get behind it. (Bonnett, 2003). Some 
critics are led by moral indignation about the human arrogance to which subjectivist accounts of 
natural beauty attest. Notice, for instance the response of John Laird: ‘There is beauty…in sky and 
cloud and sea, in lillies and in sunsets, in the glow of bracken in autumn and in the enticing green-
ness of a leafy spring. Nature, indeed, is indefinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear her beauty as 
she wears colour or sound. Why then should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?’ (cited from 
Rolston, 1982, p. 126).  
 Obviously, a struggle with intuitions like those articulated by Laird will not bring us any 
further, since these intuitions are in themselves contradictory. Even the ideas of the later Holmes 
Rolston, who aims at steering a middle course between value-subjectivism and objectivism, remain 
ambivalent on the issue of aesthetic experience. His intuitions oscillate between the intuition that 
‘such experiences happen to us without any liberty to refuse them’ on the one hand, and the intui-
tion that ‘value-judgements have to be decided’ on the other (both cited from: Rolston, 1982, p. 
127). In my view the main problem is that both subjectivist and objectivist claims of value and 
beauty suffer from a petitio principii: the legitimacy of the conclusive claims is already assumed by 
the premises; if one chooses to express the question of aesthetic experience in terms of the subjec-
tive dispositions that make possible such an experience, then the conclusion will be stated in sub-
jectivist terms since the question a priori assumes that natural value serves a subjective function. If, 
on the other hand, one chooses to phrase the issue of aesthetic experience in terms where objective 
properties count as a necessary condition for such an experience, then the conclusive claim is likely 
to have an objectivist bearing. In both cases, the epistemological framework within which the ques-
tions are being raised is biased in favour of a subjectivist or objectivist claim. Against the back-
ground of these problematic biases, our intersubjective framework might prove to be a more 
balanced starting point for further examination since it does not privilege the epistemological status 
of the individual subject or the object in advance.  
 
 
3.2 On the status of nature and her evaluators 
 
A philosophical investigation of natural value that starts from the primacy of practical intersubjec-
tivity transcends the kind of dualism that postulates a valuing subject standing over and against the 
natural world as an independent objective reality that has to be grasped. After all, the primacy of the 
intersubjective implies that any appreciation of nature takes place within our common language and 
practices in which we interact with nature such that subjective and objective claims cannot be dealt 
with separately. Rather, meaning-giving practices themselves constitute the value of nature. Within 
the field of practical ethics, this intersubjective constitution of value is best worked out by those 
who defend a Wittgensteinian-expressivist perspective on responsibility, in line with the initial 
framework offered by Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790). However, it is of great importance for 
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my purposes, to hold on to the intuition that there is some reality to the idea of nature as an object of 
judgement on the one hand, and the idea of a subjective agency on the other. After all, any under-
standing of ecological responsibility involves the idea that there is someone who takes 
responsibility for some reality (partly) outside of herself. Let us therefore now consider the episte-
mological status of the valuing subject and natural object within such an intersubjective framework 
of value in more detail. 
  
Transcendent nature as an ‘object’ of judgement 
In discussing the status of the ‘natural object’ within an intersubjective understanding of value, 
there seem to be only two possible stances to take. If one assumes nature to be immanent to our 
world and worldly expression of nature, then one implies that natural value is itself constituted by 
the intersubjective practices within which we participate and have contingently agreed upon. If one 
assumes nature to be transcendent – transcending our world and worldly expression of nature – then 
one implies that natural value is constituted by nature ‘out there’ and its meaning has to be ‘re-
ceived’ from beyond our language. Obviously, such a simple schism does not cover the complexity 
of the issue at hand. In this section, I will argue that the distinction between immanence and tran-
scendence does not coincide with the distinction between a worldly-intersubjective constitution of 
natural value and an extra-worldly constitution of nature, understood in Kantian noumenal terms. 
My aim is to show that it is legitimately possible to hold on to the primacy of the intersubjective as 
well as to the idea that nature transcends our intersubjective understanding of nature. 
 As we have seen, our judgement of natural beauty directs our attention to something that 
transcends intersubjective matters of taste: the sublime. The experience of the sublime constitutes a 
transitional category, marking the transcendent experience of that which is on or just beyond the 
boundaries of our language and ipso facto our world. Nietzsche expressed the feeling of ambiva-
lence, arising from the ‘taciturnity of nature’ in his ode to the sunset glow on the seashore:  
 
Yonder lies the ocean, pale and brilliant; it cannot speak. The sky is glistening with its eternal mute 
evening hues, red, yellow, and green: it cannot speak. The small cliffs and rocks which stretch out 
into the sea as if each one of them were endeavouring to find the loneliest spot -- they too are dumb. 
Beautiful and awful indeed is this vast silence, which so suddenly overcomes us and makes our heart 
swell. Alas! what deceit lies in this dumb beauty! How well could it speak, and how evilly, too, if it 
wished! Its tongue, tied up and fastened, and its face of suffering happiness -- all this is but malice, 
mocking at your sympathy: be it so! I do not feel ashamed to be the plaything of such powers! 
(Nietzsche, 1982, p. 423; original work published 1881). 
 
In my view, the transcendent call we experience (in the secondary sense) emanates from a tension 
between that which is significant and meaningful to us, and that which is not (yet). As a result of 
this tension, we feel that something is questioning us; we are called to give meaning to nature, to 
find words for the unspeakable. Now, the objectivist might argue that we are in fact implying an 
objectivist notion of value; we respond to a call that arises from our contact with nature, and try to 
find words for the value intrinsic to our natural environment. Though this might sound plausible, in 
my view, it is not correct. In line with Heidegger’s notion of expressive language, I will argue it is 
not Nature that speaks to us, but indeed, it is language speaking (‘Die Sprache spricht’). For Hei-
degger the essence of human language is couched in the concept of Lichtung (clearing); in our lan-
guage we disclose a world in which things appear to us as meaningful for the first time. That is, 
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language does not represent a pre-existent reality. Rather, language creates an expressive space in 
which the essence of things can appear to us. If we speak for instance about the breathtaking pano-
rama we have enjoyed from the top of a hill, we are not (merely) bringing to light this experience – 
describing the height, the palette of colours, distances, the species of trees we could descry and so 
on. First and foremost, we will find ourselves bringing about an experience of natural beauty, 
evoking within ourselves and our audience a feeling of admiration, desolation, fear or whatever. 
This expression is not a matter of self-expression (so not subjectivist either), nor an immediate 
revelation on the part of the landscape itself, but a creative response to a call emanating from lan-
guage itself. Charles Taylor underlines this evocative understanding of language in his paper Hei-
degger, Language and Ecology:  
 
So language, through its telos, dictates a certain mode of expression, a way of formulating matters 
which can help to restore thingness. It tells us what to say, dictates the poetic or thinkerly word, as 
we might put it. (….). This is how I think we have to understand Heidegger’s conception of language 
speaking. It is why Heidegger speaks of our relation to language in terms of a call (Ruf) we are at-
tentive to. “Die Sterblichen sprechen insofern sie hören”. And he can speak of the call as emanating 
from a silence (Stille). The silence is where there are not yet (the right) words, but where we are in-
terpellated by entities to disclose them as things. Of course this does not happen before language; it 
can only happen in its midst. But within language and because of its telos, we are pushed to find un-
precedented words, which we draw out of silence. This stillness contrasts with the noisy Gerede in 
which we fill the world with expressions of our selves and our purposes. These unprecedented words 
(“sayings” is better but “word” is pithier) are words of power; we might call them words of re-
trieval. They constitute authentic thinking and poetry (Taylor, 1995, p. 124). 
 
So, poetic language enables us to express those things that are beyond words, to speak about the 
unspeakable. In line with this insight, Taylor writes elsewhere that ‘the poet makes us aware of 
something in nature for which there are as yet no adequate words. The poems are finding the words 
for us. In this “subtler language” – the term is borrowed from Shelley – something is created and 
defined as well as manifested’ (Taylor, 1991, p. 85). 
 In other words, whereas the incentive originates from outside language (the interpellating 
entities), the transcendent call (to disclose them as things) itself can only be heard in the midst of 
words. We draw the words out of silence, but the silence Heidegger speaks of is a silence sur-
rounded by language. Apparently, poetic or evocative language makes us responsive to a transcen-
dent reality, in a way that enables us to experience and express the beauty or intrinsic value of na-
ture. The ideas of Heidegger indicate that this value can neither be reduced to a subjective 
experience of respect, nor to an objective quality or voice that speaks to us. Rather, it is by virtue of 
our language, and its ‘telos’, that we disclose a world of things that speak to us and demand our 
respect34. Because of its telos, we cannot deploy this language simply as a means to our own ends 
and purposes. The words transcend my purposes and by that resist any instrumental appropriation of 
its meaning and value. Moreover, the words require us to listen and care. They engender an attitude 
of solicitude. 
                                                      
34 Inspired by Levinas and Llewelyn, Paul Standish articulates this insight in terms of otherness: ‘the relation to the 
Other is not realised in a kind of abstract contemplation but rather in language itself’ (Standish, 2003, p. 109). 
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 I believe that this understanding of the relationship between nature and language is broadly 
in line with the ideas of Michael Bonnett. In his monograph Retrieving Nature: Education for a 
Post-Humanist Age (2003) Bonnett aims to retrieve an understanding of nature that allows us to 
obtain a view of ‘a right relationship with nature’. Thus, Bonnett suggests that we should under-
stand nature as ‘a dimension of experience that apprehends the self-arising in the material/spiritual 
world of which we are part, including the powers that sustain and govern it’. Bonnett defends this 
concept of nature against those postmodernist and constructivist critics who proclaim the end of 
nature or discharge any understanding of nature as ‘mere description’ (Rorty), ‘social construction’ 
(Giddens), ‘simulacrum’ (Baudrillard) or a signifier without referent outside of the text (Derrida). In 
his defense, Bonnett starts with the most empirical assault on the reality of nature, made by Bill 
McKibben in his famous book with the provocative title The End of Nature (1989) in which he 
states that we live in a post-natural world; since the influence of human activity on earth is such that 
there is no single spot on earth that is left unaffected by human action in some way, nature has lost 
its independence. Even undiscovered pieces of pristine wilderness are human-affected by means of 
our influence on climate change: ‘By changing the weather, we make every spot on earth man-made 
and artificial. We have deprived nature of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning. Nature’s 
independence is its meaning; without it, there is nothing but us’ (McKibben, 1989, p. 58). By in-
volving all nature on this globe in our radius of action we have stripped nature of its ‘intrinsic 
value’: ‘we can no longer imagine that we are part of something larger than ourselves’, so now 
‘there is nothing but us’.  
 Though an interesting and provoking statement, Bonnett adequately responds to this overly 
simple conclusion by pointing out that to say that all nature is affected by humans is one thing, but 
to say that nature has lost its independence is quite another, since this would imply that nature is 
completely dependent on our purposes and will. Ergo, for nature to lose its independence it would 
have to be completely under the voluntary control of humans. Even in their most arrogant dreams, 
anthropocentric hard-liners would acknowledge that this is not the case: natural processes – even 
our own digestion – proceed independent of our will. That our manipulation of natural forces is 
taking increasingly pervasive and world-embracing forms does not imply that these forces are under 
human control. On the contrary, as the fragility of human health indicates, there is a sense in which 
we are ‘constantly dependent upon, and subject to, natural processes at both micro and macro 
levels’, and it is in this sense that ‘nature remains always beyond us’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 595). 
Bonnett, concludes that, by taking ‘causal independence’ as the hallmark of nature, McKibben tends 
to conflate ‘nature’ with ‘wilderness’. He assumes that we can only find ‘true nature’ at the largest 
possible distance from our human world. But this is a self-refuting concept of nature, because the 
paradox is that, as soon as we find untouched nature, somewhere far beyond our human world, it 
ceases to be nature in the strict sense of McKibben, since us, humans, finding and naming nature 
has already affected and changed it. In this sense ‘nature has always already ended’, since ‘the 
world we inhabit is always already one transformed by human practices’ (Vogel, 2002, p. 23; Bon-
nett, 2003, p. 594-595; cf. Van Zomeren, 1998, p. 7). The empirical concept of nature as wilderness 
is by definition an empty category. 
  With these latter conclusions, we move towards Bonnett’s confrontation with a different 
strand of post-naturalism: the post-modern version claiming that nature is a human construction, not 
simply in physical terms but in psychological and linguistic terms. To be more specific, the post-
modern claim implies that there is nothing more to nature than its human construction; it is simply a 
cultural artefact. Following Bonnett, I take the position of Richard Rorty as a paradigm case. In 
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Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980) Rorty challenges the fundamental idea that language 
represents a pre-given reality, or that our knowledge mirrors a mind-external ‘natural’ world. 
Moreover, he refutes the representationalist idea that the truth of language and knowledge can be 
judged in function of its correspondence with this discours-independent reality. Contrary to repre-
sentationalism and contrary to correspondence theory, Rorty does not believe that we can give use-
ful content to the notion that the world, by its very nature, rationally constrains choices of vocabu-
lary employed to cope with it. In his view, any vocabulary is optional and mutable, and there is no 
reason, independent of a particular discourse, for choosing this or that particular vocabulary. Rather, 
we just have descriptions that reflect the particular discourses from which we move to and fro. 
Truth about reality is always truth about ‘reality-under-a-certain-description’ and these descriptions 
are optional – we could always choose others. To quote Bonnett on Rorty’s view of language: ‘Thus 
re-describing ourselves and the world is the most important thing we can do – finding ‘more 
interesting’, ‘more fruitful’ ways of speaking – and self-formation rather than knowledge is the goal 
of thinking. For Rorty, such ‘edification’ aims at continuing a conversation rather than discovering 
truth’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 597; cf. Hood, 1998).  
 Bonnett responds to this ‘assault on nature and the natural’ by pointing at ‘the arrogant 
meta(physical)-magicianry inherent in these views’ and the ‘self-absorbed cast of mind that is pre-
occupied with the active rather than the responsive – itself, a reflection of the modern metaphysics 
of mastery’: 
 
For example, it is interesting the way that these authors speak of the idea of nature as ‘constructed’, 
which has connotations of some focused (if tacit) agency at work, thus portraying it as the result of 
some deliberate or quasi-intentional activity – in a certain sense, an invention. While such agency 
may lie behind the production of many concepts, it hardly seems to describe the genesis of the ma-
jority, and, when applied to what hitherto have been taken as overarching or grounding notions, 
suggests a kind of arbitrariness and human authorship that would evacuate them of authority (...). 
Such a view does indeed turn nature (and everything else that is foundational) into a chimera. But 
why should we be seduced by this account? A terminal cancer sufferer is likely to receive little com-
fort from the suggestion that this is just an optional – and perhaps not the most interesting – 
description of his condition. Does Rorty’s account not trade on the authority of the term ‘descrip-
tion’, while simultaneously undermining it? What are descriptions descriptions of? On what basis 
are some descriptions properly to be held as inappropriate or inaccurate? Such questions cannot be 
adequately answered exclusively in terms of sets of (optional) local norms. Shared descriptions re-
quire shared criteria, but the logic of the notion ‘describe’ requires also something external that is 
being described (Bonnett, 2003, p. 603). 
 
In my view Bonnett correctly points at the voluntarist tendency inherent in this strand of construc-
tivism; the obvious fact that we can only experience, know and imagine nature from within our hu-
man forms of significance does not imply that we can simply employ the concept of nature any way 
we feel nor ascribe it any sort of random meaning. Nor does it mean that we can determine the 
meaning of nature for ourselves once and for all through democratic-deliberative exercise. There are 
constraints on what it makes sense to say, to imagine, to believe, and hitherto there have been con-
straints on the meaning of nature that are beyond our control. As such, Bonnett is right in stating 
that nature is culturally experienced but not culturally produced. While Rorty might agree with us 
on this point in general terms, some of his philosophical statements might seem to suggest that our 
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linguistic concepts are purely arbitrary and optional from the standpoint of the individual speaker35 
(Bonnett, 2003, p. 597). 
 While I agree with Bonnett on the constrained nature of giving meaning within a human 
form of significance, I do not agree that these constraints are necessarily ‘external’ – located out-
side, before or beyond discourse. Indeed, descriptions are always descriptions of something, but 
why should this something be of a ‘primordial’ nature? Obviously, Bonnett wants to secure the idea 
that our speaking of nature is preceded by a natural reality that provides us with the standards 
against which the truth of our statements can be judged: ‘Internal to the idea of valuing something, 
as opposed to simply liking or desiring it, is a recognition of qualities – of, in the case of nature, 
perhaps, independence, diversity, subtlety, delicacy, integrity etc. – that are not simply the product 
of human caprice, but that are somehow inherent in the thing itself. They meet a “standard” that is 
independent of us in the sense of not simply being for us to decide’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 670). In 
short, Bonnett holds on to a transcendental understanding of nature in order to prevent the measure 
of man to become the measure of natural things. However, in my view, we do not need to refer to 
the ‘thing itself’, in order to find constraints on the possibility of meaning that are beyond human 
control (and we cannot as will become clear). There are profound reasons for believing that these 
constraints come from within language, captured as it were within discourse, as Blake, Smeyers, 
Smith and Standish express in Thinking Again. Education After Postmodernism (1998). In their 
view, the constraints on the meaning of a concept like the concept of nature are not to be conceived 
as foundational – ontologically prior to discourse – but as constraints that come along with the use 
of language within a particular discourse, with the need to share references, to share meanings and 
language with fellow speakers. Thus, the ‘intrinsic meaning of nature’ is warranted by the rule-
governed practices of our language community within which our involvement with the natural 
world is being captured, rather than by nature ‘out there’. However, to say that the constraints on 
the meaning of ‘nature’ are internal to discourse and intrinsically social is not to say that language 
cannot refer to anything outside of language, and that we might just as well give up the subsequent 
ideas of nature, reality and truth. Rather, the point is that: 
 
(...) our access to reality, which is genuine enough, is never unmediated by language or, therefore, 
by dialogue. Of course we can refer to things outside our language; but reference itself is an activity 
internal to language. This point is often misunderstood. There are always those who argue that since 
our vocabulary encodes the things we refer to, it also constraints what we can possibly refer to. This 
does not follow. Vocabulary is an enactment of our transactions with the world around us, which are 
nonetheless undetermined. After all (...) we are not immured in a single language, even less a unique 
discourse (Blake, Smeyers, Smith & Standish, 1998, p. 30-31).  
 
Thus, what we can think is bounded up by the possibilities of shared language, but not by the possi-
bilities of one particular language. So, it is similarly bounded up by the possibilities of human rela-
tionships, but not by the parochial possibilities for our own particular society. What does constrain 
the possibilities of social relationships, and thus of language, is the physical form of our embodi-
ment. It seems to be this alone – this shared life-world of eating, sleeping, sex, death – that accounts 
                                                      
35 Consider for instance the phrase in which Rorty expresses his reluctance towards the word ‘truth’ because its use 
mostly indicates ‘a way of allowing a description of reality to be imposed on us, rather than taking responsibility for 
choice among competing ideas and words, theories and vocabularies’ (cited from: Bonnett, 2003, p. 597). 
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for the primordial and extensive agreement in judgements which makes shared language possible for 
us and ultimately constrains what we can say. We can extend thought and language in some direc-
tions, but not in any direction at all – only those we can make sense of with other human beings. 
That makes for a difference between sense and nonsense, and a fortiori between true and false 
(Blake, Smeyers, Smith & Standish, 1998, p. 32). 
 
These ideas on the embeddedness of discourse indicate that post-foundationalism – as articulated by 
Rorty as well as Blake, Smeyers, Smith & Standish – does not necessarily imply a ‘hermetically 
sealed internalisation of truth to discourse’ as Bonnett suggests. The authors do not at all deny the 
existence of an external reality and truth, but they question the status of appeals to such an external 
natural reality or transcendent truth within human discourse. Appeals to reality and truth just do not 
seem to do the job they are commonly expected to do. They do not tell us what to say, what to think 
or do; they cannot help us to distinguish between true and false statements about the world and they 
do not guide us in dealing with the moral and cultural problems of our time. As we have seen, these 
purposes can only be served by the standards and goods internal to the human practice and dis-
course in which they arise.  
 Behind this epistemological point, there is of course the underlying critique of 
foundationalism, which might affect Bonnett’s position as well. By suggesting that certain qualifi-
cations within human discourse immediately represent qualities of a true or real world Bonnett risks 
the giving preference to or privileging of a particular class of representations of human experience 
as ‘primordial’ over and above other representations, just as classical rationalism, empiricism and 
transcendentalism privileged certain forms of knowledge as providing us with exclusive access to 
an underlying reality or a true – rational, empirical or transcendental – world (cf. Heyting, 2000). 
The idea of privileged access to such an undistorted natural world operates as an independent arbi-
ter, and easily serves as a ground of justification for hierarchical dualisms between the natural and 
unnatural, male and female, sound and unsound, rational and irrational, private and public and so 
on. One does not have to be a postmodernist in order to recognise that these dualisms have provided 
the most horrible projects of exclusion and exploitation in modern times of a justifying rationale. 
Obviously, in the end, this is what renders the grand narratives and their privileged representations 
incredibility (cf. Lyotard, 1984). 
 However, Bonnett keeps away from dangerous implications of this kind by stressing the 
intertwining of our practical experience and understanding of nature with the human form of sensi-
bility that makes these experiences and understandings possible. Such an intertwining would not 
allow for a privileged access to a natural reality beyond discourse, precisely because this reality is 
not construed as something ‘out there’ but as a reality that partakes in our discourse and experience 
as well as that which transcends our discourse in an inextricable way. However, by stating that this 
form of sensibility should be conceived as a necessary condition for our experience and under-
standing of nature, Bonnett does seem to opt for a transcendental concept of nature as an underlying 
normative horizon, albeit one that is not completely transparent and therefore cannot be (fully) 
identified:  
 
‘(...) nature as both a concept and aspect of experience is a deeply constitutive element in our form 
of sensibility – meaning by this latter, that through which our awareness, cognitive and emotional, 
occurs and is made possible. We take our form of sensibility to be a product partly of our 
physiology, relating to our biological needs and capacities, and partly of our culture, relating to our 
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languages and conceptual schemes, which mediate whatever is physiologically given – and which in 
turn are taken to be the product of a history of interaction with a world whose features, such as the 
existence of solid bodies, are not all determined by our will and therefore require our accommoda-
tion. There are clear parallels here with Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘form of life’ (...). The argument, 
then, is that nature in the underlying sense of the self-arising can be construed as a primordial 
reality in the sense of being deeply embedded in our historically grown form of sensibility. To exor-
cise it would be to bring about a change so fundamental as to lie beyond our comprehension, if in-
deed it were even possible (...). The significant point is that our experience which is necessarily un-
dergone within our form of sensibility is conditioned by a concept of nature that is constitutive of 
that sensibility (Bonnett, 2003, p. 610). 
 
Now, the question is how this transcendental understanding of nature as an underlying primordial 
reality, that is always given and as such present to us, in a certain way relates to the understanding 
of nature as ‘the other’ to which Bonnett alludes as well:  
 
Here (...) would seem to be a case of valuing an aspect of nature not because it gives the valuer 
pleasure, but through a direct sense of, and respect for, the integrity of its ‘otherness’. Of course, a 
certain pleasure may be experienced in its otherness, but in such a case it is no the experience of 
pleasure that lends it value, but recognition of its value that gives the experience of pleasure (Bon-
nett, 2003, p. 634). 
 
In bringing us into initial contact with nature, human-centred motives can heighten our awareness of 
non-human-centred apexes of the world. Through their modulations of, or resistance to, our activity, 
they stand out as ‘other’. And this can be as true of aspects of our everyday practical equipment as 
of things that we do not think of in instrumental terms: experience of sheer otherness (Bonnett, 2003, 
p. 670). 
 
If we start from Bonnett’s classical concept of nature as ‘a dimension of experience that apprehends 
the self-arising in the material/spiritual world of which we are part, including the powers that sus-
tain and govern it’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 684), then there is a sensible way in which the experience of 
nature can be understood in terms of otherness: as the self-arising, nature for us is defined by its 
independence and otherness from the human. However, in my view Bonnett underscores the 
inherent (and perhaps inescapable) tension in his metaphysical framework between the dimension 
of experience that apprehends and recognises ‘what is’ (given) on the one hand and the experience 
of otherness – the absent, the excluded, the constitutive outside – that hides behind our present un-
derstanding of nature on the other. Sheer otherness cannot be experienced since our experience in-
evitably shapes ‘the other’, and thus, our experience of the other is always a one-sided appropriation 
that reveals and hides particular dimensions of the other. Obviously, Bonnett’s understanding of the 
other is less radical than, for example, the absolute and irreducible Other of Levinas, in whose face I 
am defenseless and taken hostage in an absolute responsibility (cf. Standish). But even if one starts 
from a more dialectical Hegelian understanding of the human relationship to nature as the ‘exter-
nalised spirit’ in whose mirror humans define themselves, then there is a tension between familiari-
sation on the one hand and estrangement on the other: inevitably, we picture the other that ‘speaks’ 
to us, or mirrors us, while, simultaneously, we feel that something eludes this picture, and look for 
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that which is repressed by this picture. In my view, this fundamental tension is a driving force be-
hind our intrinsic valuation of nature.  
 This fundamental tension between the familiarity and strangeness of nature is radicalised by 
Martin Drenthen, who takes an existential ambiguity inherent in Nietzsche’s philosophy as a 
starting point for his study of the paradoxical nature of environmental ethics. Whereas Nietzsche 
leans heavily on ‘the natural’ in his ideas on human self-understanding, his perspectivism and cri-
tique of morality leads him to value all human interpretation of nature as expression of the will-to-
power. As such, each interpretation of nature can be seen as an exclusion of alternative interpreta-
tions or a violent restriction of nature’s expressiveness, and therefore, as a seizure of power. In this 
tension Drenthen recognises an ambivalence that is ‘characteristic of our times’ and our under-
standing of nature: ‘On the one hand nature seems to have lost its status as a solid, unambiguous 
ground for moral judgements, on the other hand we do not seem to be able to articulate certain 
moral experiences without referring to a more or less normative concept of nature (Drenthen, 1999, 
p. 6; cf. Drenthen, 2003). The underlying paradox is, of course, that the concept of nature can only 
exist at places – in our language, our common practices, institutions, religion, art – where its ‘pristi-
neness’ is being harmed. As such, the word is conceptually problematic if not untenable in a similar 
way as the words ‘God’ and ‘death’ are: all idle efforts to name the unnameable (Van Zomeren, 
1998). Drenthen takes this ambiguity to be the core meaning of ‘nature’ within a normative context:  
 
I conclude that in Nietzsche’s normative use of the concept of nature, nature means that which in the 
end cannot be but at the same time always has to be ‘grasped’. The fact that nature does not have a 
moral measure evokes a meaning of nature that precedes and transcends our moral activity. One 
could say that in an absolute sense nature is something strange and different. But at the same time 
the notion of this nature functions as a criterion of human self-criticism, that is: it functions within a 
human interpretative framework (Drenthen, 1999, p. 7). 
 
Similar to the advocacy of Bonnett for an attitude of ‘letting be’, Drenthen argues that this para-
doxical knowledge need not paralyse any attempt to formulate an answer to the question as to what 
constitutes a right attitude towards nature: ‘The awareness of the radical otherness of nature can 
lead to a new attitude of listening and respect for nature and awareness of human finitude’ (Dren-
then, 1999, p. 7). While this field of tension is insoluble, human beings are situated in such a way as 
to integrate a sensitivity to otherness within their attitude towards nature, thus both Bonnett and 
Drenthen seem to imply. But now we are getting ahead of issues that will be discussed in the next 
section on the status of the valuing subject within an intersubjective framework of natural value, to 
which we will turn immediately after a brief recapitulation of the main argument in this section. 
 In our examination of the status of nature as an ‘object’ of aesthetic judgement, our aim was 
to hold on to the primacy of the intersubjective constitution of natural value as well as to the idea 
that nature transcends our intersubjective understanding of nature. Inspired by the Heideggerian 
understanding of language and the sublime, I have argued that the transcendent call we experience 
emanates from a tension between that which is significant and meaningful to us within our horizon 
of significance, and that which is not (yet). As a result of this tension, we feel like something is 
questioning us; we are called to give meaning to nature, to find words for the unspeakable. Whereas 
the call meets us from beyond, the transcendent call (to disclose them as things) can only be heard 
in the midst of words. Apparently, poetic or evocative language makes us responsive to a transcen-
dent reality, in a way that enables us to experience and express the beauty or intrinsic value of na-
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ture. Thus understood, the correct statement that nature is a human construction does not imply that 
there is nothing more to nature than its human construction, which is a cultural artefact tout court 
that has no reality beyond human discourse. On the contrary, in a sense, nature is defined by its in-
dependence of human discourse, and its independence of human will. That nature only shows up 
within our horizon of significance does not imply that its meaning is determined by it. The paradox 
is that nature can only be meaningful to us, human beings, if it is sealed in discourse. So, in a sense, 
only by doing harm to its ‘pristineness’, can we can understand nature. As soon as one has taken 
‘independence of the human will’ as central to nature, then every effort to name, interpret, imagine, 
know or value nature, reveals itself as a seizure of power. But obviously we cannot refrain from 
naming, interpreting, imagining or knowing nature. The only thing we can do is integrate within our 
attitude towards nature a listening attitude towards that which escapes our present categories or 
images.  
 To conclude this analysis, I suggest that we understand nature in similar (but not exactly the 
same) terms of Bonnett’s as a dimension of experience that apprehends the self-arising in the form 
of life of which we are part, understood as the ground or very substratum of what we experience as 
human existence, independent of the human will. Obviously, my definition expresses a human-re-
lated understanding of nature – since nature only appears to us from within our forms of signifi-
cance, sensibility and acquaintance informed by human concerns and purposes – but is not human 
centred in the sense that instrumental human purposes necessarily take the lead. This means that 
‘human beings are necessary participants in, but not in control of the showing up of beings’ (Bon-
nett, 2000).  
 Inherent to this understanding of nature as the self-arising are four characteristics of nature 
(on a metaphysical level). I am highly indebted to Michael Bonnett for my summary of them. First, 
nature is everywhere, it is ubiquitous and for situated beings like us inescapable. However, to say 
that nature is everywhere is not the same as saying that everything is nature. Rather, everything 
partakes of nature in a particular way and to a certain degree, even a personal computer, thus Bon-
nett would argue: ‘Nature as a dimension is everywhere to some degree, that is, it is not everything. 
A plastic flower partakes of nature to a degree (...) Wilderness partakes in nature to a very high de-
gree; a piece of computer code, perhaps not at all – or at least only at several removes. Such a view 
overcomes any absolute dualism of nature and culture, nature and artefacts, nature and humanity – 
but not in a way that obliterates important distinctions’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 616). Second, nature is 
transcendent, and for bodily creatures like us elusive. This characterisation seems to be at odds with 
the former characteristic but this is not so: nature is inescapable, but its value and meaning do con-
tinuously escape our interpretations and imaginations. Nature hides her own sources, and will 
therefore always be a mystery to us.  
 Third, nature is characterised by continuity, in time as well as space. This means that all 
forms of life are connected by means of symbiosis and mutual dependency in their ability to 
flourish and survive. For situated beings like us, this means that we are located in a continuous state 
of reciprocity and metabolism with our natural environment. Fourth, nature is marked by irreversi-
ble changeability. Though natural time proceeds cyclical – in recurring cycles of bloom and decay – 
nature continuously changes in unprecedented ways. As such, every natural state is temporary, but 
one moment in a flux. Panta rhei. For timely beings like us this means that ‘we cannot step twice 
into the same river’ as Heraclites’ aphorism goes. We experience nature as cyclical – in the recur-
ring experience of the seasons, day and night-time – but nevertheless unrepeatable (cf. Bonnett, 
2003, p. 614-617). Among other things, this means that there is no original state of nature – no zero 
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or starting point of evolution – to which we can refer in our present decisions of conservation as a 
standard of authenticity. If we were asked why we want to save our moors from forestation, an an-
swer in terms of authenticity alone – such as that moors are more natural than forests in this area – 
would therefore not be conclusive. Natural evolution implies a continual process of disappearance 
of some natural states and species in favour of the emergence of others. If we choose to conserve 
particular natural states or species against the powers that be, then our reasons for conservation can-
not be convincingly expressed in terms of an original state or original species. Indeed, perhaps we 
experience some natural states or species as more ‘authentic’ or ‘natural’ than others, but the predi-
cate of authenticity then refers to our feeling of familiarity or attachment: we experience these 
moors or hummingbirds as belonging to our land. Thus, romantically inclined conservationists tend 
to cultivate a nineteenth century picture of the countryside as a background for an ideal of natural 
beauty. Accordingly, environmentalists appeal to our sentiment for particular animal species like 
seals, whales, panda or koala bears, rather than to dirty vermin or bloodthirsty predators. 
 In the previous characterisation of nature, the ‘objective properties’ and ‘subjective dimen-
sions of experience’ mirror one another: the ubiquity of nature is the mirror image of the inescapa-
bility on the part of the situated subject; the transcendence of nature is mirrored by the subjective 
experience of elusiveness; natural continuity finds its counterpart in human interdependence, and 
the irreversibility of natural processes is reflected in the human experience of unrepeatability and 
uniqueness. Furthermore, while Kant characterised the aesthetic experience in terms of the 
disinterestedness of the subject, the romantic philosophers and poets stressed the presumed objec-
tive counterpart: the innocence of nature. Whether are not this is romantic idle talk, is not the point. 
Rather, these ‘mirrors’ are indicative of the kind of the relationship between nature and human dis-
course. How we mirror our natural environment and vice versa will be explored in more detail in 
the section about the ideas of Merleau-Ponty on the chiasm between man and world, but now, we 
turn to the other side of the mirror: the subject and her expression of natural beauty. 
 
Human evaluators as ‘subjects’ of judgement 
Now the status of nature as an object of judgement within an aesthetic account of natural value has 
been illuminated, we turn to the question of the valuing subject: if we argue from the primacy of the 
intersubjective constitution of meaning and value, how can we hold on to the idea of a valuing sub-
ject or agency that takes responsibility for the natural things she cares for? The former elaboration 
of aesthetic judgement and transcendent nature might elicit a picture of the speaking subject as a 
submissive mouthpiece of natural value in the name of the sensus communis. This picture is evoked 
by the manifold suggestions of a passive subject that we have touched upon. If natural beauty be-
falls us, if it thrusts itself upon us, where do we stand as an agent? If we are engrossed in an aes-
thetic experience of the sublime or immersed in an ordinary experience of natural beauty, is it pos-
sible to resist a judgement of taste? And if the meaning and value of nature are warranted by com-
mon practice how does this constitution leave room for personal taste and plurality of taste among 
people? Obviously, the picture of the subject as a mere conduit, silently passing on the judgements 
of the sensus communis without any personal voice whatsoever, does not do justice to our intui-
tions. We experience ourselves not merely as passive recipients of natural beauty, handed over to 
the general taste of our community, but – to a certain extent – as active agents as well, who express 
a personal feeling of comfort or pleasure. Moreover, we sometimes experience that it is possible to 
hold a dissenting opinion over and against a majority of people who disagree with us. This indicates 
that there must be some way in which my judgement of natural beauty can indeed be claimed as my 
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judgement, i.e. as a judgement performed by me, rather than a judgement of taste received as a 
projection of others. If we want to hold on to the idea of a subjective agency that takes 
responsibility for the natural things she cares for, then we will have to point out how the subject is 
able to express the beauty she finds in nature under her own responsibility. 
 In order to answer this fundamental question I will start from the analysis developed by 
Charles Altieri in Subjective Agency. A Theory of First-Person Expressivity and its Social Implica-
tions (1994). His expressivist account of personal responsibility is inspired by Wittgenstein’s analy-
sis of rule-governed behaviour and meaning as use, as well as the Kantian idea of an enlarged way 
of thinking, underlying our judgements. Within our practices of responsibility Altieri distinguishes 
between the perspective of the first person – the individual expressing the ‘I’ – the second person 
perspective – those significant others who hold the ‘I’ responsible for her expressions – and the 
third person perspective – the cultural grammar of the language community according to which re-
sponsibility expression and ascription takes place. Altieri now wants to save the idea of a first per-
son agency from the compelling appeal of the significant others (second person) and the coercive 
grammar of our language community (third person). In other words, he wonders what it is that 
enables the subject to counterweight the claims of others and to express herself in a way that co-
changes the rules of our vocabulary, albeit in a modest way. In order to understand this resistance, 
Altieri suggests that we should understand the individual on grounds of her desire to be someone, 
not any random person the others make of her, but to be a particular person, to be or to become ‘me’ 
in the eyes of others. The subject’s desire for recognition of the person she is or wants to be, struc-
tures her expressions of what she cares for and the audience she chooses. As I have written before, 
every expression of value solicits an understanding in agreement. In other words, we find ourselves 
constantly negotiating for a personal appreciation of nature with an audience imagined as a tribunal 
whose understanding, if not whose approval, is necessary for our experience of intrinsic value and 
meaning (Altieri, 1994; Blake, Smeyers, Smith & Standish, 2000, p. 136). 
 It should be noticed that an ‘expression’ or ‘articulation of value’ is not necessarily of a 
discursive kind – captured in a proposition of the kind ‘X is valuable to me’ – but must be under-
stood in more broad terms. We express what we care for in our daily behaviour and the rituals of 
our body: our love of nature can be read off our style of gardening and the level of my environ-
mental consciousness can be read off the way I handle kitchen waste or deal with water. By ex-
pressing the personal pleasure we find in nature we willingly or unwillingly present a picture of 
ourselves to others. For example, the person who cannot stop testifying of his tenderness for the 
horses in the meadow along the road – in words and action – displays himself as a lover of animals. 
Likewise, the person who tells exciting stories about severe hiking tours she made through desert 
hills will be recognised (and probably wants to be recognised) as a ‘tough adventurer’ who is able 
to cope with the uncontrollable forces of nature. Thus, expression of natural value and self-expres-
sion are in fact two sides of the same medal. Moreover, by means of such a double expression we 
simultaneously assume responsibility for our expression of natural value as well as our self-expres-
sion. By expressing our engagement with nature within a common language we make ourselves 
vulnerable to the reactive responses and claims of others – responses of praise, blame, mockery, 
approval, rejection or indifference – that appeal to us in a way that cannot leave our judgement 
completely unaffected. Suppose for instance that the conversation partners of ‘the adventurer’ get 
annoyed with his ‘tough stories’ and express their bore, then the adventurer will probably feel the 
need to respond to this reaction because it puts himself as a person and his engagement with wild 
nature into question. Our inclination to continuously evaluate our (intended) expressions through 
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the eyes of (actual and imagined) others does not necessarily prevent us from arriving at disagree-
ment with others. On the contrary, throughout my expressions I might want to confront others, I 
might want to try out alternative views or distinguish myself from them by taking a radically 
different stance. The critical point is that self-evaluation and evaluation of one’s commitments to 
natural value takes place in a dialogue with others that goes on in a dialogue with oneself: a dia-
logue intérieur.  
 To be more precise on this particular point, by expressing what we care for in nature and 
simultaneously expressing who we are, we render ourselves susceptible to the potential appeal of 
others to take responsibility for the things we say and do. Throughout this process we anticipate 
agreement or disagreement, praise or blame, depending on the kind of recognition that sustains our 
sense of who we are and what we stand for. It is against this background of dialogue that the urge 
for self-direction emerges. I start to realise who I am and what I want in dialogue with others who 
mirror my ‘self’ and alternative modes of being. Throughout this dialogue I want to have some 
control of the picture that others have of me. Moreover, I reflect on the ‘selves’ presented to me by 
others (second person) in terms of the strong evaluative vocabulary that is independent of my sub-
jective preferences (third person): the things that we hold beautiful, ugly, worthy, unworthy, good 
or bad within our sensus communis. These strong evaluations are not primarily about the things we 
desire but about the qualifications that render my desires worthy of desire. We would feel bad if we 
would not desire this or that. For instance, we would feel bad if we did not clean up our litter after a 
picnic in the moors. It is against this background that O’Neill argues for the use of ‘thick ethical 
concepts’ in the evaluation of our involvement with nature: concepts like ‘cruel’, ‘kind’, ‘just’ an 
‘unjust’ allow for a richer appraisal of non-human nature than the thin ethical concepts generally 
applied by environmental philosophers, such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘has value’ and 
‘lacks value’. According to O’Neill the main difference is that these thick concepts include descrip-
tive as well as evaluative claims. To say that the practices of industrial farming are ‘cruel’ is to 
describe practices that involve intentional infliction of animal suffering, while simultaneously 
recognising that the ‘cruelty’ of this practice cannot be adequately characterised without reference 
to particular kinds of human evaluative responses to the world (O’Neill, 2001, p. 173-174).  
 As Charles Taylor makes clear, such a strong evaluation is generally accompanied by self-
referring emotions like feelings of shame, guilt, dignity and pride. For Taylor too, a person is some-
one for whom particular questions have arisen concerning the good and whose provisional answers 
to these questions have a place in her self-understanding (Taylor, 1989). In line with this, we can 
conclude that the subject is able to offer resistance to the claims of others and the rules of meaning 
giving practices by virtue of her desire to express herself and the beauty she finds in nature in a way 
that meets the recognition of others. Or, to put it in different terms: underlying aesthetic judgement 
of nature is a striving after recognition in harmony with one’s feeling of what is pleasant (Altieri, 
1994; Smeyers, 1997). To recapitulate we can now state that the intrinsic value of nature should be 
understood as our expression of a transcendent experience that originates from our practical in-
volvement with nature from within our intersubjective practices. As such, I agree with Bonnett that 
an intrinsic concern for natural environments ought to be viewed less as a consequence of aesthetic 
judgement but rather as a condition of it (Bonnett, 2003, p. 672) 
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3.3 Towards an ethic of environmental responsibility 
 
As I have outlined in the introduction to this chapter, my concern is not primarily with the issue of 
intrinsic natural value as such, but with the underlying issue of environmental responsibility: how 
should we understand the responsibility we assume in our practical involvement with the natural 
environment? By expressing – in words and deeds – what we value in nature, we make ourselves 
susceptible to claims of environmental responsibility, as the analysis in the previous section has 
shown. However, the question is what kind of responsibility we are dealing with here, and what 
kind of ideal of responsibility is most appropriate in the light of the problems that threaten our 
natural environment. Dominant within educational as well as environmental policy is the notion of 
personal responsibility in terms of accountability: agents are assumed to be accountable for the 
things they say and do, measured against the publicly specifiable aims and standards they have sub-
scribed to and upon which they have rationally decided. Some authors in the field of educational 
philosophy and ethics refer to this notion as an expression of the modernist-enlightened ideal of ra-
tional autonomy; others speak of the neo-liberal account of ‘autonomous chooser’ or a legalist ac-
count of responsibility. Though there may be slight conceptual differences among these notions of 
responsibility, what they have in common is they presuppose there being an active subject that (1) 
chooses the things she cares for, (2) articulates these aims in publicly specifiable principles, aims or 
standards in a shared language (3) is prepared to justify her daily choices and actions in terms of 
these specified aims, (4) evaluates her own choices and actions in these terms – does my action 
contribute to the realisation of my aims in life? – and (5) thus in striving for self-direction in lif the 
things she says and does are informed by independent rational judgement rather than imposed by 
arbitrary circumstances or external powers. 
 
Environmental responsibility as rational autonomy; a general account 
This concept of responsibility is highly reminiscent of the Kantian glorification of the autonomous 
person: the person that owns the power of self-rule and self-legislation and therefore should have 
‘the courage to think for himself’. For Kant, a person acts autonomously when she is inclined to 
judge and act in accordance with a self-chosen law. For this law to be a moral law, it should be ac-
cepted on universally held, rational grounds. In line with the first formulation of the categorical im-
perative, one should be able to ensure that the maxim underlying one’s will could function simulta-
neously as a guideline for universal legislation. In line with the second categorical imperative, one 
is supposed to respect every human being as a person of intrinsic worth. That is, one should never 
treat other persons merely as means to an end, but always as ends in themselves (cf. Peters, 1998; 
Dearden, 1998). 
 It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the ideal of personal autonomy for the 
practice and theory of contemporary education. Education seems to appeal to the human striving for 
‘authorship’ or self-direction in life. In particular, liberal philosophers of education value education 
as a vehicle for the acquisition of knowledge, skills, virtues and attitudes required by this moral im-
perative. In contemporary educational jargon the ideal takes on various forms, ranging from ‘re-
flective autonomy’, ‘rational autonomy’ and ‘moral autonomy’ to ‘self’-related terms like ‘self-re-
gulation’, ‘self-determination’, ‘self-government’, ‘self-discipline’, ‘self-realisation’, ‘self-educa-
tion’, ‘self-improvement’, ‘self-control’, ‘self-restraint’, ‘self-examination’, ‘self-justification’, 
‘self-support’, ‘self activation’ and mental abilities such as ‘critical thinking’ and ‘open-minded-
ness’. This arbitrary list of autonomy-related aims and principles, indicates that liberal education 
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eventually aims at a certain way of life; a life of self-examination, inspired by Socrates’ adage that 
‘an unexamined life is not worth living’. Adult, autonomous people will make sure that the 
opinions, convictions, and judgements they develop are ‘their own’ and not the result of some kind 
of indoctrination, coercion, or irrational temptation. Children should be stimulated to become aware 
of the rules, conventions, powers, and habits that structure their lives and subject them to rational 
reflection and criticism. By doing this, it is argued children will gradually develop their own codes 
of conduct, their own personal styles of thinking, judging, and acting.  
 The ideal of personal autonomy appeals to the human striving for ownership or self-direc-
tion within a life. The autonomous person desires to be the author of his life story. His identity does 
not coincide with those of his family, political party, religious community, music scene or whatever 
– but transcends the plurality of social identities ascribed to him. He will make sure that the 
opinions, convictions and judgements he develops are his own, and not the result of some kind of 
indoctrination, coercion, irrational temptation or some indiscriminate adoption of customs and tra-
ditions which are mistakenly taken for granted. In a similar spirit Dearden wrote about autonomy as 
‘a new aim in education, which requires that what a person thinks and does in important areas of his 
life cannot be explained without reference to his own activity of mind’ (Dearden, 1998, p. 453). The 
ideal of personal autonomy is pursued, not merely because society requires adults to be 
independent, self-supporting and so on. Moreover, liberal education is inspired by the conviction 
that an autonomous life is in itself worthwhile.  
 In light of the major technical and economic developments of the previous century, and in 
tandem with processes of individualisation, secularisation and globalisation, the mainstream modern 
ideal of personal autonomy has gone through some fundamental transformations. Philosophers, 
historians, sociologists and writers of varying disciplines have analysed this evolution in similar 
terms. It is not my purpose to give an exhaustive analysis of its historical pretexts and explanatory 
schemes. Surely, that would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, I am interested in the 
general process of rationalisation, and its impact on the idea and practice of personal autonomy. 
Broadly speaking, late-modern western society is conceived of as the result of a process of 
rationalisation. According to Max Weber’s analysis of social action, in the course of modernity a 
traditional value-oriented rationality (Wertrationalität) loses ground in favour of a strategic or in-
strumental rationality (Zweckrationalität). With its emphasis on means-end reasoning, strategic ra-
tionality appeals to the human desire for coordination and control over both the physical and the 
social environment. It is, for instance, the guiding principle behind bureaucracy and the increasing 
division of labour. When speaking of ‘the iron cage’, Weber refers to the ubiquity and 
inescapability of this form of rationality. Furthermore, he convincingly argues that the rationalisa-
tion of social action leads to a ‘demystification of our worldview’: a loss of meaning. That is, we 
tend to value our worldly activities more and more in instrumental terms, rather than as worthwhile 
in themselves. Students, for instance, might flock to university in order to enhance their career 
prospects, rather than appreciating the intellectual challenge, or the social and political life on the 
campus (Ellwell 1999).  
 Beyond the loss of intrinsic meaning, this process of rationalisation leads to a loss of perso-
nal freedom, as Jürgen Habermas describes in his thesis of the ‘colonisation of the life-world’. The 
open, free and intrinsically meaningful communication, typical for the life-world, is being corrupted 
and suppressed by the strategic rationality of the system. In line with this analysis, though in quite 
different terms, Jean-Francois Lyotard reveals how the ‘end of the grand narratives’ paved the way 
for an uncompromising performativity: an obsessive stress on efficiency and effectiveness, in order 
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to optimise the performance of the system. Values like efficiency and effectiveness are often taken 
as instrumental qualities, employable for every possible purpose. Thus it would seem, the moral 
quality is in the hands of the engineer. However, as Lyotard shows, these qualities are anything but 
value-free. They are in the service of a performative system, a system which requires any type of 
meaning to be commensurable with any other meaning and thus subjecting the heterogeneity of lan-
guage to being subsumed under the regime of a general law, that is, to be reduced and homogenised 
to fit the logics of techno-economic performativity. As such, this system is hostile towards every 
meaning, or value that escapes its categories: ‘The application of this criterion to all of our games 
necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensu-
rable) or disappear’ (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv).  
 Of course, the analyses of Weber, Habermas and Lyotard do not converge. In fact, they di-
verge immensely. However, what their theses have in common is the acknowledgement of a hetero-
geneity of forms of rationality, one of which threatens to become normative in a hegemonic way: a 
strategic casu quo instrumental rationality as is standard in economic and rational choice theory. 
Within this type of rationality, the sole activity consists of looking for the most efficient means to 
given ends. Human activities are not valued in terms of intrinsic worth, but judged by reference to 
the balance between costs and benefits. For the most part, the ends and benefits are given with the 
quasi-neutral ‘needs’, that are prevalent within the existing economic and political structures and 
power relations.  
 In fact, this rationality can be seen as a radicalisation of the grounding metaphysics of the 
Enlightenment in which knowledge becomes a value in itself. Everything we experience is valued 
as the instance or reflection of a universal rationality. It is this appeal to universality that gives our 
experience the status of justified knowledge. Other forms of rationality or other sources of 
knowledge – such as our bodily experience of the world around us or our respect for particular 
others – are subsumed by this craving for universality. The presentday reflection on ‘universal laws’ 
takes on the form of an appeal to global principles that operate within a global market economy. 
The knowledge of our school curriculum, for instance, is judged more and more in light of the re-
quirements of the global knowledge economy. School knowledge ought to contribute to the yield 
maximisation of markets and the competitiveness of one’s own country, as documents on Education 
for Sustainable Development state36. 
 The emergence of instrumental rationality has not left our conception of personal autonomy 
untouched. Broadly speaking, in the course of modernity, a morally substantial conception of per-
sonal autonomy has given way to an impoverished one. Whereas autonomous acts and judgements 
used to be embedded within substantive moral frameworks – usually given with a particular tradi-
tion, ideology or religion, guided by universally held principles of consistency and respect for per-
sons – people at present seem to regard personal autonomy more and more as a matter of individual 
need satisfaction. Obviously, the so-called ‘end of the grand narratives’ has given rise to a host of 
individual lifestyles, extremely susceptible to the impulses of consumer society. The autonomous 
person is seen as a person promoting his own interests and satisfying his own needs. Whether or not 
these needs or interests should be regarded morally laudable or repugnant is out of question. So, the 
                                                      
36 Consider for instance the twelfth principle of the eighteen principles of sustainability as summarised in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), and rehearsed in the ESD Toolkit (2002): ‘Nations should 
cooperate to promote an open international economic system that will lead to economic growth and sustainable 
development in all countries. Environmental policies should not be used as an unjustifiable means of restricting 
international trade’ (McKeown, 2002, p. 9). 
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needs and preferences of the individual are a priori declared sovereign: something is good because I 
like it. And, apparently, I am not an autonomous person if I am not smart enough to get what I like. 
What is crucial here is that the needs and preferences themselves are not reflected upon, but taken 
for granted. Therefore, they even acquire a status of authenticity, as if they were the most natural 
expressions of personal needs. This is the false feeling of personal freedom, so sharply parodied by 
Lou Reed in his song I’m So Free:  
 
Yes I am Mother Nature's son 
and I'm the only one 
I do what I want 
and I want what I see 
It only happened to me 
I'm so free 
(Lou Reed – Transformer, 1972) 
 
The emergence of instrumental rationality has not merely influenced our stance towards nature, but 
is apparent in educational practice and theory as well. For instance, behind contemporary proposals 
for educational ‘reform’ in New Zealand, Jim Marshall found implicit notions of personal freedom 
and choice, which are clearly inspired by neo-liberal thought and technocratic rationality. Marshall 
refers to the underlying ideal of the educated person as the notion of ‘the autonomous chooser’: 
‘Students (…) are presumed to be persons not merely capable of deliberating upon alternatives, and 
choosing between alternative educational programs according to individual needs, interests, and the 
qualities of programs, but it is assumed that it is part of the very nature of being human to both 
make, and want to make, continuous consumer style choices’ (Marshall, 1995)37. This ‘personal 
freedom’ is not self-evident, but contains a particular kind of freedom, and therefore a particular 
subjection of the self as well. According to Marshall, freedom and subjection in terms of choice are 
to be regarded as a product of ‘busno-power’ (referring to Foucault’s notion of biopower): the em-
phasis on the activity of choosing rests on a behaviourist doctrine, adopted by new economic theo-
ries. These theories ‘see an autonomous chooser as perpetually responsive to the environment. In 
which case the autonomous chooser is capable of infinite manipulation by the structuring of the en-
vironment (…). The logical implication is that one's life becomes an enterprise – the enterprise of 
the autonomous chooser’ (Marshall, 1995)38.  
 A similar notion of the educated person is manifest in Dutch educational policy and reform. 
In general, there seems to be a shift from a substantive ideal of personal autonomy, in terms of self-
actualisation and moral self-determination (Langeveld, 1963), to notions of personal autonomy, in-
spired by a negative conception of freedom. In contrast with the traditional notion of autonomy, as 
constituted by a particular culture, political and moral community, these notions of autonomy seem 
to opt for an emancipation of the individual in the absence of any other person, moral framework or 
community. This person comes close to Musil’s ‘man without qualities’; a person without history 
and social context. The individual is thrown back upon her own primary preferences, tastes and 
needs. In short, to be an autonomous person is to calculate what is in one’s best interest and then to 
act accordingly. That is, finding the most advanced and efficient means for satisfying one’s needs 
                                                      
37 This quote is borrowed from the Philosophy of Education Yearbook (1995), published on-line at 
http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/pes-yearbook/95_docs/marshall.html 
38 Idem. 
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and preferences. In this perspective, values of social responsibility, environmental awareness, po-
litical participation or solidarity are only of minor or derivative importance (cf. Weijers, 2001).  
 It is not hard to see that, from an ecological perspective, there are many charges against this 
ideal of personal autonomy, some of which we have touched upon before. First, the ideal gives rise 
to an instrumental attitude towards nature. Within a framework of instrumental rationality, our 
natural environment can only be appreciated and protected insofar as it contributes to human 
interests. Animals, plants, landscapes and so on, are merely regarded as resources for human con-
sumption, production and exploitation, rather than being valued by virtue of their intrinsic qualities, 
i.e as sources of meaning, beauty, imagination, awe and wonder. Second, as a result of our inde-
pendent, instrumental worldview, we threaten to lose our fundamental sense of belonging to some-
thing larger than life, a sense of being connected to our natural habitat, in a way that makes us vul-
nerable, and dependent on the ecosystem of which we are integrally a part. According to many en-
vironmental philosophers our rational and autonomous lifestyle gives rise to an objectifying dis-
tance towards our natural environment, whereas the environmental crisis requires us to define our-
selves not in opposition to, but in continuity with the natural world that we share with other ani-
mals, plants and inorganic nature (Naess, 1989; Bai, 1998). Thus, ecological responsibility implies 
a close personal involvement, a sense of interconnectedness and ‘attunement’. 
 Third, the instrumental ideal of personal autonomy rests on the implicit assumption that 
there are essential human needs – independent of personal preference, or our location in time and 
place – that have to be satisfied in order to flourish. These needs are regarded as self-evident. 
Therefore, we do not need to scrutinise them. Consequently, in this view, it is possible to make a 
sharp distinction between natural and artificial needs. The first category of needs comprises the ba-
sic human needs, like the need for food, shelter, safety and so on. The latter needs are seen as not 
strictly necessary for human flourishing, but artificially created by society; fashions, trends, adver-
tising, popular culture in general and so on. Those are the luxury goods we can do without. From an 
environmental perspective such a distinction seems to be useful and attractive: it enables us to de-
termine – once and for all – the difference between human ‘need’ and ‘greed’. Although would I 
definitely agree with Gandhi, who reminded us that ‘the earth has enough for everyone's needs, but 
not for some people's greed’, this is neither a value free statement nor an empirical description of 
the earth’s’ bearing capacity, but a moral adage. Every statement about human needs involves a 
moral standard. For, to say that a human being needs food is to say that he will not measure up to an 
understood standard unless he gets food. In his paper on the nature of needs-statements Dearden 
concludes that every statement about needs is value-laden and culture-bound: ‘it is false to suppose 
that judgements of value can thus be escaped. Such judgements may be assumed without any 
awareness that assumptions are being made, but they are not escaped. The deceptively value-free 
concept of ‘need’ does more than foster the illusion of being purely empirical, however, for its use 
often leaves obscure just what the values are that are being assumed, even when the attention is 
turned to making these’ (Dearden 1998, p. 258; cf. Marshall 1995, Peters 1970, p. 32-36).  
 More specifically, the Belgian philosophers Burms and De Dijn argue that ‘the ideology of 
needs’ – based on the assumption of essential human needs – misconceives the very nature of hu-
man desire. According to their analysis, we only desire for X if, and insofar as X means something 
to us. Our objects of desire are not given beforehand, but they are created by means of imagination, 
identification, valuation against the background of the cultural conventions of the sensus communis. 
For instance, unlike (most) animals, who feed themselves – immediately dictated by instincts of 
survival – human beings cultivate their eating rituals. This is not to deny the biological necessity of 
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food for human survival, but to say that this necessity can never be fully separated from the 
meaning of our needs. We do not merely desire objects because of their utility or ‘consumability’, 
we long for appreciation, recognition and prestige as well. Empirical research has shown that, in 
time of crisis, people are inclined to cut back on so-called necessary goods, rather than save on 
luxury articles. Furthermore, since these needs are only meaningful to us within a given horizon of 
significance, the recognition of needs is culturally and historically situated; they change from time 
to time, and vary from place to place, even from person to person. Consequently, Burms and De 
Dijn argue that it is indeed impossible to distinguish between ‘need’ and ‘greed’ in a definite way 
like the neo-liberal ideal of autonomy seems to imply. (Burms & De Dijn, 1995).  
 The main problem with this talk of needs in empirical terms is that it tends to mask the ideo-
logical standards underlying our current patterns of consumption and production. For, there is no 
such thing as ‘a minimal level of welfare’, according to which the ‘basic needs’ of human beings all 
over the world will be met. Seemingly neutral and universal concepts like ‘basis needs’ and ‘human 
flourishing’ are to a large extend determined by the local, cultural and economic conditions of life. 
For instance, it is plausible to state that, in times of material prosperity, we are inclined to label a 
great many more goods as being necessary, than in times of crisis. Likewise, people in Third World 
countries will have a completely different view on what comprises necessity and luxury. A clear-cut 
indication for this statement can be found in the huge differences between the consumption levels in 
different parts of the world. In 1995, the high-income countries, home to 20 per cent of the world 
population, accounted for about 60 per cent of commercial energy use (UNSTAT 1997). Within the 
context of this paper, what is crucial, is that the neo-liberal or instrumental ideal of personal 
autonomy implies an uncritical acceptance of currently felt needs. This a priori justification of 
needs precludes a critical scrutiny of the ideological structures, interests and incentives that renders 
those needs significance. For instance, according to the ‘health experts’ who occupy our mass me-
dia, the cosmetic industry and the social health standard in general, the need for physical hygiene 
requires us to shower at least once, but even more appropriately, twice a day, while most of our 
parents and grandparents managed to maintain healthy lives with one shower or bath a week. It 
might not be inconceivable for us contemporaries to be incapable of surviving such a physical 
health regime anymore, sincethe high level of our hygiene standards has made us extremely sus-
ceptible to certain bacteria and other risks to which our grandparents were largely insensitive. I do 
not want to discuss this issue in detail but restrict myself to noting that something that is presented 
as a universal biological need is in fact a time- and place-specific social construction. On a local as 
well as a global level, this ‘translation’ of needs often serves political purposes. For example, the 
needs of traditional farmers in third world countries are often framed in terms of intensive expan-
sion – maximising the productivity of agricultural land by increasing the scale of production, inten-
sive artificial fertilisation and the use of genetically manipulated seeds – by international institu-
tions and fund organisations, in contrast to the ideas of the farmers themselves, who want to pre-
serve the good elements of their own traditional farming practices.  
 Just like environmental philosophers attack the hegemony of economic and technocratic 
rationality in current society, many philosophers of education argue against the pervasive spirit of 
instrumental rationality and performativity in contemporary education (cf. Blake, Smeyers, Smith & 
Standish, 1998; Peters & Marshall, 1996; Taylor, 1992 and more). Some criticism, however, too 
easily identifies the traditional-liberal conception of personal autonomy with the neo-liberal con-
ception. The development sketched previously, reveals that, though the neo-liberal conception of 
autonomy can be seen as a recent ‘outgrowth’ of liberal theory, it should be understood as concep-
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tually distinguishable from the traditional-liberal ideal of personal autonomy. The main differences 
can now be summarised as follows. First, the neo-liberal conception of autonomy implies an a 
priori acceptance of personal needs. Those needs, tastes or preferences are themselves no object of 
reflection or critical scrutiny. In fact, they are taken as a natural or neutral starting point for the ex-
ercise of personal autonomy. Liberal philosophy of education, on the contrary, is well aware of the 
fact that every acknowledgement of personal needs reflects a value position. Moreover, the liberal 
ideal of autonomy requires those needs to be subjected to critical scrutiny (Dearden 1998, p. 258; 
Peters 1970, p. 32-36; cf. Marshall 1995).  
 Second, neo-liberalism and rational choice theory see the individual as completely separable 
from its community, environment and history. The individual is thrown upon its own private 
preferences, tastes and needs. How she came to value those preferences, how she developed her 
tastes or required her needs, is not an issue within neo-liberalism. Most traditional liberals, on the 
other hand, have given account of the fact that the subjects’ moral values are constituted by the tra-
ditions and conventions of one’s culture and community (this is not to say that individuality can be 
reduced to social determinations) (cf. Peters, 1998). Moreover, over the last twenty years, liberal 
philosophers have been forced to respond to the criticism of communitarians. In response to their 
charges of atomism and individualism, most contemporary liberal philosophers have given credence 
to the idea that individual morality is embedded or within a social and cultural context. 
 
Environmental responsibility as rational autonomy; a closer conceptual look 
Although it is of crucial importance to distinguish between liberal and neo-liberal understanding of 
rational autonomy, these two are nevertheless intrinsically related to one another. The difference 
between the liberal and neo-liberal concept of autonomy is only a difference of degree. Due to a 
common ideological and conceptual history, they seem to be related by means of family-resem-
blance; the emphasis on social independence, the embeddedness of autonomy in a universally 
founded rationality, the instrumentally charged vocabulary in terms of individuals, continuously 
choosing between alternatives, defining their life plan, and pursuing their ends by finding the most 
adequate means. Whereas the traditional-liberal conception of autonomy did not necessarily lead to 
a neo-liberal version, it has contributed to such an impoverished conception of autonomy. This hap-
pened under the influence of long-term social changes: the emergence of a technological society, 
the march of the free market, processes of secularisation, individualisation and so on. The liberal 
ideal of autonomy has proved to be particularly susceptible to determinations and manipulations of 
an economic nature. In this context Marshall speaks of ‘the insertion of the economic into the so-
cial’ and shows how the individual threatens to become a defenseless ‘plaything’ of the free market:  
 
The logical implication is that one's life becomes an enterprise – the enterprise of the autonomous 
chooser. But it is not the self of classical liberal theory where the right to formulate one's own pur-
poses and projects was seen as inviolate. It is not just that the insertion of the economic into the so-
cial structures the choices of the individual, but that, in a behaviouristic fashion, it manipulates the 
individual by penetrating the very notion of the self, structuring the individual's choices, and 
thereby, in so far as one's life is just the individual economic enterprise, the lives of individuals. 
Needs, interests and growth then become contaminated as both needs and interests become consti-
tuted by the insertion of the economic into the social. One's autonomy is penetrated by these eco-
nomic individualistic needs and interests, setting growth patterns towards, for example, freedom 
from and choice. If the older liberal version of autonomy had some historical justifications, it is 
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clear that these "new" autonomous choosers have different needs and interests and that their auton-
omy is problematic (Marshall 1995)39.  
 
If this analysis is correct, that is, if these two conceptions of autonomy are indeed historically and 
intrinsically related, then the ecological and educational charges against the neo-liberal ideal of 
autonomy, at least partly apply to the liberal ideal of autonomy as well.  
 Although contemporary philosophy (of education) captures a wide variety of conceptualisa-
tions of this ideal, on further examination, every concept of autonomy turns out to be comprised of 
two related, though distinct ideals. That is, to be called an autonomous person is to meet at least two 
necessary conditions: first, there is the condition of authenticity. The condition of authenticity re-
quires that my desires, beliefs, ideas, and choices are actually ‘mine’ and not enforced, indoctri-
nated, seduced, or coerced by some other person or external conditions. This is the condition of 
‘ownership’. Second, there is the condition of reflection, demanding of the autonomous person that 
she subject her desires, beliefs, ideas and choices to rational reflection. Furthermore, she must be 
willing to act in accordance with her reflective judgement.  
 Traditional liberal philosophers, like R.S. Peters (1973) and Dearden (1972), tend to focus 
primarily on the reflective conditions of autonomy. However, when it comes down to the condition 
of authenticity, they veil themselves in rather vague terms. Peters and Dearden do recognise which 
kinds of identifications are ruled out by the condition of authenticity – those involving indoctrina-
tion, violence, seduction and so on – but are not very clear about what authenticity implies. 
However, in his paper Freedom and the Development of the Free Man (1973), Peters does formu-
late two conditions of authenticity:  
 
Firstly, the individual has to be sensitive to considerations which are to act as principles to back 
rules – e.g., to the suffering of others. Secondly, he has to be able, by reasoning, to view such con-
siderations as reasons for doing some things rather than others. How individuals develop the re-
quired sensitivity is largely a matter of speculation. Obviously, identification with others who al-
ready possess it is an operative factor; perhaps, too, a degree of first-hand experience is also neces-
sary – e.g., not shielding young people but encouraging them to take part in practical tasks where 
there is suffering to be relieved (Peters 1998, p. 23). 
 
Peters does recognise that children have to develop ‘a sensitivity to considerations which are to act 
as principles to back rules’. The question remains how children develop this sensitivity, how they 
come to identify certain goods as intrinsically worthwhile. Perhaps, there is more to be said about 
this development than Peter’s ‘speculation’ allows us for. If we define authenticity as ‘self-identifi-
cation by means of identifying those intrinsic goods, which make our life worthwhile’ (as suggested 
before) then it is possible to distinguish between two kinds of authenticity or self-identification. Ac-
cording to the illuminating edifying analysis of Stefaan Cuypers, firstly, there is the traditional 
liberal conception in which the process of identification is described in terms of choice: we choose 
the things that really matter to us. Secondly, there is an alternative conception in which identifica-
tion is described in terms of care, similar to Socrates’ ‘care of the soul’: we somehow find ourselves 
in the things we care about.  
                                                      
39 This quote is borrowed from the Philosophy of Education Yearbook (1995), published on-line at 
http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/pes-yearbook/95_docs/marshall.html 
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 Underlying the traditional-liberal conception of authenticity is a hierarchical model of the 
moral person’s volitional structure. According to Stefaan Cuypers this model is adequately repre-
sented by Dworkin and Frankfurt. Crucial to their understanding of the moral person is the notion of 
a reflexive will, understood as a reflexive structure of beliefs, desires and other volitions. Frankfurt 
argues that this structure consists of a particular hierarchy between volitions of a first and second 
order: ‘Persons typically not only have desires of the first order, X desires that p, but also desires of 
the second order, X desires or doesn’t desire that X desires p’ (Cuypers, 1992, p. 6). A standard il-
lustration of this is provided by the person who wants to give up smoking. Most likely, she will still 
long for a cigarette, but at the same time, she does not want to long for a cigarette anymore. For, she 
does not wish to be tormented by her own compulsive desire casu quo addiction. Obviously, this 
latter desire is of a second order, whereas the yearning for a cigarette is of a first order. Having 
recognised the difference in moral status, she should be willing to subject her desires of a first order 
to the desires of a second order. If there is conformity between first and second order desires, then a 
person can be said to have acted autonomously. Such an appeal to conformity is often done by en-
vironmental spokesmen and educators: we should be willing to make our ‘shallow desires’ – our 
desire for a long morning shower, for cheep meat and vegetables, or for frequent holidays by air – 
subordinate to our desire for a sustainable future. Thus, assuming environmental responsibility is 
presented as an ability of self-discipline or self-restraint that allows us to resist the temptations of 
consumer culture.  
 In Cuypers’ view such an hierarchical model of personal autonomy is problematic for two 
main reasons. In the first place, the exercise of this kind of autonomy leads to a regressus ad infi-
nitum, because it is never clear whether or not there is a desire of an even higher order to pursue 
(Cuypers, 1992, p. 8). How can the environmentalist consumer, for instance, be sure about the 
higher order status of the principle of sustainability? It is not inconceivable that this particular kind 
of environmental awareness is being manipulated by governmental campaigns and commercial lob-
bies, thereby distracting our attention from the prevailing economic and social structures underlying 
the environmental crisis. And how can the smoker be sure about the higher order status of his desire 
to stop smoking? It is not inconceivable that this wish is being enforced by the aggressive anti-
smoking lobby of the media or the social environment. This gives rise to the question, whether there 
is, or should be a third order desire, for example, a desire not to give in to social pressure. As long 
as it remains unclear how we should determine the status of desires, we are forced to appeal to an 
even higher order of volitions. As a consequence, the perspective of an infinite amount of higher 
orders opens up. Frankfurt himself acknowledged this difficulty as well. In order to put a stop to the 
infinite regress, he appeals to the notion of decision or decisive commitment. To decide in this 
sense, is to promise to oneself: this intrinsic choice is no longer susceptible to external considera-
tions. Consequently, Frankfurt seems to come close to the existentialist doctrine of personal iden-
tity, which postulates that a person is the one he chooses to be: ‘the person, in making a decision by 
which he identifies a desire, constitutes himself’ (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 170). So, the ultimate self-
identification is conceived of as a conscious act of choice; an active and intentional appropriation. 
As the criticism on existentialism makes clear, such a constitutive act of choosing is hard if not im-
possible to conceive of or conceptualise. 
 However, apart from these conceptual intricacies, I agree with Cuypers that there is a more 
fundamental problem tied to this view of self-identification that reveals itself in its counter-intuitive 
implications; the notion of self-identification in terms of choice goes against our fundamental intui-
tions and our aesthetic experience of nature as outlined in the previous section. We experience our 
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identifications and commitments, not merely as things we actively and intentionally seek, but, to a 
certain extent, as something that befalls us and in we find ourselves: instead of choosing our object 
of identifications, it chooses us. We experience something like ‘a call’. The hierarchical model of 
self-identification obviously neglects this dimension of passivity and non-intentionality. It would be 
an illusion to think that ones motives and intentions can be completely transparent to oneself in 
such a way that we are able to control them. Motivational life has its own dynamics. Therefore, 
there are limits to the identities we can ‘choose’. About these limits, Cuypers writes the following:  
 
Moreover, deep identifications seem to elude the conscious image a person has of himself. One can 
very well decide to become a certain kind of character, and yet, notwithstanding one’s act of will, 
still remain the same sort of character one has always been. A decision to identify oneself only 
creates an intention to make some desire more truly one’s own. If another internal but conflicting 
desire turns out to be predominant, then one’s decision was not whole-hearted. However, this failure 
of wholeheartedness does not indicate of necessity a lack of will-power or sincerity, since the ‘heart’ 
of a person may be located in something that is beyond his conscious and intentional control 
(Cuypers, 1992, p. 9). 
 
These objections give rise to a different view on the nature of self-identification. Surprisingly, an 
alternative conception is given by Frankfurt as well (which has, unfortunately, received less atten-
tion). Contrary to the previous notion of self-identification in active terms of deciding, Frankfurt 
explores an alternative account in terms of ‘caring about something’. Crucial to this alternative no-
tion is the insight that, in our daily actions and judgements, we are guided by persons, communities, 
ideals, projects, stories, paintings, natural spots…, we did not choose, but which we found to be an 
object of our devotion. We do not choose our objects of care, but we find ourselves caring about an 
object of intrinsic worth. This process is mainly passive in nature; our identifications escape the 
conscious intentions we express for having them. Identification in terms of caring is primarily con-
cerned with desires of a first order. In contrast with the reflective distance, required by the activity 
of choosing, in this view, identifications spring from a close involvement and contact with the 
things we care about. Metaphorically speaking, this is an experience of being engrossed in some-
thing larger than oneself. One experiences the influence of a strange kind of necessity, a necessity 
which is not under one’s voluntary control: ‘He (the moral person – DWP) feels that he cannot help 
caring so much about this or that as he does. He feels that he cannot bring himself to will otherwise 
than he does’ (Cuypers 1992, p. 10). Frankfurt refers to this compelling appeal as a ‘volitional ne-
cessity’. This is not like the compulsive desires of an addict. On the contrary, the notion of a ‘voli-
tional necessity’ indicates a desire, the moral person is unwilling to resist. In fact, he finds this de-
sire to be constitutive of his identity. The necessity, Frankfurt speaks of, does not feel like the intru-
sion of an ‘alien force’, but, on the contrary, as the liberating discovery of something familiar, a part 
of oneself: ‘When they (persons in general – DWP) let themselves be guided in a selfless way by 
objects which escape their control, they make themselves susceptible to authentic personal libera-
tion. Paradoxically, one has to lose oneself in order to find one’s true self’ (Cuypers, 1992, p. 11). 
 It is important to notice that this contrast between self-identification in terms of choice and 
self-identification in terms of care is presented here as an ideal-typical opposition of concepts. This 
means that the extreme ends of this opposition do not directly correlate with opposite practices or 
ideals in everyday life. In practice, the passive and active dimensions of identifications do not 
necessarily conflict. Often, they perfectly coexist and cooperate within one and the same person. To 
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be more precise about the relationship between the active and passive dimensions of personal 
responsibility and self-identification, Cuypers argues that the voluntaristic conception of responsi-
bility as choosing asymmetrically depends upon the non-voluntaristic conception of responsibility 
as caring (as restricted by volitional necessity)40 (Cuypers, 2000, p. 247/248). That is to say that 
choosing something in an authentic sense is not opposed to the volitional necessity experienced in 
our caring for something but instead requires it: ‘What prevents identifications through decision-
making from being self-deceptive, akratic and powerless is that they are restricted and informed by 
identifications through caring. Those non-voluntaristic identifications make voluntaristic identifica-
tions wholehearted’ (Cuypers, 2000, p. 248). Herewith, Cuypers underlines Frankfurt’s conclusion 
that: ‘Unless a person makes choices within restrictions from which he cannot escape by merely 
choosing to do so, the notion of self-direction, of autonomy, cannot find a grip’ (Frankfurt, 1999, p. 
177-178; also cited by Cuypers). Cuypers’ and Frankfurt’s argument on this particular point is 
similar to the argument of Charles Taylor in favour of a horizon of significance, independent of per-
sonal choice or preference: 
 
It may be important that my life be chosen, as John Stuart Mill asserts in On Liberty, but unless 
some options are more significant than others, the very idea of self-choice falls into triviality and 
hence incoherence. Self-choice as ideal only makes sense only because some issues are more signifi-
cant than others (...). So the ideal of self-choice supposes that there are other issues of significance 
beyond self-choice (...). The agent seeking significance in life, trying to define him- or herself 
meaningfully, has to exist in a horizon of important questions. That is what is self-defeating in modes 
of contemporary culture that concentrate on self-fulfilment in opposition to the demands of society, 
or nature, which shut out history and the bonds of solidarity (...). I can define my identity only 
against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands 
of solidarity, everything but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what 
matters. Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fel-
low human beings, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God or something else of this order 
matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity is not the enemy 
of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands (Taylor, 1992, p. 39-41). 
 
Autonomous choice can only be meaningful and constitutive for our self-understanding if we expe-
rience the particular range of options as worthy our deliberation. Thus, free choice is only possible 
by virtue of its limited focus; we choose variable options against a background of established truths. 
We cannot weigh the alternative options presented to us and simultaneously question the back-
ground truths that lend these options weight and significance. Thus, the autonomous chooser always 
stands on the shoulders of unchosen or heteronymously given standards. Within certain limits stu-
dents are free to choose their subjects and the course their education will take, but this choice dis-
tracts attention from the fact that they are not able to choose, for example, which teacher they from 
which they would like to learn or the classmates with whom they would like to learn. In itself, these 
latter issues are not likely to be less important to the student nor are they of less importance to the 
activity of learning. To argue that the promise of freedom inherent to the activity of choosing sub-
jects is limited, is not to say that these other issues should be the subject of choice as well. Rather, it 
is to argue that the idea of freedom of choice is necessarily limited and does not amount to what 
                                                      
40 Cuypers speaks of concepts of autonomy in stead of concepts of responsibility. 
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education is about. Accordingly, Cuypers argues that: ‘Too much opportunity and too many alter-
natives to choose from corrode a person’s self-confidence, paralyse his capacity for decision-mak-
ing and make him indifferent to what to opt for and choose in the end. Furthermore, if the bounda-
ries of a person’s will were themselves among the range of his options to choose from or to decide 
upon, then this would lose all “substance”’ (Cuypers, 2000, p. 249). 
 The notion of a volitional necessity obviously points at the limits of our free or reflexive 
will. A heavy emphasis on rational reflection, like the traditional ideal of personal autonomy im-
plies, can eventually lead to inauthenticity or self-deception, as Richard Smith argues: ‘It will not 
do to say that people are autonomous to the extent that they give reasons for their actions: as noted 
above, rationalisations have the same structure as good reasons and can be distinguished from them 
only by our empirical sense of what is and what is not an evasion, a subterfuge, a piece of self-de-
ception’ (Smith, 1998b, p. 129). Furthermore, Smith argues that the idea that critical reflection takes 
us to a level of autonomous evaluation is particularly shaky when the tools of such reflection have 
manifestly been fixed. Imagine for instance – this is my example – the modern high school student 
that is free to choose whatever subject he likes, but whose choice is carefully regulated and chan-
nelled in ‘desired’ directions by the suggestive option menu and choice technology. In the Nether-
lands, for instance, it would not cross a student’s minds to drop the subject of mathematics, even if 
her performance and motivation were extremely low. Without mathematics students would simply 
cut off most learning routes from that point on. Nevertheless, if weak students experience major 
problems and ask for professional assistance, the response of their teacher might be of the kind: 
‘Well, maybe you should not have chosen mathematics’. Thus, students are made co-responsible for 
the ‘free’ choices that were enforced by the system. Our school system (re)produces a particularly 
limited kind of freedom that allows students to see themselves as ‘autonomous choosers’ in a way 
that enhances the performativity of the system at large: school effectivity, output optimisation, sta-
tus enhancement and yield maximisation. The self-as-a-reflecting-chooser has become subject to 
ideological manipulation. In this light, Smith suggests that we had better trust our first-order desires 
‘which in their inarticulateness maintain some defense against external violation and manipulation 
(Smith, 1998b).  
 If we give too much weight to rational arguments in the process of moral consideration, we 
might easily become detached from the things we really care about, and consequently, alienated 
from our ‘authentic selves’. In line with this insight, David Cooper argues that there is a stance 
people often take towards beliefs that are of great importance to them, which could not be regarded 
as an ‘autonomous’ stance in the sense being discussed, because it is precisely the refusal to give up 
a belief despite the judgement that the evidence or reasons go against it: 
 
A person will not always be tempted to surrender a religious conviction by his judgement that, of the 
arguments he has encountered, those which militate against this belief are the stronger. Now it 
seems to me that we do not do right to try to shake him out of this conviction. To do so successfully 
could induce a feeling of self-betrayal, of being bullied by people cleverer than himself, a lack of 
confidence in his right to ‘stick to his guns’, even a loss of dignity and sense of individuality. It could 
be argued that, in a sense, rationality is on the side of someone who does remain with his conviction. 
He may argue, after all, that views which go against the weight of evidence at a given time often turn 
out to be right; or that, had he listened to other people or read different books, his judgement about 
the weight of evidence would have been very different; or that the reasons which go against his be-
lief count as good ones only from a certain perspective, which may be a matter of fashion even if he 
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himself is unable to form a credible alternative. In short, he may offer reasons, meta-reasons, for 
why the reasons which go against his conviction should not clinch matters for him. But this is far 
from agreeing with Peters’s and Dearden’s emphasis on basing beliefs upon reasons. The fact that it 
is through reason that a case is made against settling all beliefs through reasons alone does not alter 
the fact that the case is made (Cooper 1998, p. 51/52)41. 
 
If we understand self-identification as a subjective act of choosing, then our valuation of nature ap-
pears as an act of projection and appropriation. Natural entities are valuable insofar as they fit the 
reflective criteria and categories that enable us to choose them as ‘useful’, ‘valuable’ or ‘worth-
while’. Within this form of identification all values are in a sense instrumental because they are the 
product of a rational evaluation of things according to standards that are external to them. The lis-
tening attitude inherent to our recognition of intrinsic value contrasts strongly with the imperative of 
active choice that is at the heart of the liberal ideal of personal autonomy. Even more, our solicitude 
runs the risk of being corrupted and suppressed by this striving for appropriation of value. In order 
to safeguard our ‘authenticity’ the ideal of personal autonomy requires us to control all ‘external 
influences’ by means of rational reflection. Paradoxically, we thereby seem to seclude ourselves 
from the very sources of authentic identification, which include, the silence, beauty, and inspiration 
we find in our natural environment. One could say that we must lose ourselves in nature in order to 
find its intrinsic value.  
 Now it is clear that Kantian liberal theory mainly neglects this passive and non-intentional 
nature of (self-) identification, it is not hard to see how this ideal might contribute to an instrumen-
talisation of our identification of natural value. Liberal theory urges us to subject our intuitive rela-
tionship with nature to rational reflection. Thus, the ideal of personal autonomy requires us to dis-
tance ourselves from our natural environment, whereas an authentic identification of nature’s intrin-
sic value – at least partly – requires us to be receptive to the transcendent reality and value that 
thrust itself upon us. I want to argue that, more than our reflective abilities; we need a kind of re-
ceptivity in order to distinguish our authentic commitments from those that are imposed on us in an 
inauthentic way. By placing too much emphasis on personal autonomy in terms of rational reflec-
tion and choice, liberal education leaves little room for a transcendent call to be heard. In contrast to 
the ideal of personal autonomy the educational ideals of care and authenticity imply that sometimes 
we should give up our striving for autonomy, and lose ourselves to that which speaks to us. Under-
standing identification and responsibility in terms of care seems to do more justice to the object of 
identification, to the value inherent or intrinsic to the aesthetic experience of nature. In the next sec-
tion, I will explore how we should conceive of the ‘caring subject’ and how this subject can be 
more receptive to the value embodied in natural experience itself. 
 
Environmental responsibility as care 
The previous analysis of the liberal ideal of responsibility as rational autonomy shows that this no-
tion is not primarily false or inadequate but shallow; the ideal fails to acknowledge that in the end 
any choice on what to value in nature rests on a primordial belief and care for the Umwelt that pre-
cedes rational evaluation and choice. Without the recognition of this underlying involvement as a 
                                                      
41 In fact, Cooper elaborates on the Wittgensteinian insight – expressed in the previous chapter – that reason comes after 
the belief and that a change of belief is not a matter of rational persuasion alone. Moreover, a change of belief requires 
openness to ‘see things differently’ (as commissioned by the dawning of an aspect). 
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caring person, the ideal of rational autonomy gives way to an ultimately formal and anthropocentric 
notion of environmental responsibility. Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous chapter, this 
formal understanding of responsibility in terms of accountability for the consequences of our ac-
tions in the future does not reach far enough in time since the condition of reciprocity (in the narrow 
sense as mutuality) does not hold in the relationship between generations. For these reasons, we 
have to come up with a more substantial and sustainable understanding of environmental responsi-
bility that would amount to our existential involvement with our natural environment. 
 In the search for a fruitful framework to explore our relationship with nature more closely in 
terms of the underlying caring involvement, we touch upon Nel Noddings’ theory of care as 
outlined in Caring. A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (1984). In my view, we 
should take our cue from this theory for two main reasons. In the first place, Noddings’ phenome-
nological characterisation of the caring relation leaves much room for an aesthetic experience of 
value by virtue of the fact that the subject of our care – the cared-for – is not presented as an objec-
tifiable or otherwise controllable entity that we relate to as an optional other, but as something or 
someone whose presence addresses us as a whole person and commands our attention in an invo-
luntary way. This understanding of the other’s appeal is similar to Frankfurt’s understanding of a 
volitional necessity inherent in our caring for something. According to Noddings it is the caring at-
titude that lies at the heart of all ethical behaviour. As such, Noddings expresses her existential be-
lief that people do not primarily flourish in their pursuit of independence or self-control but realise 
themselves within caring relationships. It is in our dependence on those we care for, that our self 
emerges in an authentic way. Accordingly, I hope to convince the reader that in our involvement 
with nature we experience an appeal that makes us realise who we are and what we desire for in 
life.  
 In the second place, the ideas of Noddings are fruitful because of her distinction between 
natural and ethical caring; from the everyday life experience of caring for someone she derives an 
ethical ideal of caring that has a power of expression and validity beyond the natural caring 
experience, intimately tied to the present and the particular. Notice ought to be taken of the fact that 
the predicate ‘natural’ is tricky here and might cause misunderstandings because of its connotations 
with an essentialist understanding of human nature, independent of time and place. Such an under-
standing would obviously go against the intuitions of particularity and otherness that are so funda-
mental to the experience of caring (which will be our next topic of discussion). Noddings claim is of 
a more empirical kind; the adjective ‘natural’ expresses her anthropological assumption that the de-
sire to care and the desire to be cared for are inextricably tied to our situated experience of what it 
means to be human. Though Noddings is more specific in her analysis of the caring relation, her 
intuition is similar to Heidegger’s notion of care as the human mode of being in the world (Dasein), 
‘covering an attitude of solicitousness towards other living beings, a concern to do things meticu-
lously, the deepest existential longings, fleeting moments of concern, and all the burdens and woes 
that belong to human life. From his perspective we are immersed in care; it is the ultimate reality of 
life’ (Noddings, 1998, p. 40). According to Noddings, the fundamental double desire to care and be 
cared for originates, not from an innate essence or a natural destiny, but from a shared human con-
dition: our infancy in which we all experience what it means to be physically nursed and cared for. 
It is within this shared experience of being cared for that we develop fundamental caring intuitions 
and sentiments towards particular others.  
 In situations in which we immediately answer our intuitions and subsequently respond to the 
needs of the other that elicits a caring sentiment within us, we are caring in a natural way. Suppose, 
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for instance, that I find on my garden path a young robin that fell out of his nest. We would 
probably, make the effort to place the vulnerable bird back into his nest and unite him with his 
mother without deliberation, even without seeing this as a moral act. We just do it. That means, we 
immediately and intuitively respond to that which happens to us without an appeal to a moral prin-
ciple or ideal. Such an appeal would be redundant or idle since our intuitions do the job. Our desire 
to care coincides with a potential duty to care. Evidently, in situations like this most of us can rely 
on reactive attitudes that are part of our ‘nature’. There is an ‘I must’ in play here, though not an 
ethical one, but a necessity in the existential sense in which we respond to a crying baby: ‘When we 
see the other’s reality as a possibility for us, we must act to eliminate the intolerable, to reduce the 
pain, to fill the need, to actualise the dream. When I am in this sort of relationship with another, 
when the other’s reality becomes a possibility for me, I care’ (Noddings, 1984, p. 14).  
 Apart from these natural caring situations, we will experience situations in which we do not 
desire to care for the needful other but still think we have to respond to the needs of the other. Sup-
pose for instance that it is not a lovely little robin but a young crow that I find on my garden path. 
Suppose furthermore that I have a low estimation of crows in general, and for crows in my backyard 
even less, since they chase away the lovely little robins and titmouses and eat the bird food I hang 
out in the trees for the little birds. At this point, my caring attitude is not at all evident, but perhaps, 
my moral intuitions do require me to care for this particular bird. Noddings argues therefore, in 
situations like this one, we appeal to ourselves as caring persons. On the strength of my past caring 
experiences – my care for the robins and titmouses – I know myself as a caring person, or more 
particularly, as someone who cares for helpless birds. And it is because I am attached to this self-
understanding that I am able to call upon this image of myself as a caring person, casu quo, lover of 
animals and act in accordance with the sense of duty – the ethical I-must – that arises from this un-
derstanding. This appeal to myself as a caring person will be incited and coloured by personal re-
membrances of caring experiences in my past that were fulfilling in their tenderness and intimacy. 
Ergo, it is my ideal self that commands me to care for others if my natural caring responses fall 
short. Thus, we sometimes experience the influence of a moral imperative that involuntarily forces 
itself upon us, in situations in which we would not be ‘naturally’ inclined to care. Our experience of 
the internal ‘I-must’ is not decided upon, nor does it follow from a transcendental duty to care, but it 
arises from an evolving ethical self, shaped in congruence with one’s remembrance of caring and 
being cared-for (Noddings, 1984, 1998; Noddings & Slote, 2002). Evidently, we can leave the im-
perative we experience in such situations unanswered or simply ignore them. Moreover, we can 
deny or actively resist the imperative, but this would somehow diminish our ideal and, conse-
quently, violate our ideal self. It is in this light that Jan Bransen speaks of the ‘best alternative of 
oneself’. If we care for a dog or a cat we do not primarily identify ourselves with the needs or 
interests of this particular pet, but we identify ourselves as persons that care for animals (Bransen, 
1996; Noddings, 1984, p. 80).  
 If we want to succeed in extrapolating Noddings ethical ideal of caring to our relationship 
with the natural environment, then we should be able to locate the source of environmental caring 
within (1) our intuitive desire to care for nature, to respond to its appeals, and (2) our desire to see 
ourselves as persons who care for nature, which implies an affirmation of (1). However, the former 
elaboration on the intersubjective nature of aesthetic experience gives cause to an amendment: (1) 
and (2) should be completed with a third-person desire, because an ethical ideal or ideal self can 
only be maintained if it is sustained by social values, images, ideals and expectations concerning 
care in our society (as manifest with regard to the so-called myth of motherhood): (3) the desire to 
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be recognised as a person who cares for nature by others, not merely by those who appeal to my 
caring – the cared-fors – but third persons as well.  
 At face value, such an extrapolation of Nodding’s ethical ideal of caring in the context of 
environmental responsibility appears to be promising. However, as soon as we enter into the sig-
nificant details of Noddings’ theory, we find ourselves confronted with fundamental problems, 
mainly due to the fact that the ethics of care were modelled according to the interhuman caring re-
lation. The particular kind of personal reciprocity that Noddings assumes to be essential in a caring 
relation is absent in the relationship with our natural environment, or so it seems. And it is this kind 
of reciprocity that Noddings assumes to be conditional for such a relation to flourish : my desire to 
care must be received and answered by the cared-for in order to sustain my identity as the one-
caring and the subsequent ideal of caring. But if this picture is correct, what is the exact nature of 
the required reciprocity? Apparently, there is mutual dependency between the one-caring and the 
cared-for, but this interdependence is of a different kind than the contractual reciprocity as 
mutuality in Rawls’ theory of justice. The caring dependency is not grounded in the mutual threat 
they pose to one another’s resources, but an existential dependency: the one needs the other – and 
vice versa – to be oneself. The one-caring can hardly resist or ignore the appeal of the cared-for. 
One has to respond to the other’s needs to maintain one’s self-understanding as a caring person. The 
same goes for the other party: the cared-for can only act and speak for herself in her relation with 
the one-caring. The uniqueness of both persons appears within the intimacy and engagement of the 
caring relation. Thus, being human means being-in-relation. 
 Noddings characterises the kind of reciprocity peculiar to the caring relation in more detail 
by defining the involvement of both parties in terms of their personal dispositions. About the one-
caring, Noddings writes in terms of engrossment: a full, that is open and non-selective receptivity to 
the cared-for. In such a receptive state of consciousness we are seized by the need of the other, or as 
Simone Weil writes: ‘The soul empties itself of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the 
being it is looking, just as he is, in all his truth’ (cited from Noddings, 1998, p. 40). More particu-
larly, Noddings described the one-caring as marked by motivational displacement and empathy: 
‘the sense that our motive energy is flowing towards others and their projects. I receive what the 
other coveys, and I want to respond in a way that furthers the other’s purpose or project’ (Noddings, 
1998, p. 41). The good of the other is my good. However, Noddings underlines that engrossment 
and motivational displacement do not tell us what to do; they merely characterise our consciousness 
when we care.  
 The other party in the caring relation, the cared-for, is in a sense subjected to the care but 
she is not completely passive. She enhances the vitality of the relation by responding to the care of 
the one-caring, albeit in a minimal sense. Noddings typifies this reactive responsiveness in terms of 
reception, recognition en response: ‘The cared-for receives the caring and shows that it has been 
received. This recognition now becomes part of what the carer receives in his or her engrossment, 
and the caring is completed’ (Noddings, 1998, p. 41). Even if this response is little – as in the coos, 
wriggles, smiles and cuddles of an infant – the contribution of the one cared-for is not negligible. 
On the contrary, without this contribution the caring relation cannot survive. These responses make 
care-giving a fulfilling experience. Consider for instance how desperate parents are when their in-
fants do not respond ‘normally’ to their care. Or imagine how desperate a teacher would be if he 
does not experience any response from her pupils. Thus, the feedback I receive from the cared-for 
is essential to sustain my identity as the one-caring and the subsequent imperative to act in the spirit 
of my evolving ethical self. 
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 The former description of caring might elicit a dualistic picture of the caring relationship in 
which the positions of the one-caring and the cared-for are more or less fixed. This suggestion is 
false, or merely holds in exclusively asymmetrical relationships like that of a mother and a baby, 
but mature relationships are generally characterised by mutual care: ‘They are made up of strings of 
encounters in which the parties exchange places; both members are carers and cared-fors as oppor-
tunities arise’ (Noddings, 1998, p. 41). 
 In her chapter on our care for animals, plants, things and ideas, Noddings acknowledges the 
possibility of a genuine reciprocity between human and non-human beings that allows us to speak 
of a caring relationship. This reciprocity is not merely operative in our sentimental involvement 
with pets or cuddly animals, but even an industrial farmer may experience every now and then an 
appeal to care for his animals, emanating from the sensual contact with his cattle. So, even in rela-
tions with animals, which appear to be purely functional of nature, an acquaintanceship can emerge 
within which some degree of mutual understanding is possible and a caring appeal is likely to 
emerge. However, caring relations with animals largely remain a matter of one-way communica-
tion. Humans care for animals, but apart from the popular stories of ‘wild children’ that were nur-
tured by wolfs (Kaspar Hauser or Romus and Remulus) and the fictional adventures of ‘gifted’ 
animals like Lassie, we have no real indications that a similar caring relation in the reverse direction 
is possible. Our present form of life and common sense do not allow us to recognise animals as 
ones-caring in the full sense the way humans do. Ergo, the inherent reciprocity remains asymmetri-
cal. This asymmetry is not a natural fact or a claim of human exclusiveness. It is indeed possible 
that our growing sensitivity to animal welfare at present develops in a direction that does allow us 
to entertain more or less equal caring relations with animals in the future. Perhaps, the relationship 
of a blind person with its dog comes near to what I envisage, but here, this is a matter of specula-
tion.  
 Beyond any doubt or speculation is the fact that animals can be sincere cared-fors, in the 
sense that they respond to our caring in a way that helps to sustain ourselves as ones-caring. Cats 
for instance start to purr, nibble, lift their heads and stretch towards the one they are addressing, 
whereas dogs wag their tails and respond in another species specific manner. As we get familiar 
with one particular animal family, we come to recognise its characteristic forms of response and 
address. Subsequently, we will, perhaps unconsciously, anticipate these animal responses. We start 
to act in a way that evokes a familiar response of an animal. Thus, our interactions get richer and 
more complex in such a way, that action repertoires, patterns and rituals are likely to emerge in our 
common practices. As a consequence, we will gradually feel more sustained as ones-caring and 
more sensitive to the appealing I-must that originates from this recognition. Perhaps this is why pa-
rents entrust a pet to their children, so that they learn to care.  
 The question is now whether an ethical ideal of caring can be sustained by such a relation-
ship between humans and animals. In order to test the generalisability of our care for animals, Nod-
dings wonders whether the person that cares for her own cats with all her heart and soul should feel 
committed to care for the rancid stray cat, appearing at her front door as well. In the end, Noddings 
answers this question affirmatively; once I engage in intimate interactions with cats, I will grow 
sensitive to their typically feline appeal when it comes to my caring for them. This sensitivity is of 
such a nature and intensity that it becomes part of my ideal self: I like to see myself as person that 
cares for cats. This ideal enables me to care for cats in situations in which my encounter with a cat 
does not elicit a ‘natural’ caring response within me. In the absence of such an intuitive inclination 
to care my appeal to the ethical imperative does the job. Consequently, an ethical I-must will 
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emerge from every encounter with a cat that appears at my front door. In this way, my caring sensi-
tivity might naturally extend to even wider circles of animal life. However, my neighbour or any 
other person who lacks this caring sensitivity to the needs of cats will not experience such an appeal 
and we therefore cannot blame them if they neglect the needs of our street cats. Furthermore, my 
care will remain limited to cats, and perhaps some other similar animal families in my immediate 
neighbourhood, but I will never feel addressed as a one-caring by rats or bugs. In this light, 
Noddings concludes:  
 
What we see clearly here is how completely our ethical caring depends upon both our past experi-
ence in natural caring and our conscious choice. We have made pets or cats. In doing so, we have 
established the possibility of appreciative and reciprocal relation. If we feel that the cat has certain 
rights, it is because we have conferred those rights by establishing the relation. When we take a 
creature into our home, name it, feed it, lay affectionate hand upon it, we establish a relation that 
induces expectations. We will be addressed, and not only by this particular creature but also by 
others of its kind. It seems obvious that we might live ethically in the world without ever establishing 
a relation with any animal, but once we have done so, our population of cared-fors is extended. Our 
ethical domain is complicated and enriched, and to behave uncaringly towards one of its members 
diminishes it and diminishes us. If we establish an affectionate relation, we are going to feel the ‘I 
must’, and then to be honest we must respond to it (Noddings, 1984, p. 157).  
  
Apart from this exclusive subclass of cases in which individuals have once established a caring re-
lation with particular animals, a general extension of Noddings’ ethics of care towards our involve-
ment with non-human nature fails because of a lack of reciprocity between the parties. It is perhaps 
needless to recall that we failed to justify an ethic of intergenerational responsibility for precisely 
the same reasons: ‘our obligation to summon the caring attitude is limited by the possibility of re-
ciprocity. We are not obliged to act as one-caring if there is no possibility of completion in the 
other’ (Noddings, 1984, p. 149). According to my reconstruction of Noddings’ presuppositions, the 
main problem is not that we do not feel connected to our natural environment. Nor is it impossible 
to develop a reciprocal relationship with animals, from which a moral appeal emanates. Noddings 
even insisted on a generalisation of such an appeal to all ‘others of its kind’. After all, once we have 
become receptive to the needs of a particular family of animals, an I-must will emanate from every 
encounter with a strange animal of its kind that appeals to my care. However, the fundamental point 
is that no one is committed to enter into an initial relationship with this or that animal in the first 
place. The start of such a relation rests on accidentally originating familiarity in past experience or 
arbitrary choice.  
 That we do not feel an a priori obligation to engage into interaction with cats or dogs is 
probably due to the anthropological fact that there is no existential need or necessity to do so. We 
are not, by our very ‘nature’ or condition as interrelated human beings, in the same relation to ani-
mal life as we are in relation to human beings. The primordial relatedness or intersubjectivity Nod-
dings speaks of, is a human relatedness and intersubjectivity. Again, this is not to say that animals 
are not subjects, but that ‘we do not have a sense of an animal-as-subject as we do of a human being 
as subject’ (Noddings, 1984, p. 149). This statement leaves open the possibility that animals repre-
sent a subjectivity or a way of being-in-the-world, an openness to the world that is not completely 
open to us (yet). This is why Wittgenstein remarks that ‘if a lion could speak, we would not be able 
to understand him – would not really be able to follow him into his world’ (Wittgenstein, p. 223). 
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We need other humans in our neighbourhood to mirror our existence. We need their company to be 
recognised as a person. Their lives and responses reflect our desires, ideals and fears. However, our 
reactive attitudes towards animals are of a completely different – less exclusive – kind, thus Nod-
dings seems to imply. Perhaps it is because we do not engage in the same practices, and subse-
quently only partly share a common predicament (cf. Burms, 2000). In sum, whereas human rela-
tions are premised by an ontological necessity that is universally given with human life on this 
planet as such, our relation with animals is of a less exclusive contingent nature, because ‘we might 
live ethically in the world without ever establishing a relation with any animal’. Thus, we are by our 
very nature social beings, though we are not necessarily animal lovers. It is against this existential 
background that we can decide whether or not to engage in a relationship with animals, while we 
are-in-relation with fellow human beings from the very moment we are thrown into this world.  
 Elsewhere, Noddings marks the difference between our care for humans and animals as a 
contrast between a categorical versus a hypothetical imperative. Noddings obviously refers to her 
conclusion that our care for other humans is premised by an existential necessity, while our care for 
animals is contingent upon past experience and personal choice: ‘I must if I wish (are am able to) 
move into relation (Noddings, 1984, p. 86). While this contrast itself is illuminating, I fear that 
these terms bring with them Kantian connotations of universalisability and consistency that are at 
odds with Noddings’ambitions. For this reason I choose to speak of a general imperative and ideal, 
rather than a categorical one. As Noddings continues to discuss our relationships to plants, things 
and ideas, she observes a shading-off from the ethical into the sensitive and aesthetic. Here we are 
left with personal sentiments, attachments and aesthetic pleasures that are free of obligations. My 
engrossment in these ‘things’ might engender an I-must, but not in an ethical sense, since our care is 
not received and answered in a way that sustains my ideal self as one-caring. The self-forgetful 
pleasure we sometimes find in nature cannot underpin a reciprocal caring relation, thus Noddings. 
In her view, most if not all of our care for nature is derivative of our care for other persons or is 
otherwise dependent on interpersonal relations. We care for our garden so that we feel at home in 
our natural environment. We care for our land, because we eat its fruits to satisfy our basic needs. 
Perhaps we care for our landscape as well because it is through this land that we feel connected with 
one another (heimat). Nevertheless, if there is an internal I-must in connection with our garden or 
land then it is a mere instrumental must, premised by our needs and wants: we have to care, thus we 
can eat and drink and sleep and live our lives.  
 In my view, it is the assumption of a merely contingent reciprocity within our involvement 
with the natural environment that constitutes the problem here. Moreover, I think this assumption is 
also false to our intuitions. Perhaps, my relation to trees in general and oaks in particular are of a 
contingent nature. I can indeed live ethically in a world without oaks or stray cats, but when I am 
addressed as a person that cares for nature, or an appeal is made to my ecological spirit, then our 
responsibility is called upon for the involvement with our natural environment as a whole. Emerson 
wrote: ‘The whole of nature addresses itself to the whole of man. We are reassured’ (cited from: 
Bonnett, 2003, p.). A sense of environmental responsibility does not originate from our interaction 
with this particular tree, plant or animal, but from the realisation of the particular space we occupy 
in our natural world and the threads that tie us to this world. Moreover, we look for an answer to the 
question who we are, at least partly in terms of where we are: the earthly space we occupy (cf. 
O’Loughlin, 2002). In a sense, the natural environment is ‘a mirror’ in which we see, feel, smell, 
hear and recognise ourselves. We never speak about nature without at the same time speaking about 
ourselves. With this in mind, I suggest that we search for sources of environmental care in our 
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bodily involvement with the natural environment. After all, it is through our bodily existence and 
sensual interaction with the things that surround us, that we are connected with the natural life-
world, just like it is through language that we are connected with other humans. As such, 
intercorporeality and intersubjectivity are anthropological facts of life in an equally necessary and 
similar double way: as gift and task. Like our relation to other humans, our relation to nature is not 
merely given, but in our involvement with nature we experience an inherent appeal to relate to 
nature in such a way that it speaks to us. This will become clear as we discuss the fascinating ideas 
of Merleau-Ponty about the body subject and her world. 
 
Merleau-Ponty on reciprocity as reversibility of perceiving and being perceived 
In our perception and bodily involvement with the things that appear in our world we experience a 
carrying reciprocity: I move towards the thing as much as the things move towards me. In this 
section I want to study the ethical nature and implications of this reciprocity more closely in 
dialogue with the ideas of the French existentialist philosopher and phenomenologist of the body 
and embodied perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In his opus magnum, the Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945) he reveals in great detail how we maintain an intimate relation with the life-
world through our corporal being in the world or ‘being towards the world’ (être au monde). This 
world is not an objective world, stretching out in front of us as an objective reality, but a world that 
is inhabited and sensually experienced by us. It is through our bodily and sensual existence that we 
are familiar with the world around us; that we are in the world and intentionally engaged in its 
affairs. Thus, Merleau-Ponty strives to transcend Cartesian dualism in which the body is valued as 
an instrument that the human mind employs in order to get a view on the world, to move and act – 
in order to get along in the world. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty shows that we have a body only by 
being our body. That is why he chooses to speak of the body as a subject (corps-sùjet) that is 
marked by a pre-reflexive consciousness instead of the body as an object of which we ourselves 
dispose. Rather than an instrument, our fleshly body is a mode of being, through which we partake 
of the flesh of the world. 
 That subjective as well as objective dimensions of being flow together in our sensual 
experience of the world manifests itself in the ambiguity of our everyday use of the words 
‘experience’ and ‘perception’. Sometimes we speak of experience when we are touched by 
something external, when we experience that something from outside it pervades us. In other 
situations, on the contrary, we use the words experience and perception to indicate a particular 
activity or state of ourselves; we refer to perception as if it were a net that we throw out and pull 
over the world. In his meticulous descriptions and analyses of sensual experiences, Merleau-Ponty 
shows that these two experiences represent two sides of the same process. Any perceptive 
experience is my experience in which my being is actively involved, but simultaneously, all 
perceptive experiences are experiences of something. Perceptive experience can therefore never be 
fully understood in terms of passive reception – as classical empiricism wants us to believe – but 
neither can it be reduced to active human construction – as classical rationalism assumes42. 
 Although empiricism and rationalism are diametrically opposed to each other in this respect, 
Merleau-Ponty accuses both positions for thinking from ‘the prejudice of the objective world’; the 
perceiving subject and the perceptible world are not connected but positioned over and against each 
                                                      
42 Merleau-Ponty primarily aims at a particular kind of empiricism, called sensualism. The term ‘rationalism’ is taken to 
refer to the dogmatic rationalism à la Descartes, though Merleau-Ponty criticises the rationalist elements in Kant’s 
transcendental project as well.  
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other. There is an airtight division between them. As a consequence of this dominant experience of 
reality as an independent, objective world – material for manipulation and control – we have lost 
the kind of intimate contact with the life-world that is immediately and intrinsically meaningful to 
us, even before we our thinking and judging splits this experience in two: the experience of an 
inside and an outside quality. Following the phenomenological adage of Husserl’s to return to the 
things themselves (Zurück zu den Sachen selbst), Merleau-Ponty wants to retrieve the nature of our 
primordial life-world that precedes knowledge: a pre-reflexive world that cannot be fully known by 
an independent observer but is embodied and inhabited by it. In fact, Merleau-Ponty points at a 
primordial relation of meaning that we entertain with the perceptible world, similar to Kants’ 
understanding of aesthetic perception as an attentiveness to the experience of things in their full 
presence, unmediated by evaluative categories and concepts. But whereas Kant persists in speaking 
of a ‘subject’ perceiving an ‘object’, Merleau-Ponty only speaks in terms of their underlying 
relation. This relation reflects a pre-given unity between man and world that is not self-chosen and 
can therefore not be cancelled or cut off by an individual observer. Any promise of such a 
separation from our world – cultivated by the ideals of self-control, self-management, 
manipulability and rational choice – so pervasive in contemporary educational and environmental 
discourse – might operate as a dangerous illusion since it carries within itself an alienation of our 
natural life-world that sustains our being. Thus, the phenomenology of perception should not 
merely be read as a meta-ethical criticism of objectivism and subjectivism, but as a form of social 
criticism as well. 
 Merleau-Ponty locates the conditions of possibility of human knowledge, reflection, 
meaning and inspiration within our sensual and bodily mode of existence. Our body thinks, speaks 
and experiences meaning. It is because the things in our life-world have a similar corporal mode of 
existence, that man and world are mutually sensitive to one another. This constitutive 
intercorporeality, as Merleau-Ponty labels the fleshly interconnection between perceiver and 
perceived, is most evident in our tactile sense of touch. In touch, we cover the world with our flesh 
and return to flesh in order to feel things as real and meaningful. My hand is part of me as much as 
it is part of the world that it palpates and interrogates. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty wonders how 
it happens that I give to my hands, in the act of palpating something – say the bark of a tree – in 
particular, that degree of, rate, and direction of movement that enable me to feel the textures of the 
sleek and the rough? How is it possible that our bodily senses anticipate a particular sensation that 
they intentionally reach out into the world? The empiricist would presumably answer that the 
sensations received by my fingers, together with the sensual stimuli that my visual faculty add to 
this, form a perceptive representation of the bark, ready to be decoded and transformed into motor 
impulses by my consciousness. This explanation seems to make sense. After all, the empiricist 
makes clear how sensual stimuli in general lead to certain motor responses. However, the precise 
connection between perception and movement is turned into a black box by this type of explanation. 
The empiricist cannot explain why this particular bark attracts my attention while others do not 
concern me at all. Neither can he make understandable why this particular impression motivates 
action, while other possibilities of action remain unrealised. The human mind as conceived by 
emipircism is ultimately empty. It stands indifferently towards the perceived and therefore cannot 
know what to look for. Why is my forefinger in search of this awkward little knot, of which it 
instinctively and involuntarily explores the outline? Why does my palpating hand change its 
direction as soon as it touches the soft moss on the bark? In short, what determines the direction of 
my perceptive attention and movement? 
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 The rationalist would probably answer that it are not the external stimuli that determine our 
action, but our mind that grasps aprioristic ideas of all possible forms we find in nature. These 
mental representations of pure forms accompany all our perceptions. My finger is able to discover a 
geometric circle in the outline of this knot by virtue of the fact that my mind is already disposed to 
its intelligible form. According to the rationalist, it is in the dynamic interplay between the 
transcendental forms of my consciousness and the perceived reality that the direction of my touch is 
being determined. But obviously, my mind is in charge; my mind employs my tactile senses to 
explore the properties of this bark by ranging them under general concepts of smoothness, form, 
temperature, moisture and so on. Apart from more particular problems tied to this position, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that rationalism also fails to explain the intentional direction of my 
perceptive attention. Why do my fingers seek particular qualities in the world? Why should this 
particular knot among all the other irregularities on the bark draw my attention while my mind 
already knows its form? Here, the problem is opposite to that of the empiricist; the human mind is 
not empty but too rich. My mind already knows what it is looking for. Therefore, it is unclear why 
it commands my finger to touch the bark. To find what we expect to find? The intrinsic necessity to 
touch is absent. If my perceptive engagement were indeed to consist of being on the lookout for the 
intelligible structure of reality, why would I then my focus on the contingent, why would I pay 
attention for this particular bark with this awkward oval outline? (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 71). 
 Merleau-Ponty concludes that empiricism and rationalism fail to understand the contingent 
direction of perceptive attention because they ignore the intentionality of our body. The searching 
movement of my finger is not the logical outcome of reflection or the effect of stimulus-activation. 
Moreover, the exercise of my finger is the immediate answer of my body to the situation in which it 
finds itself:  
 
In the action of the hand which is raised toward an object is contained a reference to the object, not 
as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing toward which we project ourselves, near 
which we are, in anticipation, and which we haunt. Consciousness is being toward the thing through 
the intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when 
it has incorporated it into its “world”, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to 
allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation. 
Motility, then, is not, as it were, a handmaid of consciousness, transporting the body to that point in 
space of which we have formed a representation beforehand. In order that we may be able to move 
our body towards an object, the object must first exist for it, our body must not belong to the realm 
of the “in-itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 138-139; emphasis is mine). 
 
Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think’ but of ‘I can’. We are already 
interpretative beings on a corporal level on which we are not yet self-reflexive and reflexive 
towards the world in which we are immersed: ‘Bodies are “lived experience”. Bodies have 
understandings of the world which are independent of any sort of cognitive map; these 
understandings are like a set of invisible but intelligent threads which stream out between the body 
and that world with which the body is familiar’ (O’Loughlin, 1995, p. 3). This lived world or lived 
space can never be articulated in terms objective time-spatial coordinates. I experience the bark of 
the tree as ‘beautiful’, ‘tasteful’ or ‘creepy’ before I am able to call the bark ‘brown’, ‘cold’ or 
‘smooth’. Furthermore, we perceive gestalts or wholes before we analyse these wholes by means of 
subsumption under general categories.  
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 We can only feel, see and hear things insofar as we are engrossed by these things. Of course, 
we can take an objectifying distance to the things, but the created objective world we create by 
doing this is secondary against the primary life-world in which we are bodily situated. In short, 
perception is a pre-reflexive act of the body; a body I can hardly call my body since I share this 
fleshly embodiment with other fleshly beings and the tangible world that is flesh. It is this 
intercorporeality that makes it possible for us to experience the tangible bark without the mediation 
of perceptive representation or cognitive reflection. My body was familiar with the bark, knew the 
bark, before I had conscious knowledge of it. 
 In his last, unfinished book, Le Visible et l’Invisible (1964) Merleau-Ponty examines the 
dynamic relationship and acquaintanceship between perceiver and perceived more closely. Again, 
he illustrates the nature of this kinship by means of the sense of touch. In the first place, he affirms 
the idea of intercorporeality by stressing that my hand can feel the bark because they are both of the 
flesh. Were perceiver and perceived to have a different mode of being-in-the-world, then they 
would not be able to touch one another. They would not exist in the face of the other, since they 
partake of completely different worlds. As such, he who touches must not himself be foreign to the 
world he touches. My body must also be inscribed in the order of being that it discloses to us. I can 
see because my body is part of the visible world. Accordingly, hearing is a possibility since my 
body is audible and sonorous. Thus, my body is sensitive to the perceptible world by virtue of the 
fact that my body itself is perceptible. Nevertheless, the body interposed is not itself a thing, an 
interstitial matter, a connective tissue between me and the material world, but sensible for itself. It 
is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty labels the human body as a sentant sensible – a sensible 
sentient; my body is only sensitive to the world insofar as it is sensitive to itself. Our body raises 
itself as exemplary reality. It is along the lines of bodily self-experience that our perception extends 
from our body into the world around us. Thus, our world is being made tangible, visible and audible 
analogous to our body. In this contact with itself and the world our body transcends its activity. Our 
body extends beyond itself towards the things in our world, it runs ahead of things and is 
intentionally engaged with the affairs in the world43. The possibility of interpretation and meaning 
are given with this particular way of being-in-the-world44. In the light of this self-transcending 
activity and corporal being Hans Jonas speaks of a certain ‘openness’ and ‘care’ for the world. In a 
sense, the human being is the measure of all things, not by legislation of human reason, but through 
its own corporeality. Our contact with reality is not primarily realised by means of cognition and 
thinking, but through concrete human life that offers resistance to reality and within this experience 
of personal strength a sense of power and causality in his world develops (Jonas, 1984).  
 The human body is so important to Merleau-Ponty, because it is the site where the 
perceptible world turns back upon itself and reveals itself. By means of a reflecting activity the 
perceptible body comes to perceive itself. Thus, the human body is the initial site where a sense of 
vision emerges out of the visible, where a sense of touch emerges out of the tangible, where a sense 
of hearing emerges out of the audible, where a sense of smell emerges out of the olfactory world. 
Moreover, reciprocity of mutual reflection between perceiver and perceived constitutes the very 
possibility of perception, thus Merleau-Ponty argues: 
 
                                                      
 
44 In fact, ‘être-au-monde’, as Merleau-Ponty writes, should be translated as ‘being-towards-the-world’ but within 
ordinary language as well as phenomenological English ‘being-in-the-world’ is more commonly used. 
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There is vision, touch, when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the 
visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by 
them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible 
in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact – as upon two 
mirrors facing one another where two indefinite series of images set in one another arise which 
belong really neither of the two surfaces, since each is only the rejoinder of the other, and which 
therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them. Thus since the seer is caught up in 
what he sees, it is still himself he sees: there is a fundamental narcissism of all vision. And thus, for 
the same reason, the vision he exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many 
painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally passivity- which is the 
second and more profound sense of the narcissism: not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the 
contour of a body one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to emigrate 
into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so that the seer and the visible 
reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen. It is this Visibility, 
this generality of the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to Myself that we have previously called 
flesh, and one knows there is no name in traditional philosophy to designate it (Merleau-Ponty, 
1997, p. 139). 
 
Thus, the human body is the site where a perceiver is born out of the perceived and where an inner 
space is likely to emerge along with the possibility of meaning and interpretation of an outer space. 
In fact, it is no longer sensible to speak about the perceiver and the perceived, the inner and outer 
space, the seer and the visible as two separate entities, since they are inextricably intertwined in 
such a way that they need the reflection of the other to exist: the seer needs the visible to see itself 
and the visible glances at the seer to be seen. If we nevertheless choose to hold on to a 
‘methodological dualism’ – which Merleau-Ponty in fact does by continuing to speak of a seer as 
distinguished from a visible – then the intertwining between the two can best be characterised in 
terms of a constitutive reversibility i.e. a reversibility of the visible in the seer and the seer in the 
visible, of the touching in the tangible, of the hearer in the audible and so on. Again, our sense of 
touch offers the most powerful illustration of such a kind of reversibility. In my hand the touching 
and tangible meet each other, and because of this encounter, the feeling of the bark is alternately 
concealed, now in the touching hand, and then in the tangible bark. Thus, I sometimes concentrate 
on the grip of my hands on the bark, while at another time I concentrate on the delicate way in 
which the irregular surface of the bark brushes my fingers and invites my hand to move in a 
particular direction. Analogously, we experience this reversibility in our hearing. My sonorous body 
resonates in every sound I hear. This is most evident when I hear my own voice. I can hear my 
voice from the inside – through the vibration and acoustics of my body, or I can attune to the sound 
of my voice as it resonates and turns back to me through the outer space. Finally, in our vision as 
well such a kind of reversibility is operative: I can ‘palpate’ with my look the surface of the bark 
and explore the seemingly random course of its grooves, but as my look moves along, it easily 
disappears or loses itself in a particular groove when this captivates me and pulls my look inside. A 
strange look captivates us, in the way an artist can sometimes feel trapped or looked at by the 
landscape he is painting. Thus, intense perception can lead my attention away from myself and hide 
in the things as if it wants to glance back at me from beyond. This is the kind of self-forgetful 
pleasure we sometimes experience in the sheer thereness of nature, as Iris Murdock expressed 
earlier (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 139).  
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 In many cases it is hard to tell whether a look is my look, your look, our look or a 
completely strange look that captivates one. For this reason Merleau-Ponty speaks of a general 
Visibility or a general Sensibility as an anonymity that is innate to myself as well as the world: it is 
the Flesh of the world that makes this reversibility possible. However, there can be no complete 
reversibility between me and the world, as Merleau-Ponty illustrates with the example of the left 
hand touching the right hand. If my left hand can touch my right hand while it palpates the tangible 
world, can touch it by touching, can turn its palpation back upon it, the movements of my right hand 
either resorts to the order of the tangible – but then its grip on the world is interrupted, or it keeps its 
grip on the world, but then I do not touch my real hand, only its outward surface (Merleau-Ponty, 
1997, p. 141; cf. Bakker, 1969, p. 45). Obviously, our sensual experience oscillates in between the 
two poles of inward and outward experience, without ever reaching the extreme ends. Even if I am 
completely engrossed by the tangible world, my hands will feel themselves – albeit in a minimal 
sense – in order to experience what it feels as my feeling. Perception can never be fully ascribed to 
the perceiver, or to the perceived. Accordingly, I can try to ignore my ‘inner voice’ and concentrate 
on my ‘outer voice’, but I will never be able to hear my voice in a similar way as others hear my 
voice or as I hear the voices of others. Complete transcendence is not given to the human body. 
There will always be a tension between the sensible and the sentient body, a tension that cannot be 
resolved in complete reversibility (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 139, 141). 
 Just like a visual look alternately hides in the visible and the seer, so the visible can hide in 
the palpable and vice versa. Due to this reversibility, our senses cooperate within one and the same 
body. But even more important within the context of education is Merleau-Ponty’s insight into the 
reversibility between my look, your look and the looks of others. My look continuously hides in the 
looks of others as well as the looks of others can hide in mine. Ergo, the assumed intercorporeality 
amounts to other seers and thereby includes the primordial intersubjectivity mentioned earlier. If my 
friend and I enjoy the beauty of a landscape and talk about this or share this experience silently, I do 
not continuously wonder whether we perceive the same landscape, but act from the certainty of a 
shared experience. I do not consciously put myself in the place of the other or take the perspective 
of the other as that of an alter ego. Rather, it is through the similar functioning of our bodies and 
our coexistence within a human form of life that there is common field of vision that unites us as 
seers with the landscape. It is within this common field of vision that I can see myself. Seeing and 
being seen – by the landscape as well as by other seers – reciprocate and go together hand in hand. 
Here, Merleau-Ponty points at the ‘chiasm’: my receptivity to the others and my receptivity to the 
landscape mutually include each other and form one horizon or field of vision. Again, Merleau-
Ponty alludes to a general visibility that takes possession of us: ‘At the joints of the opaque body 
and the opaque world there is a ray of generality and of light’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 142, 146; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 422-423; idem, pp. 508-509).  
 Finally, of special interest is Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of language, since it connects the 
intersubjective- expressivist understanding of language (as previously articulated in dialogue with 
the insights of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Taylor) with the existentialist phenomenology of the 
body. Merleau-Ponty reveals the body as a locus of meaning as well as a locus of expression. The 
same body that gives meaning by dwelling in the flesh of the world, is the same body that expresses 
within itself what it reaches out for: meaning. My hand, reaching out for something, becomes a 
gesture, pointing others to the things that occupy me. Likewise, my cry of relief becomes a word, 
listened to by others as an expression of relief. Thus understood, my palpating body coincides with 
the expressive body. This means that my expression is not a translation of meaning but rather its 
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very realisation through my bodily searching. Merleau-Ponty underlines that meaning cannot exist 
within a private language: ‘A thought that would be satisfied to exist in and of itself, without the 
obstacles of words or communication, would, once it had arisen, immediately recede back into the 
unconscious, in other words it could not even exist for itself’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 206). 
 Naming something does not come after the recognition of the thing but constitutes its 
recognition: the word itself is the founder and bearer of meaning, rather than a mere vehicle. 
Through bodily expressions such as words and gestures we are nearby the things in the world. 
However, the meaning of a gesture does not occupy the gesture as a physiological quality. Like-
wise, the meaning of a word does not inhabit the word like the sound of the word does. Expressions 
transcend their physical existence by extending beyond themselves towards the world. As such, 
words and gestures create an intersubjective horizon of meaning within which we share a common 
world. Similar to Heidegger’s notion of the poetic word, drawn out of silence, Merleau-Ponty calls 
for attention to the creative power of language: 
 
As soon as man uses language to establish a living relation with himself or with his fellows, lan-
guage is no longer an instrument, no longer a means; it is a manifestation, a revelation of intimate 
being and of the psychic link which unites us to the world and our fellow men (...). It might be said, 
restating a celebrated distinction, that languages or constituted systems of vocabulary and syntax, 
empirically existing ‘means of expression, are both the repository and the residue of acts of speech, 
in which unformulated significance not only finds the means of being conveyed outwardly, but 
moreover acquires existence for itself, and is genuinely created as significance. Or again, one might 
draw a distinction between a speaking word and a spoken word. The former is the one in which the 
significant intention is at the stage of coming into being (...). Speech is the surplus of our existence 
over natural being. But the act of expression constitutes a linguistic world and a cultural world, and 
allows that to fall back into being which was striving to outstrip it. Hence the spoken word, which 
enjoys available significances as one might enjoy a required fortune. From these gains other acts of 
authentic expression – the writer’s, the artist’s or philosopher’s – are made possible. This ever-
recreated opening in the plenitude of being is what conditions the child’s first use of speech and the 
language of the writer, as it does the construction of the word and that of concepts (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 196-197). 
 
Speaking of subjects and objects ends here, because this speaking veils the primordial reality in 
which they are united. Only in their intentional engagement with the world, can human beings every 
now and then raise their heads above the things around them. Only in such temporary situations, can 
subjects and objects be said to stand in opposition to each other. However, even then they are both 
rooted in the same reality: the flesh of the world. Therefore, this ‘intentional dualisation’ should be 
seen as emanating from an original belonging and togetherness: ‘j’en suis’. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Many parallels can be drawn between Noddings’ phenomenology of care and Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenology of perception. Apart from the most evident parallels – the primacy of the life-world, 
the primordial status of human relatedness, the questioning of the autonomous subject – I would 
like to point to the fact that both phenomenologists reveal a fundamental reversibility between 
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acting and undergoing; analogous to Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility of perceiving and being per-
ceived. Noddings stresses our caring and being cared for as two sides of the same, reversible prac-
tice. This reversibility manifests itself in the fact that it is in our experience as cared-fors that we 
develop the fundamental caring intuitions that enable us to be responsive ones-caring. This reversi-
bility is displayed as well in the fact that mature and ‘sustainable’ relations are marked by mutual 
caring, in which the parties exchange places; both members are carers and cared-fors as opportuni-
ties arise. However, whereas Noddings conceives of an exclusive kind of reciprocity, restricted to 
human relations, Merleau-Ponty reveals a carrying reciprocity that is operative in our involvement 
with the perceived life-world in general. While the insights of Merleau-Ponty are worthy of discus-
sion in their own right, I want to confine myself here to the contribution of his phenomenology of 
perception to our understanding of ecological responsibility. More specifically, does Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of the reciprocal relationship between human beings and their world allow 
for an extension of the caring imperative to the natural environment? First and foremost, the phe-
nomenology of perception allows us to criticise some of the ontological assumptions that underlie 
Noddings’ denial of such an extension.  
 In the first place, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of intercorporeality provides us with 
strong arguments to question the sharp dichotomy that Noddings draws between the existential ne-
cessity of our engagement with other humans and the contingency of our engagement with the 
natural environment. This dichotomy is false, since it insufficiently accounts for our sensual and 
bodily situatedness, our physical immersion in the fleshly world. From an ontological point of view, 
our engagement with the surrounding natural life-world is equally given with our being in the world 
as our engagement with other humans. As body-subjects, we partake of both worlds. Merleau-Ponty 
uses the term intercorporeality to indicate the primordial interconnectivity between me and my 
natural world that precedes individual consciousness and can therefore not be disconnected by an 
individual agent. I exist only insofar as I am committed to this world and involved in its affairs. Just 
as we cannot cut our ‘self’ off from the significant others that carry our self, so too we cannot cut 
off our ‘self’ from the natural world in which we are intentionally involved and of which we partake 
as fleshly beings. This acknowledgement of an ontologically necessary involvement in our life-
world clears the way towards an extension of the ideal of caring towards the natural world. After 
all, our social situatedness as well as our natural situatedness sustains our being in the world in an 
equally fundamental way.  
 In the second place, and intimately tied to the above, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the 
dynamic reversibility – the mutual reflection and implication of perceiving and being perceived – 
sheds new light on the reciprocal relation we maintain with our natural world. This reciprocity is 
beyond the scope of Noddings’ ethics of care, since she chooses to take the interhuman caring rela-
tion as paradigm model for all our caring. From the perspective of human caring, Noddings ob-
serves a shading-off from the ethical into the sensitive and aesthetic, as she discusses our relation-
ships to plants, things and ideas. Here we are left with personal sentiments, attachments and aes-
thetic pleasures that are free of obligations. Thus Noddings acknowledges that one’s engrossment in 
these ‘things’ might engender an I-must, but not in an ethical sense, since our care is not received 
and answered in a way that sustains my ideal self as one-caring. I agree that, indeed, it makes sense 
to stress that the reciprocity we experience in our bodily involvement with the natural life-world 
will be of a different kind than the reciprocity we experience among human beings. And these dif-
ferences are partly of such a fundamental nature that they have implications for the possibility of 
ethical caring for nature. Things, plants and animals may respond to my caring gaze and involve-
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ment, but this responsiveness is limited to a certain level of complexity. As Noddings rightly re-
marks in relation to the caring relationship with her cat: she ‘is a responsive cared-for, but clearly 
her responsiveness is restricted: she responds directly to my affection with a sort of feline affection 
– purring, rubbing, nibbling. But she has no projects to pursue. There is no intellectual or spiritual 
growth for me to nurture, and our relation is itself stable. It does not posses the dynamic potential 
that characterises my relation with infants’ (Noddings, 1984, p. 156).  
 Our care for nature is therefore obviously of a different kind than our care for persons. How-
ever, Hans Jonas argues (along with Kant) that, while non-human organisms do not pursue ideals, 
they are purposive, in the sense that they are driven by life-preserving instincts: organisms strive 
towards their own survival and flourishing. Our care for nature is partly premised by the sense that 
in order to flourish, our flourishing depends on the flourishing of other organisms in our life-world 
in a non-instrumental way. In other words, the flourishing of our natural world is constitutive for 
our flourishing, just like the flourishing of our beloved ones is. As body-subjects we partake, as it 
were, in communal forms of flourishing. I care for the well-being of my intimate friends, not merely 
for instrumental reasons, but for intrinsic reasons: because their well-being and our relationship are 
in itself valuable to me, are part of me, in a way I cannot deny, even if I wanted to. According to 
Jonas, the same goes for our care for nature (Jonas, 1984; O’Neill, 2001). 
 The empirical fact that interhuman reciprocity is not operative in our relation with the natu-
ral environment does not imply that there is no other form of reciprocity between us and our natural 
life-world that causes an ethical imperative of caring to exist, to which we must respond by virtue of 
the very fact that we are human. The precise nature of this reciprocity and its ethical implications 
are in my view revealed by Merleau-Ponty in his examination of the chiasm between humans and 
their world: the reversibility of perceiving and being perceived. Our intentional involvement in the 
natural world brings with it a particular kind of receptivity for the appeal that emerges out of this 
involvement: the worldly things that I perceive and experience, reveal to me who I am. Thus, I 
change and the things that appear in my world change, as soon as a common field of vision unites 
us. In this sense, there is an authentic, reflecting reciprocity between me and my natural world, 
analogous to the reflection taking place in interhuman relations. Therefore, unlike Noddings sug-
gests, we should understand our involvement with the natural world as one of the sources of our 
self. The question of who we are cannot be answered without reference to where we are and how 
we relate to our natural life-world. Consequently, if I take responsibility for my self – for the person 
I am – I simultaneously assume responsibility for the sources of my self, among which my practical 
involvement with nature. In other words: care for the self implies care for my natural life-world.  
 The parallels between the phenomenology of care and the phenomenology of perception 
bring to light a striking similarity between the experiences of caring and perceiving, that allows us 
to suggest that caring and perceiving are rooted in a common mode of being in the world. More-
over, I would like to suggest that we understand the reciprocal relation established by intense per-
ception as a caring relation. The phenomenological kinship and common ontology of caring and 
perceiving justify the question as to whether we should conceive of our corporal and sensual enga-
gement with the natural life-world, and our openness towards this world, at the same time as a 
caring involvement with the natural life-world. We find support for this suggestion within the phe-
nomenological tradition of thinking, starting with Heidegger’s notion of care as the human mode of 
being (Sorge) and carried on by philosophers like Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas and Merleau-Ponty. 
What these phenomenological thinkers have in common, is that they do not see the ability of ratio-
nal autonomy as the distinguishing hallmark of human beings, but our initial openness to the world 
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around us. Since we are always already in the world and engaged with its affairs, we do not have to 
establish our contact with this world by artificial or technical means. Rather, the things that appear 
in our world already speak to us through their immediate presence. For us, the rake is not merely an 
instrument, a technical artefact, but an extension of my body, my arm. The rake is absorbed in our 
daily habits and practices, even before I take an objectifying distance towards my actions and ask 
myself what its function is and which use would be most effective. The meaning of this rake is ex-
pressed in my acquaintanceship and familiar use. As such, its meaning is extracted from the parti-
cular life-world of which the weeder, the spade, the watering can and young lettuce in my kitchen 
garden are all a part as well. This world embodies a personal web of meaning that is not deliberately 
spun by me. Moreover, the things in this web are not accessible to us by command but display their 
full meaning only insofar as we are passively involved in this life-world and are receptive to its pre-
sence. We are commissioned to be together with the worldly things in a way that enables these 
things to appear in their authentic being. This attitude of solicitousness toward other things and this 
concern to do things meticulously embody what Heidegger calls a caring involvement. The recep-
tive being in the world is a caring being in the world (cf. Taylor, 1995, Noddings 1998; Jonas, 
1984). 
 Such a caring mode of being does not primarily imply responsibility for pristine or virgin 
nature, untouched by humans – located at the largest possible distance of our cultural world. Rather, 
it is our ‘common-or-garden’ care for nature in our immediate vicinity, being absorbed in our eve-
ryday practices and routines, that generally makes up this caring attitude. Our care for nature shows 
itself in the engagement we involuntarily express within the pre-reflexive rituals and movements of 
our bodies. Not so much the spectacular climbing of a mountain top or the once-in-a-lifetime dive 
in the barrier reef, but rather the weekly weeding in my backyard, the daily cooking ritual or the 
cycling trip to and from work might give rise to the expression of such a caring imperative in our 
behaviour. It is in my familiar contact with the kitchenware, the ingredients, litter, water, natural 
gas, electricity and kitchen waste, that the internal I-must-care arises. The same goes for cooking. 
For instance, many people will experience a certain care for the ingredients in their tactile involve-
ment with the ingredients – the washing of lettuce, the peeling of potatoes, the kneading of dough or 
the shelling of beans. Thus, it is said of of a good cook that he treats his ingredients with respect so 
that the ingredients come to fulfil their promise. But even apart from this promise of taste, my prac-
tical involvement with the ingredients fulfil me with a feeling of pleasure (cf. Smith, 1998c).  
 The caring involvement with the things in our life-world is in a sense ‘commissioned’ by 
these things, rather than determined by our preferences. It is to this kind of ‘attunement’ that 
Richard Smith refers in his characterisation of the practical reason of craftsmanship as a powerful 
antidote to the instrumental means-end calculation, pervasive in mechanised, repetitive and 
alienated labour:  
 
The hallmarks of practical reason are flexibility and attentiveness to the details of the particular 
case (Aristotle calls this attentiveness aesthesis, sometimes translated as 'perception' or 'situational 
appreciation'). It is coloured by sensitivity and, crucially, attunement towards its subject-material, 
rather than the attempt to exercise mastery or control over it. The craftsman, for instance, has a 
certain 'feel' for the wood or stone he is working, and knows that if forced it will split or shatter. In-
strumental or technical reason produces goods which are specified by criteria that lie outside the 
process of making. The car that comes off the assembly-line is determined by considerations of what 
can be sold to the customer; the manufacturer is unlikely to be moved by the thought that a different 
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way of going about the process will help to keep alive certain craft-skills among the workforce. In 
practical reason, on the other hand, we seek the good that we attempt to realise through the action 
and not as a separate and independently identifiable aim (...). In this way practical reason is irre-
ducibly ethical, and its ethical quality is of a rich and complex kind, involving a continuous, if not 
always fully conscious, testing of one's action against the internal goods of an activity (...). The car-
penter knows his wood and has respect for its qualities. The experienced cook employs her knives, 
pans and other equipment so to speak as an extension of herself and comes to know quite instinc-
tively which flavours complement which. Like all craftsmen the carpenter and the cook must be pa-
tient, methodical, sometimes extemporising ingeniously. This of course is to talk of those in a posi-
tion to practise their craft with a sufficient degree of autonomy and creativity. It is precisely because 
the fulfilling work in which these crafts can be practised has so widely been replaced by mechanised, 
repetitive and alienated labour (or 'drudgery') that we both forget how readily available these possi-
bilities of 'attunement' have been until recently and at the same time incoherently romanticise the 
craft traditions in which they are found (Smith, 1998c, p. 174-175). 
 
In this light, it is important to recall that we do not care for nature because we want nature to remain 
as it presently is but because we want to preserve our worldly practices. Any understanding and ap-
peal that emerges from our practical involvement with nature is, in a sense, cultural. For some nos-
talgic minds this might cause a feeling of regret and loss, but as Hannah Arendt shows, the 
etymology of the word ‘culture’ suggests that it is this cultural bearing that allows us to take care of 
our natural world:  
 
While other species rely on instinct to develop nature into their habitat, human beings have to de-
pend on culture. The traditional work of culture, indeed, has been to make nature into our habitat or 
home (...). The word ‘culture’ derives from colere – to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend and 
preserve – and it relates primarily to the intercourse of man with nature in the sense of cultivating 
and tending nature until it becomes fit for human habitation. As such it indicates an attitude of 
loving care and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subject nature to the domination of man 
(Arendt, 1961, p. 211-212). 
 
Conclusively, the main argument in favour of an alternative understanding of ecological responsi-
bility in terms of care (as distinguished from the mainstream understanding of responsibility in 
terms of choice) proceeds as follows: just as we know and value ourselves and our actions in dia-
logue with others, so do we gain self-understanding and self-respect from our pre-reflexive practical 
involvement with the natural environment: the landscape, the skies, beloved animals and plants or 
the ‘green grass of home’. The particular form of reciprocity underlying this involvement – a re-
versibility of perceiving and being perceived – allows us to speak of a caring relation. This means 
that our care for nature is received and answered by nature as a cared-for in a way that sustains our 
self-understanding as ones-caring: the blooming flowers in spring answer my continuous care for 
my garden. Or even to a lesser degree: the black soil blinking back at me after my weekly weeding 
session pleases me in a way that makes my caring involvement fulfilling. We care for nature imme-
diately at hand and relate to the things around us on a pre-reflexive level. Analogous to Noddings’ 
derivation of an ethical ideal of caring from this ‘natural caring’, the remembrance of ourselves as 
ones-caring is of essential importance in situations in which our care for nature is not intuitively felt 
but nevertheless required by our ideal. We should call upon our ideal self as caring person and thus 
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activate our latent desire to care for our natural environment. It is along these lines of an evolving 
ethical self, to which we are committed in one way or another, that an I-must emerges.  
 This I-must is no longer a pure contingent and intuitive one, but an ethical imperative to 
which we must respond since it is premised by our very self-understanding and feeling of human 
dignity. A critic might respond that we can perfectly develop a sense of one’s self and a sense of 
what it means to be human without any involvement in our natural life-world  
whatsoever. I doubt this, because as humans, we are all biologically predisposed to eat, drink, sleep 
and find shelter against the cold; we are in a sense conditioned to make ourselves at home in our 
natural life-world. This is to say that our life sustaining functions condition us to interact with the 
natural environment in order to eat, drink, sleep and so on. It is due to the caring nature of our hu-
man being in the world, that we cannot relate to these functions in a purely functional manner: once 
we eat and drink our involvement with nature can not be restricted to mere metabolism – a mutual 
exchange of chemicals – but this interaction brings with it an acquaintanceship with the natural en-
vironment. Trust is, for instance, an important element in our consumption of food. We would never 
eat – let alone enjoy eating – if we do not trust the food that is (made) available. Accordingly, we 
would never catch sleep if we were unable to trust our natural environment in a minimal sense. 
Thus, a certain acquaintanceship and relation of trust with our natural environment is given along 
with the biological necessity to eat, drink, sleep and find shelter. We simply have to inhabit our 
natural world in order to sustain our human form of life. 
 The strength of our ideal of ecological responsibility as originating from an evolving ethical 
self, has to show what it is capable of when confronting world-wide problems of global warming, 
economic inequality, bio-diversity and so on. After all, our caring intuitions are insufficient when it 
comes to meeting the responsibilities we assume as world citizens, since these global problems ex-
ceed the limits of our life-worlds. In short, the problem is how to understand the connection be-
tween our caring intuitions that are intimately tied to our immediate life-world and the responsibili-
ties we assume as global citizens. Indeed, it is not hard to show that our local actions will have im-
pact on a global level and vice versa, that our local action is shaped by global conditions, structures 
and agreements. There are causal chains of action consequences in directions, exceeding far beyond 
the present and the particular here and now. With this empirical in mind, my question is more spe-
cific: how can we draw on local intuitions and commitments in our global adherence to environ-
mental responsibility? I would like to respond to this question along two lines that are nevertheless 
intimately related to each other. 
 In the first place, my horizon of caring is extended by means of the previously outlined ap-
peal to my ideal self as a caring person. On the strength of my past caring experiences – the care for 
the robins and titmouses in my backyard – I know myself as a caring person, or more specifically, 
as someone who cares for nature. And it is because I am attached to this self-understanding that I 
am able to call upon this image of myself as a caring person and act in accordance with the sense of 
duty – the ethical I-must – that arises from this understanding. Ergo, it is my ideal self that com-
mands me to care for something or someone in contexts where my natural caring responses fall 
short. Thus, we sometimes experience the influence of a moral imperative that involuntarily forces 
itself upon us, in situations in which we would not be ‘naturally’ be inclined to care. Of course, this 
duty will be internalised in such a way that it comes to be natural caring intuition as well. Thus, our 
moral and political sensitivities extend beyond the limits of my life-world. How far our ideal of 
caring takes us, depends primarily on the ability and strength of our imagination. When considering 
the purchase of tropical hardwood, for instance, are we able and prepared to imagine the beauty and 
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natural richness of the Amazon rain forests? Are we able and prepared to place ourselves in the po-
sition of the aboriginal inhabitants of these forests and imagine the injustice that is done to their 
community life by western importers, local large landowners and corrupt politicians?  
 My point is not that caring persons necessarily privilege their environmental commitments 
above others, because indeed, we might experience counter-commitments that make an equally 
strong demand on us: our esthetical imagination and appreciation of a hardwood window-sill in my 
living room might fulfil me with such a strong feeling of comfort that it outweighs any ethical ideal 
of caring. Rather, my point is that it is indeed possible to draw on our locally situated ideal of caring 
in global matters by extending our ethical caring intuitions in such a way that we can imagine how 
the consequences of our actions will affect natural entities, human practices and communities else-
where and in future. Whether such an ideal of caring responsibility will be strong enough to deal 
with the global problems with which we are confronted will largely depend on the way in which 
this imagination is cultivated in our common practices, so that its members will inevitably gain a 
particular sensitivity to environmental considerations of a global nature. Throughout our participa-
tion in caring practices we might develop a moral sensibility that urges us to care for foreign and 
future nature as if it were ours. As environmentally caring citizens we act in line with the ideal that 
this hypothetical image elicits within us. I will come back to the practical implications of this analy-
sis in the last section, in which the familiar environmental adage Think Global, Act Local will be 
discussed in more detail. 
 In the second place, it might be fruitful to think of this extension of our caring commitments 
in terms of expanding circles and chains, as Noddings suggests:  
 
We find ourselves at the centre of concentric circles of caring. In the inner, intimate circle, we care 
because we love (...). As we move outward in the circles, we encounter those for whom we have per-
sonal regard. Here, as in the more intimate circles, we are guided in what we do by at least three 
considerations: how we feel, what the other expects of us, and what the situational relationship re-
quires of us. Persons in these circles do not, in the usual course of events, require from us what our 
families naturally demand, and the situations in which we find ourselves have, usually, their own 
rules of conduct (...). Beyond the circles of proximate others are those I have not yet encountered. 
Some of these are linked to the inner circle by personal or formal relations. Out there is a young 
man who will be my daughter’s husband; I am prepared to acknowledge the transitivity of my love. 
He enters my life with potential love. Out there, also, are future students; they are linked formally to 
those I already care for and they, too, enter my life potentially cared-for. Chains of caring are es-
tablished, some linking unknown individuals to those already anchored in the inner circles and some 
forming whole new circles of potential caring. I am “prepared to care” through recognition of these 
chains (Noddings, 1984, p. 46-47). 
 
We may think of the expansion of our caring sentiments toward organic and animal life, future 
generations and natural beauty as proceeding along the lines of these circles and chains, the recog-
nition of which will cause one to prepared to care. Thus, particular imaginations grappling with how 
the consequences of our (in) actions will affect other humans, animals, landscapes and natural sys-
tems might transform this passive preparedness into an active caring for the natural environment. 
Contrary to the chains of rights-approach, suggested by Rawls and his interpreters, this latent con-
cern for distant and future flourishing does not originate from a predefined contractual relationship, 
assuming a strict reciprocity between moral parties, but an enlarged acquaintanceship with 
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widening circles of life. Thus understood, the limits of our responsibility cannot settled in advance, 
but they reach out in directions where our reflecting sensitivities to life deepen. As such, this under-
standing of environmental responsibility comes close to Naess’ notion of ecological selfhood and 
self-realisation. Rather than a self that employs the environment as a resource for his own purposes, 
Naess postulates a self that matures by means of identification with ever wider circles of being. For 
Naess, nature begins to have intrinsic value by virtue of the fact that self-realising persons enlarge 
their ‘selves’ in such a way as to encompass nature and become one with it (Hargrove, 1992; Mat-
thews, 2001; Naess, 1973; Noddings, 1984, p. 152; Li, 1996; Passmore, 1974; chains of love; 
Wenz, 1988; Wenz developed a similar concentric circle theory of environmental justice). 
 
To sum up, we derive an ethical ideal of caring responsibility for the natural environment along the 
following lines:  
 
1. We experience our practical-corporeal involvement with the natural world as commissioning us 
to respond as ones-caring: our sensual and bodily being in the world is of such a nature that, within 
our pre-reflexive involvement with the natural things as they appear in our life-world, we involun-
tarily display a certain care for these things. 
 
2. It is in (anticipated) dialogue with significant others that we recognise the natural things we care 
for and we reflect on our caring identifications with the natural world in terms of the strong-evalua-
tions that we borrow from our sensus communis.  
 
3. Throughout the continuous involvement with nature and throughout our continuous dialogue with 
others we gain a particular self-understanding and, thus, an ethical self evolves in congruence with 
our best remembrance of nature calling on us to care: I feel myself committed to the idealised un-
derstanding of myself as a person that cares for nature. 
 
4. When we experience an appeal to our caring responsibility – by virtue of our recognition of 
chains of care – even though our intuitive caring responses are nevertheless absent – since the call is 
made from beyond the limits of our present life-world – we call upon our ideal self as caring per-
sons in order to see how far our ethical ideal of caring will take us. We extend our caring sensibili-
ties toward organic-, animal-, distant- and future- life along these concentric lines, but obviously, 
this extension of our horizon of caring goes as far as it goes. 
 
5. The strength of our ethical ideal of caring for the natural environment depends largely on the de-
gree of institutionalisation and cultivation of our care within the practices of our political commu-
nity as sensus communis. Only on the strength of these practices can the extension of our caring 
sentiments be sustained and internalised by subsequent newcomers.  
  
6. Our ethical ideal of caring responsibility for nature is always susceptible to change, since it 
responds to the call that emanates from our continuous involvement with nature. After all, the value 
of nature transcends our ethical ideal of caring in the sense that nature resists any human appropria-
tion within a fixed and self-fulfilling understanding of ourselves as caring persons. 
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 chapter four 
 
because we educate citizens caring for nature 
 
 
 
“Give me your definition of a horse”(...)  
 
“Girl number twenty unable to define a horse!” 
said Mr. Gradgrind for the general behoof of all the 
little pitchers. “Girl number twenty possessed of no 
facts in reference to one of the commonest of ani-
mals! Some boy's definition of a horse. Bitzer, 
yours” (...) 
 
“Bitzer”, said Mr. Gradgrind. “Your definition of a 
horse”.  
 
“Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely 
twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve in-
cisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy coun-
tries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to 
be shod with iron. Age known by marks in the 
mouth”. Thus (and much more) Bitzer.  
 
“Now, girl number twenty” said Mr. Gradgrind, 
“You know what a horse is”  
 
(Charles Dickens45) 
 
 
Children are thrown into a world whose existence is at stake. Though the human world has always 
been at stake, now its survival is being threatened by the creations of its inhabitants. Human beings 
turned out to be vulnerable to the consequences of their collective behaviour. By creating an aggres-
sive-technological world, by installing an exploitative economic system and enjoying consumer 
society, we are unwillingly endangering the condition of future life on earth. Furthermore, the 
threats to our world are now of such a magnitude and nature that the danger is not solely limited to a 
particular area, but puts the very ‘health’ of our global environment at risk. Problems of environ-
mental degradation, pollution and resource depletion far exceed the local horizons of community 
action. Haunted by alarming future scenarios, local as well as global efforts are undertaken to ‘sus-
tain’ the things we care for by changing our practices, behaviours and creations in such a way, that 
they will be less threatening to the continuation of our worldly practices.  
                                                      
45 Dickens, C. (1854; 1995), p. 11-12. 
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As children are introduced to our worldly practices, they will become familiarised with these 
efforts to take up responsibility for the quality of our natural life-world and habitat; as they learn 
how to deal with waste and energy within their family household, at school, at their first job, in lei-
sure time, on the street and in public debate. As newborn citizens, they are involved in collective 
practices as fellow-citizens, who gradually come to participate and simultaneously assume co-
responsibility for the continuity of our practices in the future. But what precisely do those educators 
do when they involve children in our practices and simultaneously strive for continuity of those 
civil practices? Are environmental educators offering an appealing perspective on a possible future 
world, or do they treat their pupils as human material for the establishment of this future world to 
come? In others words, does the claim of continuity do justice to the right of children to an open 
future horizon, or does it lead to a colonisation of our future in such a way that we deny new 
generations the opportunity of shaping their own future world? Philosophers of education generally 
warn against the utilisation of education as a means of creating some preconceived ‘ideal society’. 
On the other hand, every educational act and judgement casts their shadows ahead. Every educa-
tional intention or response lays claim to a particular future of indeterminate length. By acting in a 
particular way now, the educator commits himself and the child to doing something in the future. 
Moreover, our action as well as inaction whether we or not we act has consequences for the world 
we leave behind for future generations. Therefore, we cannot remain innocent and a total refraining 
from continuity claims in education can not be logically maintained.  
 In chapter two we concluded with Hannah Arendt that this need for a guided introduction 
calls upon the double responsibility of environmental educators; by virtue of their position as me-
diators between an old world and new generations, educators need to be responsive to the implicit 
claims of young generations to an open future, as well as to the implicit claim of our ‘old world’ in 
need of protection. In fact, educators maintain a relation based on trust with the young as well as the 
old; they require the young to trust the old and require the old to trust the young by protecting the 
newness of the young against the established powers of the old and protecting the established world 
against the destructive newness of the young. In Arendt’s view adults are only able to fulfil their 
twofold task by introducing the young into our world as it is at present is, in all its potential and 
with all its flaws. Only when educators act as representatives of our present world, for which they 
assume responsibility, will the fundamental conflict between both claims be dissolved. This is be-
cause in order to preserve our shared world it has to be continuously renewed. And from the per-
spective of the young reform is only possible when newcomers take their bearings from the present 
world in which they are properly introduced. So, rather than being utopian prophets environmental 
educators should be guardians of our common world.  
 If future responsibility emerges from our commitment to what we care for here and now, 
rather than our hypothetical relationship with future citizens, how do we stand towards the things 
we value? Do we ‘make’ our natural environment valuable by ascribing value, or do we ‘find’ value 
in nature? In chapter three, an alternative view has been developed on ‘the intrinsic value of nature’ 
in terms of aesthetic judgement. In this view, the value is neither intrinsic to the subject, nor to the 
object of valuation, but resides in the common language that enables us to speak about nature, based 
on experiences to which we are all subject. As such, the value of nature is embedded in the in-
tersubjective level of our language community. However, as I have argued, the intrinsic value of 
nature transcends our articulation of value. Its ultimate value and meaning eludes us. 
 As we have seen, the issue of intrinsic value is important to our understanding of what it is 
that inspires us to care for nature i.e. the caring responsibility we assume in our practical involve-
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ment with the natural environment. Nel Noddings’ phenomenology of care as well as Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception has allowed me to describe the emergence of an 
ethical ideal of caring responsibility for the natural environment. In my view, this ideal should be 
preserved within the educational practices and arrangements of our society. But of course, any ap-
peal to environmental responsibility will have to connect to the playful involvement with nature, in 
which children maintain an intrinsic engagement with their natural environment. In this concluding 
chapter I will therefore start out by exploring the moral and educational significance of this playful 
involvement with the natural environment. Apart from this dimension of play, I will draw attention 
to two more dimensions of which I will argue that they are of vital importance for environmental 
education in the light of the previous analyses: self-expression and the primacy of the natural life-
world. In line with this primary characterisation of environmental education, I will call for a revi-
sion of the dominant framework of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD). Finally, an al-
ternative proposal will be presented, to be called Education for Environmental Responsibility. 
 
Child’s play 
Taking a glance at the list of dispositions required for an aesthetic recognition of intrinsic natural 
value, one can hardly resist the impression that we are dealing with serious, adult matter here. 
Weighty terms like ‘dwelling’, ‘contemplation’, ‘poetic involvement’, ‘receptive responsiveness’, 
‘acquaintanceship’ and ‘attunement’ allude to adult experience rather than children’s involvement 
with nature. After all, children seem to approach their natural environment in a typical childlike-
way. They experience nature mainly as something to play with and play in. Apparently, nature ap-
peals to their spontaneous responses of imaginative creativity. Thus, trees challenge children to 
climb in them, ditches invite them to build dams, sand to make castles out of them, the moon to lure 
werewolves, woods trigger children to play hide and seek, rabbits invite them to care for them and 
chestnuts to gather them and make funny creatures out of them. But nature does not merely appeal 
to responses of a noble kind. At the same token, animals sometimes release a kind of sadistic play-
fulness within children. Consider for instance how cruel children can be towards vulnerable animals 
– putting salt on snails, pulling out the paws of a spider, chasing cats – eager as they are to explore 
what it feels like to be superior and exercise power. Though we might question the moral quality of 
this behaviour, in these sadistic responses children display an intrinsic involvement as well: the 
animals are tormented without any purpose, but ‘just for fun’. 
 There is no consensus among researchers in the field of education and developmental 
psychology on what play is mainly for and about. Moreover, research literature on child’s play 
shows that it is impossible to give one definition of child’s play that covers the various dimensions 
of this phenomenon. Rather, various (partly overlapping) characteristics are given. The more these 
characteristics apply to particular behaviour, the more likely an observer will regard this behaviour 
as play. First, the characteristic of intrinsic motivation refers to the fact that an action is done for its 
own sake and not brought about by basic bodily needs or by external rules or social demands. 
Second, the activity of playing is pleasurable and enjoyable to the child. Third, the behaviour is 
non-literal, meaning that it has an ‘as if’ or pretend quality. Fourth, the flexibility stands for the 
amount of variation in form or context that playing usually displays (these characteristics are bor-
rowed from Smith & Vollstedt, 1985). Apart from these main characteristics, there is attention for 
the dimensions of voluntariness, bodily immediacy, the degree of engrossment in the play, joy in 
repetition, and the enchantment of reality (cf. Gadamer, 1960, p. 97-116; Langeveld, 1963; 
Huizinga, 1971; Imelman, 1974; Hutchison, 1998, p. 104-105). 
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 All listed characteristics of play reflect particular dimensions of the aesthetic experience of 
intrinsic value, as outlined in the previous chapter. First, the characteristic of intrinsic motivation 
reflects the dispositions of the aesthetic appreciator or the one-caring, as previously characterised in 
terms of motivational displacement, disinterestedness and engrossment. Second, the characteristic 
of joy can be seen as the childlike version of the personal pleasure and fulfilment that appreciators 
of nature find in aesthetic gratification. Thirdly, the characteristic of ‘non-literalness’ correlates 
with the creative power of imagination that is at the heart of aesthetic judgement. Fourth, the flexi-
bility of play exemplifies the continuous adjustment of responsive evaluators to the time- and place-
particularity of the aesthetic experience. Finally, the bodily immediacy in child’s play refers to the 
sensual intimacy between aesthetic appreciators and their object of care. 
 These parallels indicate that within free play, children as well as adults, realise an aesthetic 
involvement with the environment: a tacit responsiveness to the things that appeal to them. Interre-
lationships between play, aesthetics and self-expression become even more evident as we discuss 
the ideas of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who defines play in relation to the experience of a work of art. 
However, for Gadamer, play is not so much a subjective exercise of imagination but something (a 
movement of being) that has its own order and structure to which the one playing is handed over. 
This movement of play is not under voluntary control of the one playing. Therefore, Gadamer 
speaks of the primacy of the play over and above the player. Every act of play is an act of being-
played: ‘Alles Spielen ist ein Gespielt-werden’ (Gadamer, 1960, p. 108-110). Paradoxically, it is 
within this responsive play that human beings dis-play themselves, or more precise: within this play 
they are pushed to express themselves in a particular way. At this point, Gadamer points at the 
analogy between self-display, human play, and nature:  
 
Das Spiel stellt offenbar eine Ordnung dar, in der sich das Hin und Her der Spielbewegung von 
selbst ergibt. Zum Spiel gehört, daß die Bewegung nicht nur ohne Zweck und Absicht, sondern auch 
ohne Anstrengung ist. Es geht wie von selbst. Die Leichtigkeit des Spiels, die natürlich kein 
wirkliches Fehlen von Anstrengung zu sein braucht, sondern phänomenologisch allein das Fehlen 
der Angestrengtheit meint, wird subjektiv als Entlastung erfahren. Das Ordnungsgefüge des Spieles 
läßt den Spieler gleichsam in sich aufgehen und nimmt ihn damit die Aufgabe der Initiative ab, die 
die eigentliche Anstrengung des Daseins ausmacht. Das zeigt sich auch in dem spontanen Drang zur 
Wiederholung, der im Spielenden aufkommt und an dem beständigen Sich-Erneuern des Spieles, das 
seine Form prägt (z.B. der Refrain). Daß die Seinsweise des Spieles derart der Bewegungsform der 
Natur nahesteht, erlaubt aber eine wichtige methodische Folgerung. Es ist offenbar nicht so, daß 
auch Tiere spielen und daß man im übertragenen Sinne sogar vom Wasser und vom Licht sagen 
kann, daß es spielt. Vielmehr können wir umgekehrt vom Menschen sagen, daß auch er spielt. Auch 
sein Spielen ist ein Naturvorgang. Auch der Sinn seines Spielen ist, gerade weil er und soweit er 
Natur ist, ein reines Sichselbstdarstellen (Gadamer, 1960, p. 110-111). 
 
Careful phenomenological study of child play gives rise to the idea that children express within 
their play the fulfilment they find in an aesthetic involvement with nature that allows them to 
recognise (in a practical and immanent way) the intrinsic value of nature. Of particular interest 
within the context of environmental education is the magical ‘animism’ inherent in the child’s play 
world. In particular, young children between the ages of four and twelve respond to nature in an 
empathically and anthropomorphic way, ascribing human-like emotions and desires to animals, 
plants and things. Nature triggers their imagination in a special way; organisms and things are in-
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volved in their play as if they were active and intentional beings. Pets are taken care of as if they 
were babies in need of parenting; trees moving in the dark before dawn are regarded as ghosts; sick 
flowers are being nurtured and spoken to as if they were patients; the holes in the sand on the beach 
are underground cities that have to be protected against the marching breakers that come rolling in. 
According to Margadant, who studied child play in nature, such a response is not an expression of 
animistic reasoning (suffering from the ‘pathetic fallacy’ or a ‘category mistake’). Children who 
display animistic responses in their play, do not necessarily assume that flowers have human-like 
feelings and that trees are bewitched. Moreover, their imagination allows them to express the appeal 
arising from their intimate involvement with nature in animistic terms (Margadant, 1990, p. 149). 
This is a clear manifestation of Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility between perceiver and perceived; 
young children are not yet aware of emotions, thoughts and intentions as ‘inner experiences’ as 
things that can be judged independently of the world at which they are directed. An interesting re-
sult of research into the cognitions of young children is that a sense of desire that belongs to us 
more than to the world at which they are directed, only emerges with the progressive acquisition of 
knowledge (Margadant, 1998).  
 Some environmental philosophers (implicitly or explicitly) suggest that anthropomorphism 
can be seen as inversely proportional to anthropocentrism. (Lemaire, 2002; Bonnett, 2003). The 
imagination that allows us to recognise human-like intentional forces beyond ourselves literally 
pushes our ‘selves’ away from the centre of our world. Thus the assumption is the more one 
responds to these forces in an empathic way, the less narcissistic our desires, views and attitudes 
will be. Support for the thesis that anthropomorphic animism enhances our care for nature can be 
found in manifestations of animism in mediaeval culture, its origin myths and the underlying 
metaphor of nature as Mother. Like a real mother, Mother Nature was believed to suffer from 
changing moods and tempers to which her children had to adjust. Thus, belief in Mother Nature re-
quired respect and dictated a subservient attitude of piety. By satisfying Mother Nature and wor-
shipping natural gods, mediaeval people believed they were in good hands; protected against natural 
disasters and supported by good fortune. In tribal cultures as well as in the contemporary Gaia be-
lief, a similar animism is cultivated as source of wonder and respect (cf. Bonnett, 2003, p. 580-581).  
 Obviously, my suggestion is not to retrieve a version of pre-modern mysticism within our 
present concept of nature, nor to transmit Gaia doctrines within practices of environmental educa-
tion. Rather, my aim is to reveal the ethical meaning of child play in nature. Though more detailed 
qualitative educational research is necessary to sustain my thesis, the previous exploration provides 
us with strong reasons to assume that the kind of aesthetic involvement in nature that allows us to 
respect the intrinsic value of nature, can be found in child play in a most spontaneous and imagina-
tive form. Within child play educators recognise that they do not have to teach children to care for 
nature by means of transmission. They only need to appeal to a caring-bodily responsiveness that is 
present in any child.  
 However, having acknowledged the importance of play, it is worrying to see that the 
opportunities for free play in nature are decreasing in contemporary western education. Educational 
research shows that children spend less time in nature (Biologieraad, 2002). However, these studies 
tend to define nature rather narrowly in terms of natural reserves, while nature in the broad sense we 
have discussed inevitably resides in the child’s life-world. Indeed, there is a major difference 
between the quality of nature in the life-world of a farmer’s child and the environment of a child 
growing up in the suburbs of Amsterdam. But even in big cities, environmental educators have suc-
ceeded in marking out exciting nature footpaths and creating green play areas as well as school gar-
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dens. In light of this, I think that the main educational problem is not the availability of ‘play na-
ture’ in the environment of the child, but rather the opportunity to play in nature. For, obviously, the 
relationship between children and their life-world has been transformed into an ever more con-
trolled and mediated relationship. Unstructured time and opportunity to play, more or less free from 
adult supervision, is rarer now, than it was ten or twenty years ago. It is not my purpose here to give 
an extensive outline of the causes and roots of this loss of free time in contemporary education, but 
undoubtedly, the loss of free time and opportunity to play is closely related to changing priorities in 
contemporary education and upbringing. For instance, the growing concern of parents for their 
child’s safety, the desire for monitoring children’s development and the felt importance of efficient 
use of educational time have diminished these opportunities. To give a concrete example: the play-
grounds of contemporary child care centres in the Netherlands are subjected to severe safety stan-
dards that will not allow any ‘risks’ in the child’s environment. As a consequence, trees are pro-
tected from being climbed, branches are removed since children might hurt one another, differences 
of height are surrounded by safety measures to prevent children from falling, and even the smallest 
ditch is relegated from the child’s surroundings. Thus, the illusion of a risk-free playground de-
prives children of many opportunities to be triggered by raw, natural material in which to explore 
their bodily powers and simultaneously explore the powers of nature. Paradoxically, because of 
these safety measures, children are becoming even more vulnerable, since they have not learned to 
deal with risks anymore. They are not able to judge whether or not it is safe to jump down from 
such and such a height; they are not used to estimate how far they can move into the water before 
the current will catch them, and so on (De Valck, 2004, p. 11-13). 
 While schools cannot compensate for society, I do think that they have a special educational 
assignment here. By making room for an alternative-playful involvement with nature, schools are 
able to counterweight the performative tendencies within society. However, I agree with those 
critics of environmental education who stress that educators should resist external claims to con-
tribute to a predetermined approach to social problems. In virtue of their own task, purpose and po-
sition in society, educational institutions enjoy a certain degree of autonomy against political and 
economic institutions in society. Educational institutions would sacrifice their primary 
responsibility and expertise were they to give in to thoughtless expectations from the outside 
(Bolscho, 1998; Margandant, 1998; Meijer, 1996, 1997; Praamsma, 1997). Among other things, 
educators should not simply adopt the current, scientific and technological definitions of environ-
mental problems, presented to them by environmentalists, policy-makers and scientists, because 
these definitions sometimes fail to connect to the life-world experience and environmental aware-
ness of their pupils. Moreover, the special responsibility of educators amounts to the translation of 
social problems in such a way, that they connect to the purpose and meaning of the educational 
practice. Ergo, when it comes down to enhancing environmental responsibility, it is not a mere so-
cial or economic task that schools are burdened with but an educational assignment: educators 
ought to preserve the playful and caring involvement of children with their natural environment and 
inspire them to deal with the caring responsibilities that arise from this experience.  
 Unfortunately, the particular forms of environmental education enhancing intimate physical 
interaction with nature – such as Nature Education, Nature Study and Conservation Education – 
have been pushed to the back within the framework of Education for Sustainable Development. In 
fact, many contemporary organisations for environmental education want to get rid of the image of 
nature education, as they feel this is practice is intimately tied to the outmoded image of the ‘open 
sandals and woolly socks’ type of education. Against protagonists of ESD, I have stressed the aes-
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thetic and ethical importance of child play. In line with this analysis, I want to call for a revaluation 
of Nature Education, or – more neutrally – Education in Nature. This dimension of environmental 
education should provide children with the learning environment and opportunity to play in and 
with nature, free from immediate educational interference, evaluation and curricular purposes.  
 
Self-expression 
By setting limits to the satisfaction of our consumer needs, environmentalists have, willingly or 
unwillingly, contributed to the promotion of a morality of austerity and self-restraint, as if they want 
to say: all things in life that are pleasant, comfortable, tasty or exciting are bad for the environment, 
and should therefore be subject to rigorous self-discipline. In particular, advocates of sustainable 
development tend to underline that, if we want to live a sustainable life, we have to deny ourselves 
the pleasures of consumption and control our unsustainable impulses and bad habits. After all, the 
ideal of a sustainable development sets limits to our present use of natural resources, in such a way 
that these limits are assumed to be attributable to individual consumer behaviour, as defined in our 
‘ecological footprint’. Consequently, we should be willing to make our ‘shallow desires’ – our de-
sire for a long morning shower, for cheap meat and vegetables, or for frequent holidays by air – 
subordinate to our desire for a sustainable future. Assuming environmental responsibility is pre-
sented as the ability of self-discipline or self-restraint that allows us to resist the temptations of con-
sumer culture.  
 In itself, this picture of environmental responsibility is recognisable and seems to be realis-
tic, but, as I have suggested earlier, it reflects all the shortcomings inherent in the ideal of rational 
autonomy and the underlying notion of self-identification in terms of choice and accountability as 
outlined in the previous chapter. Furthermore, a strong appeal to self-restraint and self-discipline 
fails to touch upon our intrinsic motivation. Instead it primarily trades on our controlling responses, 
fuelled by fear; fear for loss of the things we care for, fear for future catastrophes, fear for our sur-
vival or the survival of posterity, fear for falling short in the eyes of others, fear of losing control of 
our future action, and so on. As previously discussed, this insight lead Jonas to acknowledge the 
‘heuristics of fear’; more precise and stronger than positive mental states like joy or desire, fear of 
specific future dangers points our attention to those vulnerable goods we really care about (Jonas, 
1984, p. 27). It might sound far fetched to mobilise fear in such a way, but in fact, many environ-
mentalists have gained support and credibility by sketching dramatic future scenarios: ‘If we do not 
change our ways drastically within a short period of time....’. However, in the long term such a 
strategy has proven to be a dead end. The fact that in hindsight some of the darkest doom scenarios 
have appeared to be exaggerated has given some environmentalists the dubious image of being 
modernday Cassandra’s, that is, prophets of doom to which nobody listens anymore (but as 
Fukuyama once remarked, the position of the pessimist is, in a particular sense, a privileged one; 
when the prophecies of optimists turn out to be too bright they easily obtain the stigma of being 
gullible and naive, whereas pessimists retain the aura of profoundness when prophecies have proven 
to be false).  
 In my view, Jonas is right to stress that fear can be an indicator of what we care about and 
for, but I agree with those educational theorists who argue that fear should not be used as an educa-
tional means to motivate children to act, think or judge in a particular way. That would imply a step 
back to the dark ages of puritan education, in which the awareness of hereditary debt and the fear of 
a punitive God were the pedagogical Leitmotif. In a similar vein, Noddings argues against those 
existentialist thinkers who elevate fear – fear of death, fear of meaninglessness or fear of human 
because we are human 
 160 
existence as such (Heidegger or Sartre) – to the status of our true mode of being. Against the heu-
ristics of fear, Noddings and Margadant, for instance, suggest that educators ought to connect to 
childlike play and care and joy in life in their moral appeal. Rather than assuming responsibility for 
fighting the things we fear, we should take responsibility for preserving the things we care for and 
about. This is not just a matter of definition, but a difference in quality and will be clear as we take 
a look at the implied engagement of the subject.  
 According to Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790), it is through our sensuous pleasure in 
beauty that we are able to transcend the inner conflict between virtue and desire: ‘(...) in the enact-
ment of aesthetic perception we are in a special way free – free from the compulsions of conceptual 
recognition, free from the calculation of instrumental action, and free from the conflict between 
duty and inclination’ (Seel, 2004; cf. Taylor, 1992, p. 71). Accordingly, the previous analysis of 
intrinsic natural value in chapter three provides us with profound reasons to assume that the aes-
thetic experience of natural beauty allows us to move beyond our desire for self-discipline towards 
a personal striving for aesthetic self-creation, understood in terms of self-expression: the self as a 
work of art, as Foucault chooses to say. Whereas the hierarchical notion of responsibility in terms of 
rational autonomy and choice starts with the necessity of making one’s first-order desires subordi-
nate to our desires of a more profound, higher order – thus appealing to our pursuit for self-control 
– the alternative notion of responsibility in terms of care allows us to be engrossed by the things for 
which we care; to lose ourselves in an object of care. This caring is of an aesthetic nature, in the 
sense that it is an experience of responding to something particular that appeals to us. In our caring 
we express the response to something particular that fulfils us in a particular way, and invites to 
follow: ‘When the other’s reality becomes a possibility for me, I care’ (Noddings, 1984, p. 14). As 
such, this appeal to environmental responsibility takes on the form of an appeal to responsive self-
expression; an invitation to express what we desire in our involvement with the natural world, to 
express the kind of life we want to lead in harmony with an image of ourselves and our world which 
we feel comfortable with.  
 Inherent to these two different practices of environmental responsibility are different styles 
of self-evaluation. In qualifying this difference, it might be helpful to employ Charles Taylor’s dis-
tinction between weak calculative self-evaluation and strong qualitative self-evaluation. Suppose 
that a particular person wonders how she might change her means of transport in order save money 
and ‘save’ the environment. Now, this person might weigh the alternative options by calculating 
which behaviour changes will contribute most effectively to her objective of saving, and 
simultaneously require the least sacrifices on her part. Biking to the workplace in stead of driving 
will probably yield a reduction of greenhouse emissions. Simultaneously it might enhance my 
‘health’ and other personal goods, but unfortunately, it will conflict with the pursuit of ‘comfort’ 
and ‘saving time’. After weighing up the relative importance of these personal standards – ranking 
‘sustainability’, ‘saving money’, ‘health’, ‘comfort’ and ‘saving time’ in the order from most im-
portant to least important – she might be able to reach a decision. She might choose to opt for a 
minimal change in her ways – only cutting out one of her holidays by air – since more radical 
changes would ‘cut’ too much into her feeling of ‘comfort’, ‘saving time’ and other goods. This 
type of evaluation fits Taylor’s notion of ‘weak calculative self-evaluation’: weighing alternatives 
on grounds of pre-specifiable standards in quantitative terms: option x satisfies my standards 
more/less than option y. The goal is to determine the option which produces the greatest amount of 
over-all satisfaction.  
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 According to Taylor this calculative picture of self-evaluation fails to come to grips with the 
richness of human judgement and the moral horizon within which we are situated. As such, we do 
not reflect on our actions primarily in quantitative terms but in strong qualifications that are inter-
woven with our self-understanding and way of life. In this stronger style of self-evaluation the actor 
qualifies her desires not merely in quantitative measures on the scale of ‘strongest/weakest’ or 
‘most/least important’, but as being worthy or unworthy, virtuous or vicious, more or less fulfilling, 
more or less refined, profound or superficial, noble or base. These strong evaluations are part of a 
vocabulary of qualitative contrast: the qualitative terms gain meaning by contrast with other qualifi-
cations. Thus, it is impossible to explain what we mean when we call someone or something ‘pro-
found’ without reference to qualifications like ‘shallow’ or ‘superficial’. Consequently, changing 
the use of one of these terms, or introducing a new term would alter the sense of the existing terms, 
thus colouring the entire vocabulary. Suppose, for instance, that someone starts to use the word 
‘profound’ in an ironic way, then the connotations of ‘shallow’ and ‘superficial’ will change apace. 
Furthermore, strong evaluations of this kind belong to qualitatively different modes of life; ‘pro-
found’ is not just an abstract qualification but alludes to a way of life to which we might or might 
not aspire, or it alludes to the kind of person we might or might not aspire to be.  
 Evaluating her means of transport in this stronger sense, the person in our previous example 
would reflect on the available options in qualifications that amount to the way of life she as a person 
feels right. She might, for example, recognise the option of biking to her work as ‘inspiring’ and 
‘deepening contact with nature’ by reminding herself how ‘refreshing’ it is to experience the 
gradual change of the landscape, to become familiar with the trees and plants along the road, to ex-
perience the cycle of seasons. Rather than balancing costs and benefits according to general stan-
dards that can be settled in advance, the personal vocabulary of worth she employs is invoked by 
considerations of this stronger qualitative kind. These qualifications are different from the general 
standards of the ‘weak evaluator’ in at least one major aspect: the standards of the weak evaluator 
can be defined independently of the particular considerations at hand. After all, saving money or 
realising a reduction on energy use and greenhouse emission can be realised independent of a 
change in her travelling habits. These goals may be realised by other means as well. In case of 
strong qualitative evaluation the qualifications I use are not independent but intrinsically related to 
the particular consideration at hand: the person in our example may feel that her life in harmony 
with nature might eventually be disrupted if she does not leave her car for a bike. Furthermore, it 
follows from this that, when weak-calculative evaluation is practiced,one desired alternative is set 
aside, it is only on grounds of its contingent incompatibility with a more desired alternative or 
another goal. But with strong qualitative reflection this not the case; the conflict is deeper. The as-
piration to live in harmony with my natural environment does not compete with the person’s desire 
for saving time, since she values the former aspiration as more profound than the latter. Moreover, 
the higher aspiration to live in harmony with nature might change her aspiration to save time in a 
qualitative manner; she may, for instance,come to reject her desire for saving time as a desire be-
longing to a superficial, hurried life she does not want to live anymore. As such, strong self-evalua-
tion seems to leave less room for self-deception since it is the very self that is at stake (Taylor, 
1969, p. 283).  
 In strong qualitative self-evaluation, the person evaluates herself and simultaneously articu-
lates what she feels is important or valuable in life. It is clear that self-evaluation in this strong 
sense is not only articulated but constituted by a particular kind of language and expression. Rather 
than being mere descriptions, strong evaluations are articulations of the kind that do not leave the 
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object of evaluation unchanged: ‘To give a certain articulation is to shape our sense of what we de-
sire or what we hold important in a certain way’. Again we touch upon the aesthetic style of self-
expression enabling us to transcend the conflict between external principles and internal desires by 
giving in to the urge of self-creation. Charles Taylor observes how such a qualitative development 
of the self emerges within our radical re-evaluations: 
 
Because articulations partly shape their objects (...), they are intrinsically open to challenge in a 
way that descriptions are not. Evaluation is such that there is always room for re-evaluation. But 
our evaluations are the more open to challenge precisely in virtue of the very character of depth 
which we see in the self. For it is precisely the deepest evaluations which are least clear, least ar-
ticulated, most easily subject to illusion and distortion (...). The question can always be posed: ought 
I to re-evaluate my most basic evaluations? Have I really understood what is essential to my iden-
tity? Have I truly determined what I sense to be the highest mode of life? (...) But in radical re-
evaluations the most basic terms, those in which other evaluations are carried on, are precisely what 
is in question. It is just because all formulations are potentially under suspicion of distorting their 
objects that we have to see them all as revisable, that we are forced back, as it were, to the inarticu-
late limit from which they originate. How then can such re-evaluations be carried on? There is cer-
tainly no meta-language available in which I can assess rival self-interpretations. If there were, this 
would not be radical re-evaluation. On the contrary the re-evaluation is carried on in the formulae 
available, but with a stance of attention, as it were, to what these formulae are meant to articulate 
and with a readiness to receive any gestalt shift in our view of the situation, any quite innovative set 
of categories in which to see our predicament, that might come our way in aspiration. Anyone who 
has struggled with a philosophical problem knows what this kind of enquiry is like. In philosophy 
typically we start off with a question, which we know to be badly formed at the outset. We hope that 
in struggling with it, we shall find that its terms are transformed, so that in the end we will answer a 
question which we couldn’t properly conceive at the beginning (...). The same contrast exists in our 
evaluations. We can attempt a radical re-evaluation, in which case we may hope that our terms will 
be transformed in the course of it’ (Taylor, 1969, p. 296-298). 
 
By positioning consumer needs in opposition to our responsibility for the use of natural resources 
the principle of sustainability gives far too much weight to our needs as consumers. This is not to 
say that we should deny, neglect or suppress these needs, but to suggest that we could understand 
them differently by revaluating those needs as part of our desires of a more profound nature; our 
desire to live sincerely, our desire to lead meaningful lives, or our desire to realise ourselves as 
caring persons that find fulfilment in their involvement with nature. As these consumer needs are 
reframed within the horizon of existential desires they are likely to change in quality: the need of 
‘saving time’ may transform into a desire to find rest in one’s life and one’s activities. As such, a 
strong qualitative evaluation changes the object of evaluation in such a way that our responsibility 
no longer consists of ‘sticking to our principles’ against immediate inclinations, but in the creation 
of a personal style of involvement with nature that renders beauty and meaning to our life. Thus, the 
conflict between principle and inclination dissolves in favour of a constitutive desire to live 
differently, to be a different person, or to live in a different world. The recent emergence of a Slow 
Food Movement illustrates the social nature of these desires; people get together around shared 
commitments to those practices of farming, craftsmanship and cooking within which our intrinsic 
care for nature is preserved. 
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 If we take seriously this understanding of self-evaluation within the practice of environ-
mental education, we may conclude that it is not appropriate to instruct children in the meta-lan-
guage of sustainability and challenge them to change their behaviour according to its meta-
principles; putting one’s inclinations under the guidance of an abstract ideal of intergenerational 
responsibility. These principles are powerless and meaningless unless they are embodied and 
‘modelled’ by dedicated persons – educators – and integrated in everyday practices. Rather, envi-
ronmental educators should challenge children to explore their present involvement with nature, to 
dwell on the corporal dimension of this involvement and express their experiences in conversation 
with others. Personal stories and autobiographical essays could play a part in this expression. Sub-
sequently, pupils and students question one another’s behaviour and self-expression in terms of the 
motives and desires that are inherent to them. This questioning should not be like a quest for justifi-
cation or mere accounting for the effects of one’s behaviour, but like an existential appeal to each 
other’s (well) being-in-the-world: How do you stand towards the things you care for, the things you 
despise, the things you are highly indignant about, the things you strive after? How do you respond 
to these things and who are you in relation to these things? The practical forms of such a conversa-
tion in schools will be discussed in my alternative proposal for Education for Environmental 
Responsibility. 
 
Primacy of the natural life-world  
In previous analyses on the nature of environmental responsibility we have repeatedly felt the fun-
damental tension between the local experience of nature and the assumption of responsibility for 
global problems of climate change, biodiversity, pollution and degradation. Whereas the sources of 
environmental care and responsibility are located (mainly) within the social life-world, the objects 
of our responsibility are generally identified from a global perspective. Thus, the subject is torn 
between two worlds: care for the natural life-world that is immediately at hand and responsibility 
for the global environment that we can only picture by means of abstract scientific language. One 
way of dealing with this tension is expressed in the environmental phrase ‘Think global, act local’, 
often referred to by advocates of sustainable development. Though it is not exactly clear what 
‘global thinking’ is taken to mean – as it is generally employed without further explanation in an 
apparently self-evident way – it is possible to distillate some of its meaning from the agreements of 
Agenda 21 (1992), in the context of which this slogan is most often used.  
 First of all, the relationship between the local and global dimension of responsibility is 
framed in terms of accountability for the transfer of harmful consequences: the consequences of our 
actions for the environment and well being of people elsewhere and in the future are no longer to be 
‘externalised’ from the calculations that inform local choices about the use of natural resources. 
Second, in Agenda 21 great emphasis is placed on the ‘translation’ of the global language of 
sustainability to local practices and communities. Local governments, institutions, associations and 
individuals are expected to participate in the promotion and implementation of sustainable 
development in a way that meets local needs and interests. Thus, the exact implications of 
sustainable development are not settled in advance, but determined in an ongoing conversation and 
process of adaptation to changing circumstances. Third, on the level of knowledge, the primacy of 
global thinking amounts to an over-all favouring of scientific knowledge. Likewise the relation 
between local and global knowledge is understood in terms of deduction and induction. It is tacitly 
assumed that the kind of knowledge that will enable us to solve environmental problems is causal-
analytic knowledge about the causes and effects of pollution, depletion and degradation. By moni-
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toring the global transfers of these environmental effects in terms of costs and benefits, we will be 
able to extract general laws that can be deduced to local practices of decision making, so that their 
policies are ‘evidence based’, thus advocates of sustainable development assume. 
 Judged against the background of globalisation processes and the ever further reaching 
consequences of human behaviour in a technological age, it is a matter of course that the environ-
mental agenda is partly determined by global concerns. Environmental educators cannot afford to 
resort to mere local concerns in order to create a green Ecotopia, without considering the condition 
of globalisation. Within the practice of environmental education, children have to be sensitised to 
the ways in which their involvement with the natural life-world is being regulated by social, eco-
nomic, technological and political structures and institutions. However, I do object to the uni-linear 
and deductive conceptualisation of the relationship between local and global concerns within the 
leading language of sustainable development. If ‘global thinking’ implies that local concerns are to 
be framed in global terms of sustainable development, if ‘global thinking’ amounts to a narrow 
ideal of being accountable for the global consequences of one’s actions against the background of 
fixed standards, or if ‘global thinking’ is about positioning oneself as a footprint-holder in a global 
system of interdependencies, then local concerns are conceptualised as a mere function of global 
concerns. My analysis of the relationship between particularity and generality in political judgement 
(from the perspective of Arendt) in chapter two gives rise to a reverse picture. Local care for our 
natural life-world precedes global responsibility. According to this aesthetic understanding of po-
litical judgement, particular concerns for our life-world cannot be subsumed under a general rule, 
but the concerns themselves reveal a general idea that we will never be able to articulate exhaus-
tively.  
 In this context, Arendt points at the exemplary validity and power of judgements within 
political discourse. Judgements that appeal to particular events sometimes reveal a strong general 
idea that cannot be expressed otherwise. Thus, particular events in recent history have fuelled public 
debate on environmental issues and shaped our awareness of environmental problems in an un-
precedented way. Accordingly, the intrinsic values that are at stake in a particular local concern of 
environmental care will be repudiated if they are immediately subsumed under a global rationality 
of accountability. Intrinsic qualities are preserved only if our thinking proceeds from the particular 
to the general. Thus, ideally, ‘anticipated communication’ starts from within those local discourses 
in which the particular significance immanent to this concern appears. As local concerns raise 
questions of a more general nature, we move on by anticipating wider circles of (imagined) 
audience as well, however, without ignoring our initial audience. Eventually, this ‘enlarged way of 
thinking’ may touch upon global issues of sustainability and development, but this is not necessarily 
so. Some concerns can be dealt with on a community scale or within national arenas of political dis-
course. Thus, in a sense, we should always start off by ‘thinking locally’, taking multiple perspec-
tives of all participants involved in a particular concern about the natural environment in order to 
highlight what is immanent about this particular concern. If these local problems turn out to be of 
such a nature, that their significance exceeds the limits of the local discourse community (i.e. that 
the problems are of a strong systemic nature), then obviously, action and reflection on a more 
general scale is necessary. Thus, the rate of generality depends on the exemplary validity of a par-
ticular concern.  
 Here, I will outline my criticism of the ‘primacy of the global’ more precisely along the 
lines of two particular objections: the first objection concerns the privileged status granted to scien-
tific knowledge in the curriculum, and the second objection amounts to the inherent pursuit of a 
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consumerist freedom of choice. Simultaneously I will suggest an alternative approach to these is-
sues.  
 In the first place, global discourses on environmental problems as well as school curricula 
are mainly informed by scientific knowledge of nature, thus privileging causal explanatory 
knowledge above other forms of knowledge, such as life-world knowledge we possess through 
bodily contact with the world; a way of knowing that ‘senses the immanent in the particular’ (Bon-
nett, 2003, p. 649-650). Obviously, we cannot do without science and technology in the approach of 
environmental problems, since most of these problems only become visible by means of scientific 
methods or instruments. But the fact that environmental problems can be identified by science does 
not imply that these problems can be fully comprehended by means of science. Rather, there are 
different ways of knowing that are equally valuable. Some of the alternative ways of knowing may 
even be regarded as more profound, such as the pre-reflexive bodily understanding of our natural 
life-world Merleau-Ponty speaks of. This understanding of nature is primordial against the scientific 
abstractions that are authoritative within environmental discourse. Scientific knowledge is neces-
sarily derivative of this primordial acquaintanceship, hence Merleau-Ponty. Because of this deriva-
tive nature, environmental educators should be vigilant with scientific concepts. It is for instance 
important to note that the ‘globe’ as such is highly counterintuitive to us, as Spivak argues: ‘You 
walk from one end of the earth to the other and it remains flat. It is a scientific abstraction inacces-
sible to experience. No one lives in the global village (...). My question, therefore: In what interest, 
to regulate what sort of relationships, is the globe evoked?’ (Cited from Bonnett, 2003). For many, 
the global perspective seems to hold promises of manipulability: by taking an Archimedean stand-
point from outside of the globe, it is like we are in the position to regulate the earth’s natural 
processes and determine everyone’s place and responsibility accordingly. Obviously, these 
promises of global engineering are illusive and express a misplaced feeling of arrogance and con-
trol.  
 Recognition of the derivative nature of scientific knowledge gives cause to a revaluation of 
the status of scientific knowledge within the school curriculum in general, and practices of envi-
ronmental education in particular. If we understand knowledge about nature as a mere function of 
the active knowing subject, then we lose the intuitive sense of nature as an independent part of our 
life-world and a source of imagination and beauty (cf. Arendt, 1958b, p 257-267). The monopolisa-
tion of our understanding of the environmental crisis by science should be counterbalanced by 
meaningful life-world experiences in order to elicit a response of care and commitment within chil-
dren. Unfortunately, translation from life-world knowledge to scientific knowledge and vice versa 
appear to be a perilous undertaking. According to Margadant, these problems are due to the fact that 
children tend to have a biotic view of nature – composed of green plants, trees and animals – as op-
posed to an abiotic view of the environment, supported by a grey picture of plumes of smoke in the 
air and toxic waste in river water. These two views are separated from one another, so that most 
children hardly recognise the interconnections between their practical concerns of nature and ab-
stract concerns of the environment. In order to establish a transfer between life-world knowledge 
and scientific knowledge that goes both ways, Margadant suggests that it is important to 
acknowledge the primacy of the life-world. Her research shows that, when children are confronted 
with new phenomena, they resort to ‘life-world thinking’ before they move on to more abstract 
scientific language. So, only if they get the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the new by 
dwelling, comparing and reflecting on these new phenomena in the midst of familiar life-world 
phenomena, are children more likely to internalise scientific understanding of natural processes and 
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environmental problems. As such, the natural life-world operates as the very substratum of scien-
tific knowledge (Margadant, 1998).  
 A similar suggestion is made by Bonnett, who equally underlines the ‘priority of the local’: 
‘(...) for the global to achieve significance it needs to be affectively as well as cognitively rooted in 
the local. This means that what is at issue is no longer simply a set of international generalisations 
produced by disengaged rationality, but the carrying forward of an acquaintanceship with the local 
into the global’ (Bonnett, 2003, p. 655). By familiarising ourselves with ‘the global’ scientific 
knowledge becomes part of our life-world. This familiarisation does not proceed along the lines of 
deduction from general principle to particular knowledge. Rather, it emerges in a different kind of 
generalisation from the particular ‘here’ and ‘now’ to ‘there’ and ‘then’, drawing on the strength of 
imagination. Thus, scientific concepts like ‘life cycles’, ‘acid rain’, ‘greenhouse effect’ and ‘food 
pyramid’ are expressive in such a way that they have rapidly become part of our everyday conver-
sations and expressions. Other terms like ‘photosynthesis’ and ‘eutrophication’ have been less suc-
cessful in pervading ordinary language, but perhaps they can be relabelled in more expressive 
terms, so that they speak to us non-scientists in a more appealing sense. 
 In the second place, I would like to counter the ‘primacy of the global’ by questioning the 
inherent adherence to a consumerist freedom of choice. As previously indicated, by taking an Ar-
chimedean standpoint from outside of the globe, we do not only harbour the illusion that we are in 
the position to regulate the earth’s natural processes. Moreover, this position also leads us to think 
that it is possible to determine everyone’s place and responsibility accordingly; from our global 
knowledge about the limits of the earth’s resources we can deductively calculate the maximum use 
of natural resources per individual, i.e. our ecological footprint. Unfortunately, global processes of 
atmospheric relations and climate change are far too complex and unpredictable to be monitored in 
this way. Having acknowledged this, many scientists and environmentalists nevertheless seem to 
anticipate this ideal of transfer from a global definition of the environmental crisis to the settlement 
of individual margins of consumption. However, as long as evidence is not sufficiently firm, these 
settlements cannot be imposed onto us without conflicting with our basic liberty rights. Further-
more, it is important to underline that global discourses are marked by scientific language in tandem 
with the global language of free market capitalism. This means that efforts to organise environ-
mental responsibility on a global level are distributed along the lines of liberty rights and consumer 
freedom. These rights are envisaged in terms of freedom of choice. Thus, global institutions like the 
Worldbank and IMF require national governments to privatise their energy markets, so that people 
can choose whether they opt for sustainable energy or regular energy generated by fossil fuels. The 
main idea behind these liberalisations (often implying or resulting in privatisations) is that green 
products have to prove themselves by generating their own public. 
 The rhetoric of sustainable choice promises individuals that they will be able to realise their 
personal freedom by making informed choices in accordance with their own preferences and self-
chosen standards of sustainability. However, in a free market environment such freedom of choice 
comes to operate as a disguised vehicle of uncritical self-restraint, since – as indicated earlier – we 
are only able to choose insofar as we subject ourselves to the regime of a consumerist choice indus-
try. In such a global system our ‘free choices’ are regulated in directions that optimise its performa-
tivity. Thus, we are made co-responsible for ‘choices’ that were enforced by the system. Here, the 
‘self-as-a-reflexive-chooser’ has become subject to ideological manipulation. This is what I would 
like to call the hidden assumption of manipulative citizenship, underpinning many discourses of 
sustainable development. If politicians, policy-makers and captains of industry fail to internalise the 
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environmental costs in the prices of products and services, they tend to call for an education that 
teaches citizens to choose for the option that is officially labelled as the most ‘sustainable’ one. In 
this light, the appeal to ‘think global, act local’ may be understood as appealing to an uncritical ap-
plication of globally defined principles on a local level. ‘All in all you’re just another brick in the 
wall’ (Pink Floyd). As such, Education for Sustainable Development easily comes to serve as a tool 
to shirk responsibility in the hands of those political authorities and institutions who fail to take en-
vironmental responsibility themselves. Furthermore, our critical horizon is being narrowed by dis-
tracting attention from the political issue to the private issue of personal choice. 
 An alternative counter-practice to this top down approach to environmental education – 
operating as a vehicle for the promotion of sustainable development – is most likely to emerge from 
the world-wide exchange among pupils, students and scholars on the internet, who work on envi-
ronmental issues in their own region or country. Rather than being some kind of abstract ideal, in-
ternational educational projects like Globe (Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Envi-
ronment)46 and Codename Future47 are supporting pupils to investigate the quality of soil, air, water 
and vegetation in their school environment, and share their findings with scientists and children all 
over the world (cf. Wijffels, 2004, p. 18-19). By sharing their ‘local’ knowledge and experiences, 
they will be able to explore the global conditions of environmental responsibility. What are the in-
stitutional possibilities and constraints for environmental action? Through joint reflection on local 
practices, possibilities for collective action may open up. Thus, new forms of solidarity have 
emerged around the anti-globalisation movement, based on shifting coalitions of environmentally 
spirited (future) citizens who met on the web and joined powers in particular political struggles. 
Different from collectives based on a universally shared ontological condition – the working class, 
women, and gays – these collectives originate from a ‘groundless solidarity’, thus Edwards and 
Usher argue. Participants are brought together on the basis of a shared commitment concerning a 
particular issue, but without explicit claims to inclusiveness. With respect to another political issue, 
participants might just as well proceed in divergent ways again, thereby making room for new coali-
tions. Thus, coalitions and meeting places grow more contingent and global processes of political 
participation will become less predictable. As soon as one starts acting in global affairs one will be 
immersed in the capricious dynamics of global politics. As a consequence of this ‘immersion’ in a 
complex and interminable web of meanings and power relations, the agent loses control over the 
meaning of his words and actions. The consequences of our actions proceed in directions we can 
not possibly predict. Calculating what the effects of local action will be on global decision making 
will become ever more difficult. Therefore, once more, imagination will have to do the job (cf. Ed-
wards & Usher, 2000, p. 134; Arendt, 1958b, p. 236-247). 
 However, as outlined in dialogue with Arendt, environmental education should not be de-
signed to educate environmental activists: ‘Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in 
every child, education must be conservative’ (Arendt, 1958b, p. 510). Moreover, educators are to 
familiarise children with the problems that threaten our shared world as part of their introduction 
into that world, thus Arendt argues. Only when educators refuse to take responsibility for these 
worldly problems, and take refuge in utopias, do risks of indoctrination and manipulation lie in 
wait. Therefore, it is important to familiarise future citizens with the global politics of sustainable 
development and the neo-liberal free market-policies. It is in this world that children will have to 
                                                      
46 www.globenederland.nl 
47 www.codenamefuture.nl 
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develop their own stance towards the things in life they value. Their ability to make judgements is 
only likely to develop within a world of contrasts, oppositions and imbalances of power. This ar-
gument for introducing children into our present world with all its potential and all its flaws should 
not be understood as a call of commitment to neutrality. On the contrary, in the way educators act 
and teach they inescapably express what they care for in this world and the ideals by which they 
live (cf. Carr, 2004, p. 221). But their caring should always be presented towards children as a 
question mark, as a possible mode of being, as an appeal to make up their own minds, rather than an 
educational effort to transmit our caring commitments and ideals to them. In many cases this may 
be the result, but transmission of ideals should never be the intention of those educators who sin-
cerely claim to educate to foster independence of judgement. In this spirit, Heyting argues that ‘of-
fering ideals to children does not make them ideals for children (...). In order to become an ideal for 
a child, she needs to develop a personal, existential, commitment to it; she needs to (re)create the 
ideal as such. Making sure she feels free and stimulated to do so, seems the overriding aim with 
respect to the role of aims in education. Too much attention to the substantive ideals that educators 
prefer – however thoroughly tested – may even hinder children from creating their own, if only for 
fear of disappointing their educators’ (Heyting, 2004, p. 246) 
 It is important to reiterate my point that the proclaimed primacy of the life-world does not 
imply that we can simply ignore the globalising processes and structural conditions of environ-
mental responsibility. On the contrary, we should reflect thoroughly on these global dimensions and 
extend the limits of children’s life-world in ever wider circles towards the global world, so that they 
become familiarised with worthwhile practices on the other side of the globe and imagine what 
‘goods’ are at stake in the environmental problems that we identify. To be more precise, there are 
three particular ways in which the tensions between local and global concerns are to be dealt with in 
environmental education. First, children are persuaded to consider the consequences of our present 
(in)actions towards global processes of climate change, depletion, pollution and degradation and 
future practices here and elsewhere, not primarily by means of calculation, but through imagination. 
Second, children are stimulated to explore the ways in which their actions are regulated – con-
strained and made possible – by global institutional structures, forces, policies and free markets. In 
this context Giddens speaks of ‘utopian realism’: examining the prevailing institutional practices for 
immanent but neglected and as (yet) unused possibilities to give new impulses to our caring respon-
sibility for the natural life-world (Jansen, 1994, p. 258; Giddens, 1990). Third, by making use of the 
possibilities offered by internet (e-mail groups, e-learning, e-meeting, e-publishing, e-government) 
children are inspired to share their local experiences and results of environmental exploration and 
action with children, scientists and politicians elsewhere. In this triple sense, children move from 
the local life-world to the global environment and backwards in ways that do not privilege particu-
lar forms of knowledge or ways of being in the world.  
 
Education for Sustainable Development revisited 
Though it is not my purpose to refute the language of sustainable development as such – because I 
think it has proved its worth by bringing together disparate stakeholders and providing them with 
powerful incentives to cooperate in contexts where institutional interests conflict – I do think it is 
necessary to move beyond the current exclusive framing of any appeal to our caring responsibility 
for the natural environmental within the language of sustainable development. Previous elaborations 
on the dimensions of child’s play, self-expression and the primacy of the natural life-world, allow 
me to specify my objections against the framework of ESD in more practical-educational terms. 
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First, the dominant framework of ESD tends to underestimate the fundamental importance of a 
playful interaction with nature. Thus, it fails to make room for a personal sensitisation to the appeals 
arising from our intimate involvement with the natural environment. After all, it is through emer-
gent acquaintanceship with their natural life-world that children develop a caring commitment to 
protect, sustain and preserve nature. 
 Second, within the framework of ESD, the process of taking responsibility is generally 
understood as a matter of appealing to personal accountability, i.e. holding one accountable for the 
consequences of one’s actions, measured in terms of pre-specified margins of consumption. By po-
sitioning consumer needs in opposition to our responsibility for the use of natural resources, the 
principle of sustainability gives far too much weight to our needs as consumers. As such, propo-
nents of ESD have, willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the promotion of a morality of austerity 
and self-restraint, as if they want to say: all things in life that are pleasant, comfortable, tasty or ex-
citing are bad for the environment, and should therefore be subject to rigorous self-discipline. Such 
a strong appeal to self-restraint and self-discipline fails to touch upon our intrinsic motivation, but 
instead primarily trades on our controlling responses, fuelled by fear. In our aesthetic experience of 
nature, on the contrary, we are able to transcend the inner conflict between virtue and desire, by 
giving in to the urge of self-expression. 
 Third, the framework of ESD fails to connect global concepts of responsibility to our local 
caring and acquaintanceship with nature. By advocating the priority of ‘global thinking’, ESD 
seems to privilege or favour those forms of knowledge, that are informed by scientific and eco-
nomic discourses on environmental problems above other forms of knowledge, such as poetic 
knowledge and life-world knowledge we possess through bodily contact with the world around us. 
By narrowing environmental education in the curriculum to a hardcore of predominantly causal-
analytic knowledge, ESD largely ignores the primordial nature of the life-world as our existential 
source of knowledge, values, attitudes and caring commitments. Recognition of the derivative na-
ture of scientific knowledge gives cause to a revaluation of the status of scientific knowledge within 
the school curriculum in general, and practices of environmental education in particular. 
 While I feel sympathetic towards those critics who have broadened the meaning of the 
leading concepts of sustainable development, sustainability and development, I do not share their 
(self-) evaluation; I do not believe that it is within the power of an individual author to intervene in 
our common use of language in such a way it gets all the participants in a particular practice to un-
derstand sustainable development in a radically different way. Those introducing a new meaning of 
sustainability and arguing that their version of sustainability has nothing to do with sustainable de-
velopment, overestimate their power. Authors who oppose the common meaning of ‘sustainability’ 
or sustainable development cannot simply choose to use the word in their own proposed new 
meaning without any consideration for the common use of language within a particular practice or 
language community on which the reception of their terms depend. It is obvious that they can, but 
their words will be not be understood in a way that reflects the author’s intentions. Their words will 
be framed in terms of the dominant discourse. For instance, I have outlined that the central concept 
of ‘development’ can hardly escape connotations derived from the free market economy. Couched 
in such terms, economic development is immediately interpreted as economic growth, which in its 
turn is equated to the maximisation of profits and capital accumulation. For this reason I do not sub-
scribe to the proposals of those who suggest that we should understand sustainable development in 
a completely different way than is commonly defined. 
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Education for Environmental Responsibility: a proposal 
My criticism of the underpinnings of the current framework of ESD gave rise to an alternative un-
derstanding of environmental responsibility and education, as previously expressed in terms of play, 
expression and the primacy of the natural life-world. However, suggesting an alternative under-
standing of an educational practice is one thing, proposing a change in practice is quite another and 
requires a different kind of knowledge. My research is not primarily concerned with the empirical 
practice of environmental education. Consequently, I lack the empirical knowledge about the edu-
cational activities that are actually taking place under the labels of environmental education and 
ESD in everyday school life; this knowledge is prerequisite for any authoritative suggestion of 
practical change in environmental education. However, I have closely studied the dominant frame-
works(s) of sustainable development in which politicians, policy-makers, environmentalists and 
educators evaluate the activities in the field of environmental education and design new ones. My 
philosophical criticism on these frameworks has informed my proposal for an alternative frame-
work. As with any conceptual framework, this proposal does not directly amount to practical 
change but to a change of understanding and evaluation. While such a change is likely to bring 
about practical changes, this is not necessarily so.  
 It is against the background of my educational and philosophical criticism on the dominant 
language of sustainable development that I want to present an alternative framework for environ-
mental education: Education for Environmental Responsibility. The nature and outline of this pro-
posed framework is generally in line with the conclusions of my philosophical inquiry but, as with 
any practical proposal, it is not determined by these conclusions, and surely not the only possible 
realisation of its suggestions in concreto. More exemplifications would be possible. Nevertheless I 
feel that philosophers of education should not only aim for rigorous philosophical analysis, but 
should, eventually, stick out their necks and express, as engaged educationalists, what they stand 
for48. 
 Within the framework of Education for Environmental Responsibility environmental educa-
tion is understood to be an introduction into those collective practices in which our involvement 
with the natural environment is somehow captured and expressed in a way that inspires children to 
recognise the things that sustain our bodily-perceptive sense of aesthetic fulfilment as caring beings 
in the world. To be more precise, this introduction will sensitise children in a playful way to the ex-
perience of an appeal to care that originates from our practical involvement with the natural envi-
ronment. Moreover, this introduction will familiarise children with stories, histories, games and vo-
                                                      
48 In general terms, my proposal is probably similar to the proposal of Lucie Sauvé, labelled Education for the 
Development of Responsible Societies (as suggested in Sauvé, 1996, 1998 & 2002). At least we share a search for a 
different understanding of environmental responsibility: ‘We should first distinguish between two conceptions of 
responsibility. There is the narrow one, associated with caution, respect, and the application of rules in a legalist 
framework; this is a shallow responsibility, which is instrumental and can be seen as having the characteristics of 
modernity with its individualist and anthropocentric focus. However, there is also a deeper responsibility or integral 
responsibility which shares some of the characteristics of reconstructive post modernity: a union of subject and object, 
of humans and nature (fundamental solidarity), between being and doing (authenticity), as well as consideration of the 
context of places and cultures where this responsibility is exercised. This second conception leads us to clarify the close 
connections between responsibility, consciousness, lucidity, reflectivity, freedom, autonomy, authenticity, commitment, 
courage, solidarity and care’ (Sauvé,1998a). Furthermore, about environmental education she writes that: ‘EE 
contributes to the development of responsible societies: an ethics of fundamental responsibility, that is significantly 
richer than the essentially minimalist ethics of sustainability (“so long as it lasts” or “so long as we survive”). The ethics 
of responsibility goes beyond a legalist and civic approach to rights and duties; it calls for a sense of responsibility for 
one’s own being, knowledge and action, which implies commitment, lucidity, authenticity, solicitude and courage’ 
(Sauvé, 2002). 
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cabularies that challenge them to express their care for the natural life-world in a personal way. 
Furthermore, this introduction will challenge children to explore the ways in which their caring 
responsibility for the natural life-world is being regulated by social structures of a political, eco-
nomic or cultural kind – including both constraints and opportunities. The identification of the so-
cial conditions of environmental responsibility may inspire children to act or speak in public dis-
course, aiming for a change of our collective practices of involvement with nature. As such, Educa-
tion for Environmental Responsibility aims to inspire children to develop a personal style of in-
volvement with nature, simultaneously expressing their personal care in a way that brings about the 
promise of something new in public discourse on environmental issues. 
 
As a curricular practice within elementary and secondary school education, it is suggested that en-
vironmental education consist of four types of activities. These activities are closely connected to 
each other, as represented by a matrix, positioning an axis of activities over and against an axis of 
loci: 
 
Activity/locus Local Global 
Expression Nature education  Exchange and participation 
Evaluation The process of taking responsi-
bility 
Global citizenship education 
 
 
Nature education serves as an umbrella term for educational activities taking place in a natural en-
vironment or with natural things (non-finished natural materials) that provide children with the op-
portunity to develop an intimate involvement with their natural life-world as expressed in a personal 
style of caring. Since nature education should enable children to follow their playful responses and 
use their free imagination, these activities are organised around open assignments and challenges, 
leaving maximum room for responsive exploration; rather than asking children to look out for a 
spider web and draw it, educators challenge them to look out for traces of insects, and show them to 
others.  
 
Whereas the purpose of nature education is to sensitise children to the appeal originating from their 
caring involvement with nature, the process of taking responsibility is meant to stimulate children to 
reflect on their caring responses within everyday school practices and make them co-responsible for 
collective practices. Pupils are involved in the practical ways of dealing with garbage, the prepara-
tion of school lunch, the cleaning of the schoolyard, the organisation of school trips, the preserva-
tion of traffic rules for parents bringing and taking their children by car, as well as the collective 
evaluation of these practices within traditional school disciplines (ranging from history to economy 
and physics). In this sense, the process of taking responsibility is a matter of collective evaluation of 
shared practices by questioning each other’s style of conduct and articulating the common codes of 
conduct sustaining these caring practices.  
 
Then, there is the educational practice of exchange and participation. As children shift their atten-
tion from the school environment to abroad, the first step in ‘carrying forward our acquaintanceship 
with the local into the global’ can be made by expressing and sharing local experiences of environ-
mental exploration together with children, scientists and politicians abroad. The possibilities offered 
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by internet (e-mail groups, e-learning, e-meeting, e-publishing, e-government) provide them with 
the media to communicate with people from all over the world without immediate interference of 
official institutions and authorities. By exchanging local knowledge and experiences, children ex-
plore the global conditions of environmental responsibility. What are the institutional possibilities 
and constraints for environmental action? Thus, possibilities for collective action may open up and 
new forms of solidarity emerge around environmental issues on a global level (emission politics, 
fair international trade, energy policies, rules of global transport, development aid, water manage-
ment, and agricultural support). 
 
Finally, more or less disciplined reflection on previous experiences of international exchange and 
environmental action is likely to take place within global citizenship education. As such, this 
reflection will be sustained by curricular knowledge of environmental theory and international poli-
tics. Furthermore, environmental issues are discussed in close connection with issues of develop-
ment, economic policies, social policies, international trade and current events in foreign affairs. 
Thus, joint reflection takes place within classroom discussion, structured around themes that pupils 
bring forward together with established curricular themes. Pupils are stimulated to examine the pre-
vailing institutional practices for immanent but neglected and as (yet) unused possibilities to give 
new impulses to our caring responsibility for the natural life-world. However, the precise content, 
agenda and organisational form of these discussions cannot be settled in advance. Deliberation 
about these preliminary matters are the core responsibility of the pupils themselves, thus creating a 
democratic space in which they experience the pleasures and burdens of political action: a space for 
personal expression and judgement.  
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 samenvatting 
 
vanwege ons mens-zijn 
 
Een filosofisch onderzoek naar vertogen over milieu-educatie vanuit het perspectief van duur-
zame ontwikkeling en een zorgende verantwoordelijkheid voor de natuurlijke leefomgeving. 
 
 
Kinderen zijn in een wereld geworpen die een strijd voert om haar eigen voortbestaan. In zekere zin 
heeft het voortbestaan van de menselijke leefwereld altijd op het spel gestaan, maar nu zijn het de 
creaties van wereldbewoners zelf die haar toekomstige bestaansvoorwaarden in gevaar brengen. 
Zowel lokale problemen van vervuiling als mondiale problemen van klimaatverandering, afne-
mende biodiversiteit, natuurdegradatie en uitputting laten zien dat mensen uitermate kwetsbaar zijn 
voor de gevolgen van hun eigen gedrag. Gealarmeerd door desastreuze toekomstscenario’s worden 
sinds enkele decennia pogingen ondernomen om menselijk gedrag en gedragsstructuren te veran-
deren opdat deze minder schadelijk zullen zijn voor de kwaliteit van onze leefwereld. Op uiteenlo-
pende manieren vinden deze maatschappelijke praktijken van milieubeleid hun beslag in opvoeding 
en onderwijs. Met de geleidelijke inleiding van kinderen in de volwassen wereld worden ook zij 
vertrouwd gemaakt met collectieve pogingen om verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de kwaliteit 
van onze natuurlijke leefwereld. Wanneer kinderen op enigerlei wijze bij deze zorg voor de natuur-
lijke leefwereld worden betrokken spreken we van milieu-educatie.  
 In tijden van structurele ecologische veronachtzaming en ‘milieumoeheid’ is het vormgeven 
van milieu-educatie echter een hachelijke onderneming. Al te gemakkelijk verwordt milieu-educatie 
tot voertuig voor hooggespannen ambities en idealen die volwassen burgers, consumenten, politici 
en beleidsmakers niet waar kunnen of willen maken. Zo dreigt in de eerste plaats een afschuiving 
van ecologische verantwoordelijkheid naar toekomstige generaties; kinderen worden verantwoor-
delijk gemaakt voor problemen die in de eerste plaats een zorg van volwassenen dienen te zijn. In 
de tweede plaats dreigt milieu-educatie een instrument te worden in handen van overheden en in-
stituties die draagvlak creëren voor hun beleid en aanpak van milieuproblemen zonder rekening te 
houden met de mogelijkerwijs nieuwe inbreng van kinderen en jongeren. Ook hier wordt de nieuwe 
generatie gezien als bouwsteen voor een door volwassenen gedroomde toekomst. 
 Alvorens ik de vraagstelling en werkwijze van dit onderzoek nader bepaal werp ik in de 
inleiding een blik op de recente geschiedenis van milieu-educatie en aanverwante leergebieden te-
gen de achtergrond van veranderende maatschappelijke condities. Want als er iets blijvend kenmer-
kend is voor milieu-educatie als leergebied dan is het de snelle opeenvolging van nieuwe para-
digma’s, programma’s en perspectieven die alle pretenderen te breken met de voorgaande praktijk.  
Sinds volwassenen hun verhouding tot de omringende natuur als problematisch ervaren, 
wordt deze verhouding als pedagogische opdracht geduid. Natuurbeschermers als Heimans en 
Thijsse stellen aan het begin van de vorige eeuw al vast dat moderne stadskinderen te zeer van de 
natuur vervreemd raken en pleiten voor een realistisch natuuronderwijs dat hen daarmee weer in 
aanraking brengt door hen te laten ervaren ‘dat alles wat groeit en bloeit ons toch telkens weer 
boeit’. Ook volgens de natuurbeschermingsorganisaties die in het voetspoor van deze heren natuur-
educatie gestalte geven liggen kennis en liefde voor de natuur in het verlengde van elkaar.  
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Met het opbloeien van een milieubeweging en ecologisch crisisbewustzijn in de jaren ze-
ventig groeit de overtuiging dat opvoeding en onderwijs een bijdrage moeten leveren aan een maat-
schappelijke aanpak van deze problemen: kinderen moeten niet alleen worden opgevoed tot natuur-
liefhebbers maar ook tot milieuvriendelijke en kritische burgers. Deze vorming krijgt nu een meer 
politiek en activistisch karakter. Begin jaren negentig is het de Nederlandse overheid die het initia-
tief overneemt en de basis legt voor een actief landelijk beleid, gericht op het versterken van ons 
milieubewustzijn en het bevorderen van milieuvriendelijk gedrag, niet in de laatste plaats om een 
draagvlak te creëren voor haar eigen milieubeleid. In het onderwijs, maar ook in wijk- en opbouw-
werk, jeugd- en jongerenwerk worden de contouren zichtbaar van wat Natuur- en Milieu-educatie 
(NME) is gaan heten. Onder deze vlag wordt gestreefd naar de integratie van natuureducatie en mi-
lieu-educatie. Sindsdien geldt NME als een van de vakoverstijgende aandachtsgebieden in het ba-
sis- en voortgezet onderwijs, en is als zodanig verankerd in de kerndoelen en eindtermen. Maar er is 
ook kritiek. NME zou eenzijdig in dienst worden gesteld van gedragsverandering en het creëren van 
draagvlak voor overheidsbeleid. Om met deze ‘onkritische’ traditie te breken wordt aan het einde 
van de jaren negentig een steeds prominentere plaats gegeven aan het streven naar duurzame ont-
wikkeling. Hiermee benadrukken beleidsmakers dat milieu-educatie een gemeenschappelijk ‘zoek-
proces’ behelst. Daarnaast verbreedt de inhoudelijke aandacht zich naar duurzaamheid èn ontwik-
keling: milieuvraagstukken worden beschouwd in samenhang met mondiale vraagstukken van ar-
moede, ongelijkheid en ontwikkeling. Het voorlopige sluitstuk van deze ontwikkeling is het nieuwe 
beleidsprogramma Leren voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling (2004-2007) en de afkondiging van een 
United Nations Decade on Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2015).  
 Zo worden doel en inhoud van milieu-educatie steeds gekleurd door de heersende 
maatschappelijke praktijken en denkbeelden over natuur en milieu. In zijn algemeenheid valt op dat 
milieu-educatie in de jaren negentig steeds meer in de greep raakt van het mondiaal-politieke ideaal 
van duurzame ontwikkeling. Duurzame ontwikkeling werd door Brundlandt (1987) gedefinieerd als 
‘een ontwikkeling die voorziet in de behoeften van de huidige generatie zonder daarmee voor toe-
komstige generaties de mogelijkheid in gevaar te brengen om ook in hun behoeften te voorzien’ 
(WCED, 1987, p. 12). Van burgers wordt gevraagd in hun omgang met de natuur rekening te hou-
den met de gevolgen voor het leefmilieu van mensen ‘elders’ en ‘later’. Daartoe dienen zij bewust 
te worden van het persoonlijke beslag dat zij met hun huidige consumptiegedrag leggen op de na-
tuurlijke hulpbronnen. Een afwenteling van de schadelijke gevolgen van ons handelen in de ruimte 
of tijd wordt door het duurzaamheidsbeginsel afgewezen. Toch is Leren voor Duurzame Ontwikke-
ling (LDO) niet enkel gericht op gedragsverandering, maar evenzeer op de sociale structuren en 
verbanden waarbinnen mensen keuzes maken en waarbinnen zich handelingsperspectieven ontvou-
wen.  
 Binnen het dominante perspectief van LDO tekent zich momenteel een tegenstelling af tus-
sen twee visies op de verhouding tussen duurzame ontwikkeling en educatie. In de eerste plaats is er 
de zogenaamde ‘positivistische visie’, volgens welke LDO als beleidsinstrument moet worden inge-
zet ter bevordering van het politiek-maatschappelijke beleidsstreven naar duurzame ontwikkeling. 
LDO dient het gedrag, de houding en het milieubewustzijn van individuele (toekomstige) burgers 
om te buigen in overeenstemming met het ideaal van duurzame ontwikkeling en daarmee bij te dra-
gen aan een groter draagvlak voor de integratie van duurzaamheid in praktisch beleid. Aldus zou het 
succes van LDO af te lezen zijn aan veranderingen in gedragspatronen en consumptieniveaus. In de 
tweede plaats onderscheidt men een ‘constructivistische visie’. Volgens aanhangers van deze visie 
maakt het begrippenkader van duurzame ontwikkeling een zinvolle gedachtewisseling over actuele 
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thema’s van duurzaamheid en ontwikkeling mogelijk, zonder een inhoudelijke gedragsmoraal voor 
te schrijven. Duurzame ontwikkeling moet veeleer als agenda worden begrepen. Wat een duurzame 
ontwikkeling precies inhoudt staat niet vast, maar wordt op lokaal niveau door uiteenlopende be-
trokkenen bepaald: door consumenten, producenten, politici en alle anderen die zich een bepaald 
probleem aantrekken en bereid zijn om te zoeken naar een gemeenschappelijke probleemdefinitie. 
Zo kenmerkt het streven naar een duurzame ontwikkeling zich door een voortdurende dialoog en 
collectieve afweging van sociaal-culturele, ecologische en economische belangen. Duurzame ont-
wikkeling behelst dus geen vaststaand ideaal of vooropgesteld einddoel maar een ‘afwegingsme-
chanisme’ of ‘zoeklicht’. Het afwegen van de verschillende belangen maakt deel uit van een maat-
schappelijk leerproces. Door ‘al doende te leren en al lerende te doen’ ontwikkelen mensen de com-
petenties, waarden en kennis die nodig zijn om te participeren aan een duurzame ontwikkeling.  
De probleemstellingen die richting geven aan mijn onderzoek ontspringen aan deze ideolo-
gische tegenstelling. Twee specifieke strijdpunten tussen de positivistische en constructivistische 
visie vormen mijn focus: ten eerste het vraagstuk van intergenerationeel burgerschap, ten tweede 
het vraagstuk van intrinsieke waarde en zorg voor de natuurlijke leefomgeving.  
 
Vanwege ons burger-zijn 
Inherent aan de idee van duurzame ontwikkeling is de veronderstelling dat we als burgers deelheb-
ben aan een wereldgemeenschap die zich uitstrekt over meerdere generaties. Het duurzaamheids-
ideaal vraagt ons om het hedendaagse gebruik en verbruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen te recht-
vaardigen tegenover de hypothetische aanspraken van toekomstige generaties. Verschillen tussen de 
positivistische en constructivistische visie in casu hebben betrekking op de wijze waarop burgers in 
hun oordelen en handelen geacht worden recht te doen aan de vermeende behoeften, belangen en 
rechten van toekomstige generaties. Volgens de positivistische visie is het mogelijk en zinvol om 
voorafgaande aan specifieke oordeelssituaties te bepalen wat de basale behoeften van toekomstigen 
zijn en welke grenzen het recht op toekomstige behoeftebevrediging oplegt aan ons huidige gebruik 
en verbruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen: energie en grondstoffen. Aldus kunnen wetenschappers, 
beleidsmakers en andere deskundigen de grenzen van onze ‘milieugebruiksruimte’ nauwkeurig 
vaststellen in overeenstemming met een beginsel van intergenerationele rechtvaardigheid. Binnen 
praktijken van milieu-educatie zouden toekomstige burgers inzicht moeten verwerven in deze mon-
diale en intergenerationele verbanden, opdat zij de gedragsvoorschriften die daaruit volgen ter harte 
zullen nemen. Aansporen tot ecologische verantwoordelijkheid is hier voornamelijk een kwestie 
van uitleggen, overtuigen en toepassen.  
 Volgens aanhangers van de constructivistische visie is het zowel onmogelijk als onwenselijk 
om de inhoud van duurzame ontwikkeling als ideaal van milieuvriendelijk handelen vast te stellen, 
zonder daarin rekenschap te geven van de perspectieven van betrokkenen in een specifieke oor-
deelssituatie. Terwijl de positivistische visie vertrouwt op het rentmeesterschap van deskundigen, 
vertrouwt de constructivistische visie op het lokale proces van deliberatie. Burgers worden 
aangespoord om met elkaar te onderzoeken welke omstandigheden hen in staat stellen dan wel be-
lemmeren om zorg te dragen voor hun natuurlijke omgeving op een wijze die zij als ‘eigen’ en 
‘authentiek’ ervaren. Milieuvriendelijk burgerschap impliceert hier niet zozeer het in acht nemen 
van burgerlijke rechten en plichten, maar een actieve deelname aan het publieke discours over pro-
blemen die onze natuurlijke leefwereld aangaan. Onduidelijk is echter hoe binnen deze visie de hy-
pothetische stem van toekomstige generaties moeten worden beoordeeld. Dienen toekomstige aan-
spraken in hun geheel te worden opgevat als ongedifferentieerd appèl op onze ecologische verant-
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woordelijkheid? Of heeft de duurzaamheidsagenda toch meer specifieke uitkomsten van collectieve 
deliberatie voor ogen? 
 Zo tekent zich een tegenstelling af tussen een positivistische visie die een zeer minimale 
doch inhoudelijke moraal aandraagt, en een constructivistische visie die dan wel een ruimere 
agenda voor milieu-educatie presenteert, maar die zonder engagement en verplichtende verant-
woordelijkheden blijft. Binnen het perspectief van LDO raken discussies over de aard en reikwijdte 
van milieu-educatie veelal gevangen in een ideaaltypische tegenstelling tussen extreme posities: 
discussies over uitgangspunten monden ofwel uit in onaanvaardbare praktijken van indoctrinatie, 
ofwel in een vrijblijvende kennismaking met vraagstukken van duurzame ontwikkeling. Naar mijn 
idee wordt deze onvruchtbare impasse veroorzaakt doordat beide visies ecologisch burgerschap 
blijven rechtvaardigen tegenover de hypothetische aanspraken van toekomstige generaties. Toe-
komstige behoeften, belangen en rechten blijven het voornaamste voorwerp van ecologische ver-
antwoordelijkheid. In het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoek ik de complexe problemen die samenhangen 
met een dergelijk begrip van intergenerationeel burgerschap.  
 Onder de titel ‘toekomstige generaties als medeburgers’ onderzoek ik in paragraaf 2.1 het 
liberale perspectief op intergenerationeel burgerschap en het daaruit voortvloeiende rechtvaardi-
gingsprobleem. Daarbij neem ik John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) als paradigmatisch voor het 
politiek-filosofische liberalisme. Een overheid mag zich volgens Rawls enkel bemoeien met de 
keuzes die burgers in de privésfeer maken op grond van een procedureel-neutraal beginsel dat ie-
dere ‘rationele burger’ zou moeten kunnen aanvaarden, onafhankelijk van zijn of haar conceptie van 
het goede leven. Die procedurele neutraliteit kan alleen gewaarborgd worden door in de rechtvaar-
diging van een algemeen bindend beginsel te verwijzen naar waarden die geen voorwerp zijn van 
levensbeschouwelijke diversiteit, maar aan deze diversiteit voorafgaan: waarden die een liberaal-
democratische samenleving mogelijk maken. In de verantwoording van een normatief-responsabili-
serende vorm van milieu–educatie ontstaat nu het volgende probleem. Een liberale overheid dreigt 
met de bevordering van milieuvriendelijk handelen en leven de publieke moraal zodanig uit te brei-
den, dat ze in conflict komt met haar eigen grondslagen: enerzijds vereist een krachtige aanpak van 
milieuproblemen normatief overheidsingrijpen, anderzijds is een dergelijk ingrijpen (dat gezien kan 
worden als uitdrukking van een inhoudelijke staatsmoraal) vanuit het oogpunt van de liberale mo-
raal ongewenst. De rol van de staat wordt hier gekenmerkt door een zogenaamde ‘liberale antino-
mie’: een spanningsverhouding tussen noodzaak èn onwenselijkheid van overheidsbemoeienis. 
 Gegeven dit rechtvaardigingsprobleem ligt het volgens liberale denkers voor de hand om de 
milieucrisis in procedureel-neutrale termen te definiëren als een probleem dat raakt aan de primaire 
rechten en vrijheden van toekomstige generaties. De vraag luidt dan in hoeverre wij de behoeften, 
belangen en rechten van toekomstige burgers als die van medeburgers dienen te respecteren. Kan er 
een contractueel-verplichtende verhouding bestaan tussen burgers die niet gelijktijdig leven? In 
mijn verkenning van deze complicerende tijdsdimensie in de contractrelatie blijkt met name het 
gebrek aan wederkerigheid tussen ongelijktijdig levende mensen de rechtvaardigingspoging te on-
dermijnen. Het wederkerigheidsprobleem vloeit voort uit de asymmetrische machtsrelatie tussen 
hedendaagse en toekomstige generaties: ons gedrag, onze keuzes hebben gevolgen voor het leven 
van toekomstige generaties. Zij zijn afhankelijk van de wereld die wij hun nalaten. Wij zijn in staat 
hun welzijn in positieve of negatieve zin te beïnvloeden. Een beïnvloeding in de andere richting is 
echter onmogelijk. Wij bevinden ons buiten het bereik van toekomstigen, zijn in zekere zin on-
kwetsbaar. ‘Time’s arrow’ maakt elke wederkerige uitwisseling onmogelijk.  
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Op zichzelf zou dit geen onoverkomelijke problemen hoeven op te werpen, ware het niet dat 
wederkerigheid – begrepen in termen van ‘mutualiteit’ ofwel ‘wederzijdse afhankelijkheid’ – bin-
nen Rawls’ contracttheorie wordt gezien als een noodzakelijke voorwaarde om van een verplich-
tende contractrelatie te spreken. De achterliggende gedachte is dat een publieke moraal burgers niet 
moet ‘overvragen’; deze mag geen altruïstische motivatie of opoffering van burgers verwachten. 
Rawls gaat ervan uit dat burgers zich in hun keuzes laten leiden door ‘gematigd eigenbelang’. Zij 
zullen bereid zijn tot het aangaan van een contract met ‘vreemden’, mits zij ervan overtuigd kunnen 
worden dat de naleving van dit contract uiteindelijk tot wederzijds voordeel zal strekken. Om deze 
reden zou de morele gemeenschap beperkt moeten blijven tot personen met wie wij in een weder-
kerige relatie staan. Sterke morele plichten zouden slechts kunnen gelden in situaties waarin 
niemand zo onkwetsbaar is dat hij met de anderen geen rekening behoeft te houden; situaties van 
relatieve afhankelijkheid van ieder ten opzichte van ieder ander. Pas in een dergelijke afhankelijk-
heidsrelatie is er een ‘rationeel motief’ tot coöperatief handelen, zo betoogt Rawls. Immers, zij die 
hun plichten binnen een wederkerige verhouding verzuimen, doen niet alleen de benadeelde actoren 
te kort, maar zij verbreken het contract en riskeren daarmee de bescherming van hun eigen rechten 
en verworvenheden. Deze noodzaak tot coöperatief handelen – het veronderstelde motief om plich-
ten jegens derden na te komen – ontbreekt in de relatie tussen ongelijktijdig levende mensen omdat 
zij zich buiten het bereik van elkaars wederkerige relaties bevinden. 
 Is het gebrek aan wederkerigheid tussen ongelijktijdig levende mensen fataal voor de libe-
rale poging om toekomstige generaties in de contractgemeenschap op te nemen? De uiteenlopende 
pogingen die liberale contracttheoretici tot nog toe hebben ondernomen om onder het probleem van 
wederkerigheid uit te komen raken uiteindelijk allemaal verstrikt in (een variant van het) het moti-
vatieprobleem, zo laat ik zien in paragraaf 2.1. Een sterke plicht jegens toekomstigen kan enkel ge-
rechtvaardigd worden binnen een contracttheorie, indien men de veronderstelling van gematigd ei-
genbelang als coöperatieve drijfveer laat vallen ten faveure van een meer altruïstische inzet die van 
contractpartners wordt vereist. Maar met het opgeven van de veronderstelling van gematigd eigen-
belang wordt de rationale van het contractuele liberalisme ondermijnd, en verliest het contract zijn 
betekenis als hypothetische eenheidsstichter.  
Het failliet van alle tot nog toe ondernomen pogingen om tot de rechtvaardiging van een in-
tergenerationeel rechtvaardigheidsbeginsel te komen, wijst naar mijn idee op de inherente tekort-
komingen van het transcendentale liberale rechtvaardigingskader zelf. Alhoewel ‘methodisch’ inge-
zet verraadt Rawls’ hypothetische reconstructie van menselijke behoeften en ‘gematigd eigenbe-
lang’ (behind the veil of ignorance) een beperkt mensbeeld dat in de uitwerking van de contractbe-
ginselen niet zonder gevolgen blijft. Rawls’ persoonsideaal spiegelt ons een autonoom individu 
voor, dat zijn vrijheid tracht veilig te stellen door de invloeden van buitenaf nauwgezet te controle-
ren. In beginsel dient alles waarom de morele persoon geeft – datgene waarmee hij zich verbonden 
voelt of waardoor hij zich aangesproken voelt – voorwerp te zijn van rationele reflectie.  
Paradoxalerwijs dreigt het individu zichzelf hiermee juist af te snijden van alle zingevings-
bronnen waaruit het zijn zelfbesef put, en van waaruit de natuur maar ook onze toekomst als intrin-
siek waardevol kunnen verschijnen: zijn relaties met anderen, zijn vertrouwdheid met de natuurlijke 
omgeving, zijn bindingen met groepen en praktijken waarvan hij deel uitmaakt, zijn passies en 
identificaties. Deze zingevingsbronnen worden binnen de liberale theorie als vervreemdbaar (van de 
persoon) en opgeefbaar beschouwd. Aldus tekenen zich de contouren af van een beknot individu. 
Door de eis van reflectie en opgeefbaarheid worden alle persoonlijke waarden, overtuigingen en 
bindingen op ‘veilige afstand’ van het zelf gehouden. Terechte kritiek vanuit communitaristische 
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hoek laat zien dat het aldus gecreëerde nomadische zelf weinig om het lijf kan hebben, aangezien 
het zelf niet kan worden losgekoppeld van de omgeving, waarden, overtuigingen en bindingen die 
constitutief zijn voor het zelf. 
 Deze prepolitieke persoonsopvatting weerspiegelt zich in het liberale ideaal van burger-
schap. Binnen een liberale democratie, zoals gepropageerd door Rawls en andere liberale denkers, 
dienen publieke inspanningen, waarden, verantwoordelijkheden en voorzieningen uiteindelijk in 
dienst te staan van individuele vrijheidsrechten. Het rechtvaardigheidscontract moet iedere burger 
maximale vrijheid geven in het vervullen van zijn private levensplan. Burgerschap wordt hier voor-
namelijk opgevat als een legale status – een geheel van rechten waarover een ieder vrijelijk maar 
enkel in passieve zin beschikt – en minder als een actieve verantwoordelijkheid voor deelname aan 
het publieke leven.  
Door het strikte, hiërarchische onderscheid tussen private en publieke levenssfeer heeft de 
liberale theorie minder oog voor de intermediaire levenssfeer van de civil society: de maatschappe-
lijke ruimte waar de publieke meningsvorming plaatsvindt en maatschappelijke groepen zich, onaf-
hankelijk van overheidsinstituties, inzetten voor een gemeenschappelijk belang of ideaal. De ge-
schiedenis leert dat juist deze maatschappelijke sfeer een wezenlijke rol speelt in de totstandkoming 
van een collectief milieubewustzijn: natuurbeschermingsorganisaties, milieubewegingen, NIMBY-
groepen en andere collectieven hebben vanaf de jaren ’60 doorlopend aandacht gevraagd voor de 
ernst van milieuproblemen en deze op de politieke agenda geplaatst door hun krachten te bundelen. 
Momenteel wordt deze kritische rol vervuld door de zogenaamde anders-globaliseringsbeweging. In 
de liberale theorie heeft de ‘civil society’ geen eigen gewicht. Rechten en verantwoordelijkheden 
worden toegekend aan hetzij de staat, hetzij aan het individu (en daarmee vaak aan de markt).  
Hiermee vindt een privatisering van maatschappelijke vraagstukken plaats; omstreden, mo-
rele argumenten en zingevingsbronnen worden van de publieke agenda geweerd. Een politieke dis-
cussie over genetische manipulatie en biotechnologie kan niet meer gaan over de fundamentele vra-
gen wanneer we van soeverein leven spreken of wie er over dat leven beschikt, maar voornamelijk 
over gezondheidsrisico’s. Deze versmalling van de agenda leidt naar mijn idee tot een verarming 
van het publieke debat over ecologische vraagstukken, die bovendien gemakkelijk wordt gemono-
poliseerd door wetenschappers, beleidsmakers en andere professionals. Binnen het liberale denken 
zien we een neiging om het publieke debat over de achtergrond en aanpak van milieuproblemen te 
versmallen tot een economisch vraagstuk van verdelende rechtvaardigheid: het zoeken naar een 
eerlijke verdeelsleutel voor de distributie van onze natuurlijke hulpbronnen onder huidige en toe-
komstige generaties. Binnen dit duidingskader lijkt voornamelijk plaats voor een instrumentele 
waardering van de natuur als menselijke hulpbron. Onze verhouding tot de omringende natuur 
wordt daarmee versmald tot een prudente gebruiks- en verbruiksrelatie, gericht op een ‘eerlijke’ 
verdeling van haar vruchten en een rechtvaardige spreiding van risico’s die onze omgang met die 
natuur met zich meebrengt. Onze verantwoordelijkheid voor de natuurlijke leefomgeving wordt 
voorgesteld als een kwestie van resource- en risk management. Voor het fundamentele besef dat 
natuur en milieu voor ons waardevol zouden kunnen zijn, los van ons gebruik, verbruik en exploi-
tatie van haar hulpbronnen – de intrinsiek waardevolle natuur – is in deze opvatting van de milieu-
crisis geen plaats. 
 Een liberale invulling van milieu-educatie zal veelal een strategie volgen van individuele 
responsabilisering, waarbij burgers aansprakelijk worden gehouden voor het persoonlijke beslag dat 
zij met hun consumptie en leefstijl leggen op de natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Een dergelijke strategie 
laat naar mijn overtuiging niet alleen de gemeenschappelijk beleefde inspiratiebronnen om zorg te 
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dragen voor onze natuurlijke leefomgeving onaangeroerd, maar miskent bovenal de structurele aard 
van de oorzaken van de milieucrisis. Zo wordt de aanpak van milieuproblemen steeds minder ge-
zien als een collectieve verantwoordelijkheid, en steeds vaker afgedaan als een aspect waarmee ie-
dereen in zijn keuzes als consument maar een beetje rekening moet houden. Door een individuele 
responsabilisering blijven de bestaande economische en technologische structuren die onze consu-
mentenkeuzes in een bepaalde richting sturen echter buiten schot, en dreigen overheden hun 
verantwoordelijkheden af te wentelen op individuele burgers.  
Een inhoudelijk alternatief voor de formele liberale opvatting van intergenerationele recht-
vaardigheid wordt aangereikt door communitaristische critici. Toekomstige generaties moeten vol-
gens communitaristen als de-Shalit niet worden benaderd als hypothetische medeburgers, maar als 
erfgenamen van onze morele, levensbeschouwelijke, culturele of etnische gemeenschap. Wat een 
samenleving verbindt met toekomstige generaties is niet (alleen) een abstract idee van rechtvaardig-
heid, maar een gedeelde identiteit en opvatting van het goede leven. Zij zijn het die als erfgenamen 
onze gemeenschappelijke tradities en praktijken voortzetten, en waarmee we ons om die reden 
existentieel verbonden voelen. Zij zullen de waarden en idealen die constitutief zijn voor onze ge-
meenschap en ons ‘zelf’ in de toekomst gestalte moeten geven. Deze verbondenheid binnen een 
meerdere generaties omspannende gemeenschap brengt sterke verantwoordelijkheden met zich mee. 
De bron van die verantwoordelijkheden lokaliseren communitaristen niet buiten ons ‘zelf’ – in de 
rechtsaanspraak van toekomstige generaties – maar in onze identiteit als deelgenoot van het ge-
meenschapsleven. Mijn betrokkenheid bij de lotgevallen van die gemeenschap houdt niet op te 
bestaan met mijn dood maar reikt verder in de tijd. Inherent aan mijn lidmaatschap van een ge-
meenschap is een besef van continuïteit. Zonder vertrouwen in de toekomstige voortzetting van de 
praktijken waarom wij geven door onze erfgenamen verliezen huidige inspanningen aan zin en be-
tekenis. 
 Om van een transgenerationele gemeenschap te kunnen spreken moet er volgens zowel de-
Shalit als Golding sprake zijn van een zekere mate aan morele overeenstemming tussen de leden. 
De-Shalit wijst op het bestaan van gemeenschappelijke tradities, rituelen, verhalen, een gemeen-
schappelijke taal en cultuur, waardoorheen mensen in dialoog zijn met hun voorouders en zich een 
beeld vormen van de toekomst. Maar de levensduur van een transgenerationele gemeenschap is niet 
oneindig. Uitgaande van een afnemende morele overeenstemming met toekomstige generaties 
naarmate de eeuwen verstrijken, nadert onvermijdelijk een moment waarop wij ons niet meer zullen 
herkennen in de waarden en idealen die deze gemeenschap vertegenwoordigt. Deze zijn te ver ver-
wijderd geraakt van onze oorspronkelijke waarden. Hier ligt de grens van onze gemeenschap en 
komt ons lidmaatschap tot een einde. 
  Het concept van een transgenerationele gemeenschap stelt ons volgens de-Shalit in staat om 
sterke, positieve plichten te formuleren tegenover toekomstige generaties. Dit zijn plichten die uit-
stijgen boven de minimale plichten van distributieve rechtvaardigheid. Omdat toekomstigen deel 
uitmaken van dezelfde morele gemeenschap is er sprake een onmiddellijke morele betrokkenheid 
op de ander. Het kennisprobleem lijkt hiermee opgelost of irrelevant geworden. Immers, door een 
gemeenschappelijke conceptie van het goede zijn wij in staat om te bepalen ‘wat goed voor hen is’ 
(want dat valt samen met wat wij goed voor onszelf vinden). In plaats van te gissen naar potentiële 
behoeften en belangen van toekomstigen, moeten we bij onszelf te rade gaan: welke toekomst wen-
sen wij voor onze kleinkinderen en verdere nageslacht?  
Belangrijk is de communitaristische opvatting van de milieucrisis als een collectief pro-
bleem en de erkenning van een collectieve verantwoordelijkheid voor de aanpak daarvan. Door de 
because we are human 
 198 
bedreiging van onze ‘collective goods’ worden wij gedwongen na te denken over wat ons gemeen-
schapsleven de moeite waard maakt. Welke ‘goods’ constitueren ons zijn en moeten derhalve voor 
ons nageslacht behouden blijven? Als onze gemeenschap wil blijven voortbestaan, waarvan moeten 
wij dan de continuïteit verzekeren? 
 Aan deze benadering van intergenerationele verantwoordelijkheid kleven ook nadelen. Waar 
de rechtvaardigingspogingen van Rawls en zijn interpreten een uitbreiding van de hypothetische 
contractgemeenschap beogen, richten de-Shalit, Golding en Passmore zich op een uitbreiding van 
de morele gemeenschap. Daarmee lijkt de reikwijdte van onze intergenerationele verantwoordelijk-
heid eveneens beperkt tot de beslotenheid van de gemeenschapsgrenzen. Het is niet duidelijk op 
welke wijze deze verantwoordelijkheid bijdraagt aan een oplossing van milieuproblemen die 
veeleer een globale aanpak vereisen. Ook blijft onduidelijk hoe ver de communitaristische plichten 
zich uitstrekken in de tijd: een tijdsspanne van drie, vier generaties of wellicht van tien, twintig?  
Nog problematischer is het feit dat de idee van een transgenerationele gemeenschap lijkt te 
steunen op een achterhaald maatschappijbeeld. De laat- c.q. postmoderne samenleving waarin wij 
leven wordt gekenmerkt door een radicaal pluralisme; individuele levensstijlen zegevieren, moreel 
homogene gemeenschappen worden in hun voortbestaan bedreigd, en samenlevingsbreed gedeelde 
waarden zijn aan erosie onderhevig. Met dit verlies aan eenheid lijkt een intergenerationele ethiek 
die een beroep doet op gemeenschapszin haar aangrijpingspunt te verliezen. Het probleem wordt 
wellicht veroorzaakt door de neiging van communitaristen om de verbondenheid van gemeenschap-
pen uit te drukken in termen van abstracte waarden – waarvoor het exclusieve eigendomsrecht 
wordt geclaimd. Zijn het niet veeleer de beleefde waarden die immanent zijn aan onze gedeelde 
praktijken die een gemeenschappelijke handelingshorizon stichten? 
 Tegen de achtergrond van mijn kritiek op zowel liberale als communitaristische invullingen 
van intergenerationele verantwoordelijkheid schets ik in paragraaf 2.3 de contouren van een neore-
publikeinse benadering. In zijn algemeenheid verwijt ik beide stromingen dat zij te zeer abstraheren 
van de concrete politieke gemeenschap – de civil society – waar het publieke debat en de strijd om 
de inrichting van de samenleving plaatsvindt. In deze intermediaire sfeer – onafhankelijk van de 
staat, maar ook van de levensbeschouwelijke gemeenschap – vindt de publieke meningsvorming 
plaats, worden milieuproblemen als politiek-maatschappelijke vraagstukken gedefinieerd en op de 
publieke agenda geplaatst. De civil society is ook de plaats waar mensen zich identificeren met een 
politieke visie, waar ze betrokken raken bij maatschappelijke vraagstukken en zich (selectief) in-
zetten voor een publiek belang; de een als lid van een speeltuinvereniging, een ander als voorzitter 
van de vogelwacht of als gemeenteraadslid.  
De liberale en communitaristische veronachtzaming van de civil society wreekt zich op een 
drietal punten. In de eerste plaats verlenen zowel Rawls als de-Shalit naar mijn idee te weinig ge-
wicht aan de maatschappelijke condities van pluraliteit en conflict. Zowel liberalisme als commu-
nitarisme postuleren een morele overeenstemming die voorafgaat aan het politieke debat, respectie-
velijk als contract of als gedeelde moraal. Beide stromingen ontlenen aan deze overeenstemming 
prima facie-regels die het politieke handelen op voorhand aan beperkende voorwaarden binden. 
Neorepublikeinen zien conflicten en tegenstellingen niet als bedreiging voor de democratische orde, 
maar als maatschappelijke condities die ruimte geven aan politiek handelen en dit handelen zin 
verlenen. Pluraliteit wordt door hen niet enkel in Rawlsiaanse zin begrepen als een feitelijke condi-
tie van morele en levensbeschouwelijke diversiteit – ‘the fact of pluralism’ – die uiteindelijk onder-
vangen kan worden door een contract. Nee, pluraliteit duidt op de onherleidbare alteriteit van ‘het 
andere’. Het is deze fundamentele andersheid die de mogelijkheid van een machtsvrije dialoog en 
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consensus in twijfel trekt. Volgens Mouffe is een consensus zonder uitsluiting onmogelijk. In elke 
deliberatie zijn in- en uitsluitingsmechanismen werkzaam, die consensus constitueren. Consensus is 
slechts mogelijk krachtens uitsluiting van andere perspectieven, die de ervaren gedeeldheid in vraag 
stellen. Elke consensus draagt daardoor de sporen van het ‘constitutieve andere’. Aldus wordt 
rechtvaardigheid door neorepublikeinen niet in de eerste plaats opgevat als een contractbeginsel of 
een deugd, maar als een gevoeligheid voor verschil en alteriteit. Morele overeenstemming is nooit 
een gegeven, maar moet in het handelen steeds opnieuw tot stand worden gebracht. Om deze reden 
kan politiek handelen niet a priori worden gelegitimeerd maar dient het handelen steeds 
zelfreflexief op rechtvaardiging gericht te zijn.  
 In de tweede plaats vooronderstellen beide perspectieven een hiërachische overdracht van 
verantwoordelijkheden van de ene op de andere generatie. Binnen een civil society zijn het niet zo-
zeer de verticale relaties die verantwoordelijkheden met zich meebrengen – de relatie tussen gene-
raties, tussen burger en staat of tussen lidgenoot en gemeenschapsleiding – maar de horizontale 
banden tussen burgers onderling die verplichtend zijn.  
 In de derde plaats miskennen zowel liberalisme als communitarisme de actieve 
verantwoordelijkheid die burgerschap inhoudt. Waar het liberalisme de burger voornamelijk als een 
passieve eigenaar van rechten benadert en het communitarisme deze burger aanspreekt als belan-
genbehartiger of spreekbuis van een morele gemeenschap, zien neorepublikeinen burgerschap als 
een nastrevenswaardige activiteit die ons bestaan verrijkt, en onlosmakelijk met onze existentiële 
levensopgave verbonden is. Volgens Hannah Arendt realiseren mensen hun vrijheid slechts in het 
politieke handelen. Arendt plaatst de vrije activiteiten van de burger tegenover de onvrije activitei-
ten van de arbeidende mens, de animal laborans, die gedicteerd worden door de fysieke levens-
noodzakelijkheden, en de activiteiten van de werkende mens, de homo faber, gestuurd door een 
dwangmatige instrumentaliteit.  
 Aan de hand van Arendts inzichten in de aard van het politieke ‘handelen’ en ‘oordelen’ 
geef ik tenslotte inhoud aan een neorepublikeinse benadering van intergenerationele verantwoorde-
lijkheid. In deze benadering verschuift de focus van de vermeende belangen of rechten van toekom-
stige generaties naar de collectieve zorgen, verlangens en praktijken die ons hier en nu verenigen, 
en op grond waarvan wij ons een beeld van de toekomst vormen. Bij de beoordeling van wat wij 
onder een leefbare wereld voor toekomstige generaties verstaan, of wat de behoeften van hen zullen 
zijn, grijpen we onvermijdelijk terug op wat wij nu ‘leefbaar’, ‘menswaardig’ of ‘onvervreemdbaar’ 
achten. In het publieke debat dient een beroep op de belangen van toekomstige generaties derhalve 
met de nodige scepsis en argwaan te worden ontvangen.  
 Een beroep op toekomstige generaties heeft in publieke discussies vaak een retorische func-
tie. Wanneer we uit naam van toekomstigen spreken anticiperen we niet zozeer op hun mogelijke 
oordelen, maar antwoorden we aan het appèl dat uitgaat van onze betrokkenheid bij de collectieve 
(burgerschaps)praktijken en activiteiten die ons leven hier en nu zinvol maken. We nemen verant-
woordelijkheid voor de (onbepaalde) toekomst van datgene waarom we geven. Het neorepubli-
keinse ideaal van toekomstgerichte verantwoordelijkheid vraagt ons daarom verantwoordelijkheid 
te nemen voor de continuïteit van de collectieve praktijken die ons handelen zin verlenen. Inherent 
aan onze deelname aan deze praktijken is een zekere zorg om haar toekomst. Met een ervaring van 
intrinsieke waarde is per definitie een open-toekomsthorizon verbonden. Deze collectieve praktij-
ken zijn voor ons slechts waardevol voor zover we vertrouwen in een onbepaald voortbestaan van 
deze praktijken.  
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 Tot zover vertoont de neorepublikeinse visie sterke overeenkomsten met die van de-Shalit, 
maar anders dan de communitaristen dient er volgens neorepublikeinen geen sprake te zijn van 
morele overeenstemming tussen de generaties. Deze benadering van intergenerationeel burgerschap 
maakt bovendien nog scherper duidelijk dat toekomstige generaties in ons oordelen slechts indirect 
een rol spelen. Primair is het streven naar continuïteit van wat ons bestaan waardevol maakt. De 
overtuiging dat toekomstigen recht hebben op een menswaardig bestaan is daarvan slechts een af-
geleide imperatief. Vanuit neorepublikeins perspectief verschijnen toekomstige generaties niet als 
hypothetische medeburgers of als gelijkgestemde gemeenschapsgenoten, maar als verbeelde vreem-
den, op wier mogelijke oordeel wij in ons handelen hier en nu anticiperen. Het is ons immers niet 
onverschillig welke sporen we nalaten. We wensen op een bepaalde wijze door toekomstigen herin-
nerd te worden. We zullen ons kortom een voorstelling maken van die toekomstige wereld, maar 
eerder dan te calculeren wat de belangen van de bewoners van die wereld zullen zijn, en ons han-
delen daarop te baseren, zullen we bij onze eigen toekomstverwachtingen, -angsten en -verlangens 
te rade te gaan. Het beeld van toekomstigen roepen we op om verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor 
wat wij in ons bestaan ‘übertragungswürdig’ achten, maar toekomstigen vormen daarvan niet de 
rechtvaardigingsgrond. Zij belichamen een wenkend perspectief, maar kunnen onmogelijk als wer-
kend perspectief fungeren. Wij kunnen ons handelen en oordelen enkel verantwoorden tegenover 
tijdgenoten met wie we samen-leven. Zij die nog niet bestaan kunnen onze behoefte aan erkenning 
niet spiegelen en derhalve niet als bron van verantwoording gelden.  
Het gereconstrueerde ideaal van toekomstgerichte verantwoordelijkheid verschijnt als grond 
voor milieubewust handelen en oordelen, maar niet als ultieme fundering. We beschikken immers 
niet over de voldoende en noodzakelijke argumenten om anderen aan onze opvatting van verant-
woordelijkheid te binden. Gegeven onze deelname aan burgerlijke praktijken kunnen we niet anders 
dan toekomstoverwegingen in onze oordelen te betrekken. Aldus houden we elkaar in de publieke 
arena verantwoordelijk voor de continuiteït van datgene waar we om geven. De gedeeldheid binnen 
deze arena moet niet gezocht worden op het niveau van beginselen of gedeelde waarden maar in de 
onontwijkbare handelingshorizon die we als leden van een politieke gemeenschap delen. In ons 
handelen beantwoorden we aan de gemeenschappelijke omstandigheden waaraan we als leden van 
een politieke ‘lotsgemeenschap’ overgeleverd zijn. Ecologische verantwoordelijkheid kan daarom 
worden begrepen als collectieve uitdrukking van onze wederkerige kwetsbaarheid tegenover de 
problemen die het voortbestaan van onze wereld bedreigen; als antwoord dus op het appèl dat uit-
gaat van onze gemeenschappelijke conditie.  
 Verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor de continuïteit van onze collectieve praktijken blijft een 
paradoxale aangelegenheid. Enerzijds willen we het goede, mooie en ware in ons bestaan zien 
voortleven in ons nageslacht, anderzijds mogen we niet vooruitlopen op een gedeelde moraal omdat 
we daarmee een kolonisering van de toekomst riskeren. Ook opvoeding en onderwijs floreren bij de 
gratie van een specifieke tijdruimtelijke horizon, zo benadrukken vele pedagogen; het vertrouwen in 
een open en onbepaalde toekomst. We mogen opvoeding en onderwijs volgens Arendt nooit 
beschouwen als instrumenten ter realisering van onze eigen toekomstplannen omdat we jongere 
generaties daarmee de vrijheid ontnemen om in de toekomst op eigen wijze gestalte te geven aan 
hun wereld. Anderzijds werpt elke opvoedingspretentie haar schaduw vooruit, en legt elke opvoe-
dingshandeling een impliciete claim op deze onbepaalde toekomst. Aangezien ons doen en laten 
onvermijdelijk meebepaalt welke wereld we achterlaten, kunnen we ons niet geheel afzijdig houden 
van de toekomst.  
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Arendt biedt een mogelijke uitweg uit deze paradox door haar aandacht te vestigen op het 
heden als ‘opening’ tussen verleden en toekomst. Het komt er volgens haar op aan dat wij kinderen 
inleiden in de huidige wereld, en voor deze wereld met al haar verworvenheden en tekortkomingen 
verantwoordelijkheid dragen tegenover hen die nieuw in deze wereld zijn. Gevaarlijke utopieën en 
indoctrinatie dringen zich juist naar de voorgrond wanneer opvoeders als representanten van de be-
staande wereld weigeren verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de wereld waarin zij hun kinderen 
inleiden, wanneer zij kinderen inleiden in een ideale wereld – Ecotopia – alsof deze al gerealiseerd 
zou zijn. Juist om elke generatie de kans te geven de wereld te veranderen op een misschien door 
volwassenen ongedachte wijze, moet men haar niet met morele lessen indoctrineren, maar inleiden 
in de bestaande wereld: ‘Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in every child edu-
cation must be conservative’ (Arendt, 1958b, p. 510). Opvoeden impliceert een tweeledige verant-
woordelijkheid: het prille vernieuwingspotentieel van de jonge generatie beschermen tegenover de 
soms meedogenloze volwassenwereld, en de volwassenwereld beschermen tegen de soms blinde 
vernieuwingsdrang van de jonge generatie. Beide zijn kwetsbaar ten opzichte van elkaar. Eerder 
dan een opleiding tot milieu-activist, zou milieu-educatie daarom moeten bestaan uit een gedegen 
inleiding in de wereld van natuurbescherming en milieuzorg.  
Met de relativering van het intergenerationele hulpbronnenperspectief – zoals besloten ligt 
in Brundlandts opvatting van duurzame ontwikkeling – omzeilen we niet alleen de rechtvaardi-
gingsproblemen waarin liberalen en communitaristen terecht komen doordat zij een gedeelde mo-
raal met toekomstigen voorwaardelijk stellen voor het aanvaarden van collectieve verantwoorde-
lijkheden. De neorepublikeinse benadering eist daarnaast ruimte en aandacht op voor dat wat ons 
hier en nu inspireert om zorg te dragen voor de toekomst. Hierdoor ontstaat een publieke ruimte 
waarin burgers elkaar, in antwoord op een gedeeld lot, verantwoordelijk houden voor de toekomst 
van hun gedeelde praktijken. In deze ruimte worden aard en omvang van toekomstgerichte verant-
woordelijkheden niet door voorafgegeven grenzen beperkt, maar hier ontstaan openingen naar 
nieuwe, ongedachte vormen van milieuvriendelijk handelen. Het is interessant om te zien hoe het 
motivatieprobleem en rechtvaardigingsprobleem in deze benadering als het ware samenvallen: dat-
gene wat ons tot collectief handelen beweegt vormt tegelijkertijd de (particuliere) rechtvaardigings-
grond ervan. 
 
Vanwege onze waardering van de natuur 
De cruciale vraag is dus niet welk beroep toekomstigen op onze medemenselijkheid doen, maar wat 
wij zelf in onze natuurlijke leefwereld waardevol en beschermenswaardig achten. Waarvan streven 
wij duurzaamheid of continuïteit na? Met deze vraag dringt zich de onderliggende vraag op hoe wij 
überhaupt waarde vinden in deze wereld, in het bijzonder de natuur. Zijn wij mensen het die waarde 
aan de natuur ‘toekennen’ of ‘ontdekken’ we die waarde in de natuur? Is hier voornamelijk sprake 
van zin-geven of zin-ontvangen? In het milieufilosofische discours wordt door velen geclaimd dat 
de natuur een intrinsieke waarde belichaamt, hetgeen betekent dat de natuur niet louter vanwege 
haar vruchtgebruik maar in en omwille van zichzelf waardevol zou zijn. Met deze intrinsieke waar-
declaim keren milieufilosofen zich tegen de heersende ideologie van het antropocentrisme, dat onze 
verhouding tot de omringende natuur versmalt tot een prudente gebruiksrelatie. Ook het beginsel 
van duurzame ontwikkeling vertegenwoordigt een tamelijk antropocentrisch perspectief, doordat 
het ons uitdaagt om onze verhouding tot de natuur in economische termen van gebruik, verbruik en 
exploitatie te duiden. De vraag is evenwel of het mogelijk is om de natuur te waarderen onafhanke-
lijk van het profijt dat wij van die natuur hebben. Is een zeker antropocentrisme niet inherent aan 
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elk waardeoordeel? Alvorens we deze (meta-) ethische vragen nader onderzoeken is het van belang 
om inzicht te krijgen in wat er in de milieufilosofie zoal onder ‘intrinsieke waarde’ wordt verstaan. 
 Over weinig begrippen bestaat zoveel verwarring als over het begrip van intrinsieke waarde. 
In paragraaf 3.1. heb ik gepoogd daarin enige helderheid te scheppen door de vier meest 
gehanteerde betekenissen van intrinsieke waarde in het milieufilosofische discours van elkaar te 
onderscheiden en te toetsen op hun bruikbaarheid in het licht van mijn onderzoeksvraag: 1) volgens 
de ruime opvatting van intrinsieke waarde als niet-instrumentele waarde zijn mensen, objecten, 
toestanden en activiteiten van intrinsieke waarde wanneer deze niet alleen worden gewaardeerd als 
middel ter realisering van een daaraan voorbijliggend doel, maar (ook) als doel in zichzelf; 2) in de 
klassiek kantiaanse betekenis verwijst het gebruik van de term intrinsieke waarde naar de erkenning 
van iets of iemand als moreel subject; de erkenning dat hij, zij of het tot de gemeenschap van 
morele subjecten behoort, met wier belangen en voorkeuren rekening gehouden moet worden; 3) 
het gebruik van de term intrinsieke waarde als niet-relationele waarde verwijst naar de waarde die 
een object heeft vanwege zijn intrinsieke eigenschappen alias niet-relationele eigenschappen: 
eigenschappen die worden toegeschreven zonder verwijzing naar eigenschappen van andere 
objecten of subjecten dan het object in kwestie; 4) in de meest strenge betekenis refereert het 
gebruik van de term ‘intrinsieke waarde’ aan een objectieve waarde: de waarde die een object bezit 
onafhankelijk van onze waardering, dus los van de (ken)relatie tussen waarderend subject en te 
waarderen object. 
 De tweede betekenis van intrinsieke waarde kan buiten beschouwing blijven, aangezien deze 
betekenis voornamelijk relevant moet worden geacht in het debat over dierenrechten en -welzijn; 
een debat dat in mijn onderzoek alleen van indirect belang zal blijken te zijn. Voorts heb ik laten 
zien dat de derde betekenis van intrinsieke waarde als niet-relationele waarde naar mijn inzicht sa-
menvalt met intrinsieke waarde in de eerste of vierde betekenis, afhankelijk van de meta-ethische 
positie die men inneemt.  
De betekenissen van intrinsieke waarde die overblijven vertegenwoordigen twee extremen: 
een zwakke en sterke opvatting. Volgens gebruikers van de zwakke opvatting zijn alle waarden in-
trinsiek die op of vanuit zichzelf nastrevenswaardig zijn, dus niet alleen als middel ter verwezenlij-
king van een verder gelegen doel worden beschouwd. Gebruikers van de sterke opvatting reserveren 
het predikaat ‘intrinsiek’ voor objecten die onafhankelijk van menselijke waardering waardevol 
zijn. Intrinsieke waarde staat voor hen gelijk aan objectieve waarde. Bij nadere beschouwing wordt 
duidelijk dat beide betekenissen van intrinsieke waarde zich op een ander niveau bevinden. De 
zwakke opvatting van intrinsieke waarde (als niet-instrumentele waarde) heeft betrekking op de 
materiële inhoud van onze waardeoordelen. De sterke opvatting van intrinsieke waarde (als objec-
tieve waarde) behelst daarentegen een meta-ethische claim aangaande de herkomst en status van 
onze waardeoordelen: de claim dat waarden eigen zijn aan het object van waardering en derhalve 
een zeker realiteitsgehalte bezitten. De vraag is nu hoe beide claims zich tot elkaar verhouden. 
Sluiten ze elkaar uit, zijn ze verenigbaar of veronderstellen ze elkaar zelfs? Aan de hand van Kants 
opvatting van het esthetische oordeel zal ik betogen dat de erkenning van de zwakke opvatting van 
intrinsieke waarde noodzakelijkerwijs leidt tot de aanvaarding van (een variant van) de sterke claim 
van intrinsieke waarde. 
 Er zijn filosofen die ‘instrumentaliteit’ zo ruim opvatten, dat elk menselijk handelen en 
oordelen het predikaat ‘instrumenteel’ meekrijgt. Het toekennen van intrinsieke waarde aan de om-
ringende natuur wordt daarmee bij voorbaat tot een conceptuele onmogelijkheid gemaakt. Het on-
derscheid tussen instrumentele en intrinsieke waarden verliest zijn betekenis wanneer alle waarden 
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in termen van belangenbehartiging of behoeftenbevrediging worden uitgelegd. Hier wordt een be-
paalde persoonsopvatting a priori verondersteld: de morele persoon als iemand die in alles wat hij 
doet de bevrediging van zijn eigen behoeften nastreeft (analoog aan de rationele keuzetheorie).  
De erkenning dat alle waardering in zekere zin een menselijke waardering is, impliceert 
echter niet noodzakelijk dat alle waarden individuele voorkeuren, behoeften of doeleinden dienen. 
Zo erkent Musschenga dat de natuur voor ons alleen waarde heeft voor zover deze appelleert aan 
menselijke belangen, behoeften en verlangens, maar geeft aan deze ‘menselijke belangen’ een rui-
mere betekenis: naast consumptieve en economische belangen, zijn er ook esthetische, zingevende 
of levensbeschouwelijke ‘belangen’ die richting geven aan onze waardering van de natuur.  
Maar als het waar is dat hier verschillende soorten waarden in het geding zijn, waaruit be-
staat dan precies het onderscheid tussen instrumentele en intrinsieke waarden? Is er geen funda-
menteel onderscheid tussen beide aan te wijzen, dan ligt het voor de hand om alle waarden als in-
strumenteel te bestempelen, ook bijvoorbeeld de waarde die een natuurschilder hecht aan een kleu-
rig herfstlandschap. Immers, zo zou men kunnen stellen: de kunstenaar bedient zich van het land-
schap als ‘middel’ om zijn expressieve verlangens te vervullen en zijn artistieke ambities te reali-
seren. Naar mijn idee maakt dit voorbeeld duidelijk dat het spreken in instrumentele termen hier op 
zijn grenzen stuit. Het is contra-intuïtief om in instrumentele termen te spreken over de inspiratie en 
verbeeldingskracht die een kunstenaar aan de hem omringende natuur ontleent. Evenals we tegen 
onze intuïties zouden ingaan wanneer we zingeving, troost, respect, verwondering, contemplatie – 
alle persoonlijke stijlen van omgaan met de natuur – in zuiver instrumentele termen zouden articu-
leren. Blijkbaar is hier een andere relatie tot de omringende natuur in het geding, een relatie die de 
gebruiks- of verbruiksrelatie overstijgt.  
 Nog scherper dan Musschenga hebben Burms en De Dijn laten zien hoe onze intrinsieke 
betrokkenheid zich onderscheidt van onze instrumentele betrokkenheid tot de omringende wereld. 
Waar instrumenteel handelen wordt ingegeven door een gegeven behoefte of doelstelling, appelleert 
zingeving aan de fundamenteel menselijk ervaring deel te hebben aan een groter geheel, een geheel 
dat de grenzen van ons beperkt en contingent bestaan overstijgt. Het is door dit verlangen naar ver-
bondenheid met een grotere realiteit, dat de vraag naar zin opgeroepen wordt. Kortom, datgene wat 
in ons een ervaring van zin teweegbrengt, is transcendent tegenover die ervaring zelf. In het verlan-
gen naar verbondenheid met de natuurlijke leefomgeving beschouwen we deze omgeving niet als 
middel om een aangename ervaring van zin, troost, schoonheid of iets dergelijks te verkrijgen. Het 
appèl dat zich onwillekeurig aan ons opdringt verwijst naar iets wat haar transcendeert, iets dat 
groter is dan onszelf en een zekere onafhankelijkheid tegenover ons heeft. Hierdoor ontsnapt er al-
tijd iets aan onze duiding en waardering van de natuur. Wanneer we stellen dat de natuur voor ons 
niet alleen in instrumentele zin van belang is, maar ook een intrinsieke waarde vertegenwoordigt, 
zeggen we dat de waarde van de natuur onuitputtelijk is, in die zin dat we haar waarde niet kunnen 
versmallen tot de waarde en betekenis die zij voor ons heeft. Zouden we dat wel doen, dan zou de 
natuur voor ons alle zin en betekenis verliezen, omdat de drijfveer naar betekenisgeving zelf weg-
valt.  
Hieruit volgt dat het gebruik van de zwakke intrinsieke waardeclaim de aanvaarding van een 
sterke opvatting van intrinsieke waarde met zich meebrengt. Immers, wanneer we erkennen dat er 
een omgang met de natuur mogelijk is waarbij onze verhouding tot die natuur niet meer in zuiver 
instrumentele termen te begrijpen valt – zwakke intrinsieke waardeclaim – dan vooronderstellen we 
de werkzaamheid van een transcendente ervaring; datgene wat in ons een ervaring van zin teweeg-
brengt is transcendent tegenover die ervaring zelf. Met andere woorden: de waarde van de natuur is 
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hier in zekere zin onafhankelijk van onze waardering. Een erkenning dus van intrinsieke waarde in 
de sterke betekenis. Dit betekent echter niet dat onze aanwezigheid er niet meer toe doet, dat de 
natuur ook van intrinsieke waarde zou kunnen zijn zonder de aanwezigheid van waarderende perso-
nen. Integendeel, het zijn mensen die waarde in deze wereld brengen. Maar deze waarde is niet te 
herleiden tot hun waarderende activiteit of intentie. De waarde transcendeert de bedoelingen die de 
actor articuleert in de aanvaarding van die waarde.  
 Deze invulling van de intrinsieke waarde van de natuur behoeft nadere precisering, en wel 
op twee punten. In de eerste plaats dien ik mijn positie te bepalen in het debat tussen waarde-objec-
tivisme en -subjectivisme. Voorbij deze tegenstelling wil ik een intersubjectieve positie verdedigen; 
de intrinsieke waarde van de natuur valt niet toe te schrijven aan een waarderend subject of een 
waardevol object maar wordt geconstitueerd in en doorheen onze gedeelde taal en praktijken. In 
onze waardenarticulatie antwoorden we aan het appel dat van onze omgang met de natuur uitgaat. 
Met andere woorden: de intrinsieke waarde wordt niet door mij persoonlijk aan de natuur toegekend 
of in de natuur ontdekt, maar deze waarde wordt tot stand gebracht binnen de horizon van gedeelde 
praktijken waarin ik met anderen betekenis geef aan datgene waartoe onze ‘omgang’ met de natuur 
ons oproept.  
 Wanneer we Kants notie van het reflexieve smaakoordeel toepassen op het domein van de 
ethiek en politiek – zoals bijvoorbeeld Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor en Charles Altieri doen – 
dan wordt duidelijk dat wij in onze persoonlijke oordelen reeds impliciet anticiperen op de oordelen 
en reacties van anderen. Wij kijken naar onszelf, onze gevoelens en opvattingen door de ogen van 
anderen; wij vormen een oordeel door onze primaire intuïties en opvattingen te (her)overwegen in 
het licht van de perspectieven die anderen naar voren brengen en hebben gebracht. In dit proces van 
reflectie verdedigen we ons oordeel tegenover een imaginair publiek. Daarmee anticiperen we op de 
erkenning en waardering van anderen. Persoonlijke oordelen komen tot stand in een verinnerlijkte 
dialoog met anderen: de dialoog met anderen gaat over in een dialoog met het zelf. Als gevolg 
hiervan dragen onze oordelen en waarden van meet af aan een intersubjectief karakter.  
 Voor zover ik in mijn oordeel anticipeer op de mogelijke reactie van een specifieke 
gesprekspartner – a significant other – kan deze oordeelsvorming begrepen worden vanuit een 
tweedepersoonsperspectief. Echter, ik ben slechts in staat om andermans oordelen te begrijpen 
doordat wij ons binnen eenzelfde culturele en morele horizon bevinden. In zijn reactie articuleert de 
ander de regels die aan ons gemeenschappelijke taalspel ten grondslag liggen. Aldus belichaamt die 
concrete ander voor mij het oordeel van de sensus communis. 
 De vraag is nu hoe we nog van een individueel oordeel kunnen spreken wanneer dit alles 
zich op het intersubjectieve niveau van de taalgemeenschap afspeelt. Het begint erop te lijken dat 
het individu niet meer is dan een mondstuk van intersubjectief gedeelde waarden en betekenissen, 
en dat ‘mijn’ waardering van de natuur niet meer ‘van mij’ is, maar een projectie van andermans 
waardering, of beter, allemans waardering. Welnu, deze situering van de morele persoon als over-
geleverd aan de morele gemeenschap strookt niet met onze alledaagse intuïties. Wij ervaren dat we 
tot op zekere hoogte zelf vorm kunnen geven aan ons oordelen en handelen, en deze zonodig 
staande kunnen houden tegenover een ‘andersdenkende’ meerderheid. Gesteld dat we toch het pri-
maat van de intersubjectiviteit erkennen, hoe kan het individu – degene die ‘ik’ zegt – dan weer-
stand bieden tegenover het appèl van anderen (tweede persoon) en daar doorheen aan de taalge-
meenschap en haar culturele grammatica’s (derde persoon)?  
Volgens Altieri moet het individu begrepen worden op grond van zijn verlangen ‘iemand’ te 
zijn; het verlangen om op een bepaalde manier door anderen herkend en erkend te worden. Door 
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uitdrukking te geven aan datgene wat voor mij het leven de moeite waard maakt presenteer ik een 
bepaald beeld van mijzelf aan de wereld waarvoor ik erkenning vraag. Die ‘presentatie’ moet overi-
gens in ruime zin worden begrepen: niet noodzakelijk als een expliciete bekentenis – ‘X is voor mij 
waardevol’ – maar als die waarden die mijn dagelijkse handelen richting geven en daarin 
onvermijdelijk tot uitdrukking komen; aan de zorg voor mijn huisdieren leest men mijn dierenliefde 
af; aan mijn zorgvuldige omgang met afval mijn milieubewustzijn. In mijn waardenarticulatie an-
ticipeer ik dus niet alleen op de mogelijke reactie van anderen, maar evenzeer op de identiteit die 
mij op grond van die articulatie wordt toegeschreven.  
Voorts evalueer ik mijn eigen oordelen en handelen eveneens binnen het evaluatieve vo-
cabulaire dat uitdrukking geeft aan wat binnen onze sensus communis voor waar, mooi en goed 
doorgaat. Er bestaat dus niet zoiets als een privétaal waarin we over onze meest intieme en intro-
spectieve impressies van de natuur mijmeren, zonder daarin reeds een beroep te doen op de 
evaluatieve smaakoordelen die enkel binnen een sensus communis betekenisvol zijn. Elke uitdruk-
king van waarde doet een beroep op een veronderstelde overeenstemming in handelen en oordelen, 
ofwel een ‘understanding in agreement’. We geven uitdrukking aan datgene wat ons in de natuur 
aanspreekt op een wijze die – naar onze verwachting – op die reacties van betekenisvolle anderen 
kan rekenen, waardoor ik mij erkend voel als de persoon die ik ben of graag wil zijn. Het is dus niet 
(alleen) omdat ik mij identificeer met de schoonheid van de natuur, maar omdat ik mezelf iden-
tificeer als natuurliefhebber, dat ik me aan dat oordeel gebonden voel. Zo lopen we in ons oordelen 
continu vooruit op de verwachte reacties van een ingebeeld publiek wiens erkenning een noodzake-
lijke voorwaarde vormt voor de coherentie van mijn oordelen in de tijd. 
 Kortom, van meet af aan is ‘intrinsieke waarde van de natuur’ ingebed in de praktijken van 
onze taalgemeenschap. Intrinsieke waarde is noch intrinsiek aan het subject – degene die het oor-
deel uitspreekt – noch aan het object van waardering – de natuur zelf – maar aan de evocatieve taal 
die de natuur als waardevol aan ons doet verschijnen en ons in staat stelt om dat oordeel uit te druk-
ken en met anderen te delen. Aldus kan ‘de natuur’ onmogelijk gedefinieerd worden in oppositie tot 
‘cultuur’ – als datgene wat ‘ongerept’ is gebleven. Integendeel, planten, dieren en landschappen zijn 
alleen betekenisvol voor zover deze deel uitmaken van onze leefwereld en zijn opgenomen in onze 
dagelijkse activiteiten. De natuur bestaat niet buiten of los van de menselijke wereld maar con-
stitueert een dimensie van onze werkelijkheid. Zelfs wanneer we van ‘wildernis’ of ‘ongerepte na-
tuur’ spreken, dan steunen we op beelden van ongereptheid en wildheid zoals we die kennen van 
Discovery Channel of The Jungle Book. In zekere zin bestaat de natuur alleen daar waar aan haar 
ongereptheid afbreuk wordt gedaan.  
  Maar indien de natuur enkel betekenis en waarde heeft binnen onze intersubjectief gedeelde 
taalpraktijken, hoe moeten we de onafhankelijke status van ‘de natuur’ dan nog beoordelen? Is de 
natuur slechts een linguïstische constructie, gemodelleerd naar arbitrair menselijk ontwerp? Neen, 
zo maakt Michael Bonnett duidelijk; erkennen dat we de natuur enkel vanuit onze culturele be-
tekenishorizonten kunnen ervaren maakt van de natuur nog geen cultureel artefact dat we naar be-
lieven kunnen vormgeven. Of nog preciezer: erkennen dat we als taalgebruikers de betekenis van 
het natuurbegrip ‘construeren’ maakt van de natuur nog geen constructie die we naar persoonlijk 
welbevinden met betekenissen en waarden kunnen bekleden. Er zijn beperkingen aan het gebruik 
van de term ‘natuur’ die het bereik van de individuele taalgebruiker te boven gaan.  
De vraag is nu waardoor deze beperkingen worden opgelegd. Anders dan Bonnett, die be-
toogt dat het de buitentalige natuur is die grenzen stelt aan het gebruik van het natuurbegrip, beto-
gen Blake, Smeyers, Smith en Standish dat deze beperkingen binnen het discours gelokaliseerd 
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moeten worden. De afgrenzing van het concept natuur vindt plaats doorheen het regelgeleide ge-
bruik van het concept binnen de praktijken van onze taalgemeenschap. Dit wil echter niet zeggen 
dat onze taal niet kan verwijzen naar een natuur die buiten onze taal gelegen is, maar dat elke toe-
gang tot deze buitentalige natuur wordt bemiddeld door (regelgeleide) taal. Juist vanwege het feit 
dat ‘verwijzing’ zelf een talige activiteit is, kan geen enkele verwijzing naar een vermeende buiten-
talige natuur als ultieme norm optreden in onze bepaling van de juistheid van een kennisclaim; dis-
puten over de waarde of betekenis van de natuur kunnen onmogelijk worden beslecht door te ver-
wijzen naar de overeenstemming met de werkelijke natuur, omdat geen enkele taalgebruiker een 
geprivilegieerde toegang tot de buitentalige natuur gegeven is, die zelf niet reeds bemiddeld is door 
taal. 
 Toch menen we zeker te weten dat de natuur niet slechts een menselijk maaksel of hersen-
schim is, maar een weerbarstig bestaan kent buiten onze betekeniskaders. Deze overtuiging sluit aan 
bij de klassieke Griekse betekenis van physis: natuur is datgene wat uit zichzelf voortkomt en zijn 
eigen realisering in zich meedraagt. In dezelfde geest definieert Michael Bonnett de natuur als ‘the 
self-arising’: ‘that sense of a self-originating material/spiritual world of which we are part, inclu-
ding the powers that sustain and govern it’ (Bonnett, 2003). De vraag rest nu wat de curieuze status 
is van deze kennis van het bestaan van een buitentalige natuur. Een antwoord op deze vraag moet 
naar mijn idee gezocht worden in Wittgensteins notie van de ‘form of life’ als de onontwijkbare 
horizon van handelingszekerheden; funderende zekerheden als de ervaring van zwaartekracht en de 
ervaring van kleuren vormen tezamen het substraat van onze bestaanservaring als mens in deze 
wereld. In ons handelen anticiperen we contrafactisch op het bestaan van natuurlijke dingen. Zo 
twijfelen we niet aan het bestaan van deze boom die we op ons pad van A naar B vinden, maar we 
lopen er subiet omheen. Mochten we desalniettemin de aandrang voelen om aan ons gedrag uit-
drukking te geven – ‘ik loop om de boom heen’ – dan moeten we deze uitspraak begrijpen als uit-
drukking van een funderende ervaring van coëxistentie met de boom (of als uitdrukking van een 
geloof in het bestaan van deze boom). Ergo: ons gedrag in deze situatie zou onbetekenend zijn, in-
dien we het bestaan van deze boom zouden ontkennen.  
 We moeten dus afscheid nemen van ons vertrouwen in de taal als ‘spiegel van de natuur’ 
(Rorty). Woorden en dingen staan uiteraard niet los van elkaar, maar onze woorden representeren 
geen dingen die onafhankelijk van die woorden buiten de taal bestaan. Meer zinvol dan deze opvat-
ting van taal als spiegel van de natuur is de opvatting van taal als antwoord op de natuur; onze taal 
als creatieve respons op een ervaring van geraakt worden of ons aangesproken voelen door ‘iets’ 
buiten de taal. Steun voor deze gedachte is te vinden bij Heideggers taalopvatting, zoals door Char-
les Taylor uitgewerkt. Uitgangspunt is de gedachte dat onze taal geen vooraf bestaande, buitentalige 
wereld representeert of weerspiegelt, maar dat er in en doorheen de taal een wereld wordt onthuld, 
een wereld waarin de dingen uit zichzelf als betekenisvol en zinvol aan ons verschijnen. Heidegger 
spreekt hier van ‘Lichtung’. De taal waarin deze betekenissen oplichten is niet de taal die wij als 
communicatiemiddel of instrument gebruiken, maar de expressieve, dichterlijke taal. Wij kunnen 
ons niet naar willekeurig believen van deze taal bedienen, de taal bedient zich in zekere zin van ons. 
Wij moeten ons voegen naar de onthullende beweging van de taal zelf om haar stem te kunnen ho-
ren. Expressieve taal behelst een antwoord op een appèl (Ruf): ‘Die Sterblichen sprechen insofern 
sie hören’. Zo tekenen we de woorden op uit de stilte. De stilte die daar is waar (nog) geen woorden 
zijn, maar waar natuurlijke entiteiten een appèl op ons doen om hen te onthullen als betekenisvolle 
‘dingen’. Uiteraard vindt dit appèl niet plaats in een talig vacuüm, maar temidden van de woorden 
waarmee we reeds vertrouwd zijn: ‘within language and because of its telos, we are pushed to find 
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unprecedented words, which we draw out of silence. These unprecedented words are words of po-
wer; we might call them words of retrieval’ (Taylor, 1995, p. 124). 
 Dat we in onze omgang met de natuur soms onwillekeurig een krachtig esthetisch appèl 
ervaren is door Kant (en later door onder andere Nietzsche) gemarkeerd in zijn uitwerking van de 
‘sublieme natuurervaring’. Waar de categorie van de ‘alledaagse’ schoonheidservaring, de ervaring 
van het mooie, aangename en smaakvolle behelst, biedt de ervaring van het sublieme een opening 
naar het bovenzintuiglijke en boven-rationele: de noodzakelijk eindige ervaring van het oneindige. 
Kant reserveerde dit begrip voor de overweldigende natuurervaring: de ervaring van een machtige 
berg, een verwoestende storm of vulkaanuitbarsting. Deze ervaringen brengen een idee van abso-
luutheid en overmacht met zich mee die ons onze nietigheid doet ervaren, maar die niet zintuiglijk 
of verstandelijk kan worden voorgesteld. Dat veroorzaakt het onlustgevoel. Tegelijkertijd hebben 
we – zij het op negatieve wijze – in de sublieme ervaring deel aan het absolute. Dat maakt dat de 
sublieme ervaring anders dan de schoonheidservaring er een is van de hoogste spanning. Hargrove 
spreekt over de sublieme natuurervaring als een transitional category. Een ervaring van wat zich 
aan de rand of net voorbij de grenzen van onze taal en wereld bevindt; datgene waarvoor we (nog) 
geen woorden hebben. Hier ontstaat een spanning tussen wat reeds betekenis heeft, en (nog) geen 
betekenis kan hebben. 
Resumerend: de intrinsieke waardering van de natuur is van meet af aan een intersubjectieve 
aangelegenheid en kan dus niet herleid worden tot de voorkeuren van een enkel waarderend subject 
of de kwaliteiten van het object, de buitentalige natuur. Dat we desalniettemin de ervaring kennen 
van een appel van buitenaf – de natuur die ons tot iets oproept – doet geen afbreuk aan deze inter-
subjectieve status, aangezien we doorheen onze talige expressie antwoorden aan dit appel. Daarmee 
blijft het menselijke taalspel de kleinste betekenisdragende eenheid van intrinsiek waardevolle na-
tuur. Deze waarde en betekenis onttrekken zich echter steeds aan onze greep, en wel in dubbele zin. 
In de eerste plaats laat de onreduceerbare volheid van de natuur zich nooit volledig vangen in woor-
den, maar blijft ongrijpbaar. In de tweede plaats ontsnappen de waarde en betekenis van deze woor-
den voortdurend aan de intentie van de individuele spreker; de betekenisgeving onttrekt zich aan 
onze controle. In feite is hier sprake van een dubbele transcendentie. Onze taal is slechts in staat om 
de schoonheid en waarde van de natuur tot uitdrukking te brengen door zich vrij te bewegen tussen 
haar sprekers en hun beoogde voorwerp van spreken. We zijn gevangen in de openheid van de taal. 
 
Vanwege onze zorg voor de natuur 
Met de uitdieping van het intrinsieke waardevraagstuk is een belangrijke zingevingsdimensie van 
milieu-educatie blootgelegd, die tegelijkertijd als bron van kritiek op het paradigma van leren voor 
duurzame ontwikkeling kan dienen. Voorgaande meta-ethische bespiegelingen blijven echter tame-
lijk abstract. De voornaamste uitdaging van milieu-educatie bestaat uit het inspireren van kinderen 
tot het nemen van verantwoordelijkheid voor hetgeen zij als intrinsiek waardevol ervaren in hun 
eigen natuurlijke leefomgeving. Dienstbaarheid aan deze praktische ambitie dwingt ons tot een uit-
werking van de voorgaande meta-ethische analyse op handelingsniveau.  
Aan het streven van de positivistische variant van leren voor duurzame ontwikkeling ligt een lega-
listische opvatting van verantwoordelijkheid ten grondslag in termen van rationele autonomie en 
aansprakelijkheid (accountability). Een dergelijke opvatting van verantwoordelijkheid schiet echter 
tekort vanwege haar vooronderstellingen van individuele toerekenbaarheid, voorspelbaarheid en 
beheersbaarheid: veronderstellingen die, met name in de context van milieuvraagstukken, niet meer 
opgaan. Voorts heb ik in paragraaf 3.3 laten zien dat het westers-liberale vormingsideaal van ratio-
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nele autonomie een bepaalde houding tegenover de ons omringende natuur bevordert waarin de 
ontvankelijkheid voor de (h)erkenning van intrinsieke waarde in het gedrang komt.  
Tegenover het aansprakelijkheidsperspectief op ecologische verantwoordelijkheid wil ik 
daarom het zorgperspectief stellen. In onze alledaagse omgang met de natuur leggen we onwille-
keurig een zorg en intrinsieke betrokkenheid voor de ‘dingen’ aan de dag. Bij dit intuïtieve verlan-
gen om zorg te dragen voor onze natuurlijke leefwereld dient een ecologische verantwoordelijk-
heidsethiek aan te sluiten. Zonder deze zorg volledig los te willen koppelen van de gevolgen op 
langere termijn, moeten we vaststellen dat de daaruit voortvloeiende opvatting van verantwoorde-
lijkheid niet gebonden is aan een tijdruimtelijke horizon van door handelingsgevolgen bemiddelde 
relaties. Deze zorgende verantwoordelijkheid wordt gedragen door het vertrouwen in een open en 
onbepaalde toekomst.  
 Om een alternatief verantwoordelijkheidsbegrip in termen van zorg conceptueel af te gren-
zen van het legalistische verantwoordelijkheidsbegrip is het van belang om te wijzen op de twee 
elementen waaruit elk verantwoordelijkheidsbegrip naar mijn idee is samengesteld. Dat wil zeggen, 
om als (zelf)verantwoordelijk persoon te worden erkend moet een persoon aan twee voorwaarden 
voldoen: 1) de voorwaarde van authenticiteit: van een verantwoordelijk persoon wordt vereist dat 
zijn oordelen ‘van hemzelf’ zijn, en niet door de omgeving opgedrongen of afgedwongen. Authen-
ticiteit veronderstelt een persoonlijke identificatie met iets dat voor de persoon intrinsiek waardevol 
is; 2) de voorwaarde van reflectie: een verantwoordelijk persoon moet in staat zijn om zijn primaire 
overtuigingen, relaties en bindingen bij tijd en wijle aan een kritisch zelfonderzoek te onderwerpen, 
en bereid zijn deze op grond hiervan te heroverwegen of te wijzigen. R.S. Peters en Dearden – wier 
opvattingen van autonomie ik in het bestek van dit verhaal even als paradigmatisch beschouw voor 
de liberale verantwoordelijkheidsopvatting – focussen vooral op de reflectieve vermogens, maar 
blijven tamelijk vaag als het gaat om de eis van authenticiteit. Men lijkt te vooronderstellen dat de 
verantwoordelijke persoon datgene wat hij van waarde vindt en waarvoor hij verantwoordelijkheid 
neemt kiest. Stefaan Cuypers laat echter zien dat deze opvatting van authenticiteit in termen van 
kiezen onhoudbaar is, niet alleen vanwege de interne inconsistenties, maar ook omdat het niet 
beantwoordt aan onze primaire intuïties; we ervaren hetgeen we werkelijk waardevol vinden niet 
(uitsluitend) als iets waarvoor we gekozen hebben, maar als iets waarin we ons vinden.  
Tegenover de voorgaande actieve notie van authenticiteit in termen van kiezen plaatst 
Frankfurt daarom een passieve opvatting van zelfidentificatie in termen van zorg: ‘caring about so-
mething’. Een dergelijke identificatie met een ‘object of care’ komt voort uit een nauwe betrokken-
heid bij dat wat ons leven de moeite waard maakt. Het gaat hier om een grotendeels passieve en 
niet-intentionele aangelegenheid: een ervaring van in beslag genomen worden door iets of iemand, 
waaraan je je niet kunt onttrekken. Deze noodzakelijkheid wordt door Frankfurt aangeduid met de 
term ‘volitional necessity’. In zijn zorg voor iets waarom hij geeft ervaart de persoon in kwestie de 
invloed van een curieus soort noodzakelijkheid, een wilsnoodzaak die zich buiten zijn controle om 
aan hem opdringt. Het betreft hier een kracht waaraan de persoon in kwestie geen weerstand kan en 
wil bieden. De persoon ervaart kennelijk iets dat constitutief is voor zijn persoonlijke identiteit. 
Datgene waar hij om geeft maakt deel uit van zijn zelfverstaan. De noodzakelijkheid waarover 
Frankfurt spreekt wordt dan ook niet als externe dwang ervaren, maar als de bevrijdende ontdek-
king van iets ‘eigens’. Bij nader inzien hebben we hier opnieuw het transcendente appèl gelokali-
seerd waarover we in het vorige hoofdstuk spraken, alleen nu belicht vanuit het perspectief van de 
verantwoordelijke persoon. 
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Wanneer we onze zorgende verhouding tot de omringende natuur nader willen onderzoeken 
op motivationele aangrijpingspunten voor een meer gevulde en existentiële verantwoordelijkheid, 
dan ligt het voor de hand om daarbij een beroep te doen op de zorgethiek van Nel Noddings, en wel 
om twee redenen. In de eerste plaats omdat Noddings in haar fenomenologische beschrijving van de 
zorgrelatie het voorwerp van onze zorg, het zorgsubject niet voorstelt als een objectiveerbare en 
beheersbare entiteit, maar als hetgeen ons in beslag neemt en een beroep doet op onze ontvankelijk-
heid voor de zorg waar het ons toe oproept. In de tweede plaats lijken de inzichten van Noddings in 
het kader van een milieuethiek goed bruikbaar vanwege haar afleiding van een ethisch zorgideaal 
uit een ‘natuurlijke zorgrelatie’: aan de ervaring van het zorgen ontlenen we een zelfbeeld, en we 
hechten aan het beeld dat we van onszelf hebben verworven als een zorgend persoon. Dat beeld van 
ons ‘ideale zelf’ normeert en begeleidt ons handelen waar onze morele sentimenten op een grens 
stuiten. In situaties waarin ik geen ‘natuurlijke’ casu quo intuïtieve aandrang voel om voor de ander 
te zorgen, maar de ander wel appelleert aan mijn zorg, doe ik een expliciet beroep op dit zelfbeeld. 
Dan spreek ik mijzelf aan als zorgend persoon.  
Wanneer we verder ingaan op het belang van deze zorgethiek voor een mogelijke milieu-
moraal, dan stuiten we al snel op grote problemen die samenhangen met het feit dat de zorgethiek is 
gemodelleerd naar de intermenselijke zorgrelatie. Immers, de persoonlijke wederkerigheid, die vol-
gens Noddings van existentieel belang is voor het floreren van een zorgrelatie, lijkt afwezig in onze 
verhouding tot de natuurlijke leefwereld. Noddings’ probleem is niet dat wij ons niet verbonden 
voelen met onze natuurlijke leefomgeving. Er kan zelfs een existentiële wederkerigheid in derge-
lijke relaties ontstaan, waarvan een zeker moreel appèl uitgaat, zo benadrukt Noddings. Wanneer 
we bijvoorbeeld eenmaal een wederkerige zorgrelatie met een kat hebben opgebouwd, dan vloeit 
daar veelal een zorgplicht jegens soortgenoten uit voort; indien we eenmaal gevoelig zijn geworden 
voor hun responsiviteit en appèl, zal er een ‘moeten’ ontspringen aan elke confrontatie met een kat 
die een beroep op mijn zorg doet. Niemand is evenwel verplicht om die initiële relatie aan te gaan. 
Het aangaan van zo’n zorgrelatie berust op een keuze of een toevallig ontstane verwantschap in het 
persoonlijke verleden.  
Kortom, we zijn volgens Noddings niet noodzakelijk of ‘van nature’ in relatie met dieren, 
zoals we wel van meet af aan in relatie zijn met mensen. Waar Noddings stelt dat ‘wij slechts zijn 
voor zover we in relatie zijn’ en dat onze moraal zijn oorsprong vindt in deze primordiale verhou-
ding, daar spreekt zij over een menselijke intersubjectiviteit. Andere mensen wijzen ons op het be-
staan dat we zouden willen leiden, zij spiegelen onze wensen, idealen en drijfveren. Onze reactieve 
attitudes jegens dieren lijken van een volstrekt andere orde. Om die reden kunnen we niet kiezen of 
we al dan niet relaties met mensen willen aangaan – want we zijn in relatie – maar kunnen we wel 
kiezen of we al dan niet een vertrouwdheid met dieren willen opbouwen. Er kan dus geen sprake 
zijn van een ‘categorische zorgplicht’ vanwege de vrijblijvende status van die wederkerigheid in de 
relatie tot onze natuurlijke leefomgeving. Waar Noddings de intermenselijke zorgrelatie als univer-
seel-antropologisch gegeven beschouwt, als noodzakelijk met het mens-zijn verbonden, blijft de 
zorgrelatie tussen mens en natuur volgens Noddings contingent, want afhankelijk van mijn toeval-
lige ervaringen en wil. 
 Noddings’ antropologische vooronderstelling van een volstrekt contingente en daardoor 
niet-verplichtende verhouding tot de ons omringende natuur is naar mijn idee aanvechtbaar. Aan de 
hand van de inzichten van Merleau-Ponty heb ik laten zien dat onze lichamelijke verbondenheid 
met de omringende leefwereld even onvervreemdbaar met het mens-zijn verbonden is als onze in-
tersubjectieve verbondenheid met andere mensen. We hebben als lichaam-subject deel aan deze 
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wereld. Met deze wereld delen we een vleselijke bestaanswijze. Merleau-Ponty munt het begrip 
‘intercorpeïteit’ om een primordiale verbondenheid tussen mij en mijn natuurlijke leefwereld aan te 
duiden, die aan het individuele bewustzijn voorafgaat, en niet door een ‘ik’ ongedaan kan worden 
gemaakt. Het ‘ik’ bestaat slechts voor zover het bij en op de dingen in de wereld betrokken is. Zoals 
we ons ‘zelf’ niet kunnen afsnijden van de sociale omgeving die ons ‘zelf’ spiegelt en draagt, zo 
kunnen we ons ‘zelf’ evenmin afsnijden van de natuurlijke wereld waaraan het deel heeft en waarop 
het gericht is. Met de erkenning van onze noodzakelijke leefwereldgebondenheid lijkt een belang-
rijk obstakel voor een ecologische zorgethiek uit de weg geruimd.  
 In de tweede plaats werpen de inzichten van Merleau-Ponty nieuw licht op de wederkerig-
heid in onze verhouding tot de waarneembare wereld. Noddings – zo bleek in het voorgaande – ziet 
een bepaalde vorm van wederkerigheid als constitutief voor de zorgrelatie. Degene-die-zorgt wordt 
in beslag genomen door het zorgsubject en haar wensen en verlangens vloeien in de richting van de 
ander. Het zorgsubject ontvangt en beantwoordt deze zorg door blijk te geven van herkenning en 
instemming. Wanneer het nu gaat om onze verhouding tot dieren, planten, dingen en ideeën, dan 
constateert Noddings een afnemende wederkerigheid, of meer specifiek: een afnemende mogelijk-
heid tot respons van de kant van het zorgsubject. Dieren, planten en dingen zijn volgens Noddings 
niet in staat om onze zorg op adequate wijze te beantwoorden. Als gevolg van deze afnemende res-
ponsiviteit zal degene-die-zorgt zich niet of minder als degene-die-zorgt erkend voelen en verplicht 
voelen om naar dat beeld te handelen. In grote lijnen deel ik Noddings opvatting dat de wederkerig-
heid in onze omgang met de natuurlijke leefomgeving van een andere aard is dan de wederkerigheid 
in intermenselijke verhoudingen. En voor een deel hebben die verschillen in wederkerigheid inder-
daad consequenties voor de mogelijkheid van een zorgethiek. Dieren en dingen streven geen idealen 
na waarmee ik rekening dien te houden. Dieren en dingen kennen geen intellectuele of spirituele 
groei die door mij gekoesterd of bevorderd moeten worden. Onze omgang met de natuur bezit 
kortom niet hetzelfde dynamische potentieel dat wel in mijn relaties met mensen besloten ligt.  
Maar dit gebrek aan intermenselijke wederkerigheid laat onverlet dat er tussen mij en mijn 
leefwereld andere vormen van wederkerigheid bestaan die evenzeer aangrijpingspunten bieden voor 
een zorgethiek. Deze aangrijpingspunten worden naar mijn idee zichtbaar in Merleau-Ponty’s uit-
werking van het ‘chiasme’ tussen mens en wereld, de reversibiliteit van waarnemen en waargeno-
men worden. Onze intentionele gerichtheid op de wereld vindt zijn weerslag in een ontvankelijk-
heid voor het spiegelende appèl dat daarvan uitgaat; de dingen in de wereld die ik waarneem tonen 
mij hun zin en onthullen daarmee wie ik ben. Zo verander ik en veranderen de dingen wanneer de 
waarneming ons in een blikveld verenigt. In deze zin is er sprake van een authentieke, spiegelende 
wederkerigheid, als in intermenselijke verhoudingen. Anders dan Noddings meent, moeten we onze 
omgang met de natuurlijke wereld als een van bronnen van ons zelf beschouwen, waarmee wij 
noodzakelijk in dialoog zijn. De vraag wie wij zijn, beantwoorden we deels in termen van waar we 
zijn. Willen we nu verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor ons ‘zelf’, dan zullen we verantwoordelijkheid 
moeten nemen voor de bronnen die dat ‘zelf’ voeden. Met andere woorden: zorg dragen voor mijn 
‘zelf’ impliceert de zorg voor mijn leefwereld.  
 Al het voorgaande in ogenschouw nemende, wil ik in deze paragraaf komen tot een min of 
meer afgeronde, alternatieve invulling van ecologische verantwoordelijkheid in termen van zorg. In 
onze alledaagse, zintuiglijke en lijfelijke omgang met de natuur leggen we onwillekeurig een zekere 
zorg voor de dingen aan de dag. Deze voorreflexieve zorg belichaamt een onontwijkbare respons op 
de natuur zoals die zich in alledaagse praktijken aan ons voordoet; tijdens het koken, tuinieren, 
sporten, klussen. Binnen deze praktijken is de natuur voor ons als lichamelijke wezens reeds zinvol 
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voordat ons oordelen daar vat op krijgt. Ons lichaam reageert niet slechts op wat zich voordoet, 
maar reikt uit naar de dingen. Het neemt die vorm en gerichtheid aan die de dingen als zinvol doen 
verschijnen. Daarna voegt het denken zich bij ons doen en niet andersom. Aldus geven we in ons 
gedrag – hetzij in de voorbewuste rituelen van ons lichaam, hetzij in onze taal – uitdrukking aan 
hetgeen we waardevol vinden. In hoofdstuk drie hebben we gezien dat we onze waardenarticulatie 
onmogelijk kunnen afschermen van een intersubjectieve beoordeling. Zodra we uitdrukking geven 
aan een persoonlijke natuurimpressie of zinervaring stellen we onszelf bloot aan de mogelijke reac-
ties van anderen. In onze expressie van wat wij waardevol vinden presenteren wij tevens een beeld 
van onszelf en worden door anderen als zodanig als persoon (h)erkend en op onze oordelen 
aangesproken. Hier wordt duidelijk dat ook het verantwoordelijkheidsappèl zijn aangrijpingspunt 
vindt in de articulatie van onze zorg. Het is niet primair doordat we onszelf aanspreken op wie we 
zijn, waar we om geven en wat we doen, maar doordat we elkaar daarop aanspreken, dat onze 
waardenarticulaties niet zonder gevolgen kunnen blijven. Derhalve moet ons zorggedrag in de ogen 
van anderen een zekere coherentie vertonen. Als gevolg van de zorg die we hier en nu in woord en 
gedrag tegenover een publiek tot uitdrukking brengen, binden we ons aan een bepaald gedrag in de 
toekomst.  
Een ecologisch verantwoordelijkheidsappèl doet zich voor in alle praktijken waarbinnen we 
op enigerlei wijze in wisselwerking treden met onze natuurlijke omgeving. Binnen alle prakijken 
zullen we dan ook moeten reageren op het appèl dat van onze omgang met die natuur uitgaat, en 
wel op een wijze die overeenstemt met onze investering in de continuïteit van deze praktijken. Dat 
een dergelijk appèl onontwijkbaar is, is gegeven met onze lichamelijke bestaanswijze, waardoor we 
onvervreemdbaar vergroeid zijn met onze natuurlijke leefomgeving. In contrast met de legalistische 
invulling van verantwoordelijkheid kenmerkt deze zorgende verantwoordelijkheid zich door een 
blijvende onzekerheid en openheid; in ons doen en laten moeten we voortdurend blijven antwoor-
den aan het appèl dat van onze lichamelijke omgang met de natuur uitgaat. Daarbij hoort een be-
wustzijn van negatie; we zijn ervan doordrongen dat elke mogelijke identificatie een bepaalde om-
gang met de natuur mogelijk maakt, maar daarmee tegelijkertijd een andere omgang onmogelijk. 
Het voorwerp van onze verantwoordelijkheid onttrekt zich altijd aan onze greep. Het is deze onuit-
puttelijkheid die elke mogelijke stellingname en verantwoordelijkheid in twijfel trekt en onzeker 
maakt. Anders dan de legalistische verantwoordelijkheid, die ingegeven lijkt door het verlangen 
naar zekerheid, beheersing en categorisering, wordt deze zorgende verantwoordelijkheid gemoti-
veerd door een verlangen om recht te doen aan de natuur die zich als waardevol aan ons opdringt en 
ons weer ontsnapt. 
  
Vanwege toekomstige burgers en hun zorg voor de natuur 
Bij wijze van afsluiting spits ik in hoofdstuk vier de conclusies van mijn onderzoek naar ecologi-
sche verantwoordelijkheid toe op vier dimensies, die naar mijn idee van wezenlijk belang zijn voor 
de beoordeling van milieu-educatie. 
In de eerste plaats vraag ik erkenning voor het feit dat kinderen de natuur op een specifieke 
kinderlijke wijze benaderen, die soms op gespannen voet staat met de dominante wetenschappelijke 
benadering. Natuur is voor kinderen in de eerste plaats doe- en speelnatuur. Van belang voor mijn 
betoog is dat men in deze spelende omgang met de natuur de kenmerken van een esthetische na-
tuurervaring kan ontwaren (waaronder de intrinsieke motivatie, het spelplezier, het vrije spel van de 
verbeeldingskracht (het alsof-karakter van spel), de afwezigheid van dwang en nut, de lichamelijke 
onmiddellijkheid, de belangeloosheid van het spel, de tijd- en plaatsgebondenheid, de betovering 
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die van spel uitgaat, de harmonie die hierdoor wordt gesticht en de totale inbeslagname van de spe-
ler door het spel). Van bijzonder belang in het kader van milieu-educatie is de personalistisch-ani-
mistische wijze waarop jonge kinderen de natuur in hun spel betrekken. Aan dieren, planten en 
dingen worden menselijke drijfveren en emoties toegekend alsof het bezielde wezens zijn. Dit bete-
kent niet dat kinderen ook per se animistisch denken, maar dat zij het esthetische appèl dat van de 
levende en niet-levende natuur uitgaat, op animistische wijze ervaren en uitdrukken. Om ruimte te 
geven aan deze speelse sensibilisering pleit ik voor een herwaardering van natuureducatie; een 
praktijk die in het kader van leren voor duurzame ontwikkeling nauwelijks gewicht krijgt. 
In de tweede plaats neem ik afscheid van de moraal van zelfbeperking die nog lang de 
boventoon heeft gevoerd in veel vormen van milieu-educatie: alles wat fijn, leuk en lekker is, is 
slecht voor het milieu en moet daarom afgeleerd worden, zo luidt – doorgaans onbedoeld – de 
onderliggende teneur. Tegenover deze ‘calvinistische’ milieumoraal plaats ik een moraal van esthe-
tische zelf-expressie. Het innerlijk ervaren conflict tussen verlangen en plicht wordt overstegen – of 
lost letterlijk op – in het onze existentiële poging om op een persoonlijke wijze vorm te geven aan 
ons leven en onze omgang met de natuurlijke leefwereld. Door onze consumptieve behoeften te-
genover een beginsel van intergenerationele verantwoordelijkheid te plaatsen verleent het ideaal 
van duurzame ontwikkeling teveel gewicht aan onze consumptieve behoeften. Hiermee wil ik niet 
zeggen dat we deze behoeften beter kunnen negeren of onderdrukken, maar suggereren dat we deze 
behoeften zouden kunnen herwaarderen als deel uitmakend van meer existentiële verlangens; het 
verlangen, bijvoorbeeld, om de verandering van dag en nacht, de opeenvolgende seizoenen en getij-
den intenser te ervaren, het verlangen naar een dunnere huid, of het verlangen naar een bescheide-
ner rol in onze dagelijkse omgang met de natuur. Onder een aldus wijzigend zingevingsperspectief 
verandert de aard van onze consumptieve behoeften mee: de behoefte om tijd te besparen zou kun-
nen transformeren in het verlangen om rust te vinden in onze dagelijkse activiteiten. Eerder dan 
leerlingen te instrueren in de evaluatieve meta-taal van duurzame ontwikkeling, en hen te stimule-
ren om oordelen en handelen met haar beginselen in overeenstemming te brengen, komt het er naar 
mijn idee op aan om een leeromgeving te markeren waarbinnen leerlingen en leerkrachten uitdruk-
king geven aan een persoonlijke stijl van omgaan met de natuurlijke leefomgeving.  
 Vanuit de erkenning dat de lokale leefwereld onze primordiale bron van kennis vormt pleit 
ik in de derde plaats voor het vooropstellen van leefwereld-kennis in het curriculum. Hiermee wil ik 
niet zeggen dat leraren zich in de duiding van milieuproblemen kunnen beperken tot de grenzen van 
de kinderlijke leefwereld en daarmee de globale omvang en aard van de milieucrisis geweld moeten 
aandoen. Integendeel, het is van groot belang om – mede vanuit natuurwetenschappelijk, econo-
misch en wereldpolitiek perspectief – te reflecteren op de globale dimensies van milieuproblemen. 
Met het vooropstellen van de leefwereld wil ik de verbinding tussen lokale en globale vormen van 
kennis bekritiseren zoals die binnen het dominante duurzaamheidsparadigma wordt gelegd. Door 
lokale vraagstukken van meet af aan te duiden in globale termen van duurzame ontwikkeling verlie-
zen leerlingen contact met het particuliere verantwoordelijkheidsappèl zoals dat zich in de ver-
trouwde omgang met de natuurlijke leefwereld aandient. Natuurwetenschappelijke (globale) kennis 
bestaat immers slechts in functie van de spiegeling aan het algemene. Hierdoor verdwijnt het parti-
culiere noodzakelijk uit zicht. In de benadering van globale vraagstukken en natuurwetenschappe-
lijke begrippen is het naar mijn idee van belang om de vertrouwdheid van leerlingen met de pro-
blemen ‘hier en nu’ uit te breiden naar problemen en verbanden ‘elders en later’. Het is niet de weg 
van inductie en deductie maar die van de verbeelding die kinderen in staat stelt om hun leefwereld 
uit te breiden naar alle praktijken waarin de gevolgen van ons handelen hun beslag vinden. Door 
vanwege ons mens-zijn 
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deze alternative wijze van ‘verbinden’ wordt het wellicht mogelijk om globale milieuproblemen 
anders dan in zuiver economische en positivistische termen te begrijpen; als problemen die onze 
gemeenschappelijke wereld bedreigen. 
 Het laatste hoofdstuk sluit ik af met een voorstel voor een alternatieve invulling van milieu-
educatie, getiteld Leren voor Ecologische Verantwoordelijkheid. Dit voorstel is een mogelijke uit-
werking van mijn conclusies en aanbevelingen, maar zeker niet de enig denkbare invulling daarvan. 
Als wijsgerig pedagoog wil ik zichtbaar maken waartoe de abstracte conclusies van mijn onderzoek 
in concreto kunnen leiden, maar uiteraard past daarbij de bescheidenheid van de filosoof die een 
practicus niet kan en mag willen voorschrijven wat te doen. Mijn onderzoek moet daarom gelezen 
worden als een uitnodiging om op een andere wijze te kijken naar de inmiddels vertrouwde praktij-
ken van milieu-educatie, in de hoop dat lezers nieuwe mogelijkheden zien om kinderen te inspireren 
tot zorg voor hun natuurlijke leefomgeving.  
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